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INTRODUCTION.
This th e s is  was based on an investiga tion  conducted in to  union- 
Management re la tio n s  a t Ardeer, the p rin c ip a l works of the Nobel D ivision of 
Im perial Chemical In d u strie s  Ltd. The investigation  was conducted by the 
Author when he was I .C .I .  Research Fellow in  In d u s tr ia l Relations a t the 
U niversity  of Glasgow during the years 1954 to  1956* Ühe terms o f réference 
fo r  conducting the in v estig a tio n  were se t by Dr. T. T. Paterson, Sohior 
Lecturer in  In d u s tr ia l Relations a t  the U niversity o f  Glasgow. AÎ the séme 
time as th is  in v estig a tio n  was being conducted a study was made in to  jo in t 
consu ltation  a t the facto ry  by another I .C .I .  Research Fellow in  in d u s tr ia l 
R elations, Mr. Heniy MoKinlay.
• I t  was decided to  r e s t r ic t  th is  p a r tic u la r  study to  the formal i l la t io n s  
between union and management; in  p a r tic u la r  to examine the causes and tjnp®» 
of disputes which arose betiroen the p a r tie s , the method o f s e t t l in g  them, and 
the consequences of the nego tia tio n s . A lthou^  Ardeer held  many union- 
management conferences to  resolve d ispu tes, re ia tio n s  between the p a r tie s  
appeared to  be good, in  the sense th a t they Imd reached an advanced and ; 
soph isticated  stag e . As th is  fac to ry  had a long h is to ry  of uniorwaanagement 
re la tio n s  i t  was reasonable to  assume th a t ce rta in  conditions were present 
which made c o llec tiv e  bargaining a success. Perhaps these conditions were of 
su ff ic ie n t g en era lity  to  é rp la in  the causes of e ffec tiv e  co llec tiv e  bargaining 
ahd the rfunotiohihg of the trade  union. The p rih c ip a l trade union in  th is  
case study was the Transport and General Workers * Union lAiich had réoeived 
considerable a tte n tio n  in  the post-w ar period due to  u n o ff ic ia l stoppages 
amongst i t s  members.
New infpamiatxon was co llec ted  about the formal re la tio n s  o f union and 
management in  a fac to ry ; and some asse rtio n s  about p a r tic u la r  aspects followed 
lo g ica lly  from consideration of the d a ta . There was na tu ra l lim ita tio n s  of 
subject m atter in  a case study. Although the a sse rtio n s  were made in  re la ­
tio n  to  thé persiatenoe o f the in te r - c ra f t  demarcation d ispu te , the necessary 
conditions fo r  e ffe c tiv e ly  in s ta l l in g  and m aintaining job evaluation and 
incentive schemes, they d id  not form su ff ic ie n t m ateria l fo r  the development 
of a general hypothesis. Yet there were common phenomena o f these seemingly 
unrela ted  sub jects, p rin c ip a lly  negotiations to  resolve union-management 
d isp u tes. C ertain conditions were found to  e x is t when nego tiations were 
e ffe c tiv e , and i t  was about th is  subject th a t the cen tra l hypothesis yas formed. 
From th a t hypothesis a number of o ther p rin c ip les  were deduced.
Sec. I .  Location o f the, case study.
Ardeer was the p rin c ip a l works of the Nobel D ivision o f ImperiallOhemi- 
cal In d u strie s  L td. The Nobel D ivision was a d ire c t descendant o f Nobel Indus­
t r i e s  L td ;, which combined w ith  the B r it ish  lyes tu f f s  Corporation Ltd*, and 
Brunner, Mond & Co. L td ., to  form 1.0*1. in  1926. V '  The two dominant
( l )  VThis i s  Our Concern’, I .C .I* , (1955)*
p erso n a litie s  in  tW  mergër were S ir  of Nobel Indu stries  Ltd#,
and S ir  Alfred Mond ( la t e r  Lord # e lo h e tt)  o f Brunner, Mond & Co. Ltd# The 
objective of the formation o f I.C .I*  was to  take advantage o f la rge-scale  
production and marketing o f chemical products. I .C .I .  grew ra p ii ly , and by 
the posi^war period i t  was B rita in ’s la rg e s t manufacturing compsajy. by 1954 
i t s  productive a c t iv i t ie s  were conducted in  a hundred fa c to r ie s  and on i t s  
payro ll were one hundred thousand employees. The number o f stocM iolders was 
estim ated to  be a t  ; le a s t  phe q«fi^®3? o f a m illion .
The Gompaqy was divided in to  a number of mcoiufacturing d iv isio n s. At 
the time of the Ardeèr study, th e re  were twelve manufacturing divisions* A lkali, 
B illin ^ am , ly eS tu ffs , General Chemicals, L eatharclo th , Lime, Metals^ Paints^ 
P la s tic s , S a lt, PhartsceutiCal and Nobel; Bach o f thèse d iv isions were under 
the control o f a. board of d irec to rs  which had considerable autonomy from the 
main board o f I;G .I*  In  addition* there were several councils, s i i^ la r  to; a 
d iv isional board, which contro lled  the manufacture of ag ric u ltu ra l chemicals 
and te iy leh e i and the operations Of the enormous works a t  Wilton. I .C .I .  alSo 
owned o r con tro lled  a large number o f  overseas companies, which manufactured o r  
marketed i  t s ;product s .
The work of the Oompaoy was co-ordinated by a main board and a head 
o ffice  located  in  London. In  1955 the board consisted o f twenty d i r e c to r s , : 
Sixteen of whom were fu ll-tim e  executive d irectors:. Apart ; from the Chairman 
and the three Deputy Chairmen, the executive d irec to rs  were divided in to  two : 
groups. Six diam eters were responsible fo r  the manufacturing d iv is io n s . Seven 
d irec to rs  were responsible fo r specia l fm otions * commercial development, finance, 
overseas, research^ techn ica l, and personnel. In add ition , a  secre tary , 
s o l ic i to r  and tre a su re r  reported d ire c tly  to  the board.
The headquarters of the Nobel Division were Ipoated a t .Glasgow,Scotland, 
In  1955 i t  employed about th irteen ; thousand personnel o f Whom one h a lf  were 
employed a t Ardeer. ArdOer was s itu a ted  about th i r ty  M ie s  south o f G1 w ^ w  
near the town o f Ètevènstohi^ A rshire, and on the shores of thb  F ir th  o f Olÿde.
The s i t e  of the facto ry  was Chosen in  I 87I beoause of i t s  remoteness f r b n .  
v illa g e  and town, fo r  i t s  nearness to  the sea, and beoause of the sând h i l l s  ; 
which could be adapted fo r  the manufacture of èaiplosivès. The. fac to ry  was 
operated fo r  most o f  the-period  p r io r  to  the formation o f Nobel In d u stries  Ltd^ 
by Nobel Is  Explosives Company* ^
Ardeer commenced operations in  I 873; At th a t tin e  the s ta f f  and 
operatives numbered one hundred* by 194^ the number o f personnel employed a t  
Ardeer had grovm to 6,800. The area of the facto ry  was one hundred acres; by 
1948 i t  was 1,790 acres. The length o f b o ^ e  lin e s  which was used fo r tran s­
porting  m ateria ls and explosives was two miles i n  1873; but by194S i t  had 
increased to  seventy-fiye m iles. B lasting  ea^losivesÿ the best known Of which
(2) ’The h is to ry  of Nobel's Explosives Company L td ., and 
Nobel Industries  Ltd. ,  187I - 1926’, ( 1 .0*1 ., ) 19 i8 |i
- i i i -
wore g e lig n ite  and dynamitej were s t i l l  the main product o f the factory  in  
1948. Other products in  I948 were detonators, sporting  powders, safe ty -fuse , 
. hlaokpowder, ce llu lo se  d eriva tives, e ther, sulphuric and n i t r i c  acids, 
ammonium, potassium, barium n itra te s ,  and ingredients fo r  pestic id es  and 
insecticides*
The manufacturing operations used unskilled  male and female labour*
In addition a su b stan tia l number, o f sk ille d  engineering and build ing  workers ; - 
were employed on maintenance and construction woik; A p rin tin g  shop Wjis also  
located in  the factory* Most o f the workers came from the neighbouMng 
towns of Stevenston^ S altcoats  and Axdrossan* Ardeer was the main employment 
centre fo r  th is  p a r t o f Aryshire and there was a close community o f in te re s ts  
between Ardeer and the lo ca l residents*
Sec* 2* The method o f investig a tio n  and the source o f the  data
The problem fo r  investiga tion  was defined as the behaviour o f manage­
ment and union and i t s  members in  re la tio n  to  negotiatiohs* in  p a r tic u la r  
the following questions were posedi what was the eS seh tial nature of negotia^ 
tio n s , why did negotiations breakdown, and why did union members sometimes 
refuse to  abide by agreements made on th e ir  behalf? These questions proved 
to  be closely  related#
Having defined the problem i t  was then necessary to  determine the 
method of investigation* This was made ra th e r d i f f ic u l t  fo r  two personal 
reasons* The Author was an economist by profession and th e o re tic a l concepts 
and techniques of research in  the f ie ld  o f  economics wore re la tiv e ly  useless 
in  th is  study; indeed, many o f th®.economist’s concepts were a  hindrance 
ra th e r  than a help in  the in v estiga tion . The Author also  had l i t t l e
knowledge o f voluntary co llec tiv e  bargaining a t  the time he commenced the 
research fo r he was tra in ed  in  the A ustralian system o f in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s  
which was e s se n tia lly  a le g a lis t io  one, ^^^ and union-management behaviour was 
to  a g rea t extent s e tt le d  by compulsory arb itra tion*
The pbyiOus way o f  proceeding was to examine the B ritish  l i te r a tu fe  
which d ea lt With in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s . At the time o f the Commencement. of 
the research only one book, Olejorg’s Labour Belations in: London Transport. '  ^  
sp e c if ic a lly  covered a case study in  something lik e  the same te m s  as was 
conceived f o r  the Ardeer p ro je c t. The p rincipal defect o f th a t book seemed
(3) ‘Ardeer JActoay * A Short Guidé’, (][;G;I.,) i^1948^,
(4): The Author e n tire ly  agrees with Zweig’s  remarks about th e  ro le  
o f 1 he economist in  in d u s tr ia l a #  soc ia l résearohjg sea gyeig. 
P roductiv ity  and Trade Ûnioïw (Blackwell).1951t especia lly  p p*5 à 16*
(F) P rio r  to  the Author’s  epppintment to  th e  U niversity  of Glasgow 
he was Président of thé Gahberra TrMes and Labour Council fo r 
two years and p r io r  to th a t A ssistan t to  the General Secretaiy 
of the Amalgamated Postal Workers’ Union# : :
(5) (Blackwell), 195O*
y:;'.
to  l i e  in  i t s  lack  o f inform ation on spooific aspects o f union^anagement 
re la tio n s . For th is  reason the investiga tion  a t Ardeer concentrated not; so 
much on the environment in  which union and management conducted i t s  negotiem 
tie n s  hut on the types o f disputes th a t arose between the parties#
The main union involved a t A ^  was the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union. This union was also involved in  Labour Relations in  London 
Transport, The Dock Worker  ^ and Goldstein * s notorious stud^ wM 
oomparisohs possib le . A very thorough study was made of the iooal branch of 
the T. & G.W.U* a t Ardeer* Minutes of the branch went back to  1928 and the 
subjects discussed over the following quarter of a century were c lassified*
I t  soon became appafant th a t  the lo c a l T; &ÀG.W.U* was IM erested  in  improving 
the conditions o f employment fo r  general workers a t  Ardeef• T t  had only a 
su p erfic ia l in te re s t  in  p o litic s*  I t s  g rea tes t worry was to  oiganise the 
general workers a t  Ardeer and to  b ring  those who flaun ted  i t s  au thority  -  
female pieceworkers, a Communist, apd an in e ff ic ie n t f u l l—time o f f ic ia l  — 
under control* This i t  d id  in  the post-war period, w ith favourable consequences 
fo r union-management re la tio n s  a t Ardeer*
Although a broad theory o f trade, union behaviour was to  be discerned 
in  the Webbs, ^  ' bole and la sk i i t  was not a r tic u la te  enough fo r  
using as: a  p r io r i  assumptions fo r  union behaviour a t facto ry  level* Moreover, 
there was some doubt as to  whether general worker unions behaved d iffe re n tly  
to :th e  c ra f t  unions* Despite a number of h is to r ie s  re la tin g  to  c ra f t  
unions ' / n o  theory of th e ir  behaviouf was apparent; :An immediate 
methodological pTOblem arose I how fa r. Should the h is to iy  o f lo ca l organisa­
tio n s  be traced? A dozen d iffe re n t c ra f t  unions had members working in  
Ardeer. Only the la rg e s t of these, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
appeared to be important in  union-management re la tio n s  a t , Ardeer* An examina- 
tionwas made o f the minutes of the d i s t r i c t  committee but i t  was found th a t 
Ardeer a f fa i r s  played; à small p a rt ; i r  the de liberations of thé A.E.U* The 
p rinc ipa l source of controversy was the em ploient ofhon^'Unionists and 
unfinancial un ion ists  in  Ardeer. Qorrespondehoe o f thé D ivisional Organiser : 
o f the Â.E.U* with the Ardeer management and the A.E.Ü. headquarters in  London f 
over the years 1932 to  1947 d ea lt with th is  controversy* The sto ry  th a t 
unfolded provided another example of a union attem pting to  exercise au thority  
over employees in  indust ay. îTo de ta iled  analysis was made of the in te rn a l 
a f fa i r s  of the A.E.U. or the o ther c ra f t  unions as the m ateria l, i f  availab le , 
was lik e ly  to  be irre lev an t to the develoianent o f union-management le la tio n s  
a t Ardeer* No general conclusions could be advanced about the comparative 
behaviour of c ra f t  or general worker unions*
(6) (Liverpool U niversity P ress), 1954#
(7) 'The Government of B ritish  Trade Unions* A study in  apathy and
the democratic process o f  the T* & G.W.U.' (Allen & Unwin),1952.
(8) ' In d u s tr ia l Democracy' ,  (Longmans, Green); 1926.
(9 ) 'An Introduction to  Trade Unionism* (Allen d Unwin); 1953*
( 10) 'Trade Unions in  the New. Society' (Allen & Unwin); 1950#
( 11) fo r example, Jeffreys* 'S tory o f the Engineers' (1945);
G illespie* *A Hundred Years o f Progress o f the S co ttish  Typographical
-S ec ieV ’ (1953)#
There was some d i f f e r  in  the subjecte over which general worker 
and o ra ft unions found themselves in  dispute with thé factory  mana^ment.
Craft Unions were in te re s ted  in  demarcation, d ilu tio n , m^hiing, and the in tro ­
duction^ of incentive soheraes, General worker unions were involved in  disputes 
over the promotion and demotion o f personnel, the employment o f females, the 
, in troduction and maintenance of job evaluation, incen tive schemes and piecework* 
This p a tte rn  was to  some extent determined by terms o f reference estab lished  
outside the control o f  the: local union and factory  maniement. Wages fo r  
craftsmen were negotiated a t hatio iial le v e l, while d if fe fe h tia l  job ra te s  fo r 
^ n e r a l  workers were mainly determined à t factory  level* General workers were , 
involved in  many m o^ disputes than were c ra f t workers* 7 The peculiar, h is to ry  , 
of the pieceworkers arid the général m ilitah t a ttitu d e  of the général workers 
employed in  the b la s tin g  department made an exhaustive ^study of thé T* &, G.W.U*
' 7 imperative;'! - 7 \ . \7'
A ccmparative analysis o f o ra ft and ^ general worker union behaviour was
important fo r  one subject* the reac tion  of wor^ towards the in troduction of
; incentive schemes in  the post-war period . Some examination was, made of union 
)■( co n stitu tio n s, th e ir  reu ies re la tin g  to  working oh piecework ahd incentives,
7 the h is to ry  of thé unions' a ttitu d e s  to  incentives and policy  decisions reached
by th e ir  governing bodies. Information was also co llec ted  from national,
regional and lo ca l o f f ic ia ls  about th e i r  members' a t titu d e s  to  incohtivee* I t
soon becapie apparent th a t  i t  was informal r à th e r 'than formal group behaviour 
in  the uuions which determined, the course o f uhion^anagement negotiations a t  ; 
the p lan t level* This was true o f both c ra f t and general worker groups* ;
Some of these groups changed th e ir  minds and agreed to  accept incentives* To
find the reasons fo r  th is  behaviour a close examination was made o f the t r a n ^  ; 
o rip t o f  e number of conferenoes on work study between o f f ic ia ls  of the unions 
and I.C .I*  Unexpectedly, the answer did not l i e  in  these proceedings; but 
the l a t t e r  explained why negotiations were sometimes in e ffe c tiv e  and th is  was 
an important step  in  the research* The research also  helped to  explain why 
inform al group behaviour rejo ined  uncorrectéd by union-management negotiations^
Many aspects o f union-management re la tio n s  a t  Ardeer v^re determined 7 
by national n eg o tia tio n s .. For example, the nego tiating  procedure was formulap- 
ted  a t  national le v e l. P rio r to  1947* fo r over a decade, there was no formal
negotiating  procedure a t  Ardeer. This l e f t  a vacuum in  the p a r t ie s ' s e t of
references f o r  s e t t l in g  employee grievances. Several abortive attem pts were 
made in  th é  la te  th i r t i e s  a t n a tional level to  reach mi agféément on a 
negotiating  procedure. Agfeemént over the negotiating  procedure nearly 
foundered ovér the Company's demand th a t Unions recognise i t s  jo in t consultation 
machiheiy in  re tu rn  fo r  i t s  recognition of shop stewards* A study was mMe o f 
the tra n sc r ip t of conferences held in  1935* 1938 and 1946-7* The minutes o f ; 
meetings "of 'Thé Mguatory Unions', as the unions w ith agreements with I.C .I*  
became known, were also examined. These mihutes révédsd th a t  national negotia­
tio n s  were in c lin ed  to  breakdown due to  ineffeo tive  ooMraunloation as w ell as to  
a clash of the p a r t ie s ' in te res ts*
' . -  . . .  - ........ ' —VlM
; Although most : of the research a t Aideer aimed a t examining union- 
management re la tio n s  in  the post, ra th e r  than the pre-war period, i t  was 
reasonable to  ^suMé th a t the nature of re la tio n s  weio p a r tly  a product of 
h is to r ic a l d ev e io ^ e n t; Apart from; the development o f the localU nions and 
extension of th e ir  membership in  the faCtoxy, there were some o ther fac to rs  
o f importance* The p rin c ip les  o f the hourly Wages s tru c tu re  was determined 
in  1936#7# Itoiform working conditions were introduced fo r most of I.C .I*  
fac to rie s  in  1938* The wage and condition s tru c tu re  estab lished  fo r  I .C .I .  
fa c to r ie s  in  the th i r t i e s  a t the same time created a  new ih s ti tu tio n a l frame­
work fo r  cohduoting union-management nego tia tions. These agreements were 
signed by I.C .I*  and were not linked to  other in d u s tr ie s . These agreements 
introduced s ta b ilis e d  in s ti tu tio n a l re la tio n s  fo r conducting unionHaanagement 
re la tio n s  a t Ardeer oyer the following two decades*
Some conjecture arose as to  whether the in s t i tu t io n a l  arrangements, as 
outlined above, adversely affected  the behaviour o f the management, unions or 
employee groups a t  facto ry  le v e l.  The in s ti tu tio n a l re la tio n s  between the 
Ardeer management and the unions were traced back to  the time th a t  tmions 
f i r s t  appeared in  the facto ry  in  1913* O riginally , nego tia tions were conducted 
a t  facto ry  le v e l. World War I  and i t s  aftermath brought national negotiations 
in  the explosives industry,: and in s t i tu t io n a l  arrangements fo r  thé c ra f t  unions 
were such tb a t there were few lo ca l negotiations. There was à movement away 
from facto ry  negotiations, a trend which was not reversed u n ti l  the post-War I I  
period*: Against th is  background there was some discontent amongst male
general workers w ith respect to  th e ir  job ra te s , and female operatives 
frequently  complained about th e i r  piece rates* A number o f spontaneous 
stoppages took place and the T* & G.W.U. seated to have l i t t l e  control over 
the s itua tion*  This information was co llected  from a f i l e  known as 'The 
Factory % te  Book', which recorded a l l  agreements, job ra te s , changes in  hours 
and working conditions, frc«a I9II to  1950#
I .G . I . 's  personnel and labour policy was e sse n tia lly  ■ an innovating one. 
Not only d id  i t  i n i t i a te  the hew- Wage and oondition agreements in  the th i r t ie s ,  
i t  was also responsible fo r formulating a grading system fo r  craftsmen based 
on m erit ra tin g , a job evaluation scheme fo r determining the work content o f 
general worker jobs, and fo r  introducing work measured incentive schemes* 
Information about these subjects was co llected  from Company publications, 
records, le t t e r s  and minutés; and also  from interview s with Ccmpany o f f ic ia ls  
both in  lin e  management and in  the s p e c ia lis t labour and work study departments. 
Except: fo r the time spent a t the neighbouring union o ffice s  and s ^ e  b r ie f  
v i s i t s  to  London, most of the research was done a t AMeer fac to ry . I t  Was 
not w ithin the ambit of th is  study to  examine the e f fe c ts  o f union-management 
re la tio n s  oh the m an^eria l'h ie rarchy*
■ - v i l -
The most f r u i t fu l  souroes o f information were the ab s trac t minutes of 
conferences held between the facto ry  management and the unions. Over two 
hundred loca l conferences were held from the time the negotiating  procedure 
came into  e f fe c t in  May, 1947 u n ti l  the end o f 1954# These conferences
were the  p rinp ipal media by which union-managément negotiatiohs were conducted. 
The conferences la id  down decisions in  the  form of some ru le  o r precedent by 
which unions and management would respect and guide th e i r  fu tu re  rela tions*
Thus bn each su b stan tia l subject -  incentives, piecework, job ra te s ,  promotion, 
redundancy, work p rac tice  -  there  were a se t o f decisions which were s im ilar 
in  nature to  'case law’ * So fax  as i t  was known th is  was the f i r à t  time th a t 
a ’ ju r id ic ia l  ’ approach involving a i^ s tecp a tic  review o f a p riva te  law making 
process was used to  study formal union-managerabnt re la tio n s  in  a fac to ry  in  
Great B rita in . The use of th is  research too l was. so successful th a t i t  led  
immediately to  form ulating a cen tra l hypothesis, about the  nature of co llec tiv e  
bargaining*
, ' ' V12VSec. 3. Features o f the p a tte rn  o f dispute in  the post-war period* \  '
Before research commenced a t  Ardeer a survey was made of the subjects 
which were discussed a t uniorwnanagembnt conferences. Exaaçles of th ree types 
o f disputes were sought* union secu rity , job secu rity  and the su b stan tia l issues 
such as wages, hours and incen tives. Disputes over incen tives and piecework 
were the most numerous, aaid accounted fo r ju s t on h a lf  of the d isputes pccurring  
in  the post-war period . There was a Considerable number of disputes over the 
fix in g  bf job ra te s , including the in troduction and the maintenance b f a job 
evaluation scheme to  cover general worker jobs* There were few disputes over 
the fix a tio n  of c ra f t  wages, and the m erit ra tin g  scheme fo r  grading craftsmen 
did not f a l l  in to  disputel| General workers had considerable number o f  job 
secu rity  d ispu tes, p a r tic u la r ly  over promotion and the «aployment of females 
and there were su ff ic ie n t numbers of demarcation disputes to  permit adequate 
jgnalysis* There were few disputes over the secu rity  of a  union.
The argument over unfinancial and non-unionists which developed in  the 
t h i r t i e s  between the. A.E.Ü. and the Ardeer management was f in a l ly  s e tt le d  in  
1947# In  effec% the A.E.U* secured a union shop, and the Ardeer management 
bnplbyed only members o f the A.E.U* Some years la te r ,  the T* & G.W.Ü., 
strugg ling  to  organise the general workers a t Ardeer, received sim ila r help 
from management in  organising a l l  employees in  a few sec tio n s . Management 
agreed to  persuade some of i t s  employees, who were e i th e r  non-unionists or 
unfinancial, to become fin an c ia l members of the T. & G.W.U.. Management d id  not 
agree to  a request th a t these enrployees be dismissed. I n . other sections o f 
the facto ry  where the ra t io  o f un ion ists  to  to ta l  aaployees was re la tiv e ly  low, 
the unibn received no help from management in  i t s  o rganisational driveb%
(P) These are examined in  Part I I .
(12) ’Survey of In d u s tr ia l D ispu tes ', Business. June 1956#
« ^ V i n -
Management believed th a t i t  was the union 's re sp o n s ib ility  to  do i t s  own 
organising. Management had no disagreement in  p rin c ip le  to  the closed shop, 
fo r  i t  recru ited  i t s  new p rin tin g  o raftsm n  through th e i r  unions* The 
factory^management adapted i t s  behaviour to  the r e a l i t i e s  o f the s itu a tio n  as 
well as to  I . G .I. '  8 general policy on union membership. This policy  moved 
generally  in  the d irec tio n  o f s t r i c t e r  union security# 7 ,
Two conferences discussed the observance o f the I .C .I .  hego tiating  
procedure. This procedure was la id  down in  considerable d e ta il  and provided 
fo r ru le s  re la tin g  to  the e lec tio n  and conduct o f shop stewards, the process­
ing of employee grievances and complaints, amd the C alling of lo c a l, in te r ­
mediate and headquarters ' eonferehces to  resolve d ispu tes. % e p a r tie s  a t  
Ardeer agreed to  s t ic k  to  the l e t t e r  o f '  thé law The negotiating  procedure 
g rea tly  strengthened the hold o f the o f f ic ia l  union-leadership over informal 
groups of employees in  the fac to ry , : and u n o ffic ia l deputations o f employees 
tdio had some grievance or I l le g a lly  struck  were no longer met by the facto iy  
management. The shop stewards were required to  handle employee complaints v 
with management. Most disputes were solved a t the lo c a l conference stage.
Usually, the p a r tie s  proceeded ad hoc; they only discussed disputes 
when they arose. Usually no attempt was made to  work out a s e r ie s  of ru les  
to  cover aspects o f an e n tire  sub jec t. In  the case o f the ru les  governing 
the promotion, demotion and retrenchment o f general workers an exoeptiCn was 
inade in  the post-war period and the  ru les  were ' cod ified’ .  These ru le s  w e^ 
introduced mmiy years ago to provide fo r  promotion according to  the length  Of 
service* Thé 'tU r n i i s t ' system, as i t  was ca lled , le n t i t s e l f  admirably to  
the ^ a l s  of the T. & G.W.U* in  attem pting to make i t s  members' jobs as secure 
as p ossib le . The union made many representations abOut the adm inistration 
and in te rp re ta tio n  o f the ru les  u n ti l  there Was a considerable body o f  'case 
law* about them. In  the post-war period i t  was found expedient to bring 
them together in to  one document. The 1^ had important e ffe c ts  on the
so c ia l system of the fac to iy . The more senior workers a lso  f i l l e d  the 
h igher rated  jobs, hence crea ting  strong informal groups. There was discontent 
when job d if fe re n tia ls  were narrowed. The promotional ru les  were o f consider­
able value in  reducing the opposition of general worker groups to  in cen tiv e . 
schemes. ' ■
The demarcation dispute between the c ra f t unions and thé unsk illed  . 
workers was a dead issu e . But demarcation disputes between the c ra f ts  p e rs is ­
ted  despite  e f fo r ts  of management to  get agreements between unions o r allow 
them to  work out th e ir  own arrangements with respect to  the a llo ca tio n  of work. 
The cause of the: d ispute lay  in  the d e fin itio n  of the woifc p rerogatives.
(?) Informal group behaviour was defined to  include any behaviour 
which was not p a rt of the code of conduct s e t by the lin e s  of 
au thority  of rlanagement, or any conduct which did not confona 
to  sp ec ific  decisions o f the formal union organisation .
Three : c r i t e r ia  were used to  define the lin e s  of demarcation — the sizes and 
types of m ateria ls , the type of ' to o ls , and the nature o f the job ; In  many 
s i tu â t  ions ho one 1ine could not be used exclusively and fo r  th is  reason 
in te rp re ta tio n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  arps®• This explanation Of the demarcation issue 
in  no. Way overlooked the  fa c t th a t the number of dém^Cation d ispu tes which 
afOse in  à shop was very much linked; to  the morale of the c ra f t  group. I f  a 
d ra f t  group became insecure then the demarcation issue w ^  an ideal grievance 
po in t. Thère was some eVidenoe to  a sse rt th a t whereas demarcation was 
o rig in a lly  a form aiised dispute in  the power Struggle between c ra f t union and 
management, i t  had become a symptom of in secu rity  of the informal c ra f t  group.
The Ardeer study tended to  support the fa n d in ^  o f : an e n q u i^  in to  
r e s tr ic t iv e  p rac tices  ih  other p a r ts  of B ritish  industry  made by ■ Zureig. 
D ^arca tio n , d ilu tio n , ^manning and c h a n ts  in  o ther work p rac tices  were not. 
widespread, nor were they associated with serious union-management conflic t*
No new ; information c r  p rin c ip les  about d ilu tio n  or; manning were found to  e d is t 
a t Ardeer* There sekaed to be soma evidence th a t the incidence o f job secu rity  
disputes .were r is in g , and becomihg mbre d iv e rs ifie d . There was howeyef, no 
evidence th a t craftsmen or general; workers opposed technological o r orgahisatiohal 
ii^roveiaents. A tra d itio n a l function of management, th a t of .d isc ip lin in g  of 
employees, was not challenged, although v ic tim isation  was alleged in  one case.
A lthou^  unions d id  not oppose changes in  technology or organisation 
as such, the most important cause of disputes was the establishment o f a
mechanised u n it to  produce b la s tin g  explosives; This u n it was s ta ffe d  by ; 
men most of whom had a considerable amount of sen io rity  in  the fac to ry . The 
men soon became the most important soc ia l group in  the facto ry , and considérable 
arguments developed over the group incentive scheme in s ta lle d  to  cover the u n it .  
The high earnings o f the men on the u n it led  to  d is sa tis fa c tio n  on the o ld  
section  of the department where th é  procéssmen were employed, on time ra te s  o f 
pay. The female operatives paid  by piecework also bedame anxious about the 
fu tu re of th e ir  jobs, as these 7were lik e ly  to  be replaced by mechahised operam 
tio n s . Considerable arguments developed over the a lte ra tio n  o f piece ra te s . 
Several spontaneous stoppages occurred in  the department, the most serious of 
which occurred in  1950 and in  1954* An attempt by management to  persuade the 
men on the o ld  side of the department to accept an incentive scheme fa ile d .
A fter a *^)-slow' and suspension, th is  section of th e , department accepted the 
p rinc ip le  of job evaluation to  determine hourly job ra té s , but to  1955 the men 
on the mechanised u n it had refused to  do sb.
The analysis o f the reac tion  of groups to the in s ta l la t io n  of incentives 
showed th e  following c h a ra c te r is tic s . Employee groups were gen ia lly  suspicious 
of incen tives. There was no evidence th a t th is  was due to  the use o f work 
measurement in  s e tt in g  the times of the jobs, although the unions seemed to  
p re fe r piece work. The reac tions of groups were dominated by fea rs  about the
(13) vide supra.
( 14) See Jacques* 'The Changing Culture of a Factory*, 1951,
p a r tic u la r ly  Chapter IV. 
and Scott & others* 'Technical Change and In d u s tr ia l
Relations* (Liverpool U niversity  P ress), I956.
secu rity  o f  th e ir  jobs*: ■; This applied whether ihdiyidUal o r  grodp schemes 
were offered; but the resis tance  was generally s t r o n ^ r  where there was a 
group scheme. Usually a group scheme involved some displacement of 
personnel. I f  the group was la rge , as i t  was in  the case of the maintenance 
f i t t e r s  and general workers employed on thé : bid side o f th e  b la s tin g  deparlU 
ment, the re s is tan ce  was so strong th a t no scheme was accepted. General 
workers were more- inc lined  to  change th b ir  a ttitu d e  and accept ; in c en tiv e s . 
than were c ra f t  workers. This was due l a r ^ l y  to the existence of the 
sen io rity  ru les  which governed thé displacéméht o f personnel. The draftsmen 
had no job secu rity  and oonsequehtly most groups refused to  accept incen tives.
Host of these reac tions tended to  be those o f informal groups,
Their behaviour was a lte red  in  some casés by the in terven tion  o f the unions 
to  negotiate the d e ta ils  o f  the scheme. In the case of the T , & G.W.U, the 
lo ca l o f f ic ia l  had experience in  negotiating  over the piecewoik system a t  
Ardeer and th is  was used in  negotiating  over the new incentive schemes. In  
the Case o f the c ra f t  unions there was a tra d itio n a l h o s t i l i ty  to  payment by 
re s u lts  and no re a l attempt was made to  n e ^ t ia te  the  d e ta i ls  of the schemes 
o ffered , However, in  one Casa where the unibn intérvéned the c ra f t  group 
changed i t s  dec ision , and accepted incen tives. Where management made some 
eonoessibhs w ith respect to  the number of personnei to  be included in  a  scheme, 
or the ta rg e t a t  which bonus was to  be earned, the groups tended to change 
th e ir  decisions,  . Unfofttuiately, the national conferences on work study 
fa ile d  to  i^ .d o w h  d e fin ite  Conditions fé la iin g  toc the in s ta lla tio n  and : , 
maintenance o f incentive schemes. The groups d id  not see th a t i t  was in  th e i r  
in te re s ts  to accept incen tives, fb a rs  about redundancy and the discrim inatory 
nature of incehtives remained dominant in  th e ir  a t t i tu d e ,
• Once incen tives and piecework were in s ta l le d  they! became the most 
d ispu t^p rone o f  a l l  subjects in  the union-management nexus. . This was due 7 
to  the considerable amount bf d e ta i l  th a t  had to  be n e ^ t ia te d ,  and tc  the 
fa c t th a t incentives and piecework led  to ■strorig: informal group behaviouf 
vdiiCh was d irec ted  towards im pfovi%  the amount Of the bonus earnings. The 
groups also wanted s ta b ilis e d  earnings and to  reduce the worst disCritnihatory: 
fea tu res o f  inoeh tiyés, Incentive e ffo r t was fofthCCmihg i f  s a tis fa c to ry  
conditions were estab lished  by n e ^ t ia t io n s .  Incentives placed a severe s tra in
on union-managément re la tio n s ,a t the facto iy  le v e l,  In p a r tic u la r , changes 
in  jobs o r methods necessita ted  a lte ra tio n s  in  the pjase ra te s  o r defined tasks 
of an incentive scheme, and the, operative acceptance o f new ra te s  o r times was 
frequently  d i f f i c u l t  to  obta in , Oûoév an incentive scheme was accepted by ; 7
employees management Was precluded from a lte r in g  the fateC , times^ o r personnel 
i f  a group scheme was in  existence, without the approval o f  the union. In  
Ardeer th is  meant without approval of the group of operatives involved in  the
(F) The groups usually  came to th e ir  decisions a t workshop meetings 
which were in  nature in fom al and hot p a rt o f the o f f ic ia l  
union a c t iv i t ie s .  Later most of these decisions were confirmed 
a t o f f ic ia l  union meetings, A decision reached a t an o f f ic ia l  
union meeting was formal behaviour. /  -/ 7 ; -
- z i -
scheme* Both the female pieoewoxlcerB and the men on the mechanised u n it were 
strongly  disposed to  informal behaviour.
At the formal lev e l o f negotiations there were many types of d ispu tes. 
These were grouped uiider the following headings* fac to rs  determining the size  
of the bonus, reasons fo r  a l te r in g  incentive or;-; piece ra te s ,  d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  
a lte r in g  the ra te s  o r  tim es, and specia l problems o f group schemes. There was 
v ir tu a lly  no d ifference between the e ffe c ts  of piecework and the various 
types of incentive schemes used in  the fac to ry . Work measurement was used 
in  varying degrees ih  a l l  types of schemes, A good deal of argument centred 
over the problem o f ' t i ^ t *  ra te s ; the operatives claimed th a t they could 
not earn su ff ic ie n t bonus while management contended th a t the ra te s  o r times 
were se t equitab ly . Problems arose over the subsid isa tion  of effo rt*  when 
th e re : were composite ra te s  fo r  piecework, when there was a hold-up o f m ateria ls  
o r break-down o f machines, a group scheme included jobs which required d iffe re n t 
e f fo r ts  and ■sihen le a rn e rs , inspectors and other personnel were included.
Problems were also met when the pace of the machine o r some techn ical fac to r
prevented the operatives working a t a bonus pace throughout the day. T ria l
periods were used to  secure the o pera tives ' acceptance o f a lte re d  r a te s .
Special ra te s  o r make-up payments were made whan operatives could not earn bonus
because o f no fa u lt  of th e ir  own. P rac tica lly  any condition th a t had some 
connection with the earning power of operatives was discussed a t  union-manag«nent 
conferences on incen tiv es,
A m erit ra tin g  scheme was used to grade craftsmen fo r  the purpose of 
paying them a margin over th e i r  hourly ra te  of pay, A job evaluation scheme 
was introduced in  the post-war period to  c la ss ify  and rank general worker jobs 
according to  th e ir  work content. Merit ra tin g , job evaluation and work measured 
schemes a l l  had a common objective* to  e s tab lish  an equitab le  system&>r determin­
ing the f ix a tio n  o f wages, The job evaluation scheme attempted to f ix  hourly 
ra te s  of jobs according to  the value of the work performed. The m erit ra tin g  
scheme attempted to  assess the value of the work o f the indiv idual operative in  
re la tio n  to  minimum acceptable requirements of thé job . The work measured 
incentive schemes attempted to  e s tab lish  equitable tim es, tasks and ra te s  fo r 
rewarding operatives fo r  the amount of e f fo r t  put fo r th . The equitableness of 
the re s u lts  achieved by using these schemes depended on the r e l i a b i l i ty  of the 
pre-deteirained c r i t e r ia ,  th e i r  e ffec tiv e  implementation and the r ig h t of the 
union to  question the re su lts  obtained.
The existence o f the job evaluation scheme gave union and management a 
se t of references to  f ix  and ad just job ra te s .  This elim inated the haphazard 
adjustment o f job ra te s  due to  the pressures of groups w ithin the union. I t  
had the same e ffe c t on uniorwnanagement re la tio n s  as m ulti-union a g r e e m e n ts  
w ith 1 ,0 ,1 , to  prevent leap-frogging of wages of c r a f t s .  These agreements 
were introduced in  the th i r t i e s  la id  down ra te s  of pay fo r  engineering and 
build ing  craftsmen* They were so successful th a t only on a few occasions were 
claims f i le d  fo r  ra te s  to  cover specia l conditions ex isting  a t  the Ardeer fac to ry .
^Similarly, few claims were lodged fo r  à review o f job ra te s  once the job 
evaluation soberae was in sta lled*  At the time o f  in s ta l la t io n  there was 
considerable pressure by various groups w ithin the union to  obtain favourable 
e la ss ifio a tio n  o f  th e ir  jobs, and thus secure a higher hourly rate* Job 
evaluation was a t  f i r s t  re s is te d  by the union members, but as most jobs 
received higher ra te s  under the scheme i t  was ultim ately.accepted* Once 
the scheme was properly  in s ta lle d  the r e la t iv i ty  o f the job bates was main­
ta ined  by the negotia tion  of a peroehtage increase to  apply to  a l l  jobs 
evaluated^ ,
Sec, 4, Some observations of the em pirical d a ta .
The vast m ajority  of the two hundred conferences held between the . 
Ardeer management, and the trade unions ended in  agreement,: A se t of ru le s
re la tin g  to  promotion, demotionj tra n s fe r  and retrenchment were codified  
in to  one document; normally the p a r tie s  agreed to  a minute which im p lic itly  
se t out r ig h ts  and ob ligations o f each p a rty . In  th is  process of reaching 
agreement they observed ce rta in  precedents, estab lished  by previous 
conferencesj and they in te rp re ted  the ru les  la id  doym. in  national agreements 
which covered the negotiating  procedure, the: minimum wages fo r  craftsmen and 
general workers, and the agreement re la tiv e  to  working conditions. In  the 
case of m aintaining incentives the nego tiato rs found i t  extremely d i f f i c u l t  
to  reach agreement fo r  the ru les  la id  down by the national conferences were 
vague and indefin ite*  The negotiators then proceeded to  decide what was a 
’fa ir*  and * ju s t  * so lu tion  to the d ispu te . While union and management 
were hot unconcerned with the m aterial outcome of a p a r tic u la r  d ispu te , they 
t r ie d  to  abide by the s e ts  o f reference which had been previously la id  down.
In  th is  way they were able to  reach agreement*
The most outstanding cases of in e ffec tiv e  negotia tions were dyer 
the in troduction  of incen tives. The fa ilu re  o f these conferences was la rge ly  
due to  the absence o f c lea r terms o f reference w ithin which to  h sg c tia te .
The national conferences on work study fa ile d  to  e s ta b lish  s è t s ;of reference 
due to  fa u lty  communication and to  a clash of in te re s ts ,  e i th e r  re a l o r 
il lu so ry , between the p a r t ie s .  The p a r tie s  d id  not lo g ica lly  th ink  through 
th e i r  problem, they  did  not t r y  to  reach an e ffec tiv e  Agreement which la id  
down rig h ts  and ob ligations, and f in a lly .th e y  became suspicious of each 
o th e r 's  in ten tio n s . The fa ilu re  of thé p a r tie s  to  see mutual in te re s ts  
also  p]«)longed negotiations over the negotiate ng prooeduré*;.
: The 1 ,0 ,1 , nego tia ting  procedure did a -g réâ t deal to  a s s is t  the
lo ca l p a r tie s  in  th e i r  nego tia tions. Before th e  procedure came into: e ffe c t 
the method o f dealing with grievances of employees was tedious and cumbersome. 
Some groups took m atters in to  th e ir  own hands, spontaneously stopped work 
and 'n eg o tia ted ' d ire c tly  w ith management. As a re s u lt  there was d isorder 
in  th e -fa c to iy . A fter the nego tia ting  procedure came in to  e ffe c t the means 
of dealing w ith grievances was la id  down in  d e ta i l ,  w ith  the re su lt  th a t  
employées khew they had ce rta in  r ig h ts  in  using the procedure. Provision 
was made fo r  staging appeals, f i r s t l y ,  w ithin the department of the aggrieved 
employees^ and secondly, by a system of unioiMnanagement conferences. The 
formal lin e s  o f  au thority  were c lea rly  estab lished  and ce rta in  o f f ic ia ls ,  
notably the lin e  management and shop stewards, were held responsible fo r  
try in g  to  resolve th e i r  d ifferences a t  the workplace. Both union and 
management adhered s t r i c t ly  to  the  provisions of thé procedure.
: P art of the se t of référencés fo r  thé p a r tie s  a t Ardeer was 
estab lished  by national agreements. In  add itio n :to  the nego tiating  - 
procedure o ther s e ts  o f reference were se t out in  the agreements re la tin g  
to wage ra te s  and working conditions. The national agreements reached on 
these m atters involved multi-union bargaining. Although many amendments 
were made to the ra te s  o f wages la id  down in  these national agreements no77%#.: 
national s tr ik e ,: or th re a t of s tr ik e  action , ever took p lace . This, 
su g ^ s te d  th a t thé p a r tie s  resolved th e ir  d ifferences about the extent of 
th e  improvement of the wage f a te s  by other means than à ' t e s t  of strength* 
or 'power' — two concepts constantly  used in  reference to  union-managemerit 
re la tio n s . The p a r tie s  used equitable standards in  reaching agreement,.
From the middle o f  thé th i r t ie s  1 ,0 .1 . employees were not linked 
to Other in d u s tr ie s . S tab ilised  union-mànàgément re la tio n s  developed in  
the colleO tive bargaining frameworks, and th is  helped the p a r tie s  to  see 
theirtoomnicm' ^ in te re s ts , 1 ,0 ,1 . had an innovating labour po licy  and a 
good deal o f i t s  success in  in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s  was a t tr ib u ta b le .to  th a t 
po licy . However, i t  was qu ite  wrong to  suppose th a t because I .C .I ,  was a 
large combine, a monopolist in  some f ie ld s  o f the chemical industiy , th a t 
i t  'bought' peace; a t a p r ic e . In d u s tr ia l peace was only secured by 
effec tive  negotiations and by sound personnel procedures.
There was no evidence to  s u r e s t  th a t the trade  unions a t Ardeer 
aimed a t elim inating p riv a te  en terp rise , or th a t negotiations were influenced 
by ideologioal differenOes between union and management o f f ic ia is ,  TBhile 
the lo c a l branch o f  the T, & GéW.U, passed ce rta in  motions respecting  
p o l i t ic a l  events in  the th i r t i e s ,  i t s  main in te re s t  was d irec ted  towards 
improving the wages and working conditions of i t s  memberseD^loyed a t  Ardeer 
fac to ry , . The s itu a tio n  çould have been; d iffe re n t had the Ardeer fac to iy  
management f ru s tra te d  the aims of the lo ca l union branch. Thé Ardeer 
management was subject to  the control of thé p o lic ie s  o f 1 ,0 ,1 .  ^ and th is  
organisation was under the influence of thé la te  S ir  A lfred Mond, He saw 
th a t  th e  development of unionr-management re la tio n s  was in ev itab le , and fo r  
th is  reason some co-operation between management and union was necessary to  
e s tab lish  co llec tiv e  bargaining. The Mond-Tumer ta lk s , which took place 
a f te r  the Général S trike , were of more than passing in te re s t  a t  Ardeer —
Ardeer was a l iv in g  example of Mondism-in-action.
The local branches of the unions did not seek to  n a tio n a lise  I .C . I . ,  
Nor was. there  evidence to suggest th a t  the union o f f ic ia ls  were in  any way 
influenced by the prospect th a t I .C .I ,  could be na tio n a lised  had the B ritish  
Labour Party  been successful in  the 1955 GlectionS. PeiAaps thé lo ca l 
branches were.impressed by the fa ilu re  o f  the n a tionalised  in d u s trie s , 
p a r tic u la r ly  the railways and the mines, to  maintain in d u s tr ia l peace, ( I 5)
( 15) Baldwin * 'Beyond Nationalisation*^ (Harvard), 1955•
Spero t 'Labour Relations in  B rit ish  N ationalised Industry*,
Univ^ P ress),: 1955; 7 ;
Nor was ther® any evidence to  s u r e s t  th a t the management o f f ic ia ls  were 
tnduly influenced hy the th re a t of n a tio n a lisa tio n .  ^ The foundations of 
peace in  union-management re la tio n s  a t Ardeer were la id  by I .C .I .  in  the 
co llec tiv e  bargaining frameworks estab lished  in  the th i r t i e s  and in  the 
negotiating  procedure d e ta ile d  in  1947# These foundations were estab lished  
long before the th re a t of n a tio n a lisa tio n .
The lo ca l T. &, G.W.U. did not allow i t s  bargaining function to 
be obscured by i t s  p o li t ic a l  or s tr ik e  function. I t  was prim arily  con­
cerned with improving the wages and working conditions of i t s  members ■ 
employed a t Ardeer. I t  never t i l e d  to  Organise an o f f ic ia l  s tr ik e  amongst 
employees a t Ardeer, although spontaneous stoppages o f groups o f employees 
took place both before, during, and a f te r  the second World war. P rio r  to 
the war spontaneous stoppages occurred amongst groups o f employees, 
p a r tic u la r ly  amongst the female pieceworkers, who were not members o f the 
union. Indeed,, i t .  was not U ntil the post-war period th a t the union was ; 
successful to  re c ru it as members a l l  employees in  the b la s tin g  department 
where most of the trouble oocurred. U ntil employees became members a 
union could not exercise control over them; For th is  reason the T, & G.W.U. 
wasseak and in e ffe c tiv e , and i t  was fu r th e r  handicapped by incompetent 
leadership which d id  not adequately discharge the branch 's bargaining 
function.
The rea l turn ing  poin t in  the h is to ry  Of the T; & G.W.U, was the 
establishm ent of the  negotiating  procedure in  19^7• From th a t date onwards 
the branch underwent some important changes, which included the removal of 
a Oommunist part-tim e o f f ic ia l ,  the  dism issal from the positio n  of 
secretary  of a man conservative in  h is  views, the re-o rgan isa tion  of the 
branch committee to  include the shop stewards, and the crea tion  a t  the work­
place leve l a fom  of Union organisation based p rin c ip a lly  on the shop 
stewards. The negotiating  procedure also provided a ready means whereby 
the grievances o f the employees could be transm itted  to  formal channels and 
th is  reduced the necessity  fo r  the informal groups to  take d ire c t ac tion . 
Moreover, the r ig h ts  of the branch to  p a rtic ip a te  in  form ulating p o lic ie s  
and ru les  to  cover Ardeer employees was sp e c if ic a lly  recognised by the new 
negotiating  procedure. As a consequence, the Ardeer branch of the 
T. & G.W.U. fo r  the f i r s t  time became a bargaining agency in  the fu l le s t  
sense of the term, and i t s  Control was extended over many aspects of 
employment policy of the management.
Spontaneous, stoppages took place amongst employees of the b la s t­
ing department in  1950 and again in  1954# These employees were members 
of the T. & G.W.U. The stoppages were triggered  by the  rapid  d e te rio ra tio n  
of morale amongst the employees following two f a ta l  accidents, and to an 
underlying fee lin g  of discontent due to problems remaining unresolved by 
negotiation . Thé in s ta lla tio n  of the mechanised u n it had ra ised  serious 
doubts in  the minds of many employees about the secu rity  of th e ir  employ­
ment, and i t  was th is  fe a r , plus a change in  s ta tu s  of th e i r  earning 
capacity, which activated  th e  behaviour o f th e  informal groups. Job
ra te s , piece ra te s , arid incentives became th e  ta rg e ts  fop.; d isa ffec tio n  
amongst the various employee groups. 7 In  1954 the  'go-slow* o f the men 
on the 'o ld ' side Of the department was a d ire c t re s u lt  o f the  agreement 
reached by negotiations to  resolve a 'go-slow ' on the; meehariisod unit#
I t  was: noteworthy th a t the T. ;&. G.W.U. was able to  re -e s ta b lish  
i t s  au tho rity , and there was no continued defiarice o f union d irec tio n s  by 
the informal groups as there was in  other p a rts  o f B rit ish  industry  in  
the pOst-war period. ( 16) Authority was re-imposed by th e  management and 
the union negotiating  to  solVe the problems oonfronting them, even though 
the s tr ik e s  were s t i l l  in  progress. Jb r  th is  reason there  was no d ia s t ic  
s h if t  in  power frcan the formal union leaders, to  the informal groups. The . 
power of decisioKwnaking lay close to  the formal union leadership in  th e  
post-war period because o f the general success o f nego tia tions. , Manage­
ment a ss is te d  the union to  reach i t s  objectives by co-operating with i t  7 
in  estab lish ing , appropriate ru le s  to  regulate the ooriduot of the employees,, 
management and union o f f ic ia ls .  In  short, the au thority  o f the union did 
not break down fo r lengthy periods because of the behaviour of th e  Ardeer 
management; i t  broke down fo r  short periods when management made some 
mistake in  i  t s ’dealings w ith i t s  employees,; but these'm istakes were 
repaired  because of the  genuine desire  of management to  be equitable in  
i t s  dealings with i t s  employees. ;
; The soc ia l s tru c tu re  of the Ardeer management was of the utmost 
importance to  the mairitenanoe of union-management peace. Management made 
re a l attem pts to  see th a t i t s  employees f e l t  th a t they belonged to  a worth­
while soc ie ty . For th is  purpose they used a wide range o f personnel 
techniques including jo in t bonsu lta tion , a suggestion scheme, works news­
paper, soc ia l clubf proper induction procedures, counselling, and extensive 
w elfare  serv ices. ( 17) The organisation was b u i l t  on sound p rin c ip les  o f 
managerial theory (18), and th i s  made work meaningful to  employees. ( 19)
The sen ior fac to ry  management t r ie d  to make the work o f the organisation 
more humane by taking a close in te re s t in  personnel m atters; the factory  
manager, fOr example, personally  reviewed the gradings of the craftsmen^ 
and he chaired the meetings of thé worbis council and the conference between 
union arid management. A good deal of time was spent in^ tra in in g  supervisors 
and managers to  be b o tte r  leaders* Ihiployees found sa tis fa c tio n  in  th e ir  
jobs, most o f which were arduous, re p e titiv e  and involved a g reat deal of
See The Dock Worker.
(17) See Yoder* 'Personnel Management and In d u s tria l 
. R elations), (P rentice-H all) 4 th  E dit.
( 18) See Koonta and O'Donnell* 'P rin c ip le s  of Management';
(McGraw-Hill) 1955;
Urwick* 'The Elements of Adm iriistratiori', (H arper):1944;
7 Barnard: 7 'The Functions of the .Executive ' , (Harvard) 1938*
( 19) See Paterson* 'Morale iri War and Work', (Parish) 1955»
Dubin* 'The World of Work' (P reritice-H all) 1958. :
(20) See Tead* V 'The Art of Leadership ', (McGraw-Hill) 1935» 
Eoethlisberger* 'Management and Morale», (Harvard) I946.
sk ili*  Unlike the dock workers, who did not f e e l . th a t they belonged to  
the management organisation, the employees a t  Ardeer did not make unreason­
able demands bn th e ir  uriipn beoauBe of ari^ d issa tlèfaO tion  of work* (21 ) 
Thus, the T% : & G.W.U* was able to  fuhotion e ffeo tiv e ly  beoàùse the demands 
of the  informal groups were basioa lly  s a t is f ie d  ;by management behaviour.,
(21) o f. The Dock Worker.
Sed. 5# A Theory of Côlleotive Bargaining
What conclusions can he drawn from the evidence found in  the 
Ardeer case? , I t  is: possih le to te s t  the theo ries  of co llec tiv e  bargain- : 
ihg and to  aoOurately define i t s  nature. Three mhih groups p f theories 
seek to  explain thé phehomehon of cp llec tiye  bargaining. These are the 
marketing, ' governmental and management theories^  (22) : The maiketipg : 
theory corresponds mbst c losely  to the ideas o f the c la ss ic a l economist.
I t  looks upon ob llectivé bargaining as a means fo r  s e t t l in g  a contract 
re la tin g  to  . the employment o f  labour, ; In  the end an agreement, s im ilar 
to  a commerciai con tract, cpmies in to  being. On c r i t i c a l  examination th is  
theory does not explain the nature of co llec tiv e  b à r^ in in g  fo r  the 
following reasons* In  B rita in  few agreements, run a :sp ec ified  l i f e ,  the to ta l  
terms fo r  union-managemeht conduct are ra re ly  committed to  w ritten  agree*» 
ments, an agreement to  be e ffec tive  must be based on equitable terms o f 7 
employnerit, and i t  isopen to  doubt whether a union gives consideration in  ;
re tu rn  fo r  an improvement in  w.agej f a te s ,  hours and working conditions. For 
thèse reasons! the marketing theory caïi be rejectedii
Much more p lausib le  i s  the governmental theory which s ta te s  th a t 
Golleotive bargaining i s  a constitu tional system which regulates conduct 
in  industry . S lic h te r, (23) whC f i r s t  asserted  th a t  co llec tiv e  bargaining 
i s  a method of building in d u s tr ia l jurisprudence, excluded the. p rice or 
wage-making aspects of co llec tiv e  bargaining. Dihilop Ç24) and 
Flanders ( 25) appear to agree with th i s  exclusion,, and even Chamberlain 
who c le a rly  favours th i s  theoiy does not push h is  arguments incontestably 
to  th is  end. He p re fe rs  to  view these th re e  groups of theo ries  as 
d ifferences in  degree ra th e r  than in  kind. This view i s  open to  question 
on general grounds as a theoiy has to  ôxplain th e  to ta l  phenomenon of 
co llec tiv e  bargaining. (26) To have v a lid ity  i t  must also  explain collec­
tiv e  bargaining ( 27) wherever it i s  found, in  the United S tates or the 
United Kingdom; ' .7 .
(22) Chamberlain# C ollective Bargaining, (McGraw-Hill) I95I .
( 23) S lichter* Union P o lic ies  and In d u s tr ia l Management,’
7 /' - (Brookdngs) 1941
(24) Dunlop & Healy* Collective Bargaining, ! P rincip les  and
’7 :7  7„: ; 7 .
(25) Tianders & Clegg* The System Of In d u s tr ia l Relations
:In Great B rita in , (Blackwell) 1934
(26) Chamberlain* loc . c i t . ,  pp .156-7
( 27) This i s  not the only system of in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s ; 
the A ustralian i s  one of extensive s ta te  in te rfe ren ce .
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At Ardéef union and management îEiegGiîxated to  feabh agreements.
The e ssen tia l nature of negotiation  was a law-making; process. The 
p a r tie s  le g is la te d  ru le s  to cover such m atters as the negotia ting  procedure 
and the national wages s tru c tu re , they in te rp re ted  those laws when d e te r­
mining sp ec ific  Cases, they created, in te rp re ted  and observed precedent in  
case-made law, and they invoked the standards o f equity when a case did 
ho t f a l l  w ithin the mutually accepted ru les in  order to  resolve th e ir  
differences* The end re s u lt  o f negotiation was an agreement s e t out in  
r ig h ts  and ob ligations to be observed by union and management and th e ir  
members# The p a r tie s  used the same method ’ o f negotiations to  resolve 
disputés whether they were oyer job secu rity , W i^s, hours, working con­
d itio n s  o r the  d e ta ils  o f the p r ie r a i  union-Mahagement rela tionship#  The 
system o f  ih d u s tr ià l jurisprudence, enunciated by S lic h te r , governed 
union-management re la tio n s  w ith respect to  wages and hours as well as non­
economic matters*
I t  follows from th is  analysis th a t co llec tiv e  bargaining should 
be defined not in  eoonoinic terms but by those o f so c ia l theory (20)#
(Brds, co llec tiv e  bargaining i s  an in s t i tu t io n  which has as i t s  purpose  ^
the goverhmeht o f re la tio n s  betwéen union and management# I t s  function, 
through Which i t s  purpose i s  achieved# i s  to  e s ta b lish  r ig h ts  and ob liga­
tions fo r  union and management and th e if  respective members# These 
r ig h ts  and ob ligations are se t out %ie]Q)licit and recognisable forms^i th a t 
i s  1hey are s tructu red  in  a formal way# The r ig h ts ; and obligations 
re la te  to  the general ru les  which goverh the method by which union arid 
management are to  lay  down fu ture rig h ts  and ob ligations, and to  spec ific  
ru les  which cover p a r tic u la r  sub jects such as wages, hours of work incen­
tiv e s  and other working conditions. The method by which the function of 
co llec tiv e  bargaining i s  achieved i s  known as negotiation . The 'process* 
of c o llec tiv e  bargaining i s  the re fo re  synonymous with negotiation .
- ; C ollective bafgaihing re a lis e s  i t s  purpose of reso lv ing  oohflio t 
between union and management when negotiations a re ,e f fe c tiv e . Peace in  
industry  follows as a heoessaiy consequence. C ollective bargaining f a i l s  
when i t  does not achieve i t s  purpose when negotiations are ineffeciive#  
C onflic t i s  a neoessaiy consequence. In  such a s itu a tio n  thea^ i s  indus-. 
t r i a l  àfarOhy, in  the sense th a t the  behaviour o f the p a r tie s  i s  not 
governed by law# In d u s tr ia l aharchy pan take two forms, v iz , a s tr ik e  o r 
a rb itra iy  behaviour on the p a rt Of management w ith respect to  i t s  employees. 
The l a t t e r  has the opposite purpose to  th a t o f po liec tiv e  bargaining which 
seeks to  goveiu employment conditions by reference to  *law* in  industry#
A s tr ik e  on the o ther hand, may have the same goal as th a t o f co llec tiv e  
bargaining, to  e s tab lish  r ig h ts  and ob ligations, : but i t  i s  a phenomenon o f ; 
d iso rder and not of order#
(28) See T. T# Paterson* A Methetic Theoiy o f Social 
Organisation (U niversity of Glasgow) 1957 (mim)?y
7%##' i i’’ ■ Are there any conditions .which” determine whether ' or not negotia- : 
tions are to  he effective?  To s a tis fa c to r ily  answer th is  question i t  i s  
WiOith making réference to  e x is tin g  knowledge o f soc ia l in s titu tio n s»  I t  
i s  asserted  th a t in  order fo r  a soc ia l system to  function e ffec tiv e ly  i t  
i s  necessary th a t i t s  members have coomon b e lie fs , d e fin itions, and va lu es;(29) 
At once i t  beoOmes apparent th a t union and management, which are the two 
members o f c o llec tiv e  bargaining, have few common beliefs*  d e fin itio n s  
arid values* H istory is  such th a t the two d is tru s t  each o ther, and th e ir  
functions, organisational forms and mores are suph th a t they have Very 
d iffe re n t behavioural patterns* , The evidence o f  the Ardeer case suggests . 
th a t even when there are no re a l o o n flic ts  o f in te re s ts  in  a s itu a tio n , 
fa u lty  communication o r e rro rs  on the p a rt o f one o f the p a r tie s  conducting 
nego tiatiohs, (such as the fa ilu re  to  determine an appropriate method to  
reach a goal in  nego tia tions), tend to  be viewed as a c o n flic t àfi in té ré s ts  
betwpen the p a r t ie s • Thus, there i s  a decided tendency fo r the 'separate
in te re s ts  o f the pariiies to  bé accentuated during nego tiations which prove 
d if f ic u lt / tc - re s o lv e ^ ';
Union and nianâgément have one common in te re s t ,  th a t i s f  the 
employment o f union members by management* For th is  reason unions do not . 
attempt t o  elim inate managements by s tr ik e , p o l i t ic a l  action  Or by demanding 
wage increases th a t would cripp le  a business* Sometimes unions may not 
see thé consequences of th e i r  actions, especia lly  thé adverse e ffe c t of a 
high wage claim  on the secu rity  of employment o f th e ir  members; th is  i s  an 
e rro r  in  perception* For th is  reason i t  i s  possib le th a t unions and 
management see th e ir  comrapn in te re s t  most c lea rly  when they are linked 
together in  a narrow co llec tiv e  bargaining framework, ra th e r  than a broad 
one* This ru le  does hold fp r  a l l  s itu a tio n s ; i t  i s  conceivable th a t the 
C onflict o f  in te re s t  i s  in te n s if ie d  in  a narrow co llec tiv e  bargaining frame­
work by thé management attem pting to  keep i t s  wage payments lower than the 
re s t  of the industry*
Union and management are bound together in  the in s t i tu t io n  o f  
co llec tiv e  bargaining because of the need to  e s ta b lish  a soc ia l order to  
allow production, and hence employment to  take place* C onflicts s t i l l  
a r ise  over the d e ta ils  of the socia l order to  be estab lished , th a t i s  over 
the terms o f employment* The A^^ieer case suggests th a t there i s  only one 
method by which these co n flic t o f d e ta ilé  may be avoided, and th a t l i e s  in  
the ju d ic ia l behaviour of the two parties*  The p a r tie s  must se t aside 
th e ir  immediate separate in te re s ts  when déaling with disputes and resolve 
the dispute in  accordance with ex istin g  ru les  and precedents, and when 
these are absent in  accordance with mutually accepted standards of equily* 
This is  the same type of behaviour as th a t of a judgé. This behaviour 
not only e s tab lish es  f a i r  ru le s  which regulate human conduct a t the work­
place, i t  i s  a method o f  log ica l thinking, and as such i t  also  helps to 
overcome o ther p i t f a l l s  o f negotiations such as inappropriate goals and 
methodsi ' : ""'V'
(29) Schneideri in d u s tr ia l: Sociology,; (MoGraW-Hill) 1957*
Ii> i s  in  th is  conneetion th a t a w elÎT^truotursâ negotiating  
prooedu3^ i s  of: tremendous importance to  e ffeo tiy e  nogoi;iations fo r the . ; 
p a r tie s  follow accepted methods when processing th e i r  disputes# I t  i s  
primae fac ie  evidence th a t the p a r tie s  intend to  so t in  accordance with law# 
Not a l l  the terms of reference fo r  the parties*  conduct a re  .found in  the 
negotiating  procedure, important ru les  a ;^  also  contained in  the agreement 
re la tin g  to  su h stah tia l m atters, such as w a^s and working conditions#
The Ardëer case strongly  s u ^ e s ts  th a t in  many cases successful negotiar- 
tio n s  are dependent on the p r io r  existence of ru le s , themselves la id  down ; 
hy negbtiationa* , In  other wo3?ds, negotiations are somètimes in e ffec tiv e  
fo r  th e .shnpl© reason th a t p^^vious negbtiations were, in e ffe c tiv e , o r ahsent* 
vacuum in  the terms of reference to guide the p arties*  behaviour i s  so 
g reat that, i t  i s  nox possib le fo r  them to resolve d isputes in  present contest.
There are some p eo u la ritie s  of the in s t i tu t io n  o f co llec tiv e  
b a r^ in in g  th a t need to  be noted# Gollective bargaining does not exercise =
au thority  d ire c tly  over those human actors who are responsib le .fo r i t s  
maintenanbe; i t  : has no power to  punish the , ac to rs fo r  th e i r  bad performance# 
The d iv ision  of labour of tasks and ro les  which are ; required to  itain tain  
co llec tiv e  bargaining are not, d ire c tly  determined by it*  ; I t  has au thority  
only oyer two in s t i tu t io n s ,  union and management, and these may in  turn  
vest th e ir  own o f f ic ia ls  with au thority  to  carry on the work o f co llec tiv e  
bargaining and hold them responsible fo r the way in  Wiioh they perfoim 
th e ir  tasks# 'I t  follows from; th is  th a t union and management must have 
. o f f jc ia is  who can .cope w ith th e ir  ro les i f  co llec tiv e  b£0?gaining is  to  be 
maintained* O ffic ia ls  must perceive the purpose and functions of bollecw 
t iv e  bargaining,, union and management so th a t the f i r s t  may be properly 
nm ihtained#; : .This complex, s itu a tio n  makes co llec tiv e  bargaining vulnerable 
to  s tra in , d isrup tion , biéakdown and eyen to  d isin tegration*  ,
There are. reasons fo r  suspecting; th a t the impetus fo r  d isrup ting  
the work o f co llec tiv e  bargaining; oomés not frcmi the union, but from manage­
ment# In  the f i r s t  place à union’s purpose i s  f ru s tra te d  i f  co llec tiv e  : 
bargaining fa ils#  I f  co llec tiv e  bargaining f a i l s  the .pitrpose of management 
i s  only f ru s tra te d  i f  a union can bring i t s  opérations to  a h a l t ,  and th a t 
i s  not always possible* In  th e  second place a comparative analysis of 
case s tud ies seems to  ind icate  th a t the s ta te  of union-mhoagement re la tio n s  ; 
i s  la rge ly  determined by the a ttitu d e s  o f management tOWSrd i t s  personnel# 
îtelatiohs àrè  bad in  ce rta in  in d u stries  because th e ir  managements do hot 
observe good personnel principles#  (30) In  the. th ird  place most,of the 
pressures to  change th e  se ts  o f reference estab lished  by negotiations pome 
from ; the; need cf the socia l s tru c tu ré ^of management to  adapt to  new
(30) 8ee # e  thesis*  ’Canadian and
; : in d u s tr ia l  R elations; A comparative analysis o f h a lf
a century o f le g is la tiv e  in teffèfehce  in  union-management : 
re la tio n s  in  two countries’ in  which; hé compares the 
case stud ies made in  WalkerthJndUstfial he ia tions in  ■ 
A ustralia  (Harvard) 1$$6, and V/oods (Ed) « ; P atterns of 
In d u s tr ia l Dispute Settlement in  Bive ,Canadian 
Industries* (McGill) I958#
bohàitlohs# (31 ) With oné vdr two exceptions the so c ia l. and ecpnpinic 
environment whiéh i s  said  to; surround ooliectivS  hargaining ban he 
c la ss if ie d  as p a rt o f, o r hearing on, the so c ia l s tru c tu re  o f management# :
I t  follows th a t the le ss  the p a r tie s  are inclined  to  a l te r  the 
formal se ts  o f reference the le ss  there i s  l ik e ly  to  he d ispu tes, and 
n a tu ra lly  the le s s  chances are there of s tra in s  developing hetween the 
p arties*  A s tah le  socia l s tru c tu re  o f management;is le s s  l ik e ly  to  
demand changes in  the terms of rcforenoe thgm an in s tab le  one. I f  manage-.- 
ment has to  ad ju st to  few pressures from the ex ternal environment the 
chances o f;d isrup tion  of co lleo tiy eh a rg à in in g  are few* Heyertheless^ 
Change i s  in ev itah le  and i t  m ^  he necessary to  a l te r  the te m s  o f  
reference hetteen  the parties*  Some/managements are able to  ad just 
successfully  and do not damage th e ir  re la tio n s  with the  unions^ while 
others ad just badly and d isrup t co ilec tive  bargaihirig*. - This seems to  be 
compatible with the conclusion o f the IT.P*A* survey th a t ’ex ternal fac to rs  
dp not n ecessarily  pre-determine the ,nature of th e .c o lle c tiv e  bargaining 
relatiohsbip} énvirbnmental, factors; ;sét, lim its , but w ithin those lim its  : ; 
the p a r tie s  are free: to  crea te  a bad re la tio n sh ip  o r a good one*
hy f a r  the most important determinant o f peace in  industry  (which 
i s  the oonsequence o f e ffeo tiy e  negotiations) i s  the a ttitu d e  o f management* 
Tfittien a, management. r e f  uses to, recognise the ro le  of a union, in  p a rtic ip a tin g  
in  formulating laws to  regulate employment, c o n flic t i s  inevitably# In  
such a s itu a tio n  i t  be a, misnomer to  c a ll the; union-management re la tio n ­
ship one. o f pp lleo tive bargaining. C ollective bargaining only ex is ts  where 
union management fe la tio n s  are characterised  by ju d ic ia l beha^dour in  th e ir  
attempts to: resolve disputes* Such a system o f uniorirtaanagement re la tio n s  
i s  prim arily  dependent oh management accepting the r ig h t of the union to  
negotiate with i t ,  and the ob ligations la id  down by agreement. In  short, 
co llec tiv e  bargaining is  a system o f law which operates a t the workplace 
by the consent of management. I t  i s  a system based not on power but oh a 
sense o f  obligation^
_  A: m eory :o f Trade Union Behaviour
A trade union i s  one of two in s ti tu tio n s  which e s tab lish  and mai]&- 
ta in  co llec tiv e  bargaining*,: As a good deal i s  known about the characteris­
t ic s ,  and behaviour of so c ia l in s ti tu tio n s  (33) i t  i s  possib le to  e s tab lish  
w ith prev ision  various ch a ra c te ris t ic s  and behavioural p a tte rn s  of a trade 
union; i t s  re la tionsh ip  tc. co llec tiv e  bargaining Can be confidently stated*
(31) See Golden and Parker* Causes of In d u s tria l Peace under 
C ollective B argaining,;(harper) 1955#
(33) See Schneider* / ;  ''.'bit," -
T alcott Parsons* The Social System, (Tavistock) 1952.
Prom these p rin c ip les  deduced;ffom. ex isting  knowledge i t  i s  possible to 
in te rp re t the em pirical data co llected  a t Ardeer about the behaviour of 
the T* & G.W.U* This approach answers the f in a l question posed by the 
Ardeer experiment» why do union members refuse to  abide by agreements made 
on th e ir  behalf by th e i r  governing body? ;
; A union has oyerlapping membership with th a t of management^ and 
i t  has a separate but interdependent function  with th a t of the employment 
function o f management # (34) I t  is  these two, fac to rs  which give r is e  to  
a ‘ unique in te r- îin s titu tio n a l re la tio n sh ip . Thus, any d e fin itio n  of trade 
union must include reference to  these two d istingu ish ing  c h a ra c te r is tic s .
A new d e fin itio n  o f trade union is  attempted. A trade union may be 
described as an in s t i tu t io n  which has as i t s  purpose the p a r tic ip a tio n  ; 
w ith another in s t i tu t io n , mahagement, in  form ulating laws to  govern the 
r ig h ts  and obligations of: i t s  members. With respect to  th e ir  employment by 
the second in s t i tu t io n .  Or more generally , a trade union i s  an in s titu tiC n  
which has as i t s  purpose, the p artic ip a tio n  in  form ulating laws to  govern 
the r ig h ts  and ob ligations of i t s  members w ith  respect to  a second 
in s t i tu t io n  to  which they a l l  belong as subservient members.
In  order to  re a lis e  i t s  purpose a trade union has a number of 
functions. By fa r  the most important i s  i t s  bargain ing  function, th a t  i s  
thd function  o f nego tiating  and reaching agreement w ith management respect^ 
ing ;the r ig h ts  and ob ligations of i t s  members. I t  may also exercise a 
p o l i t ic a l  function when the environment i s  such th a t i t  f ru s tra te s  i t s  
purpose, and i t  is.poB sible th a t a co n flic t may a rise  from the discharge 
o f- these functions, thus leading to  s tra in , and possib le d iso rgan isation  
or even d is in te g ra tio n . This occurs where a union gives to i t s  p o l i t ic a l  
function preoedence over i t s  bargaining function. Sometimes a miion may 
d isch au ^  i t s  ftmotidn^ t  s tr ik e  when i t s  bargaining function fa ils#  I t  
i s  possible th a t  the discharge of th is  function may be fru s tra te d  by some 
groups o f members refusing  to  s tr ik e .  This i s  one case of a breekdown in  
union au tho rity , but i t  i s  not sp eo ifica lly  examined ih  th is  th e s is .  À 
union may also  discharge several o ther fanotions, such as education and 
welfsnre, but these ra re ly  c o n flic t with i t s  primary function Of bargaining 
and no breahdowh in  union au thority  i s  experienced^
Next in  importhnoe to  i t s  bargaining function l i e s  i t s  law* 
envorcSment function, th a t i s  the function of seeing th a t i t s  members d is ­
charge th e i r  ob ligations la id  down in  the union-management agreement. I t  
i s  in  the dlschars'® o f th is  function th a t most instances of breakdown in  
union au thority  take p lace, y Groups of members spontaneotisly s tidke vdthout 
wuthority o f th e i r  governing body and in  defiance of the procedures la id  down 
in  agreements. Before, a union; i s  able to  e ffec tiv e ly  exercise i t s  authority
(34) Moore» In d u s tr ia l Relations and the Social Order
" (Haiper) 1951.
over the work groups to  secure th e ir  obedience to  the ru les  contained in  
the;agreemehts i t  i s  necessary th a t a union re c ru i t  a l l  employees ae 
members^; fflaus, the exercise of the law-enforcement function i s  conditional 
on the e ffec tiv e  discharge of i t s  recruitm ent function* ,
For th is  reason there i s  an a p r io r i  Case in  favour o f s t r i c t  
union secu rity  provisions o f  the ’union* or the :'closed* shop# (35) All 
employees must be brought w ithin the ambit. o f t jbhe law* e s t ablished ? by 
co llec tiv e  bargaining* There i s  no room in  a law-abiding socie ty  fo r  
perverse o r iso la te  individual who refuses to  confim  the norms of behaviour 
estab lished  by co lieo tive  bargaining. I t  also follows th a t a maniement 
which allows à union to  founder in  i t s  recruitm ent d rives or ac tually  
f ru s tra te s  à union * s attempt to  organise employees, i s  ipso facto  fo s te rin g  
in d u s tr ia l anarohy in  i t s  workplace* This does not mean th a t a management , 
i s  forced, to agree tp  a l l  proposals o f a union to strengthen i t s  secu rity  
over i t s  members,, but i t  i s  in  i t s  own in te re s t fo r  man^;ement to  agr©e. to  
the most e ffec tiv e  means to  strengthen the  membership drives of a unidh^
This may be accomplished by the recognition o f  shop stewards as the exclusive 
means fo r  processing grievances and helping the shop stewards to  re c ru it 
employees as imion members.
An examination o f the formal s tru c tu re  of à union shows th a t i t  
i s  much le ss  f i t t e d  to  enforce the obligations of i t s  members than i t  i s  
to  negotiate th e ir  r ig h ts . I t  has an extremely weak au th o rita rian  struo* 
tu re . Although i t s  co n s titu tio n  estab lishes a cohtraotUral re la tionsh ip  
between the union and i t s  members i t s  o f f ic ia ls  can ra re ly  order th e ir  
members in  the same way as a manager orders and secures obedience of h is  
subordinates. In  the mam a union re l ie s  on moral ( 3 0  au thorityfounded 
on the sense o f o b l i^ t io n ,  to secure obedience of i t s  members. Union 
members respect the orders o f th e ir  governing bodies and o f f ic ia ls  when they 
fee l th a t the orders are r ig h t and good. . I f  a group of members fe e l th a t 
the b rd e r  is, n e ith e r r ig h t nor ^ o d  i t  may not obey an order of i t s  union, 
and hence a breakdown in  union au thority  takes place* : ; ,
' . There,are several o ther featu res of the formal s tru c tu re  of a 
union which m ^e i t  vulnerable to  s tra in , d isorganisation  and breakdown.
The au th o rita rian  s tru c tu re  i s  b u il t  on a democratic hierarchy of governing i, 
bodies, and a buo^aUcraCy of o f f ic ia ls  responsible fo r  adm inistering policy , 
and the work of these two sides sometimes conflict*. The chain of command 
i s  b lurred, the s ta tu s  s tru c tu re  i s  in d e fin ite  and the ro le  s tru c tu re  i s  not 
sharply defiried. In  add ition , there i s  a mass o f  l a i ty  who have no 
d iffe re n tia te d  fUnctions to  perform. For th is  reason, apathy o f union members
(35 ) Of. Aileh* Power in  Trade Unions.
(36) See PatersChi A Methetic Theory of Social Organisation.
I ...
i s  a consequence of the passive ro le  of union membership both in  theoiy 
and in  p rac tio e . For somewhat s im ilar reasons the incentive and punitive 
system of a union i s  un likely  to  motivate individual members to  perform 
th e ir  best o r to  prevent groups d isrupting  the operations o f a  union, A 
union has control over i t s  paid o f f ic ia ls  and active  lay  members vüo ; 
asp ire to  acquire positions o f power and au th o rity . But on the whole i t  
appears th a t the formal s tru c tu re  o f a trade union i s  so d e lica te  th a t i t  
only works e ffec tiv e ly  in  specia l conditions* : ; ' ; r : ■ : « ;
À breakdown in  union au thority , whereby members' refuse to obey 
an order of th e i r  governing body, i s  dependent on there being a s h if t  in  
; power from the formal to  the informal s tru c tu re  of a union. The most , 
important fea tu re  o f th is  informal s truc tu re  i s  the informal group. The 
Ardeer case suggests th a t the most important informal groups a rise  not 
from p o li t ic a l  re lig io u s  or friendship  in te re s ts ,  but from the organisation 
of work by management, Informal groups of workers have th e ir  respective 
common in te re s t  in  job ra te s , piecework, incentive schemes, occupations,' 
promotional system, and the departmentation of th e =organisation . These 
informal groups have two main functions. The f i r s t  i s  to  attempt to safe­
guard th e ir  jobs by marking out demarcation lin e s , re s is tin g  d ilu tio n , 
challenging manning ra tio s  and work loads, and demanding conditions to pro- 
te c t  themselves against the deployment of personnel. The second function 
i s  to  improve th e ir  s ta tu s  in  re la tio n  to  otlier groups by attem pting to  
increase th e ir  job ra te s  and improve th e ir  working conditions, I f  a group 
fe e ls  th a t i t s  in te re s ts  are not being protected  by the union i t  may decide 
to  take m atters in to  i t s  own hands. This i s  l ik e ly  to  happen in  those 
unions which have few common occupational in te re s ts ,
Vi/hy does power s h if t  to the informal group? Is  i t  due to the 
fa ilu re  o f p a r tic u la r  union o f f ic ia ls  to cope v/ith th e ir  ro le s , or i s  i t  
due to  the size  and composition of a union? (3?) Or is  i t  due to the 
d e ta ils  of the organisation structu re? (38) The Ardeer case re je c ts  
these contentions, and.puts forward the proposition th a t i s  the general 
union-management re la tio n sh ip  which determines the way a union organisation ’
; functions. The empirical evidence suggests th a t th e ‘determining fa c to r  
i s  the behaviour of management. I f  the l a t t e r  'co-operates* in  the sense 
of p a rtic ip a tin g  with the union to  e s tab lish  law and order in  the workplace, ■ 
power:remains with the formal union s tru c tu re . In  p a r tic u la r , the ru les  
estab lished  by the nego tiating  procedure are important, including those 
re la tin g  to  the au thority  and re sp o n sib ility  of shop stewards in  the 
processing of grievances of the .work groups. The promotional and demotional 
ru le s , and the agreements re la tin g  to demarcation lin e s  and d ilu tio n , also 
go a considerable way to  s a t is fy  the job secu rity  needs of the work groups,
(37) See The Dock Worker,
(38) c f , Roberts* Trade Unions Government and Administration 
in  Great B rita in , (B ell) 1956,
The job evaluation scheme estab lishes  a r e la t iv i ty  between job ra te s  and 
maintains the s ta tu s  of the various work groups^ Agreements re la tin g  to 
the conditions covering piecework and incentives s a t i s fy  both job secu rity  
and s ta tu s  d rives o f the work groups,
%hen a manag©mônt does not co-ioperate w ith a union in  e s tab lish ­
ing law and p rd ef in  the work place. tlu^oUgh d o llec tive  bargaining, th a t i s  
negotiation  and estab lish in g  agreement, a union tends to  function as a 
p ro tes t gr^up in  Order to  challenge the a rb itra ry  actions o f ménagement*
In  such a s itu a tio n  informal groups, are forced to  fend fo r  themselves, and 
breakdowns in  union au thority  are accompanied by; d ra s tic  ; s h if ts  i n  power 
from the formal to  the informal group* In  workplaces long characterised 
by in d u s tr ia l anarchy the establishm ent of order i s  p a rticu la rly , d if f ic u lt ; ,  
any action  taken by management IS viewed with suspicion by i t s  work group*; 
Any sharp drop in  morale i s  lik e ly  to  be followed by spontaneous action on 
the p art of the work g r o u p -Where there are no ru le s  to  cover sp ec ific  
points o f dispute between the p a r tie s  the gap i s  open, fo r d iso rder to 
develop* The procedural clauses included in  the . nego tiating  pfocediire are : 
net su ff ic ie n tly  meaningful to. the work group to e l i c i t  a sense of obliga­
tio n  and: thus cOntroi; i t s  behaviour* The morale of a work team i s  ; 
prim arily  determined by the . behaviour of management, and when i t  makes 
mistakes because of bad mana^ment, ..a union i s  th ru s t .■ in to  a s itu a tio n  of 
having to  re p a ir  the damage* For th is  task  i t  i s  singu la rly  u n fits
The Ardeer base suggests tha t, the, d iso rderly  conduct of Work 
groups can be bibught under control by co llec tiv e  bargaining, bpth in  the 
long and in  the short term* In  th e  long teim i t  i s  necessaiy to  condition 
employees to  the rule; in  law in  industry* This i s  achieved, by a union 
es tab lish ing .equ itab le  r ig h ts  and obligations fo r  i t s  members* In  the 
short period, when d isorder breiks b u t, i t  is  necessaiy to  re -e s ta b lish  
control of thé groups* behaviour through co lieo tive  bargaining* A ûnion 
i s  unable by i t s  hatufé and s truc tu re  to achieve th is  alone; i t  can only 
achieve i t  through negotiations with maha^rnent to; permit the re tu rn  to  ; 
work o f  the ré c a lc itra n t groups*; ' In  workplaces Usually characterised  t)y 
the ru le  o f 1 aw the s h if t  of power fo r the informal gioup i s  not d ra s tic ; 
fo r th is  reason th e re  were no bad breakdoYms in  the au thority  of the 
T, & G.W.U* a t Ardeer* In  the post-war p erio d  the 1 .0.1* management a t  
Ardeer a ss is te d  the union in  es tab lish ing  law and order in  the factory* .
PART I  ■ ÏMPAOT OP UNION . OF MAHAOEMENT
. ,CHAPTBR I .  THE CHANGING FRAMEWORKS OF GOLLECTIVE .BARGAINING 
Introduction
From a labour re la tio n s  viewpoint the h is to ry  of Ardeer factory  
f e l l  in to  four periods, ( f )  The f i r s t  was the pre-union period from the 
commencement of facto ry  operations in  1873 u n ti l  the emergence of unionism in  
1913* The second period la s ted  u n ti l  1936 and covered the f i r s t  world war, 
the recession and "boom in  the tw enties and the Great Depression, In th is  
period, Nobel’s Explosives Company, which owned Ardeer, was merged with 
o ther in te re s ts  to  form 1*0*1, The th ir^  period was ushered in  when 1.0*1* 
signed agreements with the major unions to ^ v e rn  wages and working conditions 
of most o f i t s  employees on a company-wide basis* The fourth  period, the 
post-war period, commenced in  1947 when a formal nego tiating  procedure came 
in to  existence*
In  the fourth  period union-management re la tio n s  reached an advanced 
and soph istica ted  stag©* During the th ird  period I*C*I* labour p o lic ie s  
were f e l t  in  B rit ish  industry fo r thé f i r s t  time. For Ardeer, i t  was a 
formative decade; the stage was se t fo r the post—war development in  union- 
management re la tions*  The second period was not p a r tic u la r ly  s ig n ifican t 
fo r  understanding events in  the fourth  period* Only a few social fea tu res 
a ffec tin g  unioïwnanagement re la tio n s  in  the post-war period could be traced  
to  the f i r s t  period*
: During the fo rty  years of experience of union-management re la tio n s  
negotiations over wages and working conditions a t Ardeer were conducted 
w ithin a number of frameworks* The term ’framework’ was chosen to i l lu s ­
t r a te  the existence of a bargaining re la tionsh ip  between two in s ti tu tio n s , 
union and maneigeraent* Changes in  frameworks wére due to  three reasons» a 
fundamental change in  ownership of, or control over the facto ry  management, 
or i t s  a f f i l ia t io n  to  a new enployeré federation responsible fo r  conducting 
of negotiations; an amalgamation or federation  of unions o r the a f f i l ia t io n  
of Unions to  a new confederation o f unions fo r the purpose of conducting 
negotiations; o r the in i t ia t io n  of a bargaining re la tio n sh ip  between the 
factory  mana^ment o r employer association  with a union or confederation fo r 
the f i r s t  time* The co llec tiv e  bargaining framework was antecedent to  a 
negotiating  procedure by which the p a r tie s  se t out ru le s  to  govern future 
negotiations on su b stan tia l matters*
(F) inform ation fo r th is  and the following sections was 
compiled from the ’Factory Rate Book’ which se t out 
changes in  ra te s  ;0f pay and working conditions fo r 
Ardeer facto ry  from I9II to  1950* The author was 
indebted to  Ardeer Deputy Dabour O fficer, Mr. T* C* 
Hamilton, who was able to give a good deal of in fo r­
mation about the early  h isto ry  of the factory* Mr* 
Hamilton was in  no way responsible fo r  the in terp re­
ta tio n  of events described in  th i s  chapter*
I n i t ia l ly ,  the fao to :^  management and the l o c a l /branch of the 
various unions w ith members a t Ardeer ûonduotédnégotiatibhs. The frame­
works fo r  co llec tiv e  bargaining then consisted o f  the Nobel’s Explosives 
Company on the one hand, and one of the several lo ca l union organisations, 
on the o ther. Over the period from the days of World War I  to ju s t  before 
the outbreak of World War I I ,  Ardeer had few s é tt le d  terms of reference fo r 
conducting union-manageraent re la tio n s  as there were many changes in  the 
frameworks of co llec tiv e  bargaining. These changes were due to s ta te  
in terven tion  in  the f i r s t  World War, the post-war development of national 
negotiations fo r  determining wages and working conditions fo r  the explosives 
ind,Ustry, the link ing  o f the explosives with other in d u strie s  in  the tw enties, 
the crea tion  of I .C . I , ,  and the amalgamation of Unions to  bring the A.B,U. 
and the T* & G.W.Ü. in to  ex istence. I t  Was not u n t i l  ju s t before World 
War I I  th a t I .  C .I. cp lleo tiye  bargaining frameworks were estab lished , and 
these remained in  existence fo r  the next twenty y ears . .
Sec. 1» The emergence o f the  unions
Forty years a f te r  the factory  commenced operations trade unions, 
made th e ir  f i r s t  appearance in  Ardeer. Unionisation of general workers 
d id  not come excessively la te  to  th is  factory  compared with other p lan ts  
elsewhere in  B rita in . ; I t  was during th i s  period, in  the few years before 
World War I ,  th a t membership of general worker unions rose spectacularly  
from th ree hundred thousand to  over a m illion . The organisation of sk ille d  
workers in  Ardeer Was la te  oompafed with th a t in  thé ne i^bou ring  Clyde 
shipyards. Ardeer was re la tiv e ly  iso la te d  in  the south-west of Scotland, 
and i t  d id  not pay union organisers to  v i s i t  the facto ry  to  re c ru it a few 
members. The move to  organise workers in  Ardeer came frtm the rank and 
f i l e  themselves*.
The way in  which the general union came to  represent the workers in  
Ardeer was ra th e r unusual. In  1913 general workers went ; on s tr ik e  fo r  
increased pay. This was the f i r s t  b ig  s tr ik e  in  the fa c to ry 's  h is to ry .
At the  time they went on s tr ik e  they were not unionised. They had th e ir  
informal leadersh ip , f o r .i t  was p ractice  fo r management to  meet deputations 
of worlcers to d iscuss wages and working conditions. The s tr ik e rs  had no 
f in a n c ia l resources. The lo ca l branch of the  S co ttish  Union of Dock 
Labourers stepped in  and maintained them. A fter the s t r ik e r s ’ re tu rn  to 
work, the S.U.D.L. became o f f ic ia l ly  recognised by Nobel’s îbqplosives , 
Cœnpany as the bargaining au tho rity  fo r  general workers w ithin the fac to ry .
The p a r tie s  sighèd th e i r  f i r s t  agreement in  1913.
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Shortly a f te r  th is  several c ra f t unions entered in to  arrangements 
with th e  Conpany to  obtain wage increases fo r th e ir  members employed in  
Ardeer. These unions were the Federated Society of E leotrotypers and 
S tereotypers, Amalgamated Society o f Carpenters and Jo iners and the S co ttish  
P ain tersi Society. In I914 Nobel’s  entered in to  formal agreements with 
four engineering UhionsI; th e  Blacksmiths* Society, E le c tr ic a l Trades Union, 
Amalgamated Society o f Engineers and the Amalgamated Society of General 
Toolmakers, Engineers and M achinists. Smaller groups of craftsmen were 
then brought under agreement by the Glasgow Amalgamated Coppers * Society 
in  1914, the Glasgow Typographical Society in  I9I5 and the Amalgamated 
S la te rs ’ Society of Scotland in  1917# ^  the end o f World War I  boileav
makers, tinsm iths, pïumbers and bricklayers^ a l l  had thG ir wages and working 
conditions fixed  hy agreement between th e ir  respective unions and Nobel’s .
Although the unions were recognised by the Management th is  d id  not 
imply th a t they had strong memberships. There was no reason to  suppose 
th a t the S.U.B.L. was able to  organise a m ajority o f general workers. Net 
a l l  the f i t t e r s  belonged to  the unions represented a t Ardeer, thé A.S.E. and 
the A.S.G.T.E.M. In  1915 there was a mass walk-out of f i t t e r s  including 
non-unionists, the only s tr ik e  by engineering tradesmen ever to  occuf in  
Ardeer. In  the same year th e  S co ttish  Painters* Society called  a s tr ik e  
which led  to  the withdrawal of a l l  pa in ters  from the fac to ry . So i t  was 
probable th a t most pa in ters  belonged to  th e ir  union. The extent to which 
o ther craftsmen were members of th e ir  respective unions was mücnown.
The general worker union was in  a weak p o s itio n . For a number of . 
years the S.U.B.L. was precluded from bargaining with management over the 
wages and working conditions fo r women employed a t Ardeer* . The S.U.D.L. 
was also unable to  tack le  the d if fe re n tia l  wage s tru c tu re  which ex isted  in  
the fao to iy . I t  was not unusual fo r  a group of workers to approach the 
fac to ry  management to  ask i t  fo r  an increase in  th e ir  job ra te s .  Many 
years elapsed before the general worker union was able to  secure the 
exclusive f ig h t to  Channel a l l  employee grievances and .complaints through 
i t s  organisation .
The general workers’ union also fa ile d  to control the piece r a te  
s tru c tu re . . P fh o tica iiy  a l l  the female operatives in  the factory  a t th a t 
time were paid by piece work. There were a la rg e  nimber o f jobs performed 
by men who were also paid by re s u lts .  Even the rab b it catcher, who was 
appointed a t  thé lab o u re r’s hourly ra te , was stim ulated to  snare h is  
victim s ’a t the ra te  of a penny per pair* . The union, found i t  impossible 
to  take Up the numerous questions which arose under a piece work system*
The female operatives frequently  resorted  to  d ire c t action to  press th e ir  
case with management. On some, occasions they did not allow the union to 
represent them. Management made m atters worse by dealing d ire c tly  with 
these workers in s te a d .of ; through th e ir  union o f f ic ia ls .  On one occasion
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a group of workers opposed a ce rta in  provision in  an agreement and went on 
s tr ik e .  Management gave way to the workers* demand. This did not help to 
s ta b i l is e  union au tho rity  in  the facto ry .
Sep. 2. S ta te  in terven tion  in to  in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s
Ardeer became subject to  an inquiry by the Admiralty shortly  a f te r  
the general workers’ s tr ik e  in  I9I3.  This enquiry was held under au thority  
of the ’F a ir  Wages*"Resolution passed by the House of Commons in  1891 and 
amended in  1909.  The reso lu tion  was designed to  prevent contractors to  
the Grovemraent paying th e i r  employees .lower wages than those p revailing  
. amongst ’good’ employers in  the same d i s t r i c t .  The enquiry feV e^ed th a t 
weekly w â^s in  Ardeer were s lig h tly  le ss  than in  neighbouring fac to rie s , 
because the hours of work v/ere sh o rte r. . In 1911 thé management had reduced 
the hours o f work to  f i f t y  while other fac to rie s  worked f if ty - fo u r  hours 
per wSek. The Admiralty reoommended th a t some increase be made to  the wage 
ra te s  of explosives workers. . The Company then increased the vfage ra te  by
an ex tra  fa rth ing  per hour. Apart from bringing thé union in to  Ardeer the 
s tr ik e  also brought the, workers an increase in  pay.
Another gfcup o f  Ardeer workers also secured an increase in  pay due 
to  s ta te  in tervention  in  I9I5# The Conciliation Act of 1896 allowed the 
Board o f Trade to  appoint an a rb itra to r , i f  both p a r tie s  agreed to  re fe r  a 
d ispute to  i t  fo r  settlem ent. In  the only case re fe rred  from Ardeer, the 
jo in ers  claimed an increase in  th e ir  rate, of pay, based on th e ' ra te  paid in  
the d i s t r i c t , of Glasgow; ; The Company resis ted , the claim but th e ,. a rb itra to r  
found in  favour of the union. Most of thé other .c ra fts  benefited  from th is  
decision . Their v/age r a te s  were also  raised  to  those applying in  Glasgow.
Shortly a f te r  thé f i r s t  world war, a case s im ila r to  the jo in e rs ’ . 
claim was refe rred  v o lu h ta rily  by the two p a r tie s  fo r  a rb itra tio n  to  the'" 
In d u s tr ia l Court which had been s e t  up, in  I919* I t  gave the decision in  
favour of tbe National Union of P rin ting , Bookbinding,rMachine Ruling and 
'P ap e r’Workers, fo r i t s  members employed in;Ardeer to  be paid the c ra f t  ra te  
applying in  Glasgov/. As f a r  as i t  was known, th is  dispute was the only one 
ever submitted to  the In d u s tr ia l Court from Ardeer.
Ardeer, along w ith many other fac to rie s  in  th e  country, was. subject 
to  war-time a rb itra tio n  and w a^ fegu la tioh . . In  I 915 the Mimitions of War 
Act gave the Cocmittee on Production power to  make a rb itra tio n  decisions and 
to  : enforce them. .In d ifeo tly ,. th is  had the e ffec t o f ra is in g  wages o f  
craftsm en.in Ardeer. Under the terms of th e ir  agreements with the Nobel’s
Explosives Company,. the craftsman reoeiyed the Same increases as d id  Glasgow 
workers.
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In  1916 an amendment to the Munitions of War Act gave the Committee 
power to  f ix  wages for. ce rta in  classes of munition workers. ..Until the end 
o f the war Ardeer general workers had th e ir  wages a lte re d  by government 
decree. Under the oircumstances i t  was agreed by the S.U.D.L. th a t there 
was no poin t in  nego tiating  wages* Wages in  AMeer continued to  be adjusted/ 
by the domnittee on Production, and u n ti l  1920 the Ih d u stria l Court, under
i t s  t r ^ s i t i o h a l  war-tiine powers. ;
The wage f ix a tio n  machinery o f the trade boards, estab lished  under 
an ac t o f 1909 to  prevent the sweating of labour in  non-unioniséd industry* 
also had .the e ffe c t of ra is in g  wages in  Ardeer. A board was estab lished  
fo r  the paper box industry.V As Ardeer had a paper box u n it , workers on th is  
process were .brought under the trade board regu la tions. As time progressed 
and the general imion grew stronger in  Ardeer, the wage ra te s  fixed  by 
voluntary op lleo tive bargaining outpaced those s e t by regulations of the 
trade boards. In  the post-war I I  period, the la tte r .c e a se d  to  have any 
e ffe c t in  Ardeer because of the high level of; wages paid under union agree­
ment. Groups which were techn ica lly  subject to  wage f ix a tio n  ly  the wage 
councils, a s .th e ,o ld e r  boards la te r  became known, included workers employed 
on laundering, boot repairing , clo thing. Catering, t in  and canister-making.
Sec. 3% The growth o f ex tra -fac to ry  frameworks
The p rinc ipa l e ffe c t ; of the wai^time regula tions of wages was the 
deyelopmnt of industry-wide bargaining frameworks. In  many in d u stries  
p lan t bargaining Was superseded by negotiations between national organisations 
of employers and unions; (Hie explosives induètty  was no exception, and in  
1919» an agreement was negotiated by the. National Federation o f General 
Worker Unions With the Explosives Trades Employers* A ssociation. This s e t 
up a new co llec tiv e  bargaining framework*
The co ilec tiv e  bargaining framework fo r the explosives industry did 
not . appear to be too stable* In  the récession of the tw enties the wage 
ra te s  of explosives workers were reduced. The authorisatiori of th is  action 
was not made by the explosives employer s .  . The Engineering and National 
;Etapioyerd* Federation was responsible fo r th is  decision, a f te r  most; o f the 
general worker and c ra f t  unions had met i i  in  conference. The Ardeer branch 
strongly disapproved of the action taken but Was not strong enou^ to s tr ik e  : 
against i t*  There was fu r th e r  un rest a. few years; l a te r  when the factory  
management; re ferred  a dispute cf; minor importance to  the Engineering and . 
National Employers’ Federation. In  I925 i t  was agreed th a t fu ture negotia­
tio n s  were to  be confined to  explosives employers and the unions named in  
the agreement. There was to  be; no re p e titio n  of link ing  negotiations in  
the explosives industry  to  those of other in d u s tr ie s .
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, The tw enties were a period in  which the in s ti tu tio n s  representing 
management and labour changed rap id ly  and d ra s tic a lly . There were many 
amalgamations, amongst the trade unions. The two g ian ts , the Transport 
and General Workers* Union and the Amalgamated Engineering Union, both 
came in to  existence in  the early  tw enties. The T, & G.W.U, took over 
the task  of representing the workers h t Ardeer in .p lace  of the S co ttish  
Union of Dock Labourers. The A.B.U. se t up a sing le  branch to  represent 
engineers in. the fao to iy  who-had formerly belonged to: the A, S .l ,  and the  
A.S.G.T.M. & E. The la rge unions, by elim inating many regional, 
occupational and in d u s tr ia l unions brought common id ea ls  and purposes to  
organised workers in  B ritish  industiy . This le d  to  g rea ter uniforadty 
in  union-management re la tio n s .
Snployers also  found i t  necessary to combine to  determine common 
a ttitu d e s  to  labour problems and to  s e t up cen tra lised  agencies fo r 
conducting negotiations with unions, on,an industry-wide basis* , The 
Explosives Trades anployers* Association was an example of such an organissp- 
tio n . I t  had a re la tiv e ly  short life*  The B.T.S.A, soon lo s t  i t s  
id e n tity  in  the la te  tw enties, and was reconstitu ted  as a group w ithin the 
Chemical and A llied  Snployers * Federation, The l a t t e r  body was formed, 
fo r  thé sole purpose o f dealing  with labour re la tio n s . I t s  p rinc ipa l 
ob jective was to  co-ordinate employers in  th e ir  dealihgs with claims by 
worknen. An employer member was not empowered to  concede an improvement 
in  w a^s o r in  working conditions, uhless f i r s t  authorised by i t s  s e c tio n a l, 
oommittee and endorsed by the executive board of the federation .
The Chemical and A llied Enployers* Federation appointed represents^ 
tiv e s  to  the Chemical Jo in t In d u stria l Council, thé l a t t e r  having been 
constitu ted  in  1918 to  detemaine wages and working conditions in  the 
chemical industry . The general worker unions made up th e  employee side 
of the C .J.I.G . . When the E.T.E.A,, lo s t  i t s  separate id e n tity  the C .J.I.C , 
became also  the co llec tiv e  bargaining framework fo r  explosives workerév 
This d id  not please the explosives workers who took objection to  being 
placed in  the same category as chemical workers, althqugh,they both 
belonged to  the same .unions* In  1931 the repW sentatiyes of the explosives 
woikers demanded the r ig h t to  negotiate With thé explosives employers over 
a proposed wage reduction. Although the r i ^ t  was granted : explosives 
workers found th a t they were oh; the same minimum wage ra te  as thé ; chemical 
worker -  and there  they remained. The explosives workers did not; mourn'
thé passing of the C.J.I.C. in 1935*
See* 4* The im pact-of 1 .0 .1 . Ltd.
Union-management re la tio n s  at: Ardeer were not h i t t e r  as they were in  
many p a rts  of B rit ish  industiy  during the, twenties and th i r t i e s .  I t s  
workers did not . take p a rt in  the General S trik e . A fter 1926 the Union- 
management re la tio n sh ip  was influenced greatly  by I . 0 .I ,  A cen tra l labour 
department was estab lished  and fao to iy  managements, including th a t o f Ardeer, 
were required to  conform to I .G .I ,  p o lic ie s , A ese p o lic ie s  were influenced; 
by the philosophies o f S ir  Alfred. Mond* . Far-sighted Mend believed th a t 
managements had to  end th e i r  au tocratio  wéys and lé c p ^ is ë  the p a r tic ip a tio n  
of trade unions in  form uiating and adm inistering wagés and working conditions* 
The Mond-Turher ta lk s  aimed a t  es tab lish ing  law and order in  industiy . 
P rac tica l expression of Mpndism was given when I .C .I .  estab lished  i t s  own 
co llec tiv e  bargain ing  frameworks with general worker, engineering and 
build ing  unions. : 1 .0 ,1 , then became a ’p a tte m -se tte r*  fo r  in d u s tr ia l 
re la tio n s  in  B rita in ,
At Ardeer lo c a l agreements governed the deteiraihation Of w a^s
f o r  the various groups o f  craftsmen, remained in  force fo r  nearly a decade 
a f te r  1 .0 ,1 's  c rea tio n . This period was one o f declining, or s ta b ilis e d  
Wage le v e ls . 1 .0 ,1 , had l i t t l e  influence pn the negotiations which took 
place in  the engineering, building and p r i n t i ^  in d u s tr ie s . For à large / 
employer such as 1 .0*1,, th is  was a d is tin c t disadvantage fo r  i t  had no 
control over the wage ra te s  paid to  i t s  ov/h employees. 1 .0 ,1 . brought 
pressure to  bear on the c ra f t unions to  end a l l  lo c a l, d i s t r i c t .dhd regional 
arrangements and to  su b s titu te  exclusive agieemehts w ith th^ Company fo r 
determining wage ra te s  fo r  Craftsmen in  1*0.1* employ. . Two ’n a tio n a l’ 
agreements wore signed, one fo r t%  engineering trades and another fo r  the : 
build ing c ra f ts .
Four important co llec tiv e  bargaining frameworks, which encompassed 
Ardeer, were thus created  in  the second h a lf  of the th i r t i e s .  On the 
employer’s side of each was 1 ,0 .1.  On the unions’ side were respectively  
four general worker unions, eight engineering unions, one build ing trades 
federation  representing  twelve constituent uhions, aDd in  the fourth  frame­
work, a l l  the aforementioned unions. This l a s t  framework came in to  being 
in  193d; when the Cpmpar^ secured ah agreement pn working ophditione which . ; 
made the l a t t e r  common to,most workers within its/employ* These agreements 
remained in  force in  the post-war I I  period.
All the unions, which became p a r tie s  to  agid.ements with I .C .I .  were 
u ltim ate ly  draira together in to  a loose ;confederation^ khpwn as the Signatory 
Unions. , . They found r t  necessary to  meet when one o r more c f  th e ir , lo ca l 
I branches or d i s t r i c t  councils asked fo r iamendmentC to the agreement s e tt in g  
out the Compahy-wide working conditions. ; 12ie custom grew to discuss other
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m atters which affected  th e ir  members in  I .C .I .  When the Company desired  to  
: sound the unions* views on a chan^ in  labour po licy , or when i t  wished to 
submit proposals' fo r  incorporation in  a formal agreement, i t  approached them 
co llec tiv e ly . For example, in  1938 the p a rtie s  discussed the recognition 
o f shop stewards, and the Company submitted to the unions a proposed 
' negotiating  procedure to govern union-management re la tio n s .
One event threatened the development o f s ta b ilis e d  co llec tiv e  bargain­
ing frameworks created a t the in i t ia t iv e  of I.C .I*  This event was due to  
the d esire  of the  Amalgamated Engineering Union to  * go i t  alone*. Thé 1936 
agreement which regulated the minimum wages fo r  craftsmen was signed not only 
by the A.B.U.', but by another seven engineering unions. 1 .0 ,1 . did not 
want to  create eigh t co ilec tiv e  bargaining frameworks. I t  wanted, and got, 
one agreement with eigh t se ts  of signatures which had thé appearance o f 
adm inistrative s im p lic ity . In the year following, the signing o f  the agree­
ment, the A.B.U. sought an amendment to  the agreement. The other unions 
immediately f i le d  claims fo r s im ilar amendments. I ,C .I .  then asked the 
À.B.Ü. to  meet the o ther unions and work out a common policy  with respéct to 
wage ra te s  fo r engineering craftsmen. The A.B.U* refused, demanding that: i t  
negotiate with I .C .I .  alone. This did not su it the Company which strongly 
urged the crea tion  of a union confederation fo r the purposes of conducting 
negotia tions. F ina lly , the A.B.U. met. I .C .I .  in  p riv a te  and signed the same 
agreement as had been signed by the o ther unions* This , comic opera was not 
; repeated and from th a t time the A.E.Ü* co-operated w ith .other unions in  submitt­
ing new demands on the company.
A fter signing the agreement re la tiv e  to the negotiating  procedure 
in  1947, conferences; between thé Company and the uiiiohs became more frequent* 
Consequently, there  were more and more in ter-union  meetings held to  work out 
po licy . The S i^ a to ry  Unions adopted no formal ru les  fo r  the conduct of 
th e ir  business. , No formal voting system was developed, and most m atters 
were se tt le d  by discussion . Where a. vote was taken i t  was usual to  allow 
each union one vo te . Failure to  present a co-ordinated policy would have 
been d isastrous to trade union unity  and d isruptive to the process of negotia­
tio n s . The spokesman fo r  the Unions came from the general worker organisa­
tio n s, whose in te re s ts  were much g rea te r in  the chemical and explosives 
in d u strie s  than were those o f the c ra f t unions. Nevertheless the c ra f t  
unions had more delegates as a group a t the Signatory Unions* meetings w d 
th e ir  viewpoints were well s ta te d ,
-Althou^ there was national bargaining -  r e a l ly  Company-wide -  on 
some important sub jects, the great bulk of union-management re la tio n s  a t 
Ardeer in  the post-war period .took place at; fao to iy  le v e l. Negotiations . 
were between the factory  management and the individual unions. . Thie 
d iffe red  from the national scene where multi-union bargaining was th e  custom. 
N ational and m ulti-union bargaining tended to b ring  uniform ity in  union- 
management re la tio n s  to I.C .I*  fa c to rie s , as they had in  other p a rts  of 
B ritish  industry . "
Conclusion ' '
A co llec tiv e  "bargaining framework existed  when there was a general 
"bargaining re la tio n sh ip  "between union; and management. The sim plest f r ^ e -  
work ex isted  when n e i^ tia tio n s  took place "between a management operating a 
sing le workplace and; a  union organising the one occupational group* More 
complex frameworks came in to  existence when ah employers* association  o r 
associations negotiated  with a federation  or confederations of unions organ­
is in g  d iffe re n t occupational groups. Sometimes these complex frameworks 
covering an industiy  or eyen in d u stries  were created to  obtain g rea ter 
uniform ity in  wage ra te s  and general employment conditions. At o ther times 
the co llec tiv e  bargaining frameworks were estab lished  following the merger 
of managements o r the amalgamation or federation  Of unions.
The framework of collective; bargaining was extremely important fo r  
the conducting of negotiations as i t  fixed th e ^ n e r a l  terms of reference 
fo r .th e  two p a r tie s , union and management* The general terms of reference 
fo r each party  were to  be found in  the to ta l  soc ia l s tru c tu re  o f each 
in s t i tu t io n . While the to ta l  social s truc tu re  of e i th é r  management or, * 
union could a l te r  regardless of the co llective bargaining framework, a 
change in  the co llec tiv e  bargaining framewoik usually  involved a rad ica l 
departure from the  previous terms of reference fo r  eonduoting negotiations* 
Moreover, the more complex the co llec tive  bargaining framework the more 
complex were the general terms of reference because of the d iv e rs ity  of the 
socia l s tru c tu re s  involyed*
A fter the I .C .I .  frameworks were established there were no fundamental 
changes in  the employer or the union side . Indeed, there  were in teg ra tin g  
forces a t  work which helped to  s ta b ilis e  the ^ n e r a l  terms of reference.
The control, which I .C .I .  , exercised over i t s  many fao to iy  managements was 
strengthened, and th is  had a d e fin ite  effect; ©hi the managements* behaviour.
The unions were gradually  drawn together in to  a confédération which moulded 
a approach to  I .G .I .  problems. This was tru e  even though negotiations
between the Company and the unions were bonducted a t  two d iffe rë n t lev e ls , 
a t  national and a t  faCtoiy levels* - The local negotiations idiich were most 
important to  union^anagement; re la tio n s  a t Ardeer wèfe conducted w ithin 
given se ts  of reference made possible by stab le  co llec tiv e  bargaining 
frameworks, •
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In  signed, an agrbbment which e s t ablished a n e g o ti#  ■ ^
; procedure fo r i t s  fa c to r ie ^ ; : U  nbSûtiatiàg  procedure: emhOdiêd the" procédural 
ru les  hÿ which union and management conducted th e ir  re la tionsh ips in  coming 
to fu rther, a^ceements ahoht w a^s and working bohditiohs# . The important 
po in ts o f the I .C .I ,  agreement were the récognition of shop stewaMs, the " 
eetablishment of a grievance procedhre and the convening of *looal* conferences 
betweeh union and mahagement to  deal with disputes* Provision was made fo r : 
.^intermediate * and ’headquarters’ o^  ^ The/agreement also included
à new statement on union membership and foimial récognition o f I .C . I . ’s jo in t 
consultation machineiy, known as the Works Council Scheme,
P rio r to  the 1947 agreement I .C .I .  fa c to rie s  conducted th e ir  union- 
management re la tio n s  according to  lo c a l custom. This was not very sa tisfac^  
to ry  and was resented by the unions. No shop stewards were o f f ic ia l ly  
recognised in  I .C .I ,  factories*  and there was no easy: way to transm it Worker 
grievances to  th e  unlon**manas©mant nexus. At Ardeer the lo ca l union o f f ic ia l  
wrote and asked management fo r a factory  oonfefenoé. dUe Consequéhtiàl
delays in  s e t t l in g  disputés during the war Ted to  u n o ffic ia l actions by the
Thé importée having a well publicised  and understood procedure r 
fo r  bringing worker complaints to  the a tten tio n  of management, and tihion, was 
fu l ly  rea lised  in  the years which followed i t s  in troduction . Thé I947 
agreement, although s lig h tly  amended .some years la te r ,  WaS; generally regarded 
by both mana^ment and union as a very effec tive  one*
The, negotiations leading to  the agreement on the negotiating  procedure 
were p ro trac ted . Compromise came only a f te r  some in tense debates, so#é / 
very hard bargaining, sh il'ting  of positions ahd -a ca re fu lly  woordedr reso lu tion  , 
which meant'much more to the p a rtie s  than mere sophistry . (P)
(p) The author was indebted to  Mr. B. /Higgins, .National, 
O fficer of the T. & G.W.U. and Ih*. G. Aitken, Research 
; . O fficer of the:;A,B.U. fo r supplying union records .
re la tin g  to  thé N e,^ tia tion  Prooedurei 1946%7 and the 
, n e ^ t ia t io n s  which Ted to  the signing o f  the/ nationaT, 
wage agreements, 1935- 38*. .They were in  no way 
responsible fo r :th e  Author’s in te rp re ta tio n s  o f the 
records.
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Sec. 1. Searching fo r  a negotiating  procedure.
The o rig in a l agreement, signed in  1911, between Nohel'e Explosives 
Gompahy and the S co ttish  Union of Dock Labourers was, in  a sense, a negotiat­
ing procedure* I t  contained clauses which recognised the rig h t o f  the 
union to  represent ce rta in  c lasses of workers employed in  the facto ry , tho 
r ig h t of. management to  h ire  personnel regardless of union membership and . 
the f ig h t of Workers to  re f ra in  from becoming members o f the union, i f  they ; 
so desired . Thé agreement also la id  down a procedure fo r  dealing with wage 
claims, and i t  provided a method by whibh grievances were to  be processed. 
/S im ilar agreements wéré; s i^ e d  in  tu rn  with fouf Engineering unions in  I9I4 .
. Prom time to  time there, were changes in  the ru les  goveming the
re la tio n sh ip s  o f  union and management* ;In l 919 w ith the advent of national 
bargaining on minimum wages the lo ca l union b r^ c h  was precluded from demand­
ing general wage increases* This p roh ib ition  was Continued in  th e 1925 
agreement. In  th is  la s t  agreement provision was made fo r  dealing with d is ­
putes which arose on the factory  f lo o r i  They were re fe rred  to  a he^St^ 
qu a rte rs’ conference composed of delegates from thé  employers* associa tion  
and the tîiree général worker unions. Thus the idea o f  a ’court of appeal* 
became known to Workers in  Ardeer, With a fu rth e r change in  the co llec tiv e  
bargaihing framework the  ru les  o f procedure of the Ghemical Trades Jo in t 
In d u s tr ia l Council were adopted to  resolve disputes in  th e  explosives indus- 
tryV The collapse of the O .T .J.I.O . brought to  an end a l l  formal procedural 
arrangements between general worker unions and facto ry  managements of 1 .0 ,1 .
1*0.1. and the general worker unions negotiated the 1936 wages/agree­
ment without reference to formal ru le s . A1though th is  agreement was prim arily  
designed to deal w ith wage ra te s , i t  also included some procédural clauses. 
These s ta ted  th a t only negotiations between the Company and the national head­
quarters of the unions were empowered tC. a l te r  the minimum ra te s  o f wages fo r 
general workers. S im ilar procedural clauses;were included in  the agreements 
with the c ra f t  unions/ and in  the 1938 agreement s e tt in g  out working oohditiona 
fo r  I.G .I*  fa c to r ie s .  There was no formal agreement which se t /out a compre- 
hensive negotiating procedure#
Negotiations between the A.E.U. and I .C .I ,  in  1935, p r io r  to  the 
signing of th e i r  wages agreement, showed the importance of a negotiating  
procedure fo r  conducting: orderly  unioiwnanagement re la tio n s . The A.E.U* 
complained ,to  I.C .I*: th a t many of i t s  fac to :^  managements had turned down 
demands fo r Wage increases* Their d i s t r i c t  committees did not know how to 
resolV^ these disputes fo r  there was no estab lished  system of appeal, as 
ex isted  in  the engineering industry  generally . , A.E.U; o f f ic ia ls  were very 
surprised  to  le a rn  th a t Lord le lo h e tt  (Alfred Mond) ; had to ld  a group of 
unioh o f f i c i ^ s  th a t they were free  To come and d iscuss th e i r  d isputes with 
the Central Labour Department any time th a t they wished. The union o f f ic ia ls  
expressed th e ir  ighorano© of th is  statem ent. ; In any event, they contended:
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th a t t h e r e a  vast differenoe hetween meë^ ^^  the Oompany inform ally to  
ta lk  about a cLisagreement, and having ,a; se t procedure : which guaranteed 
workers the r ig h t of appeal when th e ir  demands ware turned down by th e ir  
respective fao to iy  managements. Thé A.B.U. wanted a negotiating  procedure. : 
I t  d id  not get one; in stead  it ;  got a new agreement which introduced a 
imifoim wag® engineering craftsmen employed in  I . 0 .I . fa c to r ie s .
Confusion continued, to  dog the minds of employees : and union o f f ic ia ls  
as, to  how they were to  process th e ir  disputes w ith th e  company* The l a t t e r  
t r ie d  to  dodge the issue of a formal negotiating  procedure* The unions, 
oh the other hand, did not l e t  the m atter die* While discussing the agree­
ment re la te d  to  working, conditions in  1938, they reminded th e  Company th a t 
there was s t i l l  nO co rrect way fo r dealing With grievances a r is in g  on the 
Workshop :flopr* L ater in  the Same year, I .C .I .  produced ce rta in  memoranda 
on a proposed nego tiating  proceduré,. The scheme i t  put fo rth  was very 
oonplex. I t  asked the unions to  recognise the 1 .0 ,1 . Woiks Council Scheme 
and assigned important ro les  to  the ind ividual councillors in  s e t t l in g  
grievanoes. I t  d id  not mention shop stewards whom the  unions wished to  
hâve recognised. I t  also proposed to  use the works councils as sounding 
boards fo r  Changes in  facto ry  or Opmpary personnel p o licy . The unions 
objeoted to  the inc lusion  of the works councils which they mistrusted* 
Theipropoaais were shelved, - '
Sec. 2* E stab lish ing  a negotiating  ofoceduret /
•Soon a f te r  the war, the unions renewed, th e ir  demand fo r  a formal 
agreement goveraing a h®gotiating procedure. On th is ; occasion thé unions 
took the in i t ia t iv e  ah i presented the Company W ith  a oompréhensive document 
s e tt in g  out th e i r  proposals. The l a t t e r  were not im like those which the 
Company had submitted to  the tihions in  1938.  They omitted reference to  the 
works bouhoils and they provided fo r Company recognition of shop stewards*
In  presenting th e ir  case the unions s ta ted  th a t i t  was e ssen tia l fo r an :
agrsement to  be: réachedt The Company was aware of the urgent neoessity  of 
es tab lish ing  an adequate procedure by which complaints of thé workers could 
be ;dealt with; expeditiously* /-/The' war had brought some d isorder to  in d u s tr ia l 
re la tio n s  w ithin I .C .I .  fa c to r ie s . Negotiations therefore commenced in  
earnest, and a f te r  s ix  months of strenuous bargaining, a national a^eem ent 
was signed in  May, t g # ;   ^'
The agreement estab lished  a procedure by which workers were perm itted ; 
to  ra ise  any m atter their liked  with th e i r  management. A se rie s  of steps were 
incorporated in  the procedure. The f i r s t  s e r ie s :o f  steps took place in  the 
section^ p lan t o f depârtmént and involved the shop steward and the, lin e  manage^ 
merit; The hext se rie s  of steps involved union-management conferehces o f  which 
there wéfé th ree  types* F irs tly , there was a ’lo c a l’ bonferénoe. A;Ioqal ■ 
conference was ca lled  a t the request of e ith e r  the local; uhiOn branch or the
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facto ry  management* I t  was a two way communication system which was used 
regu larly  by both s id es . Under the terms of the agreement i t  was necessary 
to  re fe r  to a local conference any workshop issue which involved a national 
agreement o r  the general; labour policy o f the Company. I t  was impossible to 
s e t t le  these m atters w ithin the p la n t. Secondly; provision wah made ; fo r  the . 
holding of an * interm ediate • conference i f  the p a r tie s  fa ile d  to agree a t the 
local lev e l; and th ird ly , ’ v a ’headquarters’ conference was held when 
agreement fa ile d  a t the interm ediate one. This provedure embodied the idea 
of a court o f  appeal.
The: composition of the delegations were varied  to s u it  the needs of 
each conference. At the interm ediate conference rep resen ta tives  of the 
headquarters of the union and the Company attended to  bring outside influence 
on the lo ca l parties*  At the headquarters’ conference n e ith er of the local 
p a r tie s  Were present and. th is  allowed the conference to  consider the issue 
im partially* Only a f te r  the ; p a r tie s  nad disagreed was .no tice to be given 
fo r  a lock-out or s tr ik e .  No such notice was ever given in, re la tio n  to  s tr ik e s  
occurring a t  Ardeer*
Several important p rin c ip les  Were recognised in  co n stru e tii^  the I . 0 .I .  : 
procedure. F ir s tly ,  time lim its  were imposed on the union and management 
o f f ic ia ls  to  discharge t.heir functions so th a t disputes were handled without 
undue delay* Secondly, the proceedings Of each conference were recorded in  
an agreed minute so /th a t there was no confusion o r recrim ination about the 
settlemeht* (Hrlrdly, emphasis was placed bn s e t t l in g  the issue aS hear to  
the workshop flo o r as possible * : Fourthly/ the agreement, re c o ^ ise d  the
inportance o f a  c lea r statement of the dispute ahd a p recise statement of. 
the resolution* The: establishment Of a 'communication system infoiroed a l l  
workers of the procedure so th a t th é #  understood i t s  steps and abided by them.
Sec, 3* B eco^ ition  o f show stew ards.
: The Company recognised the o ffice  of shop steward. In doing so i t  
reversed i t s  previous policy* In 1936 the Chief Labour O fficer of I*G*I. 
to ld  the A.F*U, th a t he hated the ; idea of shop stewards* Theim icns believed 
th a t the. Company feared th a t  shop stewards v/ould undermine the works council 
system, a prophesy which # # e d  out to be co rrec t. The unions wanted the 
shop stewards not only to^  ^ and co lle c t dues,; but to  bring
m atters to  th e 'a tte n tio n  of the Union O ffic ia ls  and management before they 
reached danger p o in t.' In  1947 ; the Company di'^ - not challenge the fundamental 
conception o f th e  shop stewards’ functions. The unions* spokesmen 
expressed sa tis fa c tio n  of the Company’s change of policy  and declared th a t 
the agreement gave s ta tu s  to  Capable and earnest ranlc and f ile rs*  This 
was bound to  re f  léç.t i t s e l f  : in  b e tte r  leadership on: the workshop floor*:
The agreement laid : doim oohditlons vUioh covered' the e lection  of shop 
.stewards, th e ir  q u a lif ica tio n s , th e ir  tenure in  o ffice  and th e ir  duties*
During: the negotiatfons there  was some ■bargaining on re la tiv e ly  k ihor points*
The Company, fo r  in stance, pushed up the q u a lifica tio n s  o f candidates fo r 
shop stewards* They were to have a minimum service of two years in  th e , 
Company’s employ and be a t  le a s t  twenty-five years o f  age* The Company 
believed th a t these q u a lif ic a tio n s  were necessary to  obtain persons with a 
reasonable balance c#' d isc re tio n  and judgment* ' This p royisioh vras subsequently 
a lte red  to  one y ea r’# service and an age lim it of twenty-one*
r
• Under the tAms of the agreement the shop steward, was, required to 
sign a c reden tia l f o ^ , in  which he uiidertook to  accept re sp o n sib ility  fo r  
carrying out, h is  WRVles in  accordance thé terms of the negotiating  .
procedure. He v/as hi so required to! observe a l l  agreements and to  accept 
personal responsib ility : fo r seeing th a t union members w ith in 'h is  section  
complied with agxeenîents* ; Vihère the shop steward w ilfu lly  fa ile d  to  observe 
the terms of h is  c red en tia l, or induced others to break union-management^ 
agreements, the Company reserved the r ig h t to  request a union to  withdraw the 
steward’s credential;#
Unions wereUot perm itted to  appoint th e ir  shop stewards. They: had 
to be e lected  by a b a llo t o f the union members in  the factory  o r section  
w ithin the factoiy* B allots,w ere under the control of the respective unions* 
Candidates were res^M^icted to workers of the p a r tic u la r  e lec to ra te  which the 
steward was to represen t. By an amendment in  1951» the Company secured an
additional r i ^ t  btdr!ïéiéb:;f with the trade unions any objections which i t  
had to  the e lec tio n  o f  an ind iv idual, and to d iscuss th is  objection a t  /, 
conference before t l #  e lec tion  was confirmed*
There were lim ita tio n s  bn the actions of shop stewards* Hewas not 
allowed to  ac t outside the section fo r which he was e lected , unless by special 
agreement w ith /the ij»na^ment* He was not perm itted to  leave h is  work 
without perniission %  the foreman; th is  permission Was not to  be unreasonably 
withheld* A steward’s e a rn in g  were safeguarded while oariying out the 
d u ties  prescribed by the agreement'*
An in d iv id u ^  employee who wished to  ra ise  some issue with the: manage­
ment of the p lan t w #  f i r s t ,  required to  discuss h is  grievance with h is  fore­
man* I f  he fa ile d  %o receive a sa tisfac to iy . answer from the foreman, he was 
then permit ted /to  ; consult h is  shop steward a t the next, break in  working time* 
The .shop steward v/as empowered to  d iscuss the issue  with the foreman. I f  
the m atter s t i l l  réâfe.ined u nse ttled , the foreman was required to  take the 
complaint: to  h is  lin e  manager who, was to  confer with thé shop steward* This
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gavé the shop steward the exclusive r ig h t to  process; individual grievances 
beyond the foreman. On a motion by the miions in  1951, an amendment wa© 
in serted  which allowed the aggrieved member t o . acoompai^ h is  shop steward 
when discussing h is  complaint* This provided à démocratie check on the 
work o f the steward and a t  the same time safeguarded the steward from u n fa ir  
c r itic ism  by a d is s a tis f ie d  member*
The shop steward became the lin k  betweeh the radc ah f i l « |;  and the 
lo ca l o f f ic ia l  o f the! trad e  union* AVhere ah issue remained unresolved fo r 
three days between the. management and the shop steward, the l a t t e r  reported 
the m atter to  the lo ca l union o ff ic e r , who was then empowered to  make formal 
represen tations to  the management* The Gonpary then met the union w ithin 
fourteen days a t ' loOal conference’• Shop stewards invariab ly  accon^anied 
thé union delegation* I t  was possib le  fo r a union member to  take a m atter 
to  the union meeting/' so by-passing the shop steward* At Ardeer th i s  was 
only a ra re  opoufrence, as most is su e s  th a t went to  the formal ’loca l 
conference’ stage emanated from the p lan t and not from the union meeting*
8eo* 4* The ’Bargain’ of thé I*C«I* Y/orks Council SchemI*
The Company’8 immediate prioe in  thèse negotiations fo r recognising 
shop stewards was recip rocal recognition by the unions o f the I*0,1* Works 
Council Scheme* ; ■ This scheme was organised with the object of fo s te rin g  
jo in t consultation between management and employees* Works councils were 
composed of equal -représentatives of employees and management* In addition , 
there were group or d iv isional councils made up o f .representatives from the 
facto ry  councils* For the whole of I*C .I. there was a cen tra l council 
which considered m atters of général in te re s t  to  the Company, /  The scheme 
was m istrusted by th e  : trade union movement* The unions f e l t  th a t i t  was 
ainied a t  countering th e ir  e f fo r ts  to  organise the workers* To them, i t  
was ’company unionism’* In T 947 I .C .I*  did not attempt to  give the works 
oouncil a prominent place in  the negotiating  procedure as i t  proposed to 
the unions in  I938* I t  merely sought to  have thé scheme recognised by the 
unions * This counter claim held up agreanent on thé nego tia ting  procedure v 
fo r  six  months* Four conferences were held before the issue was resolved.
The sequence of the conferehces ^ e d  some l ig h t on the resu lu tion  of 
controversial union-mahagement nego tia tions. At the i n i t i a l  conference the 
unions’ case f c r  e s tab lish in g  a negotiating  procedure Wjas presented. The 
Company then asked fo r  the inclusion of i t s  counter claim. The meeting 
was adjourned to  allow the unions to  consider th is  new development* At 
th e  second meeting the unions opposed the recognition o f the works councils* 
The Company refused to  withdraw i t s  counter proposal and the conference 
fin ished  abruptly* The unions then considered ways of re-opening negotia- : 
tions to see whether x t was possib le to; modify each p a r ty ’s a ttitude*  A 
th ird  conference was held a t wliioh both p a rtie s  attempted to  t e s t  how f a r  
each would go in  compromising th e ir  position . The fourth  oonferenoe con#
sidereà a number of counter-proposals inolüding thé Compaiy’s o ffe r  .to broaden 
i t s  policy  on union membership. Agreement was reached on the cen tra l issue 
and the re s t  o f the terms were se ttled*  /
The unions complained th a t - I ,0*1* was oomplioating the negotiations 
by seeking repognition: of the works councils* They f e l t  th a t jo in t consulta­
tio n  was one thing} à negotiating  procedure/was another. In actual fa c t,  
thé Company did  not e s tab lish  a conneotion between the two* The uniorm did 
not want to  give re o o ^ it io n  to  the t ^ e  of jo in t consultation  foUnd in  1*0,1* 
They soon rea lised  th a t some recognition would have to  be made in  order to 
secure the recognition o f  shop stewards* In  re-opening negotiations the 
uhions sought to make some recognition of works councils — but as l i t t l e  as 
possible* V The Company spokesman then questioned thé unions’ ’good faith* 
and wondered i f  th e ir  proposals d id  not ’savour lik e  a deathlbed repentance’ t
• ’Let us be honest* What i s  on your, minds? You are re a lly
"t^yioe to  doim the works councils are you not, and you think 
i f  you get the récognition o f shop stewards through, you . 
w ill be one s t a ^  fu rth e r  to  downing them? ’
This did not séem very he lp fu l to  the negotiations} but the unions
did  not pick up th e i r  b r ie f  cases and walk out* For they knew th a t  while
the Company refused to  deal w ith the u n o ffic ia l shop stewards, the unions ‘
were hot able to  prevent thé works councils from meeting. : So in  th a t way the
Company was in  a b e t te r  ta c t ic a l  position* The unions responded with
admirable re s tra in t}  th e ir  spokesman, also an able nego tia to r, replied*
’I f  you are try in g  to  be proyooative and get our dander up and 
. "get us; going, i t  cannot be done;, we are too old in  the tooth 
to be caught out th a t way/’:
The ta c tic s  o f  the Company spokesman yielded dividends* For the 
union spokesman soon acknowledged th a t while the unions were o r i^ n a l iy  
suspicious of the works councils,, th is  a ttitu d e  had gradually chahged* This 
statement was veiy d iffe re n t frOm the one made sho rtly  before by the unions 
which completely opposed thé works c o u n c il#
The way was then open, fo r  the f in a l round of negotiating* ' This took 
the course o f ah argument over the exclusion and inclusion  of certa in  words; 
i t  was important th a t both mutually understood the lim its  o f each o the r’s 
obligations* The unions took objection to  the word support, which i f  ^ r e e d  
to , might have involved them in  fo s te rin g  works co u n c ils / The Company s ta ted  
th a t i t  had no in ten tio n  of forcing employé# to p a r tic ip a te  in  jo in t 
consultation  where i t  was not wanted* The unions refUsed to agree to  the 
word support and su b stitu ted  formally rècoghiséi and th is  was as fa r  as they 
were prepared to  commit themselves* .
Chapt. I l ,  Seo* g *
The preamble, f in a l ly  agreed, s ta ted  amongst other things th a t 
nothing was intended to  r e s t r ic t  the works council scheme of the Compare, 
o r the freedom of any individual employee to  associate  him self w ith the 
advisory and consultative functions of the works council* Under th e ir  
constitu tion  the works councils were forbidden to d iscuss any subject which 
came in to  the realm o f union activ ity*  The Compai^ suggested a fu rth e r 
clause in  order to  allay, fea rs  th a t the works council might be used to  
encroach on union functions* Under th is  clause the Company undertook to  
make the fu l le s t  use of the negotiating  procedure*
These seemingly small changes to  each p a r ty ’s p o sition  were e ssen tia l 
to  bring about agreement* . The process of compromise was described by the 
secretary  of the Signatory Unions when he said*
’Trade union negotiations with employers do not mean th a t the 
trades unions have i t  a l l  th e ir  own way a l l  the time; nor do 
employers have i t  a l l  th e ir  way a l l  the time; we must meet 
on common ground and compromise must take place on both sides 
to reach a common so lu tion** -
This point of view was put much more te rse ly  during the more h ec tic  moments 
of negotiations by another union o f f ic ia l*
’I f  you do not give us recognition on one side , you cannot
'have i t  on the other and we reaoh a deadlock’*
Sec* 5* 1*0*1* policy  on union membership*
1 .0 ,1 , did more than recognise shop stewards in  the 1947 agreement*. 
The l a t t e r  included a new pronouncement in  regard to  the Company’s policy  on 
union membership fo r i t s  employees* In  1938 the unions asked the Company 
to  recognise the p rin c ip le  of having a l l  i t s  employees members of th e ir  
appropriate trade unions. The Company refused* I t  reaffirm ed i t s  s ta te ­
ment of 1933 of recognising Union membership as not being inconsisten t with 
Company personnel policy* L ater in  1938, the Company took a more positive  
stand in  regard to  employées who became members o f a union and then refused 
to pay th e ir  union dues* The Company E^reed to take action  against these 
unfinancial members i f  the unions supplied the factory  managements with th e ir  
names* But 1*0,1, refused to  coerce i t s  employees who had never been 
members o f  a union in to  jo in ing  an organisation*
No mention was made of union membership by the unions when they sub­
m itted th e ir  proposed negotiating  procedure to  I* G ,I, in  1946* In order 
to  a llay  fears  of the unions in  regard to  the Company’s works council scheme, 
i t  made a more p o s itiv e  statement in  regard to union membership* The 
Company spokesman s ta ted  th a t i t  wanted i t s  employees to  be union members* 
I*C,I*, i t  s ta te d , had no in ten tio n  of try ing  to  d e fle c t the workers’
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lo ya lties ,from  tlie t r ^ e  uhion movement. Accordingly i t  suggested the 
in se rtio n  in to  thé preaflihle o f  two clausesi one declaring  th a t i t  was in  
the in te re s ts  of the workers and the Gonipany th a t a l l  employees should he 
memhers q f a trade union which was s i^ a to r y  to  thè. agreement j and the 
second which s ta ted  th a t while union membership, wasI not a  condition of 
employment in  1 ,0 .1 ,.  the Companj>- undertook, to bring to  the notice of 
workers i t s  policy in  regard to  union membership. The e ffe c ts  of these ' 
changes of Oompary policy  on union memborship were important to  Ardeer as 
w ill  be seen in  the following chapter.
/ Chapter I I ;
Oonclusion
>Tlie n e g o t ia t i^  procedure estab lished  ce rta in  ru les  as to  how the 
p a r tie s  were to  conduct’th e ir  relations*  The negotiating  procedure 
estab lished  some p a r tic u la r  ternis of reference fo r  the parties*  .negotiations* 
I t  d id  not e s tab lish  the to ta l  terms of reference. The co llec tiv e  bargain­
ing framework which was b u il t  on thé; soc ia l s tru c tu res  o f union and 'manage- 
merit was more im portant because th is  fixed the general terms of reference* ■ 
The negotiating  procedure d id  not even lay down-/aiW^/|^^ terms of 
: reference by which the p a r tie s  were to  conduct negotiations*. Inço rtan t 
tOCTfls of reference were also included in  the agreements which established,, 
the wages s tru c tu re . and se t out employment conditions*
. .. The significarioe of the negotiating, procedure , lay  in  the p rin c ip le  
th a t  the p a r tie s  agreed to regulate th e ir  conduct in  accordance with rules*
In  e ffe c t, they re ç o ^ is e d  Ithe ru le  of law' in  industry* Eights, and 
obligations of each party  were se t out in  the nego tia ting  procedure,
Eeference to  these r ig h ts  and obligations helped the course b f  negotiations, 
but it : was riot possib le  to  resolve a l l  disputes by looking a t the provisions 
of the negotiating  procedure*: I t  was S t i l l  neoesSary to negotiate bv er
/many issues, and the negotiating  process, as i t  was seen in  th is  ohapter^^ 
was strewn w ith many p i t f a l l s  -  co n flic ts  of in te re s t ,  s ta tu s  s itu a tio n s , 
in e ffec tiv e  methods o f reaching goals, arid inadequate oommtmioation*
The e ffe c ts  of the establishm ent of the nego tia ting  procedure on 
management, union and employees were extremely im portant, I t  estab lished  
a formal lin e  of communication fo r  dbaling with the grievances of informal 
work groups* \ Line management was obligated to  t r y  and resolve the grievance 
. as, near to  the workfloor as possib le . I f  i t .  fa ile d  the union had the r ig h t 
to  intervene, and provided the uriiori gave i t s  approval, the grievance of 
, the informal work group became a formal one between union and management,
V/hen décisions were made by the lo ca l conferenoes between union and management 
rep résen ta tives the employées were required to  observe the terms of agreement 
reached, : The negotiating  procedure was not only a communication charinely 
it: was also a formal lin e  of au thority^
GHAPm III*  THB GROm Of THE LOCAL IMIOI? GMAHXSATIQjST 
Iritroduotion
The union; w ith tke la rg e s t membership .in Ardeer was the Transport 
and .General Workers* Union* ,/ About two thoUsahd.general workers were >
; members of the T*& G,W,U*. Prom the h^iewpolnt of uniorwnanagement re la tio n s  
in  the facto ry  i t  was by f ^  the most important* ' A fter the  T* & 'G.W.U. csjne 
the Amaigamat ed Engineering Union both in  , size  ; and importance * _ About three :
hundred f i t t e r s  ware employed a t Ardeer* The A*B.U* held f if te e n , ; ; compared 
to the T* & G.W*U* *s one hundred and. séventy-^seyen, conferences, w ith Ardeer 
management in; the post-war period* „
’Éae Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers had more than a hundied 
members. Then in  numbers of members^oanie the B lec trio a l Trades Union, 
the  S co ttish  Painters* Society j Associated Blacksmiths * : Society, the B oiler­
makers! Society, Piumbing T r^ e s  Union,: Patlonal Union of Sheet metal V/orkers, 
and thé Amalgamated Union of Building Trades Workers* The Amal^anated 
Society of Woodcutting Machinists and the three p rin tin g  unions had very 
small memberihips in: Ardeer* The to ta l  number of conferences called  
between Ardeer .management and a l l  these; unions to ta lle d -a  mere eighteen in  
the post-war period*
The T / & G*W*U* branch was made up of workers from. Ardeer. The 
A*E* U* branch was composed of craftsmen liv in g  in  the; area, most o f whom 
worked a t  Ardeer* The organisation o f other c ra f t  unions d iffe red ; some 
had local re s id e n tia l branches fo r Ardeer workers, o thers included them in. 
branches which had h  wide geographical or in d u s tr ia l membership*'
See* 1* The T. & G*W*U* branch in  depression* recovery and war* (?)
.. .'/yWhen the Great Depression l i f te n  only a handful of general workers 
a t Ardeer b e lo n ^d  to the lo ca l branch o f the T,& G*W*U* ; Less than. one 
hundred put of s ix teen  hundred men were paying regular, contributions to  
the T* & G*W*U* Not one of the five  huhdred female workers was a fin an c ia l 
member o f the union. The ohslaught. Pf unemployment and the collapse ;pf 
the lo ca l organisation, due; to  the tra n s fe r  of the fu ll-tim e  o ffic ia l; to  , , 
another area, had l e f t  the union weak and Ineffective* The lo ca l branch 
gave up the strugg le to  re o ru it new memberé* , I t  continued to  meet during 
the depression w ith  An Average attendance o f about; h a lf  .a dpSjen raemberd* - 
I t  made no suggestions, e ith e r  in d u s tr ia l or p o l i t ic a l ,  as io  how the economic
(?) The Author was indebted to  Mr* A*.Matthews,; lo c a l . V 
secretary  of the T. & G*\V*U* fo r  ailpwing him to : 
use the minute books of the Ardeer Branch 1928k1954* 
In  no way was he responsible fo r the in te rp ré ta tio n s  
of those records*
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catastroplie might have ibeen solved* In five years i t  lodged only one claim, 
and th a t was fo r a small group-of workers* The worders d id  not tu rn  to  
th e ir  union in  th e ir  hour o f g rea tes t need*
The hranoh he Came active again with the up-turn of the business 
c^cle* îtaploÿment in  the factory  rose and the branch commenced a campaign 
tp organise the general workers* The methods i t  Chose were tra d itio n a l, ' 
in  the sense th a t they followed the time-worn paths of the early  unionists* 
Meetings were Organised in  ^Residential areas adjacent to  the factory*
L eaflets  were diStitibuted w ithin the facto ry . Ai door-to-doOr canvass was 
made o f workers *' homes* Membership climbed slowly and Spasmodically*
This increase was a ss is ted  by the tra n s fe r  to  Ardeer of groups Of union 
members from Ihglish . fa c to r ie s , departments of which were closed down to 
ra tio n a lise  explosives production in  thé United Kingdom, These workers 
were accustomed to a union l i f e  and brought new v i t a l i ty  to  the branch*
Claims fo r  increased wage d if fe re n tia ls  were lodged by the branch With the 
facto ry  management * J The branch also  passed many motions which bore on the  
, events of ; the la te  th i r t i e s  -  the Miners * Hunger March, : the Spanish Revolution, 
Abyssinia arid Nazi, Crérmany*
anployment in  thé facto ry  expanded tO a peak of eleven thousand 
during the second world war* Union membership reached two. thousand but 
declined as peace drew near, For the f i r s t  time in  the h is to ry  of th e  
facto ry  the uniori co llec to rs  addressed meetings o f th e ir  departments in  th e  
moss rooms* 9 ^  was never withdrawn but management s t i l l  r e s is ­
ted  uniori a c t iv ity  in  the factory* ; I t  refused to  allow the branch to  take 
a b a llo t amongst workers on the job about claims which the union Was 
proposing to  submit to  management*, Union co llec to rs  p l^ e d  no p a rt in  the 
gj^evancè procedure* Local factory  conferences to .d iscu ss  worker complainte 
were arranged by ] the branch secre ta iy  with the management.
Kie war saw in d u s tr ia l u n re s t/a t Andeer* The immediate causes were 
explainable in  terms o f in te rn a l factory  ooriditionsi The lo ca l branch of 
the T* & G*W*U* had l i t t l e  control over s tr ik e  action  taken by workers 
w ithin the factory* Workers, and p a rtic u la rly  female operatives, frequently  
took th e ir  complaints d ire c t to  lin e  management* 1*0*1* was p a r tly  to  . 
hlame fo r  th is  p rac tice  fo r  i t  d i^  not rScognise shop stewards, nor had i t  
éricouraged thé èstçblisM ïent of a gripvànce procedure Whioh might have solved 
the Workers* d issa tisfac tio n s*
The union organisation did not always function effectively*
; îWeguèrit c ritic ism s were made o f the person who then held the position  of 
branch seori®tary, fo r  f a i l in g  to a r r a n ^  conferences with thé management 
in  order to  d iscuss workers* grievances. The regional o f f ic ia ls  of the
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T. & G*W#U, were ca lled  to  make aii enquiry in to  'branch, a ffa irs*  The 
regional o ff ice rs  in  tu rn  reported th a t the d isgrun tled  members did not , 
a ttend  the meetings of the branch and had no idea of union rules*
Female members, in  p a r tic u la r , had l i t t l e  idea o f the obligations 
they incurred/when they joined a union* At one conference, shortly  a f te r  
the war, the regional o f f ic ia l  to ld  the rep resen ta tives o f female opera­
tiv e s  -  very m ch to  th e ir  su rprise  -  th a t they could not go bn s tr ik e  
simply because a sectional meeting had re jected  management’s offer* Under 
the rulSs of the T* & G*W*U* a dispute had f i r s t  to. be reported to  i t s  
Executive Council which alone could authorise a s t r ik e .  The actual c a llin g  
out o f the workers was the re sp o n s ib ility  of the appropriate lo ca l and 
regional o f f ic ia ls .  The Union had obviously not succeeded in  e s ta b lish ­
ing i t s  au thority  over the workers a t  Ardeer fac to ry  a t  th is  time.
Sec, 2* Strengthening the lo ca l T. & G*W,U* branch
A fter the war the branch went through a number of developments 
which had the e ffe c t o f strengthening i t s  au thority  over i t s  membership*
The branch took action  against those members who ac tiv e ly  disobeyed the  
decisions of branch meetings, A Resolution was passed which prevented 
co llec to rs  ( s t i l l  not recognised by management as shop stewards) from speato-  ^
ing  in  the canteens about union policy* This stopped ce rta in  ind iv iduals from 
misleading workers about the o f f ic ia l  decisions of the branch* By th is  
means the branch reduced the p o ss ib il i ty  of u n o ffic ia l s tr ik e  action  by 
the workers and kep t the control o f a f fa ir s  securely in  i t s  grasp#
Action Was also taken against the anarchical elements w ithin the 
branch* The ch ie f offender in  th is  regard was a member o f the Commuhist 
P arty , In  194Î he was removed from the chairmanship o f the branch "because 
he p e rs is ted  in  c r i t ic i s in g  other branch o ff ic ia ls*  The action  taken by 
the branch was not fo r  p o l i t ic a l  reasons# The branch took the view th a t 
i t s  o ff ic e rs  had to  work together, i f  i t  was to  increase i t s  membership and 
become an e ffe c tiv e  bargaining au thority  in  Ardeer# The same person was. 
defeated in  e lec tions fo r  shop steward* These events took place before the 
b ienn ial conference of the T# & G#VY#U* declared th a t no member o f the 
Communist Party  was allowed to  hold o ffice  in  the union* I t  was the Left ’ s 
own fo lly  and in d isc re tio n  which led  to  i t s  eclipse in  lo ca l union a f fa ir s  
in  Ardeer#
Perhaps the most important action  talcen by the branch was the 
removal o f the secre tary  from office* This person had o r ig in a lly  been 
elected  in  the depression days when nobody e lse  wanted the job* Later he 
was appointed a fu ll-tim e  o ff ic e r  o f the union# There were many complaints 
th a t he was not attending  to  h is  d u tie s . An attempt was made to, elim inate 
him from negotiations with the factory  management* At la s t ,  as fee lin g  
mounted against himj the branch a t a plenary meeting ca lled  on the national 
executive of the T# & G*W*U* to  remove him* A fter an enquiry he was d is­
missed from h is  fu ll- tim e  p o sition  in  the union#
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The impact of the nevf 1,0*1* negotiating  procedure: in  1947 was
tremendous* The recognition , of shop stev/ards hy : the Compare, and the 
assigning td  them o f important ro les in  the settlem ent of grievances, 
strehgthened the.il ranch in, i t s  control over i t s  members. ., The management :: 
was not perm itted to  deal d ire c tly  with worker delegations, ' a hab it which 
had been r i f e  in  Ardeer factory* On one occasion the T. & G,Vf*U4 o f f ic ia ls  ; 
warned th a t in d u s tr ia l anarchy would re su lt i f  management d ea lt.w ith  a . ; ■
delegation o f workers when the l a t t e r  v io la ted  an;agreement by u n o ffic ia l /
: s tr ik e  action* Worker grievances were channelled through - the o f f ic ia l  
■representatives o f the union* The workshop o f f ic ia ls  of the loca l branch 
wr»re now able to  work in  the open, whereas before they had no o f f ic ia l  status* 
Membership grew as. a percentage, of the fào to iy ’s 'work force, and in  the base 
of the women, .'the increase was spectacular*
One of the main reasons why the nego tia tin g  procedure helped 
strenÿhen the branch was the extension o f  i t s  organisation in to  the workplace. 
Individuals p a rtic ip a ted  in  the work of the union by bringing th e ir  
complaints to the. a tten tio n  of the shop stewards* ■ These were d e a lt w ith 
Ih  the  f i r s t  instance a t the p la n t level* - In  some im portant disputes 
sectional meetings were: called* : I f  d irec t action was involved the meetings 
were w ell attended* U nfortunate ly ,'these usually  decided in  favour o f 
m ilitan t: action, including not observing union-mani^ement agreements. A . 
breakdown in  union au thority  was usually  associated w ith a high degree of = 
partic ipa tion*  : ; Smaller attendances met in  a more re f le c tiv e  mood*
: ’ Generally speaking, informal leadership ofwoik groups was obnsideiw 
ably reduced by the re c o ^ it io n  of shop stewards* A ll shop stewards were 
elected  according to  the 1 ,0*1# negotiating  procedure* The l a t t e r  se t out 
the shop stewards! du ties and resp o n sib ilitie s*  These n ü e s  Conditioned, 
the behaviour of the shop stewards when they were carrying out th e ir  
functions* ; Trouble over the shop stewards was prevented because they had 
d e fin ite  r ig h ts  and ob ligations. They did not ’manufacture* grievances*
In  th e . main they abided by the negotiating  p ro oedure *
A fter the negotiating  piooedure came in to  e ffe c t the committee of 
the lo ca l branch was re -co n stitu ted  to  include shop stewards, a p residen t 
e lec ted  by the annual meeting of the branch, and a secretary  who. was a 
fu ll-tim e appointed o ff ic ia l*  The new seoretaiy^ who was appointed in  
1948 a f te r  the dism issal o f h is  predecessor, worked in  close touch with the 
committee* The monthly meetings o f the branch were so badly attended th a t 
the committee grew to  be the re a l power in  lo c a l organisation* The 
secretary  as co-ordinator of the loca l organisation, once an issue came 
to  the a tten tio n  of the local union o f f ic ia l ,  became thé key man in  
subsequent nego tia tions. I t  was h is  re sp o n sib ility  to  prepare and present 
h is  union’s case to  management* At the same time he drew heavily on the 
knowledge o f the shop stewards fo r they had the sp ec ific  experience of the 
actual working of the plant* Quite frequently  the fu ll- tim e  o f f ic ia l
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in i t ia te d  improvements fo r. Ills members* He bad to work in  dlose, co-operation 
with the shop stewards. , When,issues went to an in term ediate bonference, - 
both the regional and the national o ff ice rs  p a rtic ip a ted  in  the negotiations 
and the loca l o f f ic ia ls !  importance declined* As very few headquarters 
conferences were.held in  connection with disputes emanating from Ardeer, 
the importance o f the lo ca l union o f f ic ia ls ,  both lay  and fu ll- tim e , was 
paramount in. m aintaining sa tis fa c to ry  labour rela tions:,
SeoA 3* T, & G*W*IJ* extends i t s  membership*
: From 1947 to  195$ there was a steady increase in  union membership 
amongst general workers a t Ardeer4 . Although a m ajority  of .workers, were 
organised, the T* & :G*W,U,: was unable to obtain a hundred per cent of 
workers throughout the facto ry . While union membership v/as widespread 
throughout the various:departm ents, some sections: remained obstina te ly  non­
union o r only, p a rtia lly - organised^ Some of these were predominantly : /  
manned by femalë opeiàtivès* The différence in  sex, however, was in su ff-  - 
io ien t to  explain why some sections refused to be drawn in to  the uniong 
Some female, sec tions were very extensively unionised.
During the th i r t ie s  the methods of recruitm ent of hew members, i t  
was observed# were prim itive* , In  the post-war period the local branch;of 
the IV; & G.W.U* was beginning to  use more sophisticated, methods, using the 
question of membership as a bargaining po in t. In 1948, when a large group 
of workers Was being transferred  to work on the new mechanised p la n t ., 
producing b la s tin g  explosives, exception was taken to  management including 
several noiA^imionists. In  1950 the branch applied pressure on the workers, 
by declaring  th a t i t  would not handle a p a r tic u la r  dispute, involving female 
operatives unless a l l  became members*. As a re su lt  o f these th re a ts  both 
these sections became/one hundred f e r  cent unionised*
In  1953 the 'branch had a: conference, with: thé factory  management 
over four non-union workers employed alongside seventy-four union members.
The branch alleged th a t one individual was causing, discontent and asked 
management to  take d isc ip lin a ry  action against him. In  accordance with 
the stateiÉent in  the 1947 XVG*I* agreement re la tiv e  to/union membership# 
the factory  management brought to  the, a tten tio n  of these four non-unionists 
the d e s ira b ili ty  fo r  them to  become members of a union* Subsequently, th is  
section  of workers became one hundred per-cent organised. Management, a ss is ­
ted  the union to  extend i t s /  au thority  oyer I*G*I* employeesv
In 1954 a fu rth e r  conference took place between the lo ca l branch 
and the factory  management following a s lig h t change in  company policy  
towards the .question o f uMoh membership. , P lan ts which showed a hundred ; 
per cent union membership webe# in  e ffe c t, to  become union shops. . liooal 
management also  agreed th a t i t  would consider the representations of the 
branch regarding non-unionists in  sections which were nearly  organised to  a 
hundred per c e n t . - The branch was required to  prove th a t the ’odd! workers
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were causing d is sa tis fa c tio n  in  the section because of. th e ir  fa ilu re  to  jo in  
the union. The factory: management was not able to  give an undertalcing th a t 
i t  would dismiss a re ç a lo itra n t worker as th is  was not m th in  i t s  au thority . 
There was nothing to  prevent the company from exercising  th is  power on the 
reoonmiehdation of :the facto.rj’^ management. These policy  changes fu rth e r 
strengthened union au thority  in  the factory# /
Sec# >4# The. A«B;U. struggles f o r  a union shop* .(F)
; The extension o f  the local organisation o f th e  Amalgamated Fngineeiw 
- ing Union' in  Ardeer was a very d ifferent, story  from th a t  of the T. & G.VVU. 
The f . & G.W.U* was/faced vdth the ta sk  of organising a large group of ■ 
workers, many of whom were ..d isin terested in  jo in ing  a trade union. The 
A.l.U# with i t s  long h is to ry  o f  success in  organising sk ille d  engineering 
craftsmen, was not so unlucky. The majority, o f  workers in  the Ardeer 
engineering workshop were in  good, financ ia l standing,w ith th e ir  union. Only 
a few remained outside the union or did not pay the ir: dues. These few 
engineering craftsmen were to  cause the A.E.U. and the fac to iy  management 
a headache, fo r over a decade* The events i l lu s tr a te d  the f r ic t io n  and 
suspicion which arose through management being  unw illing to  concede f u l l  
recognition to  a trade Union which believed a l l  workers owed allegiance to i t .
A few workers w ere,of unorthodox re lig io u s  sec ts  who considered 
membership of trade unionism incompatible with th e ir  b e lie fs i  The A.E.U. 
refused to  accept th is  argument as a leg itim ate reason as to  wly they were 
not union members* I t s  o f f ic ia ls  bd i^ved  th a t there  was a dual system 
of moRal. ob ligations, one to  re lig io n  and one to the union movement. The 
o f f ic ia ls  attempted to persuade, the men th a t there was com patibility  .between 
the two f but with no avail#
Most o f  the non-unionisers to ld  the A.E.U. o f f ic ia ls  th a t they would 
jo in  the union, i f  a l l  o ther workers also became regu la r financ ia l members#,
No moral p rin c ip le  was ihvbived here - o n ly  sheer opportunism. These . 
re c a lc itra n t workers oaUsèd considerable trouble to  the A.E.U. as ,o th er \ 
workers then refused to  pay th e ir  dues. The lo c a l branch claimed th a t,  as 
the union provided the machinery fo r  negotiation w ith  the employer, i t  was 
only f a i r  th a t a l l  workers should have contributed towards i t s  cost*
(p) The Author was indebted to A.E.U. D ivisional Organiser,
. Mr. . J., Savage, fo r  allowing him to Compile much of th is  
information from the Union oofrespohdence f i l e s  (1932—47)> 
and to former A.E.U# D is tr ic t Goimittee o f f ic ia ls  Mr. A#. / 
v ; ; : Matthews, Sen# .arid Mr# D. M itchell fo r  supplying additbnal 
information about .the. h is to ry  of the A .S.E ., A.S.G.T.B*M# 
‘and the A.E.U. in, AMeer# None of these persons were 
responsible fo r  the; author’s In te rp re ta tio n  o f the events*
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The workshop in  the la te  th i r t ie s  became re s tiv e  about the non- 
un ion ists  in  i t s  midst and ta lked of taking d ire c t ac tion . I t  was restra ined  
by the A.E.U. Executive Council, as national negotiations were then in  pro­
gress with I .C .I . ,  respecting the recognition of shop stewards and compulsory 
union membership. The loceil o f f ic ia ls  th o u ^ t  th e ir  headquarters too 
cautious and blamed i t  fo r not forcing the issue . They did not see th a t 
the Executive Council had to  consider the Im plications of d ire c t action, 
especially  i f  i t  was a f a i lu re .  The local branch was apprehensive of 
c a llin g  a s tr ik e  on i t s  own au tho rity . I t  was afraid th a t i t s  action  would 
have been branded as ’un o ffic ia l* , a teim which was not rea lly  understood# 
Asked the lo ca l secre tary  of h is  d iv isional o ff ic ia ls
"When can you have an ’o ff ic ia l*  s tr ik e  a f te r  years of negotia­
tio n s , and you have forgotten  what you th o u ^ t  of s tr ik in g  
about?"
The facto ry  management was not Insensitive to  the local branch’s 
contentions and became increasingly  concerned in  finding a solu tion  to  the 
problem# I t  too was not free  to follow i t s  own labour policy . I .C .I .  
la id  down the policy  to  be followed regarding union membership o f i t s  
Employees# U ntil 193Ô Ardeer management took the view th a t the question 
of membership and payment of fees was one to be worked out Ty the union with 
the individuals concerned. The declaration  was then made by the Conq)any 
th a t i t  would take action against those union members who fa ile d  to pay 
th e ir  contributions regularly# This new policy  allowed the local Ardeer 
argument to  be re-opened with seme hope of resolution#
Unfortunately, new disagreement concerning the fa c ts  of the argument 
arose# A fter interview ing the re c a lc itra n t workers, the management reported 
to the A.E.U. th a t the men had claimed th a t they refused to pay th e ir  dues 
because of domestic troubles w ithin the branch. Accordingly, manag«nent 
would not take aotlon against the men, suggesting th a t the A.E.U. do some­
th ing  about i t s  branch. The branch o f f ic ia ls  strong ly  resented th is  
management's antagonism. A summoned meeting was called  fo r  the aggrieved
members to put th e ir  case, but they did not appear. I t  was not impossible,
therefo re , th a t the men had strung management a sto ry  about u n fa ir treatm ent.
Through the war bickering continued over the non-unionists. I n  
1944 the main workshop tr ie d  to force the issue by refusing  to work under 
incentives u n ti l  the non-unionists were removed. This was not suooessful. 
F inally  in  1947* following the new statement on union memlo 
the issue was resolved a t local conference. The branch a ^ ^ ^ S ^ o
demands to force the re lig io u s  objectors in to  the A.E#U#
ment put pressure on the re s t  of the non-unionists and those unfinancial to 
make th e ir  peace with the union. In fu tu re, only engineering craftsmen,
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who had fin an c ia l standing with the A.E.U,,/were to  he employed in  the facto ry . 
Iri; th is  way further: trouhle. was avoided* This gavé the A.E.U. a; union shop 
a t Ardepr a f te r  a long p ro trac ted  strU gg l#
Sec. 5# A ttitude of management towards union .secu rity .
/ The a ttitu d e s  adopted hy management a t any one time tojéards each 
union d iffe red  according to  the r e a l i t ie s  of the in d d s tr ia l s i tu a tio n ./  As 
fa r  hack as the th i r t i e s  management was prepared to  interview  i t s  employees 
who were memhers of the A.E.U. fo r  the purpose of persuading them to oonfprm " 
w ith the r e s t  o f the workshop. I t  was nearly two decades before management . 
gave /the same help to  the T . G . W . U .  In th e  èa ily  post-war period, manage­
ment was prepared to  agree to: h irin g  only'members of the A.E.U. who were in  
. f in an c ia l standing with th e ir  union./ ; No such concession was made fo r  the.
T* & G.W.Ü* Ten years la te r ,  a somewhat s im ilar conoessioh was granted to  
the T. & G.f.U.'On a seo tional b a s is  but not fo r the, whole facto ry .
Maniement took the view th a t i t  was not going to  organise i t s  '/ /  
employee Si That/was the union’s function. In the th i r t i e s  I .C .I .  d id ; 
not oppose i t s  employees becoming members of th e ir  appropriate trade unions* 
Only: where there was trouble was management prepared to  bring pressure on / 
individuals to  inake peace w ith th e ir  union; Management was exeroising i t s  
e ssen tia l function ,o f keeping i t s  faotbry  free  from irid u stria l disturbance;
In  con trast to  th is  narrow concept ion o f  i t s  personnel po licy , a f te r  the 
war I .O .i ;  acknowledged th a t i t  was in  i t s  own ir i te re s ts  to  extend the 
au thority  of th e  trade Unions over i t s  employees, in  order to, improve unions 
management re la tio n s . But there  s t i l l  existed  a strong sentiment among 
managerial o f f ic ia ls  th a t unions were responsible fo r  th é i r ;own organising*
th i r t i e s ,  i t  did not: appear....
wise fo r management to  tak e /a  m ora lis tic  view on Whether o r not an individual . 
had a/leigitim ate argiment with .his union. I t  looked/as i f  the management 
.wad supporting the hon-oonioimist, motiyated frequently  by sheer idiosyncraoy* , 
This Was the wrong approach; /  In  l a te r  years a b e t te r  method was availab le 
to  resolve union-management d i f fio u l t  ie  s : about union membership of individual 
workers through the use of the: negotiating  procedure. In the post-war period 
there were no. accusations th a t ahy employee was harshly  trea ted  by h is  union. 
Had such a case arisen , there was : good reason to  believe th a t the holding/of
a facto ry  oonferènçé would h a v e / r i g h t s  of
the indiv idual against a rb itra ry  treatment by h is  union o f f ic ia ls .  The issue 
o f  the, r e l i^ o u s  objeotofs was by-passed; ra th e r  than resolved. . /  -^ ■' / /  ■' ;
While [management was opposing some of the claims o f .th e  A.E.U,; and the , 
T. d.G.WiUi a t  the same time i t  ta c i t ly  recognised the clbsed shops of the 
p rin tin g  unions. For many years the th ree  p rin tin g  unions supplied the 
Ardeer p r in t ing shop w ith  craftsmen when these were needed; /
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, The existence of the ’closed*: shops of the printing, unions and the 
’union* shop o f the A.E.U. implied th a t these unions had exclusive bargain­
ing r ig h ts . Other unions with members a t Ardeer also, enjoyed exclusive 
bargaining fig h ts*  In  fa c t,  i t ,w as'possible fo r exclusive bargaining r ig h ts  
to e x is t without a union having any o r only some members ; in  the p la n t. (l )
The T, & G.W.U* had exclusive bargaining r ig h ts  fo r general workers 
in  Àrdeéf. This was a lo ca l custom. I t  was not due to  an agreement. : In  
o ther p a rts  of I ,O il .  general workers were covered by the I&inioipal and 
General Workers’ Union. On one ocçàsion, management réfusèd to n e ^ t ia te  
w ith the Construction Engineering Union when i t ;  attempted to  coyer rig g ers , 
who in  Ardeer were covered by the T. & G.W*U# Management did not want to 
see another organisation cover the same group as i t  feared- inteiw-union 
Jealousies and attem pts to  upset; the ex isting  wage structu re '; ; This union 
was - riot a signatory union and I .C .I ,  considered th a t  i t  had no negotiation  
r i ^ t s  over company empi^yees;;
(1 ) This, has not al together been appreciated*..
See J i  Mokelvey ’The closed shop controversy 
in  post-war B rita in ’s; In d u stria l and Labour 
E elatibris.Review, Ju ly , 1954#
■ ■ ' - GZ' %H #
: Conclusion ,;:" ' v;
One ..of the objectives o f thé Tpoair. union organisatibri, both O f/craft ; 
and general workefsj was to  extend i t s  membership over employees a t Ardeer* /
; , The methods th a t  the union used, depended: on th e /e x te n t to  which employees 
. had already joined the organisation j- and the help o r hindrance which manage- 
:: ment gave th é  unibn in  reaching th i s  .ob jective, Although I .C .I . was never 
an ti-union , fo r  a long time i t s  policy  was one of la isS e z -fa ire ; i t  did 
no t p o s itiv e ly  : h e lp , a i t s  orgahisihg. This was seen in  the case
bf the A.E.U. which attempted to foioe a few ré c a lc it ra n t ind iv iduals in to  
the union* However, the shortcomings of I .O .I ,  po licy  were to  be seen in  r 
the s to iy  o f the T. & G.W.Ü. U n til 1990 the general workers’ union was 
weak, unable to  extend i t s '  membership ih  : Ardeer, and incapable bf con tro lling  
the behaviour of employees when they took u n o ffic ia l s tr ik e  action . Amongst 
the female pieceworkers i t s  influence was p a r tic u la r ly  weak, and i t  had l i t t l e  
control over th e i r  ac tions. In  order to  d isc ip lin e /th ese  groups i t  was 
: necessary fo r  the:union to  re c ru it the employee union members; Membership
of /the  union was a  p re req u isite  fo r  exercising au tho rity  over employee behaviour;
-///' A fter the War the lo ca l i ,  & G.W.U, organisation strengthened i ts .  
in te rn a l d isc ip lin e . I t  took steps to  remove those who refused to follow 
i t s  po licy , : :/ In  pa .rticu lar j ■ i t  removed from : o ffice  ah avowed/ CoranUnist and 
an incompetent fu ll-tim e  secre tary . I t  discouraged the disoussion b f issues 
p a r tic u la r ly  p o l i t ic a l  ones^ which d iv ided  the lo y a ltie s  of i t s  membersv 
I t  re-orgahised i t s  committee by including th e  shop/stewards, once these were 
recognised. The recognitibh o f shop stewards and the in troduction of th e  
/ ■ negotiating  procedure had the e ffe c t o f extending union au thority  amongst'
Ardeer employees. The negotiating  procedure allowed employee grievances to  
: b^ by the union, and th is  had the e ffec t of increasing  the union/
mémbèrship and u ltim ate ly  con tro lling  employee behaviour. Informal leadership , 
especially  amongst the female pieoewbrkers, was d e a lt a grievous blow.
Disorderly conduct o f informal groups was brought under con tro l.
The lo c a l branch also extended i t s  au thority  to  n e ^ t ia te  over the 
range o f  subjects which were included in  d isputes. For/the f i r s t ’/time^^to 
// i t s  h is to ry  the branch negotiated the d e ta ils  of the e n tire  piece and job 
/ d if fe re n tia l  ra te  s tru c tu re s , and the ru les fo r promotion and demotion. U ntil
■ the post-war period i t  had pro tested  spec ific  changés or demanded certa in . / 
improvements in  a piecemeal fashion. I t  negotiated Over the d e ta ils  bf ihoen-/
■ ;/ tlv e  schemes based on work measurement which the management proposed in s ta l l in g ,
Previously, most incentive and piece ra te s  had been offered d ire c tly  to  the 
groups of employees concerned. I t  also challenged/changes in  work p rac tice  / 
which i t  th p u ^ t  were inequ itab le ; / I t  was/ realjy/^^^ I95O th a t  the local
: ; general workers ’ union organisation; became, a fu lly -fledged  bargaining au tho rity ;
PART I I  DISPUTES IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
CHAPTER IV. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPUTE
Introduction
Ihe p rin c ip a l re la tionsh ip  between union and management was the 
•dispute*. The analysis of union-management re la tio n s  in  the post-war 
period was d irec ted  to examining the reasons fo r  d ispu tes, the subject 
m atters over which they took place, how they were s e tt le d , and what ru les  
were estab lished  by the reso lu tions of the d ispu tes. A s tr ik e  was a 
d if fe re n t phenomenon from a d ispute , although sometimes a s tr ik e  developed 
out of a d ispu te . A dispute was a disagreement between management and 
union which h^d to  be resolved by formal nego tiation . Under the 1947 
negotiating  procedure the local conference was the p rin c ip a l medium fo r 
9#ttlÈ#g dàflputes. The number o f conferences, held between May, 1947^ ^ d  
December 1954, was a measure of the number of d isputes which occurre î in  
th is  period.
Only 'local*  and * intermediate* conferences were included in  the 
figu res used in  the tab les  in  th is  chapter, A few 'headquarters* confejv
enoes were held in  the post-war period, but these were excluded from the
fig u res . Some lo c a l conferences d ea lt with more than one subject, so the
figu res underestimated the number of d ispu tes. On the o ther hand some of 
the more important d isputes took more than one conference to resolve.
These over-estim ated the number of disputes which occurred. The numbers 
in  the following tab les  were designed to convey an impression of the impo3>> 
tance of each subject m atter of d ispu te .
Sec. 1. Disputes involving the T. k G.W.U,
( i )  By subject m atter.
The number of conferences held to discuss the various subjects in  
d ispute involving the T, & G.W.U., from the inception of the I947 negotiating 
procedure to the end of 1954 were as follows* (P)
Table I
1947-1950 1951-1954
Introduction of incentives 7 9
Consequences of incentives 14 33
T raditional piece work 16 22
Total payments by re su lt 37 64
Wage d if fe re n tia ls  13 15
Promotion and redundancy 10 15 ___
Changes in  work p rac tice  4 12 16
Working conditions 2 - 2
Union membership — 2 2
N egotiating procedure 1 1 2
to ta l  68 109 177
(F) These figu res were compiled a f te r  examining the records 
of lo ca l and inteim ediate conferences in  Ardeer, The 
author i s  indebted to Ardeer Labour O fficers, Messrs,
Wilson Shaw and Ian McDavid, fo r use of th e ir  records.
Total
F i g u r e  2 .
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Compared to  the early  p a rt o f the period, 1947- 1950,  there was a 
sharp r is e  in  the number of d isputes in  the second p a r t of the post-war 
period# Disputes over a l l  the four major sub jects, v iz i payments by 
re s u lt ,  wage d if fe re n tia ls ,  promotion and redundancy, and. changes in  work 
p rac tice  allowed increase# in  the second p a rt of the period# The number of 
conferences held to  disouBB wori&HÉeaBured incentive schemes g rea tly
increased while those concerning piece wodc rose only s lig h tly  in  the 
second h a lf  o f the period#
Job secu rity  d isputes occurred over the ru le s  re la tin g  to  promotion and 
redundan<^ and also over changes in  work p rac tice  and load. Py comparison 
with the immediate post-w ar period job security  d isputes showed a considerable 
increase in  the period 1951p1954* They were v ir tu a lly  non-existent a t  Ardeer 
during the war and in  the pre-war period# A number of conferences were 
devoted to  d iscussing the ru le s  re la tin g  te  promotion and demotion. Disputes 
over redundancy were concerned with the many female operatives who were 
rec ru ited  to  the fac to iy  during the war and the post-war period# There 
was only one d ispute about d isc ip lin a ry  action .
Disputes over wage d if fe re n tia ls  were im portant in  the post-war 
period# À job evaluation scheme was introduced in  1948-1950 to  f ix  wage 
d if fe re n tia ls  fo r  the jobs in  the fac to ry . The in s ta l la t io n  of th i s  scheme 
was discussed a t p lan t ra th e r  than facto ry  level# Most of the d isputes 
shown in  the above tab le  re fe rred  to  disputes over job ra te s  not in i t i a l ly  
brought w ithin the job evaluation scheme# Minimum wage ra te s  fo r  general 
workers were fixed  by national negotiations and were not therefore subject 
to  lopal negotiations# Woifcing conditions were a lso  deteimined by national 
negotiations# Working conditions covered such m atters as hours o f workp 
s h if t  arrangements and vacations. Only two bohferences f e l l  in to  th is  
c la ss ifica tio n *
Some conferences discussed more than one su b jec t# Towards the end
of 1954» fo r  example# a se rie s  o f  conferences d e a lt w ith in te rre la te d  d is­
putes over incen tives, wage d if fe re n tia ls  and changes in  work practice*
Disputes were c la s s if ie d  according to  the main subject discüBsed a t  the 
p a r tic u la r  conference# The r e s t  o f the conferences d ea lt only with one 
p rin c ip a l subject# However sub jects in  dispute were frequently  in te r re la te d  
fo r  example; re je c tio n  of incen tives was re la ted  to  job secu rity , promotional 
ru les  to  the job ra te  s tru c tu re , and wage d if fe re n tia ls  to  incentives#
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( i i )  Py department.
Only one . d ispute in  th e . post-war period  affec ted  a l l  general workers 
in  the factory  -  a  union claim fo r  an Increase in  wages based on the hazard 
o f producing explosives. Not even the job evaluation scheme covered a l l  
the jobs in  the fac to ry . The ru le s  fo r  promotion and redundancy covered 
a l l  general workers in so fa r as they d ea lt w ith facto ry  se n io r ity . So f a r  
as departmental se n io rity  was concerned the ru les  only applied to  the 
departments and sections sp é e if ie a llÿ  named; Disputes over work p rac tice  
usually  affected  small groups o r even sing le workers#
More d isputes arose in  the department producing b la s tin g  e x ^ s iv e s  
than in  the r e s t  of the fac to ry . This department employed about fo r ty  
percent of the workers* I t  was the o rig in a l core of the fac to ry  and the 
’bread and butter* deparW ent o f Ardeef# From an in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s  viewu. 
po in t i t  oonsisted of th ree  main so c ia l groupirij^# F ir s t ly  there were the 
men employed on a mechanised u tiit which commenced operations in  1948* No 
women were employed on th e  mechanised unit# Secondly, the re  were men 
employed on the o id  side of th e  department which produced much the samè 
products as the mechanised unit* Thirdly, there were the female operatives 
employed on the o ld e r éide o f thé department on the f in a l  stages of produce# 
tio ri. These were paid  by piece work#
The r e s t  of the fac to iy  was made up of another seven manufacturing 
departments producing ac id s; propulsive explosives, detonators, sa fe ty  fuse, 
blackpowder^ n itro c e llu lo se  and nitrobody products; A ll these departments 
employed general woikers who were e lig ib le  to  jo in  the T. & G.VY.U. In  
add ition , general workers were also employed in  the commercial department 
including tran sp o rt, s to res , and docking# General workers were employed in  
the engineering and research, departments as trades a s s is ta n ts  and labourers# 
The processes and the physical woiking conditions in  each of these deparW 
merits Varied tremendously. Not a l l  the processes were dangerous# Sot»  
were extremely d ir ty ,  o thers no worse than in  aiy  engineering factory#
; A ll departments but one were involved in  d isputes over incentives# 
Disputes over a l l  the sub jects s e t  out in  the tab le  above were experienced 
in  the b la s tin g  department# Disputes bver most sub jects also  arose in  the 
engineering department# The o ther departments were involved in  only a 
lim ited  number o f  disputes# The department producing b la s tin g  explosives 
was the most ’dispute prone’ and was the ’p a tte rn  s e t t e r ’ in  settlem ents fo r  
the r e s t  of the fac to ry . More job secu rity  d ispu tes occurred in  o ther 
departments than the b la s tin g  departmenlf#/
A breakdown o f  the number of conferences by sub ject f o r  the b la s tin g  
department and the r e s t  o f the facto ry  was as follows*
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TABLE n ;
Payments by re su lts
In troduction Conseouenoes
Wages
Security
B lasting  Department 
Mechanised u n its  
T rad itional manuf* 
Female piece-workers 
Total Department
Rest of Factory
. ' ;■ . ■ 
Grand Total
(f)  In  addition  there were 7 other d isputes not f a l l in g  
withiri the p rinc ipa l catégorie#;
Total
2 18 3 6 29
6 4 8 5 23
0 38 2 3 43
8 60 /  13 14 95» 25 27 75
16 85 28 41 170 (f)
Bed# 2# Discutes involving the c ra f t  u^ons#
( i )  by subject m atter;
The number of conferences held between the Ardeer mEhiagement and 
th ir te e n  c ra f t unions to ta lle d  th ir ty - th re e , compared to  the one hundred 
and severity-seven with the T; & G.W.U# Incentives were the p rin c ip a l source 
o f dispute between the management and the c ra f t  unions# In  1950 management 
urged a l l  o ra ft unions in  Ardeer to  accept incentive s ç h e # s , although th e ir  
members were formerly paid  by time rates# Demarcation was the next most 
important subject o f dispute and #owed ho sign of disappearing# The 
d isputes over other aspects of job secu rity  were rniiinportant# Disputes 
over working conditions and wages were small in  number#
!^e  conferences held between 1947 and 1954 d ea lt w ith d isputes over 
the following subjects#
TABLE I I I
Subject 1947-50 ,1951-54 Total
Incentives -  in troduction 2 8 10
Incentives — consequences 1 - 6
'Wages' .2;  ■ 1 . 3
Working conditions y.  ^ • 1
Demarcation ■ 3 y ; 4 r
D ilution 1 1
Manning and o ther work p rac tice 1 2 3
Uniori membership : 2 - — 2
Total 12 21 33
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( i i )  /by union#
About seven hundred s k ille d  workers were employed in  Ardeer, Most 
o f these worked in  thé engineering department which was responsible fo r 
maintaining the equipment and buildings of the fac to ry . These craftsmen, 
belonged to  th ir te e n  unions. The union with the la rg e s t membership in  
Ardeer was the Amalgamated Engineering Union, I t  had over th ree hundred 
members, _ The Amalgamated Society o f Woodworkers had more than a hundred 
members. Then in  numbers o f  members came the E le c tr ic a l Trades Union^ the 
S co ttish  P a in te rs ’ Society, Associated Blacksmiths*; Society, the Boiler^ 
makers’ Society, Plumbing Trades Union, National Union of Sheet-metal 
Workers,/and the Amalgamated Union of Building Trades Woikers, The Amalgam­
ated Society of Woodcutting M achinists ^ d  the th ree p r in tin g  unions had ' 
very small memberships in  Ardeer, f The p rin tin g  trades worked in  a separate 
shop to the o ther oraftsmeri;
The A.É.U, was the only union which had conferences with management 
over a wide rSnge o f sub jec ts , A breakdown of the conferences held 
between management respectively  with the A.E.U, and the re s t  of the c ra f t 
unions grouped together showed the followirig*
' - \ /TABLS'lV % :/ :-
Subject A.E.Ü, others
Incentives . in troduction 8
conséquences ' " 4  ; / / .y;
Wages ■ / : ;::2 / ' 1
Demarcation 4
D ilu tion 1 ■ ■ ■ ■
Work p rac tice  and Manhirig y y  2::'-
WoxMhgcconditions 1
Union membership 2 *-
TOTAL: 15 . , 16
Sec. 3# The importance o f change as a cause o f d ispu te .
Why did  disputes; occur? They aTOse when there  was some change in  
the se ts  o f references which guided each or both p a r t ie s ’ behaviour, 8«ne
fac to rs  idiich se t o ff  these reactions were exogenous to  the co llec tiv e  
bargaining framework. For example, cost of l iv in g  Inoreases and the 
general employment trends were beyond the con tro l o f . a p a r tic u la r  union o r 
or. federation  o f unions. 80 too was the s ta te  o f consumer demand beyond . 
the control of management. Changes in  these fac to rs  reacted  on the behaviour 
o f union and management* . Changes in  the soc ia l and p o l i t ic a l  climate also 
had th e i r  effects , on the behaviour of both p a r tie s ; n e ith e r  of these 
fa c to rs  were Controlled by union or management. Even a decrease in  working 
hours or an increase in  wages fo r  workei* covered by one co llec tiv e  bargain­
ing framework was an ex ternal fa c to r  so fa r  as another co llec tiv e  bargaining 
framework was concerned. Sometimes the p a r tie s  o f one p a r tic u la r  co llec tiv e  
bargaining framework adopted as p a r t of. th e ir  se t o f references the wage ra te s
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and conditions la id  down by another, but these were external to th a t 
p a r tic u la r  framework.
Other fac to rs  which changed the se t of references fo r  the behaviour 
of the p a r tie s  were endogenous to  the co llec tive  bargaining framework.
For example, an increase in  Wage d if fe re n tia ls  fo r  one group of workers was 
bound to  influence thé behaviour, of. another group w ithin  the same facto ry ; 
Management had complete oontaxîl over the effic iency  with which i t  carried  
on i t s  operations, over i t s  product development or techn ical improvement;
I t s  supervisory standards were important in  the way they reacted  on the 
employées, . There were ce rta in  fac to rs  which had specia l significance in  . 
a lte r in g  the terms of reference fo r the p a rtie s  * behaviour; fo r example job 
evaluation ! and work measured. incentive schemes both dèteiminéd methods of /  
paying wi^es. The negotiating  procedure was also an endogenous fac to r;
•So fa r  as the Ardeer case study was concerned the endogenous fac to rs  
were, the most s ig n if ic a n t in  changing the se ts  o f references fo r  guiding the 
p a r t ie s ' behaviour. The most important o f these changes was an organisâtional 
on© which caused the g rea tes t upset o f Union-management re la tio n s . In  1948 
a new section  of the department manufacturing b la s tin g  explosives was brought 
in to  production. This section was known as the mechanised u n i t , '  fo r  i t s  
method of operations was a vast technological improvement over the old method 
of manufacturing explosives. I t  v/as manned by some of the longest-served 
employees in  the  fac to iy , who quickly'formed themselves in to  a new and 
powerful soc ia l group in  the factoiy* This section  was paid by a group 
bonus scheme, based p a r t ia l ly  on work measurement. I t  was seen in  Table U  
th a t the u n i t  was. responsible fo r a large number of d isp u te s , ' mainly over the 
incentive scheme but also over job security  and job rates*  A change in  the 
safety  fa c to r  due to  an explosion involving the deaths of two workers in  19M  
s e t o ff  the most important post-w ar s tr ik e .
The establishm ent of the mechanised u n it had important reac tions on 
the behaviour o f other groups of workers, in  p a r tic u la r  on the older sections 
of the b la s tin g  department which s t i l l  produced explosives in  the tra d itio n a l 
way. The man on the mechanised itn it soon earned la rge bonuses. The men 
l e f t  behind on the old side were not paid by incentive, and so they demanded 
an increase in  hourly ra te s  of pay in  I949, I95O and in  I954 to  compensate 
them fo r loss in  s ta tu s . Demands fo r  increases in  hourly ra te s  were re s is— 
ted  by the management, although i t  was forced to make some adjustments in  /, 
job ra te s ; In 1950 and 1954 there were stoppages of work. Management 
tr ie d  to  persuade the  men to  agree to  an incentive scheme, but th is  was 
re jec ted  several times,: A stoppage also occurred over th is  subject;/
: Chapt. IV.: Soc, 3 ..
Thé mechanised u n it was s ta ffed  e n tire ly  by male workers. They 
perfomned ce rta in  operations which were customarily carried  out by female 
operatives on the o ld e r  side o f the department. These operations included 
the c a r t ridging operations whioh produced the well-known s tic k s  o f 
g e lig n ite  and dynamite, and the packing o f s tic k s  in to  cartons and boxes. 
Management expected to discharge a large number of female operatives once 
the me ohanised u n it caught up with demand. The women not unnaturally  
s o u ^ t  the p ro teo tion  of s t r i c t  job security  ru le s , demanding th a t discharges 
be made in  accordance with sen io rity , and tha t married women be dismissed 
f i r s t  desp ite th e ir  length  of serv ice . Many women were beyond the marrying 
age and h ^  spent a considerable p a rt o f th e ir  working liv e s  in  the fac to ry . 
At one time they had a powerful soc ia l system b u i l t  in  the form o f an 
.dtigarcby based on length  o f service in  the fac to ry . Before the war the 
l e a d s o f  the o ligarchy  were responsible fo r  nego tia ting  p iece  ra te  changes 
w ith management. While there was ho doubting th e ir  m ilitancy when i t  came 
to  re so rtin g  to  d ire c t action , they had not b u i l t  the b est possib le piece 
ra te  s tru c tu re . The d efic ienc ies  in  the piece ra te  s tru c tu re  came to  l ig h t 
in  the post-war period, unfo rtunate ly , a t the same time as the women workers 
were beocmiing anxious about redundancy. The female operatives t r ia d  to  
push th e ir  earnings as h i ^  as possib le by challenging any a lte ra tio n s  in  
rates*  At the  same time there were suggestions th a t management was try in g  
to  use time study to  reduce the percentage o f bonus earnings of piece 
workers. There was considerable d isp a rity  between piece earnings and those 
under the  newer incentive schemes*
Fears about redundancy spread to  o ther p a r ts  of the facto ry  and job 
secu rity  d isputes became widespread* This accounted fo r  the large number 
of d isp u te s  about t h i s  subject in  a l l  deparWentS, Management decided th a t 
i t  was desirab le  to  codify th e . lu le s  re la tin g  to  promotion, demotion; 
d ism issal and tra n s fe r .  In  1953 fo r  the f i r s t  time in  the h is to ry  o f the 
facto ry  l^e  ru les  were incorporated in  a sing le  union-manàgemeht agreement. 
The ru les  covered general workers, they d id  not cover craftsm en. Job 
secu rity  d isputes involvihg pr&ftsmen were few and spasmodic, and along 
tra d itio n a l lin e s  -  demarcation, d ilu tio n  and manning;
The other b ig  Change which affected  the p a t te rn  o f d ii^u tes  in  the 
post-war period was management’s atteiopt to , introduce incentive schemes 
based dh work measurement. In  1950 i t  offered most craftsmen the oppor­
tu n ity  to  work on incentive schéraes* Most of the c ra f t  men re jec ted  the 
incentive schemes fo r  fe a r  th a t these would lead to  redundancy. This 
shKciety was no doubt increased by the general workers’ uneasiness with 
respect to  th e ir  fu tu re  employment prospects* The craftsmen had no 
sen io rity  ru les  which determined an o ider of discharge. Anxiety about job 
secu rity  also  motivated general worker groups to  r e je c t  incentive schemes* 
However, the fea rs  of these workers gradually vanished as the atmosphere 
in  the facto ry  became one of optimism'about the fu tu re  market fo r  explosives. 
General workers had the p ro tec tion  of th e i r  s e n io r i ty  ru le s , and u ltim ately
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a l l  "but on®. group accepted an incentive scheme* . This group of workers on 
the old side o f the h ia s tin g  department, and the la rg e s t group o f craftsmen 
in  the facto ry ,, the maintenance f i t t e r s ,  refused to  accept incentives under 
any conditions#
The craftsmen did  not appear to  become p a r tic u la r ly  anxious about th e ir  
jobs once they re jec ted  incentive schemes* Demarcation issues p e rs is te d , .
The A,E,U, strongly  re s is te d  management’s attempt to  d ilu te  the tra d e  in  
1951;  The plumbers and the f i t t e r s  both took exception to  a new record 
system which they contended could be used fo r introducing an incentive 
scheme# Some o f the disputée iivolving changes in  work p rac tice  and load of 
general workers could also  be traced  to  the proposed incentive schemes and 
the fe a r  of redundancy, Hanagement was fo rtunate  in  th a t in security  d id  
not develop amongst craftsmen a t  Ardeer.
Although the job evaluation schema led  to  a few disputes in  thos sec­
tions not covered, amongst the female and male operatives of the old side 
o f  the b la s tin g  departmeht, on the whole the change was generally  accepted#;
Mmiy job ra te s  were ra ised  and th is  helped the acceptance of the scheme.
I t  was somewhat su rp ris in g  th a t there were no p a ra l le l  demands fo r  increases 
in  ra te s  fo r  craftsm en. This occurred only once, the stim ulus was not 
improvement in  hourly job ra te s  fo r  general workers, bu t an incentive scheme 
fo r, unskilled  wbrkers. The ra te s  fo r  sk illed  jobs were s e t  n a tionally  and 
WbrQ adjusted from time to  time in  the post-war period to  meet r is in g  costs 
of liv in g . The Craftsmen were graded according to  th e i r  a b i l i ty  and paid 
m erit money, . d h is  gave them a  high wage ra te  compared to  the  r e s t  of 
Scotland, There was a w aiting l i s t  fo r  employment a t  Ardeer.
The study a t  Ardeer was la rg e ly  one o f trac in g  the e ffec t o f 
endogenous fac to rs  on the behaviour of the p a r t ie s .  I t  was not concerned 
w ith the effect, of external fac to rs , such as the s ta t#  o f demand or the 
cost of liv in g , on the two in s ti tu tio n s  * behaviour. The study was d irec ted  
a t  examining the in te rp iay  of the formal endogenous fac to rs  w ithin the 
ooilectiv© bargaining framework. The informal fa c to rs , such as the creation  
of so c ia l groupings due to  d if fe re n tia l  job ra te s , sen io rity  ru les  and 
incentive schemes, were examined only to  explain the formal re la tio n sh ip s .
The formal re la tio n sh ip  between union and management coimenced with a 
dispute over a spec ified  sub ject. The method of resolving th a t  dispute 
was by formal nego tia tion , -
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Conclusion
The s ta r t in g  po in t fo r the re la tio n s  between union and management 
was a  d ispu te . A dispute was a  disagreement between union and management 
which had to  be resolved by formal negotiations. A dispute arose because 
pf some change in  the se ts  o f references of the two p a r t ie s .  The change 
in  the se ts  of reference were sometimes sp ec ifica lly  re la ted  to  the formal 
re la tio n s  already ex istin g  between the p a r tie s . For example, a change 
in  the method of a rriv in g  a t the wages stru c tu re , by the in troduction o f 
job evaluation or ihcentive schemes, d ir e c t ly ,affected  the se ts  of 
reference which were common to  both p a r tie s . Other changes were not 
d ire c tly  associated  w ith the formal re la tio n s  of the p a r tie s , but grew out 
of a change in  the so c ia l s truc tu re  of one of the parties#  For example;i 
the most important change th a t occurred in  Ardeer in  the post-war period 
was the re-organ isation  of the, la rg e st department when the mechanised u n it 
was in s ta lle d . This s e t  o ff  reactions of in secu rity  amongst the work 
groups in  the department and led  to  a d isp a rity  of earnings which caused 
considerable f r ic t io n  in  the factory  and in  the union.
Both the union and management in s ti tu tio n  adjusted to changes 
which took place in  the general soc ia l and economic environment. But 
before r is e s  in  the cost of liv in g  or costs of production could be trans­
m itted to  the union-management re la tio n sh ip , soma a l te ra t io n  had to  take 
place in  the soc ia l s tru c tu re  of one of the p a r t ie s .  Even then, the change 
had to  take the form of one of two types of disputes* job secu rity  o r the 
su b stan tia l issues o f wages o r hours of work. For a change to  become a 
dispute between union and management, i t  had to  involve the fa irn ess  or 
equity  in  the way employees were to be treated* B asically , the subjects 
over which management arid union tra d itio n a lly  disagreed formed the m atter 
fo r  dispute in  the post-war period a t Ardeer, The in troduction  of job 
evaluation and work measurement were inseparably linked to the old problem 
of rewarding labour. The types of formal disputes which took place between 
union and management were d is tin c tly  lim ited ;
CHAPTER V. JOB SECUIgTY PROVISIONS FOR GENERAL WORKERS 
In troduction
A fundamental aim o f th® triad® unions was to  make th e ir  members’ jobs 
as safe  as p ossib le . O riginally , job secu rity  d isputes took place over 
demarcation, manning and d ilu tio n . The c ra f t unions sought to  l im it the 
prerogative o f management in  deploying sk ille d  labour as i t  s o u ^ t  f i t .  
Management believed th a t these actions o f the unions were r e s t r ic t iv e .  In  
time o ther changes in  woik p rac tices  were questioned and the types o f r e s tr ic ­
tiv e  p rac tices  grew.
As the general workers became organised they too sought job secu rity . 
At Ardeer, the lo ca l T, & G*W,IJ, branch was successful in  obtaining provisions 
to  cover some o f the more important aspects of job secu rity . These included 
ru le s  fo r  the promotion, demotion and tra n s fe r  of workers and supervisors, 
establishm ent of an order of dism issal fo r  married and sing le  women, and the 
safeguarding of male jobs frcm endroachment by women. The Union a lse  
p ro tested  changes in  work p rac tices  which adversely a ffected  /work loads o r 
earnings o f p a r tic u la r  groups o f workers,
- %  fa r  the most important of the job secu rity  provisions were the 
sen io rity  ru le s  governing promotion, demotion and rotronchment* These ru les  
had been in  existence fo r  many years, but they were not se t down in  a union- 
management agreement u n t i l  1953#: The ru les  provided th a t a l l  promotions
were to  be ba®®d on sen io rity  acquired by employment in  a p a r tic u la r  depart­
ment or sec tion . One notable featu re  of the system was the m u ltip lica tion  
o f promotional séquences in  the facto ry , and the gradual elim ination  o f 
managerial p rerogatives over th e  placement of labour. Management reserved 
i t s  r ig h ts  to  se le c t supervisors. Although the system of promotion was 
frequently  c r i t ic is e d  by managerial o f f ic ia ls  i t  performed several inçiortant 
functions which contributed to  the s ta b i l i ty  o f labour re la tio n s  iri the 
.faotoiÿ*: ■
Sec, 1, Factory ru le s  of promotion and demotion.
Long before trade unionism appeared a t  Ardeer management had i t s  
own ru les  about working conditions which i t  observed when employing and 
p lacing  labour. One of i t s  po lio ios was to  promote and demote workers 
according to  se n io r ity . This scheme f u l f i l le d  several funotions. F ir s tly , 
only trustw orthy employees were employed on the dangerous stages of manufac­
tu rin g  explosives. Secondly, the scheme kept the longest served employees 
on the payro ll when production was cu t. Thirdly, promotion and demotion 
according to  length  of service provided a measure o f so c ia l ju s tic e  to  the 
workers in  the fac to ry . By the tw enties there  ex isted  a formidable s e t 
of ru le s  which guided lirie  management when making promotions and demotions.
The names of ; the workers! werie se t down on departmental l i s t s ,  by sen io rity , 
and the whole scheme became ap tly  known as ’the tu rn - l is t* .
Iri the t h i r t i e s  thé lo ca l T# /& G,W,U, branch commenoed making 
représen tations to managemerit about i t s  superv iso r*  in te rp re ta tio n s  of 
& e ru les  o f  promotion# In time, the ru les  were modified by th is  process 
o f in te rp re ta tio n  and managerial d isc re tio n  was reduced, As new sections 
o r departments were estab lished  a t  Ardeer the union sought to  in c ité e  them s 
w ithin the promotional ru le s ; The union attoo^ted to  matte i t s  Members’ 
jobs as secure as p ossib le , arid the turrip-list system le n t i t s e l f  admirably 
to  th is  purpose. The workers gradually came to  believe th a t the system 
was formulated by th é  union, and jea lously  guarded i t s  provisions. Yet 
i t  was not u n t i l  1953 th a t the whole scheme was se t out in  an agreement 
w ith the lo ca l T, & G,W,U, and the factory  management.
One o f the main p rin c ip les  of the system was the separation  of 
promotional lin e s  fo r  each department or section  o f a department* The 
separation o f  these tu x a r l is ts  narrowed the opportunities of pr«notiOri to  
the workers on the p a r tic u la r  séquence, Jhén a vacancy ocouxred the 
promotion had to  be made from the worker next on the  l i s t ,  A worker on 
another promotional sequence was riot considered fo r  the promotion. Nor 
were tra n s fe rs  perm itted from one pjromotional sequence to  another, except 
Under ce rta in  w ell defined condition#* The number o f promotional sequenoes 
grew from th ree  in  1925 to  tw enty-five in  1953, covering eigh t departments, 
w ith a fu rth e r  seventeen sequences fo r  female workers* The separation  of 
the promotional seguences reduced th é  movmaent o f personnel from one p a r t 
of the fac to ry  to  another.
Promotion was by length  of serv ice , A male worker acquired both 
facto ry  and departmental se n io r ity . An employee was a llocated  to  h is  
department according to  h is  fac to ry  seniority* He was promoted according 
to  h is  sen io rity  in  the department* Seriiorily w§« measured by the number 
o f  s h if ts  served iri the  department. Management was on t i t l e d  to  withhold 
promotiori to  the most sen ior worker ’in  exceptional circumstances’* When 
the union disagreed about the application  of th is  le t-o u t  clause a  grievance 
was aometimoB f i l e d  on behalf of the individual by—passed* ; Management 
promised to  inform any iridiyidUal o f the reasons fo r  re fu sa l of promotion, 
When i t  was rieoessary fo r  the primotion to  be made according to  technical 
q u a lif ic a tio n s , the iiriiori in s is te d  th a t management show the place o f the 
p o te n tia l promotée on the tu r r i - l i s t ;  No argument then took placé about 
the promotiori* ■ - ;
Under the 1953 ru les  no employee whs perm itted to  refuse promotion.
An employee was dismissed i f  promotion Was ^refused. This ru le  was included
fo r  yeiy good reasoris. The promotional steps were determined according to
the hourly wage ra te  fo r  the jobs in  the department. Due to incentims and
s h if t  allowances t t ^  hourly/ ra te  did not necessarily  r e f le c t  the earning 
capacity  o f the job , Bnployees had iri the past refused promotion ^ t i l  i t
suited/them . This was considered Unfair p rac tice  by the union branch and
so the ru les  were tigh tened . A fter 1953 the only excuse accepted f o r
refusing  promotion was on medical grounds, A member who asked fo r th is
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concession had. to  appear personally  a t the plenary h r^ c h  meeting before 
h is  case was taken up with management. The faotoay medical o ff ic e r  then 
decided whether o r not the worker was u n fit to  take the promotion. This 
p rac tice  su ited  management as the l a t t e r  did not want large numbers o f 
workers to  refuse promotion to  dangerous jobs.
e n tit le d  to  downgrade a promotee who could not 
perform h is  job s a t is f a c to r i ly .  A worker who was demoted because of 
in cap ab ility  lo s t  a l l  sen io rity  r i ^ t s  to  iail o ther wbi^ers holding h l ^ e r  
ra ted  jobs# In  the case of i l l  health  management attempted to  find  the 
demotes a su itab le  job . I t  refused to  consider a union request th a t i t  
pay a specia l ra te  when a worker was demoted on the grounds o f i l l  health#
I t  paid  fo r  the job, and not the man. %
. l)eim)tions also  pocurred when labour deinand dropped due to  
technological improvement, in troduction  of incentive schemes and reduced 
product demand* Individuals were then removed from the department u n ti l  
the personnel cemplement corresponded to  the number required  fo r  production* 
The worker with the sh o rte s t length of service W£« removed f i r s t .  Under 
th is  system of demotion workers w ith the longest serv ice were l e f t  on the 
job* Workers who looked upon th e i r  employment in  Aideer as a Career 
n a tu ra lly  favoured th is  System of demotion. The ru le s  g rea tly  strengthened 
the secu rity  of th e ir  jobs . The demotional ru le s  were to  have specia l 
significaiios in  removing general workers* objections to  the in troduction  of 
incentive sohemes.
A male worker once displaced from a p a r tic u la r  promotional sequence, 
o r * tu rn  l i s t * , whs then  a lloca ted  to  the general labour pool. Here he 
took up h is  p o s itio n  according to  length  of service in  the facto ry . Ho was 
not discharged u n t i l  a l l  o thers with le s s  service were f i r s t  dismissed.
He was ^ lo c a te d  to  a vacant job in  another department, according to  h is  
faotorjr s e n io rily . He then acquired departmental sen io rity  on th is  new 
promotional sequencer : He was not perm itted to  count h ie  previous service 
On another promotional sequence* He did however m aintain ce rta in  sen io rity  
righ ts, i f  he was re -a llo ca ted  to  h i s  o rig in a l department. S im ilarly, ho 
maintained ce rta in  r ig h ts  when he was dismissed from the factory  and 
subsequently re-employed w ithin one year* Ho c re d it fo r  sen io rity  was 
given to  a worker who was re-employed a f te r  resigning  on hi© own v o li tio n .
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Sèc» 2* Asaegsment of the System#
An in te re s tin g  featu re  uncovered hy th is  research was the a ttitu d e  
of lin e  management towards the turï>-*list# Few o f f ic ia ls  had any idea o f 
i t s  h is to ry  and many helieved i t  was union-inspired . They complained 
about i t  when f ru s tra te d  witÎ3L day-to-day problems. They cursed i t  when 
they became * anti-worker* o rien ta ted  in  times o f anxiety;* Some of the 
facto ry  o f f ic ia ls  genuinely believed the sen io rity  system o f  promotion to  
be a bulwark against e ffic ien cy . When the ru les  were codified in  1953 
management a ttec^ ted  to  throw over previous p rac tice  and asked the union 
fo r d iscre tionary  r ig h ts  in  promoting workers. I t  to ld  the union th a t 
sen io rity  would be kept as the main fa c to r  in  se lec tin g  ind iv iduals fo r  
promotion. The Union strongly  opposed th is  suggestion, and the ru le s  
remained su b s tan tia lly  the same as they were in  the tw enties. .
Qhe promotional system had sevèral disadvantages# I t  prevented 
management p lacing  workers according to th e ir  c a p a b ili t ie s . , Fof a l a r ^  
range of jobs i t  prevented the placement of personnel according to  job 
sp ec ifica tio n s  based on job study and ana lysis . I t  was impossible to  
employ new workers a t hourly ra te s  above the minimum* All male workers i 
had to  s ta r t  in  the factory  labour squad. They were then a llocated  to  
jobs i n  departments according to  th e ir  factory  sen iority#  In  times o f  
labour shortage th is  procedure aooentuated recruitm ent problemsV On the 
c red it s ide , the system reduced problems of labour placement to  manage­
able s is e .  Ardeer was prim arily  an employer of ^ n e r à l  lab o u re rs . Ifiach 
of the work was unsk illed  and ra th e r  arduous. The schecæ did not apply 
to  c ra ftm en . The number o f promotion steps according to  the wage 
s tru c tu re , liy comparison: to  other fa c to r ie s , was sm all. Experience was 
an important job fa c to r  in  sections mahufaoturing explosives.
From a unioî>ài^ageméht re la tio n s  viewpoint the system prevented 
disputes a ris in g  over the promotion, demotion and dism issal o f ind iv idual 
w orker#  The tu r n - l i s t  was d e f in ite , and showed how each individual stood 
in  re sp ec t to  apy fu tu re  action  by management^ When an employee f e l t  ■: 
aggrieved he o r she could request the T. & Gi*W.U* tO take h is  o r her case 
to  management, and i f  necessary to: lo c a l conference. i^w disagreements 
in  the post-war period were ever carried  to  lo ca l confeienc© stage. Most 
workers were s a t is f ie d  th a t the system worked equ itab ly .
Before workers were forced to  accept promotions discontent arose 
over the d isp a rity  o f earnings. On one occasion sen io r wOakers demanded 
increases in  th e i r  time ra te s  o f pay. The system form alised the status; 
o f groups according to  th e ir  hourly wage r a te .  The system generally  
s ta b ilis e d  union l e ade#hip  amongst the employees with some length o f  
service a t Aideer. The promotional system had a d is t in c tly  favourable 
e ffe c t in  removing worker oiDjeotions to the in troduction  of incen tive 
schemes'. Kie system gay© general workers job secu rity .
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The promotional system had important e ffe c ts  on the formal and 
informal behaviour Of groups of employees* The sen io rity  system, linked 
inseparably to  thé hourly ra te  s tru c tu re , created formal s ta tu e  groups 
w ithin management * 8 hierarchy and informal groups w ithin  the union. The 
behaviour o f these groups, had;, an e f fe c t on unidn-management rela tions*
For example, the hillm en, who generally  had the longest service in  the most 
important department and had the h ighest ra te  of pay, demanded an increase ; 
in  th e ir  hourly ra te s  of pay to  maintain th e ir  e ta tu s  in  earning power 
w ithin the fac to ry . On the whole the sen io rity  system probably s ta b ilis e d  
ra th e r  th a n 'E ru p ted  the lo c a l union organisation* I t  had a favourable 
e f fe c t on the  groups who would have otherwise re jec ted  incentive schemes*
The Seniority  system gave a high degree of job secu rity  fo r general workers, 
almost career employment to  workers normally on the fringe o f the labour 
mairketV - '
The se n io rity  system reinforced another aspect of personnel polioy 
o f Xv# I* which gave career employment. Hourly workers obtained ce rta in  
p riv ileg es  and s ta tu s  normally accorded to  s t a f f  employees* The I*C*X.
S ta ff  Grade Scheme applied to  workers who had th ree years or more o f service 
with the Company, and who in  mana^ment's Opinion were worthy o f acceptance* 
I t s  b en efits  included paym®îii o f wegce In time o f sickness* The scheme 
was not without i t s  d if f ic u ltie s *  Many employees Who had. achieved the 
p riv ileg e  of : sick  leave V^th pay immediately Used i t .  . l i t t l e  could be 
done about; th is  m atter as i t  was a symptom o f  general so c ia l tren d s.
The unions did not p a rtic ip a te  in  adm inistration of the I.O.X.
S th ff Grade Schimnei; I t s  conditions wwre not sub ject to negotiation  by the 
ttoions, nor were they peim itted to  p ro te s t the treatinent of th e ir  members ; 
when they were excluded from i t s  b én afits i For th is  reason management 
o f f ic ia ls  d id  not regard the scheme with sceptisra as they did the ! tu m - l is t* ,  
y e t both had exactly  the same ob jectives. The cen tra l labour o f f ic ia ls  ■ 
responsible fo r  the formulation of the S taff Grade Scheme wrote in to  i t  af 
ru le  which perm itted union members to  leg a lly  s tr ik e  without lo s s  of 
priv ileges*  This ru le  d id  not apply to  i l le g a l  s tr ik e s  where the  informal 
group took action  without approval o f th e ir  union executive. I t  was the 
aim of the loca l union organisation a t Ardeer to  ex ten t the s ta f f  grade - 
p riv ileg es  of the scheme to  a l l  Workers* Ct appeared inev itab le  th a t th is  
was to  be a bargainabie issue in  thé future*
■ v. seo. 3 .
Sec. 3» Supervisory arid s ta f f  positions^
Thé lowest rank of supervision was th a t,o f  leadinghând. The 
leadin^and*s au tho rity  and re sp o n s ih ility  was to  transm it orders’ to  the 
group of workSrs.with whom he or she worked. . The leadinghand was paid a . 
small margin above the hourly ra te  of th e  most sen io r operative in  the 
group supervised^ The ru le s , la id  down in  1953, s ta te d  th a t sen io rity  
was to  he the ch ief fa c to r  in  the seleo tion  of leadihgharid. The T» & G.Yf.U. 
hrahoh claimed th a t a l l  promotions were to  he made according to se n io rity . 
Management d id  not agree to  th is*  THIhere, fo r example- sen ior workers were 
a llocated  to  a hew work group management refused to  demote a worker with 
l é 88 sen io rity  f roà the p o s itio n  of l e # in ^ a h d .  This was an exception to  
the general p rin c ip le  of the r ig h t o f *humping* In  the saune promotional 
sequence*
The interm ediate rank o f supervision was th a t of the chargehand*
The chargehand was paid a h i ^ e r  d if fe re n tia l  than the lead ih^and  hut was 
s t i l l  on an hourly ra te .  At the time of the co d ifica tion  of the promotional 
ru les  the union pressed strongly fo r  applying sen io rity  as the sole c r ite r io n  
in  promoting workers to  the position  of chargehand* Management agreed to 
consider the claims of the most sen io r worker, hut refused to  make i t  a 
hard and fa s t  ru le  to  promote hy se n io rity , Where i t  was necessary to  
reduce the number of chargehande, due to  cu ts  in  the requirements o f personnel, 
th e  redundant char^hsrid reverted  to  worker s ta tu s  and took up h is  or her 
po sitio n  on the tu m l l s t  according to  s t r i c t  se n io r ity . In  th is  way the 
most sen io r operatives* in te re s ts  were safeguarded. The senior operatives 
s t i l l  ocoupied the h ip e s t  p # d  jobs*
The union had no say oyer the method o f se lec tin g  the foreman*
This was l e f t  e n tire ly  to  management * s; prerogative* Management a lso  had 
sole Say over the appoihtment o f spafé foremen, who acted as foremen When 
they were required . The ch ief complaint the T* & G.W.Ü. branch had about 
the foremen and spare foremen was over the question of demotion* The union 
wanted the person demoted to take up h is  po sitio n  on the tu rn  l i s t  accord— 
ing to  s t r i c t  S e n io r i^ .  In  the case o f  a foreman who was demoted^ mane^e- 
ment agreed to  the union*s contentions* I t  was unusual fo r  a foreman to  
be demoted* I n  the case of spare foremen the management disagreed* I t  
argued th a t the spare foreman had to  be placed a t  the  top o f the tu m - l i s t  
so th a t he Was a lw ^ s  sen io r to  the ohargehands and leadinghands* Th# 
spare foreman*© au thority  was impeded i f  he was sub ject to  d irec tio n  by 
persons whcm he supervised when acting  as foreman. The union was able to 
force a  cohcessionV from management when the l a t t e r  agreed th a t in  the 
b la s tin g  department the spaxe foreman had to take Up h is  place on thé tu m  
l i s t  by s t r i c t  sen iority^  Thus the ru les  .governing th is  p a r tic u la r  subject 
were n o t iniiform throughout the factory*.
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There were no ru les  to  govern the appointment o f persons to  the 
sa la ried  s ta f f  of the factory* On one occasion the lo ca l T* & G*W.U* 
branch p ro tested  to  management about the appointment of a ce rta in  
individual (who had previously been dismissed from the secretaryship  of 
the union branch) to  the po sitio n  o f s to res clerk* The union claimed 
th a t a promise was made to  the checkers th a t they were to  be given the 
opportunity to  apply fo r  the p o sition  o f s to res c le rk  i f  a vacancy 
occurred* This had not been carried .o u t, and the man appointed had le ss  
c le r ic a l  expeideno© thân the checkers* Management s ta ted  th a t none o f 
the  checkers had applied fo r  the p o s it io n , . and i t  was not obligated to 
appoint a checker* Apparently the woifcers were ignorant of the method 
of appointing s ta ff*  This inciden t showed how l i t t l e  the hourly workers 
knew o f the ru les  re la tin g  to the sa la ried  d iv ision . Yet most o f the 
hourly and the sa la rie d  employees liv ed  and worked together in  quite a 
small community.
Séc. 4* Female employment *
The facto ry  was a large employer of female operatives. Before 
the war only sing le  women were ^p loyed  in  the factory* During the war 
a considerable number of married women were rec ru ited  to  the  fac to ry . In  
the post-war period the T* & G.W.U. urged management to  give preference to  
single women in  recruitm ent, and to  discharge married women f i r s t*  The 
union expected th a t many female employees would be declared redundant when 
the new mechanised u n it producing b la s tin g  explosives went in to  operation. 
Women, p a r tic u la r ly  the single  women, were apprehensive o f  th e ir  fu tu re 
employment prospects* The branch argued th a t sing le  women were forced 
to  trav e l many m iles in  search o f employment o ther than a t  Ardeer, and 
as Ardeer was the main employer in  the area, the townspeople looked to  the 
facto ry  to  provide them with employment* The union argued th a t i t  was 
so c ia lly  desirab le  fo r  single  women to  have preference in  employment over 
married women*
Management did not wish to give to ta l  preference to  single  women 
because i t  f e l t  many- married women were good workers* I t  agreed to  d is ­
charge a l l  married women with le ss  than three years* serv ice , before single 
womèn* Workers w ith more than th ree years* serv ice were to  be discharged 
according to  se n io rity , regard less of m arital sta tus*  These provisions 
were o rig in a lly  drawn up to  cover the department which expected to  retrench  
a lo t  of female labour, ( although in  actual fa c t the la ÿ -o ff  did not. occur 
a t th a t time due to  thé  high demand fo r  explosives) i Subsequently, the 
preference given to  sing le  women in  the b la s tin g  department Was extended to  
a l l  o thers in  the fac to ry . A lo ca l conference ru led  th a t a g i r l  maraying, 
and who had le ss  than three years* serv ice , lo s t  h e r preference. She had 
to  be discharged before a l l  eingle women with le s s  sen io rity  than she had.
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Although there were union fears about the employment prospects for 
women there was at times a vexy acute shortage of manpower. This led 
management to seek to use women woxfcers, in place of male labour, in parts 
of the factoiy store. The local branch of the T. & G.W.U. opposed the 
dilution of jobs by women workers. The representatives stated that there 
was no knowing how long the labour shortage would last. Althou^ only 
twenty-one jobs were involved in the case they should be kept for disabled 
male workers. The management dropped its proposals, althou^ it was 
convinced that the jobs were within the capabilities of female workers.
In its opposition the branch was clearly influenced by a set of social 
preferences which to a great extent mirrored deep-seated community (Scottish) 
values.
Sec. 5. Changes in work practice.
A number of disputes arose over changes in work practices. These 
changes involved personnel matters# The T. & G.W.U. did not oppose tech­
nical changes such as improved layout of plant or methods of work. One 
dispute occurred over a proposed change in methods of materials handling.
The branoh claimed that management was using work study to fix the number 
of personnel on the job, but without offering an incentive scheme. Manage­
ment replied that it was entitled to alter the manning ratio of 
tion, provided it respected the rules for demotion when getting bd* 
excess labour. Although the workers complained that they had t M ^ h n o o  
hard, the new practice continued.
Managmnent then drew iq> an incentive scheme and offered it to 
those personnel left on the job. The scheme proposed a further cut in 
their numbers, and consequently the scheme was rejected. The materials 
handling section then changed the methods of the job and reduced the mann­
ing ratio, although not to the ratio proposed in the Incentive scheme.
The T. & G.W.U. protested that the cut in personnel was contrary to union- 
management procedure as the workers had rejected the incentive scheme. 
Management insisted that it had the rightful prerogative of making changes 
in the jobs, and deploying labour, in the absence of any specific agreement 
to the contrary. It acknowledged that under an incentive scheme it was 
not permitted to make changes in the deployment of labour without negotia­
tion with the union. The branch was therefore not successful in its appeal.
It was customary for the older side of the department producing 
blasting explosives to work to a given * task*. In 1947 when the forty—four 
hour week was introduced the union agreed that workers would produce the 
same amount of material despite a reduction of three hours in their working 
week. This led to demands by some sections for additional labour to help 
them maintain their output. In 1956 there was a ‘go-slow* which brought 
the 1947 agreement into discussion but it was not changed.'
Uiicyj V # y #
The r e s t  of the disputas over changés in  work p rac tice  were of a : 
minor nature and involved few woifcers. One compialnt occurred over the ; 
*on©-4ûan-ûn©-job* p r in c ip le . , A. foreman performed work during the weêto-* 
end which was noimally dCno by a piboassman durii% the week. Apparently 
th is  change was made to  save paying penalty  ra te s  to  à processman. For 
a sim ilar; reason management placed ce rta in  maintenance workers on o ^ i ,  
ra th e r tlian pay thein extended overtime. Quite clesurly the union acted to 
maintain the earnings of the woifcers affected  by the ohan^s id  Woifc 
p iao tio s^
Chapter V.
Conolusion ■ •
: The siihject m atter in  th is  chapter was an in te re s tin g  example of 
the impact of a union gradually extending i t s  au thority  to  l im it  the preroga­
tiv e  of management to  u n ila te ra lly  determine the working conditions of i t s  
employees* Management d id  not necessarily  exercise tvitsci prerogatives in  an ’ 
unwise and a rb itra ry  manner. On the contrary, the ’tu m - lis t*  system grew 
out of management's needs to have an orderly  system of p lacing i t s  labour 
force* The policy  of management was to  promote and demote i t s  employees 
according to  th e ir  sen io rity  of serv ice . The ru les  fo r  the scheme were 
formulated and adm inistered by management. At a l a te r  stage the union made 
some represen ta tions about the in te rp re ta tio n  o f the ruled* I t  made these 
representations when one of i t s  members claimed th a t the adm inistration of 
the ru le s  was anomalous, o i  was inequitable in  the sense that: a member's 
r ig h ts  o r p riv ileg es  suffered from a p a r tic u la r  managerial decision , 'The 
ru le s  had to  bo administered equitably  and with as few anomalies as possib le , 
otherwise the morals o f employees; was lik e ly  to be damaged by not f u l f i l l in g  
th e i r  expectations, about job secu rity . This p rin c ip le  o f  personnel manage­
ment held true regard less as to  the ro le  of the union*
The p a r tic u la r  system o f placement a t Ardeer was compatible with 
the un ion 's  objective of providing job security  fo r  i t s  members. Seniority  
was an objective measure o f soc ia l ju s tic e  in  placing employees. The union 
wanted the system extended to  those p a r t s  of the facto ry  where there were no 
ru les  covezing the promotion and demotion o f personnel; The ad hoc approach 
of the union in  in tervening to ra ise  sp ec ific  issues continued u n ti l  well 
in to  the post-war period . Then fo r  the f i r s t  time in  the fo rty  years h is to ry  
of unionism in  the factory^ union and management, on the la tte r* s  proposal, 
worked out ,a comprehensive agreement on the ru les to  cover promotion and 
demotion. The ro le  of the union was no, longer one of in tervener, but one 
of p a rtic ip a n t in  fozmiulating an important p art of the personnel polioy of 
management. On some o ther aspects of job secu rity , fo r  example a change in  
work p rac tice  o r load, the union continued i t s  ro le  o f in tervener and ra ised  
m atters only when sp ec ific  deicisons o f management were thought inequitab le^  ;
. CHAPTER VI. DBE/IAROATIOH, DILUTION AHD MANITEHG 
In troduction
The tra d itio n a l job secu rity  disputes involving craftsmen were 
over demarcation, d ilu tio n  and manning* There were few disputes of these 
kinds in  Ardeer "before the second world war. During the war a l l  unions, 
except the S co ttish  Typographical Association, agreed to  the upgrading of 
workers to  sk ille d  jobs'* A fter the war d ilu tio n  in  most trades wa^
b ro u ^ t  to  an end* The H.U.P.B* & P*W. agreed to  continue i t s  d ilu tio n  
agreement because of the in tense shortage o f sk ille d  workers* The A.E.U* 
refused to permit d ilu tio n  of ce rta in  jobs in  Ardeer* A few manning 
disputes occurred a t Ardeer in  the p rin tin g  trad es, but they were 
unimportant*
Démarcation d isputes over the use of unsk illed  workers on jobs 
were almost neglig ible*  The reasons fo r  th is  were simple. General 
workers were organised by the T* & G*W*U., and th is  union did not allow 
i t s  own members to  do wozk which was r ig h tfu lly  th a t of the c ra f ts .  The 
general narrowing of . d if fe re n tia l  eEirnings between the c ra f t  and general 
worker jobs gave management l i t t l e  cost advantage in  using the odd non­
sk ille d  worker on contentious work areas* Ardeer management p referred  
to  respect mutually agreed work prerogatives se t up by the unions*
There was however a second type of demarcation d ispu te , th a t which 
took place over the r iv a l  claims of two c ra f t unions* This was the most 
important type o f job secu rity  dispute in  Ardeer* Analysis showed th a t 
théré  were fundamental reasons fo r  the persistence of th is  type o f d ispu te , 
A demarcation claim by a c ra f t  against another c ra f t  was not simply a 
m atter o f * empire-building* * The demarcation d isp u te  arose due to  the 
use of over-lapping c r i t e r ia  to  f ix  the area of work prerogatives of two : 
trades* Many d isputes over ce rta in  work areas were avoided in  A rleer by 
ca re fu lly  defin ing  c r i t e r ia  in  advance, so s e tt in g  up sa tis fa c to ry  
demarcation lines* (F)
See. 1* Demarcation between crafts*
( i )  l in e s  of demarcation
I t  was custcsnary in  the factory  to define the exclusive areas of 
work prerogatives fo r  p a r tic u la r  c ra f ts  according to c e rta in  c r i t e r ia ,  which 
attempted to  define the 'l in e s  of demarcation** , Three c r i t e r ia  were used*
(P) The author was indebted to  the following who read portions 
o f th is#  chapter* Mr. H. Girdwood, General Secretary o f 
the S.T.A.j Mr. Hugh Kelly, General Sécretaiy  of the P.T.U.; 
and Mr. J .  S ava^ , D ivisional Organiser o f the A.E.U* In  
view of the controversial aspects of demarcation, i t  must 
be s tre ssed  th a t the in te rp re ta tio n  o f  the events was 
e n tire ly  th a t of the . Author*
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the type o f to o ls , the type and size  o f  m ateria ls , and the nature dr the 
technique o f doing the job* Due to  tecîm ioal fa c to rs  i t  was not possib le 
to draw lin e s  of demarcation according to  only one c r ite r io n . The p a r tie s  
frequently  used two or even three c r i te r ia ,  and th is  led  to  considerable 
argument because of the overlap in  determining the work areas. Demarcation, 
d isputes d id  not show ary tendency to  diminish in  the post-war period; in  
fa c t they s lig h tly  increased,
; Duxlng the war bpiiermakers and blacksmiths were involved in  a 
dispute over tté ld ing i The boileimafcers claimed thé exclusive r ig h t to  
jobs which required' welding, Mans^ment rebuffed the claim, holding 
th a t the nature of the job determined the work area and i t  would not agrée 
th a t  the to o l f ix ed  the lin e  of demarcation* I t s  po licy  wg  ^ to  allow each 
trade  to  weld in  oonnaotion with th e ir  respective work. Thé blacksmiths 
also  argued over wre>lding. They took objection in  the w #  years to  a 
female d ilu tee  using a tordS. Management likew ise [dismissed th is  contention. 
Thus i t  was the nature of the job which s e tt le d  the demarcation lin e  between 
the bpilermakers* :and blacksmiths* work areas* ;
Blacksmiths found themselves in  dispute w ith  the f i t t e r s  over the 
use of m aterials* I t  was customary p rac tice  fo r  f i t t e r s  to  handle a l l  ; 
pipework carry ing  # r ,  steam or acids, and also any work involving n inety- 
f iv e  percent (s ic )  of pipe* The blacksmiths were using pipe as a su b stitu te  
fo r  m ateria ls which were in  short supply* The f i t t e r s  claimed the work, 
oohtendihg th a t the type of m ateria ls  s e tt le d  thé lin e  of demarcation* The 
blacksmiths» supported by management, argued th a t th e  job was theirs»; # 
because i t  was normally performed by them* The d is p u #  was se tt le d  in  the 
blacksmiths* favour* But i t  was not c le a r  whether the typé o f m ateria ls 
o r the nature o f thé job was to  be the guiding c r ite r io n  in  fix in g  fu tu re 
demarcation lines* . The two c r i t e r ia  obviously overlapped, and there was 
no simple way o f resolving the d ifference o f opinion by reference to  
p rih o ip le t
Boilermakers in  th e ir  tu rn  complained to management, th a t  the 
f i t t e r s  had done ce rta in  work which, they claimed, was th e ir s .  Certain 
m ateria l was i n i t i a l l y  prepared by the bo ilem akers, but was l a t e r  lin ed  
up by the f i t t e r s  because the work required accurate adjustment* In 
th is  case the d if f ic u lty  o f  f ix in g  the demarcation lin e  resu lted  from a : 
change in  th e  c r ite r io n , from type o f m ateria ls to  nature o f the jobi 
The boilermakers sought #to obtain the r i ^ t  to  work u n til, the f i t t e r s  
were required to make the accurate adjustment. The boilermakers* claim . 
was re jec ted  by the A.E.U, and th e  management'*
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( i i )  estab lia tiing  the praoedent
The aispu tes discussed ahoyearoae over the necessity  to  in te rp re t 
ex is tin g  lin e s  of demarcation in  re la tio n  to  sp ec ific  oases* . With the. 
possib le  exception of the welding dispute the unions were not olaifeing new 
work areas* They were attem pting to  safeguard e x is tin g  woik areas* The 
c r i t e r ia  which .the p a r tie s  used led  to  blujn?ed lin é s  ï n  practice# On o ther 
occasions thé dem arcation.dispute aimed a t s e tt in g  a new precedent, fo r  
example, when new to o ls  o r new m ateria ls  weye intrcduced or when new jobsv 
were performed in  the factory*
Gonsiderable argument developed in  the fac to ry  over thé in troduction 
ofa new typé of p la s t ic ,  alfcathene* The plumbers claimed exclusive use 
of th is  m aterial in  the fac to ry . They referred  to  à previous conference 
held a t headquarters le v e l, which they contended had decided in  favour o f 
allowing plumbers to  use th is  m a te ria l. The plumbers claimed th a t the 
facto ry  management had broken precedent by allowing o ther c ra f ts  to  use 
i t s  material* Management re jec ted  th is  argument, contending th a t no 
precedent Was ye t es tab lished . I t  recognised th a t plumbers had used th is  
new m ateria l more than others but th is  did not imply th a t other C rafts had 
:no claim* r'
Management had already received complaints from the sheetmetal 
workers th a t sane o f th e ir  work was being tran sfe rred  to  the plumbers. The 
sheetmetal workers d id  not claim the exclusive usé of alkathene, but wished 
to  safeguard ex is tin g  work areas by using the c r ite r io n  of nature o f the 
job fo r  f ix in g  the demarcation lin e  -  as did the boilermakers and the f i t t e r s .  
In  fa c t the l a t t e r  were already working with th is  now m aterial* Management ’ 
proposed therefore th a t a l l  c ra f ts  should continue working according to  the 
nature o f the job* The plumbers rep lied , th a t i f  i t  was correct to f ix  
lin e s  of demarcation so le ly  by the nature of the job, then they would be 
pleased to  receive back a l l  the work area they had lo s t  when s ta in le s s  s te e l 
replaced lead . Management s ta ted  th a t th is  Was not a v a lid  argument because 
d i s t r i c t  p rac tice  determined the a llo ca tio n  o f woifc involving s ta in le s s  
steel*  Although not relevant to  the dispute in  po in t, the argument of the 
plumbers showed how extremely d i f f i c u l t  i t  was to  e s tab lish  equitable 
precedents* .
Management, supported by the other c ra f ts ,  was firm ly against se ttin g  
a precedent based on alkathene. Hor was i t  possib le to  draw a S atisfacto ry  
lin e  of démarcation fo r  the various work areas by reference to  the use o f a 
p a r tic u la r  type of tool* A n itrogen blow lamp was used to  work alkathene 
and there  was no precedent which la id  down th a t  th is  was to  be used 
exclusively by a ce rta in  c r a f t .  Management proposed tra in in g  a l l  c ra f ts  
lik e ly  to use the new m ateria l in  the use of th is  to o l .  Even jo in ers  were 
using the m ateria l in  place of wood.
The plumbers then sought to  take the issue to  a rb itra tio n . For ; 
the f i r s t  time since the tw enties a dispute a t  Ardeer was re fe rred  to  
a rh itra tio n *  The M inistry of Labour appointed the D irector o f the Glasgow 
Technical College as a rb it ra to r ,  and a f te r  considering the case he found 
in  favour of the management. % ile  tM s  dispute was Waiting settlem ent 
th e  plumbe3?s lodged an add itional complaint to  the factOw  management , 
th a t i t  had broken the sta tu s; quo by a llo ca tin g  work involving alkathene 
to  the tin sm iths. In  the l ig h t of the a rb i t r a to r 's  award th is  p ro te s t 
was not correct* For there was no estab lished  precedent by which manage­
ment agreed to  a llo ca te  the work to  the plumbers. U ntil the a rb it ra to r  
gave h is  decision management was free  to  a llo ca te  the m aterial according 
to  lin e s  o f demarcation estab lished  by the nature o f  the job*
( i l l )  Management's a ttitude*  v.H ‘
In  the demarcation d isputes reviewed above, management was not 
responsible fo r changing precedent* Management adopted a neu tra l polioy 
towards disputes when the c ra f t unions agreed themselves to  s e t t le  the 
lin e s  of demarcation. A demarcation dispute, i t  must be stressed , arose 
only a f te r  a decision was made by management to  a llo ca te  work in  a ce rta in  
way. In  the f i r s t  instance i t  -waS - management's resp o n sib ility  to  
respect estab lished  demarcation l in e s . #
Management also adopted a positive  ro le  in  avoiding demarcation 
d ispu tes, by bringing together the c ra f ts  in  conference to  draw up agree-w 
ments, re la tin g  to  the lim its  o f th e ir  respective work areas. An agreement %
drawn up a t  workshop leve l s e t out the prerogatives o f blaoksndths, : b o ile r ­
maker s» sheet iron  and sheet metal workers, by types and s izes  of m ateria ls 
and methods o f working. - For four years a f te r  the drawing up of th is  agreed 
ment no demarcation dispute arose* The agreement was subsequently 
endorsed a few years la te r*  I t  did not s e t out the respective r i ^ t s  of 
the f i t t e r s  and plumbers in  re la tio n  to those included in  the agreement*
(iv ) inteiwunion co-operation».
Towards the end of the war the plumbers became concerned about the 
use of su b s titu te s  fo r  lead* requested a conference with the  o f f ic ia ls
of the A.E.U* The D ivisional Organiser of th is  union, when authorising 
the D is tr ic t  Committee to  confer, s ta ted  th a t demarcation lin e s  were 
s e tt le d  according to ex is tin g  p rac tice  —•Practice can be a lte red  as a re su lt 
o f mutual ^ so u s s io n s . I f  there i s  any ind ication  th a t our members are 
prepared to  y ie ld  anything to  the plumbers then I  have no objection to you 
meeting them. * A meeting was held , and lin e s  of doaarcation agreed upon.
As a consequence no d ispute arose between these two crafts*
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Sometimes oonsiderable f r ic t io n  arose between the oriafts. On one 
occasion discussions about demarcation were loaded with suspicion and counter 
claims by two unions. During the war years the blacksmiths became anxious 
about the fu tu re  s ta tu s  of th e ir  c r a f t .  The work of th is  c ra f t  was said  
to  be declining# There was plenty  of work in  Ardeer, as there was elséidiere 
in  those days, but the union was watching i t s  woaic p rerogatives, and i f  
possib le , i t  attempted to  expand employment opportunities fo r  i t s  members.
For these reasons the union demanded the rig h t to  do c e rta in  welding. When 
management, agreed to  t r a in  an apprentice in  th is  f ie ld ,  the boilermakers 
then attempted to  secure an exclusive rig h t to a l l  welding, because they 
f e l t  b tha t blacksm iths' Work was g e ttin g  le ss  and l© ss”j an<i they were 
a fra id  th a t th is  o ther c ra f t  might encroach on th e ir  work# There was much 
misinformation and a ra th e r  absurd and mythical s itu a tio n  developed leading 
to  suspicion,which management found d if f ic u l t  to  d isp e l.
Sec. 2» Demarcation involving unskilled  workers#
In  the early  days o f trade unionism the c ra f ts  were wary of the 
encroachment of unorganised unsk illed  woikers, whom employers attempted to 
use on jobs claimed by the c ra f ts .  I t  was p o in tle ss  fo r  the c ra f ts  to  
organise, control the admission of members, se cur© reasonable wages and then 
find  th a t th e i r  jobs were ^allow ed Up by the unqualified  and lower paid 
workers# Employers had an obvious in te re s t in  keeping the number of sk ille d  
jobs as low as possib le in  order to  save paying the c ra f t  ra te  o f wages* 
Demarcation d isputes were aoooidingly fought out in  considerable b it te in e s s .
There were only two demarcation disputes in  the post-war period at 
Ardeer involving unsk illed  woikers* In the f i r s t  dispute the T. & G.W.U. 
backed the A.E.U*'s claim th a t a ce rta in  machine#, used on experimental work, 
should be worked by ; a sk illed  man. Management held th a t while the machine 
was s e t  up by a sk ille d  worker, i t  Should be operated by a general weaker.
The A.E.U. argued th a t i t  was the machine, and not the s k i l l  z^equxred to  
operate i t , '  th a t was the deciding fac to r  in  determining the work prorogative. 
The A.E.U. won i t s  case, but management gave notice th a t i t  intended to  
ra ise  sfresh the whole issue , i f  the machine was used in  a manufacturing 
department.
In  the second dispute the T. & GiW.U. opposed the A.E.U. The 
dispute ocOurrod over re la tiv e  claims o f the mechanics and the d riv ers  to  
do minor re p a ir  work on motor v e h ic le #  The mechanics were sk ille d  trades­
men who wanted the exclusive xise of a l l  to o ls . Tools were to  be used as 
the demarcation l in e .  Management and the T.& G.W.U. claimed th a t the nature 
of the job determined the work pferogatives# The two unions then drew up 
a demarcation agreement to  allow motor d rivers to  do some minor re p a ir  
work* Thus to o ls  were not used as the sole c r ite r io n  fo r  f ix in g  the 
demarcation line* Drivers were paid almost as high a ra te  as mebhanice," : 
so i t  was o f l i t t l e  in te re s t  to  management, from a cost viewpoint, who did 
the repairs#
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Demarcation issues were pot confined to the engineering t r a d e #
During the war the S co ttish  Painters* Society complained to  the management 
fo r  ellow ing general workers to  usé â brush to  p a in t out marks on drums.
I t  also took objection to  general workers doing o ther rough pa in tin g . I t  
claimed th a t management v io la ted  precedent.  ^At a cphference called  to  con­
s id e r  the question, management secured the r ig h t to use uhskiiled  workers 
on ro u ^  pa in ting  jobs. In  th is  way the nature o f the job se tt le d  the 
issu e , while the to o l ceased to  be an effec tiv e  l in e  o f  demarcation* Later 
pain ters; succeeded ih  es tab lish ihg  the spray gun as a too l of exclusive 
use fo r  sk ille d  craftsmen*
Sec* 3* D ilu tion  o f the c ra f ts *
.Dilution d isputes prig inally} occurred over the up-rgrading of unsk illed  
workers to  sk ille d  jobs. .Disagreement arose over the p rin c ip le  o f  using a 
worker who had hot served h is  apprenticeship on a s k ille d  msüi’s job. In 
the second world war the; Ardeer management found i t  neoessaiy to ask the 
c ra f t  unions to  agree; to  the up-gTading; o f non-sfcillod men to  sk ille d  jobs. 
Only on© union, the Sco ttish  Typographical A ssociation, réfUséd to  agree to  # 
d ilu tion* A kindred union, the  Hational Union of P rin tin g , ; Bookbinding and 
Paper Workers entered; in to  a d ilu tio n  agreement which Was subsequent^, 
renewed to allow d ilu tio n  in  peaCe time# The agilement covered job security  
fo r  i t s  sk ille d  members*. , Ho dism issal of q u a lified  men was to  take place 
while a d ilu tee  was employed. Generally c ra f t  unions opposed d ilu tio n  
in  peace tim e. ; The E.T.Ü. pressed the A rieer management to  remove d ilu tee s  ; 
in  the e le c tr ic a l trades long before the war ended. . U ltim ately a l l  
engineering,jobs were returned to  sk ille d  workers.
Some o f the war-time agreements allowing d ilu tio n , which we:M negotia­
te d  a t national le v e l, were not cancelled. Under one of these the Ardeer 
management in  1951 asked the A.E.U* to  approve the d ilu tio n  o f ce rta in  jobs. 
% e approach f a i le d . I t  had come to  the notice o f the A.E.U. th a t seme o f 
i t s  members had been refused employment in  the fac to iy . Management s ta ted  
th a t i t  was not i t s  policy  to re-employ workers who l e f t  o f th e ir  own 
accord to  take employment in  neighbouring fa c to r ie s . The A.E.U. refused . 
to  permit d ilu tio n  while any of i t s  members in  the d i s t r i c t  were unemployed. 
D ilu tion Was shown to  be p rac ticab le  only when there was an acute shortage 
of labour* I t  was not possible to  enforce a discrim inatory personnel 
policy  a t the same time*
;Chapt* VI. Sec, 4,
Sep. 4 . Manning in  the p rin tin g  trad es ,
The manning dispute was very much akin to  th a t o f demarcation.
The demarcation dispute involved the rig h t of a p a r tic u la r  c ra f t to  perform 
a ce rta in  job. The manning dispute concerned the number of craftsmen to  
work a p a r tic u la r  type of machine. Thé demarcation dispute was q u a lita tiv e i 
the manning dispute was quantitative* The manning dispute was generally 
le ss  oomplioated than thé demarcation issue* In Ardeer the manning d ie - 
pute affected  only the p rin tin g  trad e s .
The Sco ttish  Typographical Association attempted to  Enforce s t r i c t  
manning standards^ In  th is  way it-e s ta b lish e d  a powerful control over 
job  secu rity  fo r  i t s  members. I t  policed the  in troduction  of new machines 
and se t manning ra tio s  fo r  them. A fter the Ardeer management had 
in s ta lle d  a new type o f machine, the S.T.A. sent a note to  the mânagément 
se tt in g  out thé ra tio  of sk ille d  and unsk illed  men required to operate 
the machine* ; Management complained th a t the suggested ra tio  was 
uheconomic. A compromise was then arranged. Sometime l a t e r  the S.T.A. 
refused to  consider the a l te ra t io n  of th is  ra tio  when management wished 
to  introduce an incentive scheme. On another occasion the S.T.A. refused 
to opnsider a change in  another manning ra tio  as a b asis  of discussing à 
:wagé.increwe.
The National Society of E lectrotypers and Stereotypers also kept 
a close watch on manning ra t io s .  Shortly a f te r  thé war i t #  o f f ic ia ls  
noticed  th a t a manning ra tio  in  Ardeer did not conform to  normal in d u s tr ia l 
p ra c tic e . However j they were unable to  in s is t  on i t s  a l te ra tio n , as the 
union could not supply the add itional oraftamwi to  Ardeer. Had there been 
a surplus of labour then no doubt the union would have demanded the ra is in g  # 
of the manning r a t io ,  y:'
Another p rin tin g  union* the National Union o f P rin ting , Bookbinding 
and Paper Workers, oomiplained to  m^agement th a t one o f i t s  members was 
employed on two jobs. In  view of the labour shortage i t  did not press 
fo r  the employment o f an add itional woïkér. Instead  management agreed to  
p ty  the worker a t the higher of the ra te s  which applied to  the two jobs.
This union also refused, to  consider a change in  the manning ra tio  when 
asked to  consider thé app lication  o f an incentive scheme.
/ ' Ohapt. VI. se cs . 5 and 6 ,
See. 5 . Ohange: in  supervision methods.
Like the T* & G.W.U*, the c ra f t  unions d id  not oppose changes in  
work p rac tice  which were made in  the in te re s ts  of e ffic ien cy . They 
occasionally questioned a change which affected  the r i ^ t s  of personnel.
One such chffiige in  work p rac tice , which was disputed, concerned supervision. 
Management introduced a record system which required individual workers to  
f i l l  out cards about work perfonaed. Managœnent wanted the information 
fo r  planning the maintenance of the p la n t. As many craftsmen worked 
without a ^ e a t  deal of supervision over a wide area, management believed 
i t  im practicable fo r  the foremen to  make the recordings. U nfortunately, 
in su ff ic ie n t prelim inary inform ation was gty% t)the wodçe]}©, who viewed 
the new system with suspicion.
The A.E.U* and the Plumbing Trades Union pro tested  to  management 
about the use of the scheme. The A.E.U. thought th a t management was 
going to  use the infoim ation fo r  checking on worker performance. I t  
objected to  the c ra ftto en  f i l l in g  out the cards. In  e ffec t the union 
seemed to  believe th is  was u n fa ir  supervision. : So did the P.T.U. The 
l a t t e r  union also accused management of s to ring  up inform ation to  in tro ­
duce an incentive schoae — despite  the fab t th a t both maintenance workers 
had re jec ted  sohemes. This was probably the basis  o f  both unions* 
Suspicions. Management assuiwd the unions th a t i t  d id  not intend to  use 
the information fo r  introducing an xncenvive scheme, nor to  assess the 
personnel performance o f any ind iv iduals. The system remained.
The P.T.U. spokeemah also added another objection! th a t the system 
was p a r t o f an e ffic iency  d rive . # i l l e  he appreciated the management's 
in te re s ts  in  improving effic ien cy , from h is  personal experience, such 
drives always adversely affected  the job secu rity  o f h is  members. He 
s ta ted  th a t the union was opposed to any deviation from work p rac tice  
which adversely a ffe c t h is  members. There was no evidence however, th a t 
the union ac tu a lly  opposed technioai improvements. The spokesman was 
repeating  Some o f thè myths th a t some union members s t i l l  c lin g  to  and scsne 
managements accuse them of harbouring.
Sec, 6. The incidence and nature of r e s tr ic t iv e  p rac tice s .
The Ardeer study, showed th a t disputes over demarcation, d ilu tio n  
and manning were re la tiv e ly  unimportant in  the union-management re la tio n sh ip . 
Was th is  tru e  of B ritish  industry  generally? In  the days before the f i r s t  
world war seme o f the most b i t t e r  struggles between management and union 
took place over the demarcation, d ilu tio n  and manning d ispu tes. ( l )  In  those 
days the c ra f t  unions had two mutually consisten t objectives* to  maintaüi
(1) For example, see Jeffreys* 'The Story o f the EngineersV.
â©C.: 6*
the seourity  o f th e i r  m®®bers* jehs and to strengthen the bargaining power 
of the unions# They supported a system of apprenticeship whicdz lim ited  the 
entry  of new persons in to  a given trade , work prerogatives were demarcated 
to  prevent the use o f lower paid labour, they stopped the d ilu tio n  o f the 
trade by preventing the upgrading of non-qualified peraonnal, and they 
fixed the r a t io  of men required to  mann a machine. The unions successfu lly  
lim ited  the prerogatives o f management to d # lo y  labour as i t  saw f i t ,  and 
estab lished  job secu rity  fo r  th e i r  members#■
■ :  :  : . ■ ' ' '  ' ■  ■ . - . '
Since the f i r s t  world war disputes over demarcation, d ilu tio n  and
manning lo s t  much of th e ir  b it te rn e s s  as th e ir  importance in  the power 
struggle between u^iicn and management declined. Disputes over demarcation, 
d ilu tio n  and manning s t i l l  arose but they were usually  resolved without too 
much d if f ic u l ty .  This was the conclusion of a survey made by Zweig in to  
the cottyn, iron  and s te e l ,  p rin tin g , engineering and build ing  in d u strie s  (?) 
in  the period a f te r  the second world war. Manning d isputes in  the p rin tin g  
and engineering in d u s trie s  were unimportant. Usually the engineering 
trades stuck to  the p rin c ip le  o f  'one man, one machine*;, while the manning 
ra tio s  fo r  minding p rin tin g  machines was determined by'mutual discussions 
between unions and managements. Demarcation d isputes in  the build ing 
trades were p ra c tio a lly  non-existen t, and while they were occasionally 
troublesome in  the engineering trèdés, they were not far-reach ing , (3)
The re a lly  s ig n if ican t aspect o f the demarcation issue a t  Ardeer 
was the persis tence  o f the in te r* c ra f t dispute* This demarcation dispute 
was a ju r isd ic tio n a l conflic t^  involving two or more c ra f t  unions, over 
work p rerogatives. The c o n flic t was hot simply a m anifestation o f •empire- 
b u ild in g ', On close analysis o f  the problem an inherent d if f ic u lty  was 
found to  e x is t in  defin ing  the lin e s  of demarcation. I t  was customary to 
use several types of lin e s  -  type o f to o l, type , and size  of m ateria l, and 
nature of the job — to  define work prerogatives* IXie .to  the r e a l i t i e s  o f 
production i t  was frequently  impossible to  marfc o ff  work prerogatives of 
each trade by the use of a single  c r ite r io n . In te rp re ta tio n  d if f ic u l t ie s  
were bound to  a r is e  once two lin e s  were used# Where new m ateria ls, too ls  
o r jobs were used o r came in to  being fo r  the f i r s t  tim e, a precedent had 
to  be estab lished , and i t  was possib le fo r  a  dispute to  occur over the 
a llo ca tio n  o f to o l, m ateria ls or job . These demarcation issues arose 
from a system o f  apprenticeship and c ra f t  unionisation;.
( 2) Zweig* 'P roductiv ity  and Trade Unions', (1951), p .21,
(3) Ibid} see p p , .201, 210, 23#
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Thé demarcation issue between the c ra f ts  was not. bound to  become 
bothersome, especia lly  where management allowed the c ra f ts  to  come to th e ir  
own agreements w ith respect to  the a lloca tion  of work. I t  was lik e ly  to  
a r ise  when morale in  the workshop declined, due e i th e r  to  an underlying 
th re a t to: the secu rity  of the jobs o f the p a itic u la r  c ra f t  o r because of 
poor supervision and management. This Was tru e  of most job security  
disputes — over changes in  work p rao tice and load, promotions, demotions 
and; d ism issals, Zweig also  contended th a t unions became re s tr ic t iv e  or 
non-co-operative when the morale of th e ir  members d e te rio ra ted . To be more 
precise ,: the informal groups of employees with common c ra f t  in te re s ts  took 
action  to  p ro tec t the secu rity  of th e ir  jobs when a managerial action  
threatened them* , The group demanded pro tection  from their, unibn, and 
formal disputes over demaroation, d ilu tio n , manning, change in  work p rac tice  . 
or load were then created*
The opponents of unions argued th a t any p rac tice  imposed by a 
trade union which affected  the effic iency  of management was primae fac ie  a 
re s tr ic t iv e  p ra c tic e . As the argument went , r e s tr ic t iv e  p rac tices  were 
, lim ita tio n s  on managerial prerogatives to, organise th e i r  work as e f f ic ie n tly  
as possib le , including the r ig h t to  deploy labour in  the best possib le manner. 
These views were subject to  severe questioning by Zweig, In  the f i r s t  place 
there was evidence th a t not a l l  employers regarded the provisions covering 
job secu rity  as necessarily  • re s tr ic tiv e # , . There was no evidence th a t 
employers believed .that unions were taking over the management of th e i r  
. en te rp rises . In  the second place Zweig concluded th a t work p rac tices  were 
p a rt and parce l o f ru les  and;légulations o f industry  which were necessary to 
elim inate in d u s tr ia l anarchy. The jo in t ru les  were o ften  a stim ulus to  good 
management, while a hindrance to le ss  e f f ic ie n t management. Even i f  the 
p rac tices  involved some sa c rif ic e  : of production by re s tr ic t in g  the freedom 
of deploying labohr,'. they o ffered  valuable 'Compeusations which found ■ 
expression in  s ta b i l i ty  and con tinu ity  of .production without disturbance*
Zweig concluded (unfortunately, ta n ta lië in g ly  b r ie f ly )  th a t  each 
industry had i t s  system of in d u s tr ia l  jurisprudence, ahd •'the bo ss 's  word 
was no longer law". Many f e l t  tha t th is  elaborate system of in d u s tr ia l 
jurisprudence needed developing in to  a positive  and formal system o f in d u s tr ia l 
adm inistration of ju s tid e  a t  a l l  le v e ls , (4) The Ardeer study showed th a t  ^
th is  had. talcen p lace, both with respect to c ra f t and general workers' job 
secu rity .
(4) Ibid* p p .:24- 5.
Conolusion
O rig in a lly , the  dem arcation,, d i lu t io n  and manning d isp u te s  arose fro^n 
th e  c r a f t  unions challenge t é  management♦s p rero g a tiv es  to  deploy i t s  
employees. As th i s  challenge hecame more su ccessfu l customs and p ra c tic e s  
were e s ta h lish e d  in  employing craftsm en. ’ These customs and p ra c tic e s  hecame 
p a r t  o f  a system o f in d u s t r ia l  ju risprudence which s e t  out the  righ ts : and 
o b lig a tio n s  o f management, and the unions* ... At Ardeer, the  growth o f p rac ­
t ic e s  which p ro tec ted  the job se c u r ity  of draftsm en d if fe re d  somewhat from 
the development o f th e  ru le s  r e la t in g  to  placement o f general workers* The, 
l a t t e r  which were s e t  ou t in  a  s in g le  document, were something equ ivalen t to  ; 
• s ta tu te  law** The dem arcation and manning p ra c tic e s  were e s ta b lish e d  on 
•a case to  case* approach which was stro n g ly  based  on e x is t in g  •p reced en t',
\Vhen a union made i t s  p ro te s t-  to  management i t  based “i t s  arguments on p as t 
customs, which v/ere observed o r put in to  p ra c tic e  by management. When new 
m a te ria ls , to o ls  o r jobs were, in troduced fo r  which th e re  was no previous 
p ra c tic e , a precedent had :to  be e s ta b lish e d , From then  on, a llo c a tio n  o f 
work amongst thé d i f f e re n t  c ra f t:  groups was made in  l ig h t  o f th is  p reoedeh t, ■
Frequently ,; d .i f f ic u l t ie s  arose over the  in te rp re ta t io n  o f the  
e x is t in g  p receden t, and a union claimed th a t mana^ment had attem pted to  
a l t e r  precedent*. As i t  was w ith in  management's p re ro g a tiv e ,, a n d ,i ts  
r e s p o n s ib il i ty  to  .a llo c a te  vrork; amongst th e  c r a f t  groups, the  demarcation 
d isp u te  arose between i t  and: à  p a r t ic u la r  union. This was so , even when 
management encouraged the- c r a f t ■ unions to  agree on the  l in e s  o f demaroation* 
During the post-w ar. period , a  number o f  unions attem pted to  codify  t h e i r  ru le s  
r e la t in g  to  dem arcation. T his agreement ; seemed to  hay© a sa lu to ry  e f f e c t  on 
the re la t io n s  betw een.the  c ia f t  unions, even though in te rp re ta t io n  d i f f i c u l - : 
t i e s  s t i l l  arose a t the workshop level*  . •
D ilu tio n  d isp u tes  were v i r tu a l ly  e lim inated  by • s ta tu te s ' -  
agreements n eg o tia ted  a t  n a tio n a l le v e l ,  .Manning r a t io s  in  a few cases were 
se t by hnion-managemént n eg o tia tio n s ; : otherw ise changes in: work p ra c tic e  
f e l l  irito. d ispu te  only when th é r© was Some inequ ity ,: which was challenged, on ■ 
an hd hoc b a s i s , . When . an incentive: scheme came in to  being the  manning r a t io  
had to  be s e t  out in  the scheme, and nego tia ted  between union and management,:
chapter:VII. : ' THE HOURLY WAGE STRLIOTUHB#' : " # h :
Introduotiûh
Features o f the Ardeer wage stru c tu re  included a minimum hourly ra te  of 
pay fo r male general workers, and separate ra te s  fo r  female and juvenile 
workers* 'All th ree ra te s  were co^on  to o ther 1*0*1. fa c to r ie s  as well as 
Ardeer. They were fixed  hy national negotiations hetwoen 1 ,0*1* and the 
general worker unions* The d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  was determined on a factory  
■basis* A fter 1948 the d if fe re n tia l  wage s truc tu re  was to some extent de ter­
mined hy a job evaluation scheiae* Females did ho t receive the same ra te  fo r 
the job as male workers*
Craftsmen were paid a t an hourly fa te , negotiated a t national leve l by 
I*C*I* with the build ing  and engineering unions. These agreements s e t  out the 
d if fe re n tia l  ra te s  to  be pa id  to  the p a r tic u la r  type of p ra f t and sem i-skilled  
workers* These ra te s  were more than minima* The .craft ra te s  were. common, in  
the sense th a t they applied to  a l l  types of work in  I.C * I. factories*  The 
craftsmen enjoyed a f a d in g  system» which granted ex tra  hourly ra te s  to  workers 
on a m erit ra tin g  scheme*
Both craftsmen and general workers had a common code which re la ted  to, 
premium. payments, such as overtm e and s h if t  allowances* Mai^ general workers 
and craftsm en were also  paid  by resu lt*  One 1.0,1* agreement se t out working 
conditions to be observed fo r  a l l  categories o f labour employed in  1 ,0 ,1 . 
fa c to r ie s  producing chemicals* \
Sec. 1» Features of the c ra f t  wage s tru c tu re ,
fflie present wage s tru c tu ré  fo r  craftsmen was introduced in to  Ardeer in  
1936 when the 1*0,1, national agreements came in to  being fo r  the f i r s t  time.
P rio r  to  th is  the wages s tru c tu re  : a t Ardeer waS determined by lo ca l nego tiations. 
Several f u tu r e s  of th is  method of fix ing  w a^s conditioned the craftsmen a t  the 
fac to ry  to  accept the new I .C .I .  agrsementh. In the f i r s t  place the loca l 
engineering and build ing unions had no rea l control over wages paid a t  Ardeer, 
They had agreed to  follow movements in  the Glasgow ra te s  fo r  each, c ra f t  occupa­
tio n , ' O rig inally , the fa te s  paid  in  Glasgow were higher than those paid a t  , 
Ardeer, so there  was a. stim ulus fb r the Glasgow standard to  be adopted* In  
the second p lace, the large number of amalgamations of unions a f te r  the f i r s t  
world war made the craftsmen, wherever they, worked, conscious o f the d e s ira b ili ty  
of a national wage ra te , (ra th e r  than a se rie s  of regional and lo ca l va ria tio n s  
of ra te s , ) although tin ifom ity  was never achieved. In  the th ird  p lace, c ra f ts ­
men a t Ardeer worked under the same working conditions as did the general 
workers. Thèse conditions wepe determined by negotiations w ithin the various 
frameworks encompassing ^ n e r a l  workers. In  e ffe c t, the individual lo ca l c ra f t 
organisations a t  Ardeer had l i t t l e  or no control over the wage ra te s  or the 
working Conditions which applied to  th e ir  members a t  Ardeer. The Ardeer frame­
works were inseparably linked to  o ther frameworks which covered much la rg e r 
groups of workers.
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Although I*C*I* was founded in  1926 i t  was another decade before 
i t s  rea l influence was f e l t  in  B ritish  in d u s tr ia l ré i# ip n s*  : In  1935 i t  
l e f t  the re s t  of the chemical industry  to  deal d ire c tly  with the general 
worker unions* At the same time i t  commenced nego tiations with the A*E*U,, 
add la te r  w ith o ther engineering unions and the bu ild ing  trades^ fo r  
exclusive Gompany-wide agreements* By sk illfu l negotiations with th#
A*E*U* i t  obtained th a t un ion 's  assent to  a national wage s tru c tu re  c o v e r ­
ing  a l l  engineering trades in  I*G .I. fao to ries(w ith  some exceptions)* I t  
offered a le v e llin g  up o f unequal c ra f t  wages then found in  1*0*1* facto ries*  
The re su ltin g  agreement was signed in  1936 by seven o ther engineering 
unions as well* A sim ila r agreement was signed w ith the build ing  trades 
uhiqns#sh6rtiy. a f te r* .;
In  1938 1*0*1* signed an agreement fo r  introducing common working 
conditions to cover engineering, build ing  and g en er#  workers* In  some 
1*0*1. fac to rie s  ce rta in  craftsmen lo s t  some advantages Wien they agreed to 
follow the conditions o f general workers* In  Ardeer a l l  workers lo s t  a 
ra th e r small long-servie© pa;^ent* But craftsmen in  the fac to iy  accepted # 
the new conditions f o r  they were long conditioned to  observing working 
conditions which applied to general workers* Thé craftsmen never p a r t ic i­
pated in  lo ca l oyer workihg/ conditions in  Ardeer* They did
not lose any r ig h ts  when the new aigreement came in to  being* Ihstead the 
lo ca l branches of the c ra f t unions acquired r ig h ts  to  in d ire c tly  determine 
these conditions*
There were three main featu res of the new I*C*I* wage structu res 
the su b s titu tio n  of d i s t r i c t  and lo ca l negotiations by the national fix a tio n  
of Wages fo r  craftsmen, the development of m u ltila te ra l negotiations with 
two major groups o f unions» and the, establishment; of uniform working 
conditions to  cover both craftsmen and general workers* These agreements 
out o ff  most of the craftsmen employed in  1*0*1* fa c to r ie s  from the re s t  
o f the engineering sùid build ing  industries*  There were many advantages 
fo r  a large employer such as 1*0*1* in  having i t s  own exclusive agreements 
and not being tie d  with o ther employers* 1*G*I* workers were kept out of 
the: f ie rc e  wage arguments which f la re d  up from time to  time in  the engineer­
ing  industry* I*C.I* paid i t s  g e n # a l workers higher than.> did other 
chemical employers* There was also anéthèr reason* 1*0*1. took over 
many companies pleoits, each o f which had d iffe re n t labour re la tio n s  
h is to rie s*  By bringing the determination bf the minimum hourly ra te s  fo r  
most categories of i t s  workers w ithin the control o f the Central Labour 
Department, 1*0.1* exerted considerable influence over i t s  managements in  
applying a progressive personnel policy*
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M u lti- la te ra l negotiations had some importsait coneequénees* As the 
approval o f a l l  unions was required to  a l te r  the agreement i t  followed th a t 
no union was able to  'go i t  a lo n e '. The A.B.Ü. tr ie d  to  dp th is  but i t s  
ta c tio s  were hot supcéssful. Thé unions were forced to  agree on a common 
a lte ra tio n  to the ra te s  of wages paid* This had to  be done before the 
unions met the «aployer* This encouraged in te i-im ion  cC-operation, sim pli­
f ied  the union-rmanagément p a tte rn , and brought s ta b i l i ty  to  the movement of 
wage d if fe re n tia ls  as between the various c ra f ts  in  the workshop. Multi­
la te r a l  negotiations prevented leap-frogging o f wage ra te s .  The lo c a l union 
branches had to submit proposals fo r  changes in  wage ra te s  (and subsequently 
in  working conditions as w ell) to  th e ir  national executives. The demand had 
to  be endorsed by a meeting of delegates from a l l  the engineering unions*
Tbis n a tu ra lly  c u r ta ile d  the power of thé lo ca l union organ isations. In 
the Case of Ardeer no p a r tic u la r  fru s tra tio n s  occurred because the craftsmen 
were long condition to following ex tra-facto ry  norms*
The p rin c ip le s  o f wage stru c tu re  e s tab lish ed ,by I* C, I * in  the period 
before the second world war remained in  existence fo r  the next twenty years*
A$ Ardeer there  were few disputes which d ea lt w ith c ra f t  wages or the working 
conditions covering both c ra f t  and general workers* A conference was ca lled  
to  discuss the in troduction  o f  the fo rty -fo u r hour week sho rtly  a f te r  the 
war, and another conference d ea lt w ith another m atter re la tin g  to  vacation pay* 
There were few in te rp re ta tiv e : disputes^ The only one of inq>ortance occurred 
when the A.E.U* attengpted to  b b t^ n  specia l ra te s  fo r  d ir ty  work and special 
sk ill*  Management re jec ted  these claims as the ra te s  contained in  the 
national agreements were common ra th e r  than minima* Craftsmen were paid more 
than th is  ra te  when they q u a lified  fo r  a h igher grade according to  th é ir  m erit. 
There were also  one o r two conferences in  the post-war period to  f ix  the ra te s  
fo r p rin tin g  c ra f ts ,  which were not included in  the I*0,1 , national agreements.
Sec* 2* The m erit ra tin g  scheme*
The only way open fo r  craftsmen employed in  Ardeer to  receive a higher , 
hourly wage than the common ra te  was through a grading scheme which paid 
specia l allowances to  those whose work performancewas assessed to  be above 
minimum acceptable standards fo r  employment* The object o f the scheme was 
to  reward those, who in  the : opinion o f the management, showed a  h i ^ e r  degree 
o f s k i l l  in  th e ir  work than was required fo r  th e i r  continued employment in  
the fac to ry . Grading w’as based çn a m erit ra tin g  scheme which assessed 
the individual worker on h is  c a p a b ili tie s . The fac to rs  talcen in to  account 
fo r  assessing  performance included technical a b i l i ty ,  r e l i a b i l i ty ,  standard 
of dex te rity  of work, sense of teamwork, regard fo r general tid in e ss  and 
d isc ip lin e . The m erit ra tin g  was canned  out every s ix  months by a manage­
ment team consisting  o f two o ff ic ia ls*  All the craftsmen (except those in  
the p r in tin g  trades) weré included in  th is  period ic  survey* The m erit 
scheme appiied only, to  craftsmen, and had nothing to do with the job evalua­
tio n  scheme which covered general worker jobs in  the factory*
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Provisions fo r  paying a l l  owanoês fo r  grading were included in  the 
1936 I.G .I* agreements# The ra te s  were negotiated toge ther with the 
ra te s  fo r  the various c ra f ts .  From 1936 to  1954 the allowances fo r  grad­
ing were adjusted th ree  tim es. On the la s t  occasion the number o f grades 
was increased from fiv e  to  six# The ra te s  paid ranged from one and h a lf  
to  nine pence per hour. Receipt o f an allowanoo, p a r tic u la r ly  the h i ^ e r  
amounts^ had a considerable e ffec t on the earnings of the craftsmen* The 
Company fixed the percentage of workers a llocated  to  each grade. I t  was 
a forced d is tr ib u tio n  scheme o f m erit rating^#
Under the revised scheme adopted in  1954 'any tradesman who f e l t  
d is s a tis f ie d  with h is  grading was a t lib e r ty  to  seek an explanation from 
management I f  the explanation given to  him was unsa tisfac to ry  then the 
individual'w orker was e n t it le d  to  appeal according to  the estab lished  
nego tia ting  procedure* I f  necessary the case could be re fe rred  to  lo ca l 
conference. Before a worker v/as dovmgraded he was given due warning so 
th a t he might improve h is  performance* The Coorpany reserved the r ig b t to 
downgrade a worker fo r  d isc ip lin a ry  reasons* These conditions were d is ­
cussed with the Signatory Unions* They want a long way to meet the general 
objections lev e lle d  by unions a t  m erit ra tin g  schemes.
Sec* 3* The general workers' wage .s tru c tu re .
The wage s tru c tu re  a t  Ardeer fo r  general Workers had both a base 
ra te  fo r  male and females, and a d if fe re n tia l  ra te  according to  the job 
performed* The. minimum ra te s  were deteimined by a number of frameworks 
mentioned in  the opening chapter* F ir s t ,  there were lo ca l negotiations 
between the Sco ttish  Union of Book Labourers and thé factorjr management; 
then the ra te s  were deteimined by the explosives employers and tbe national 
unions; la te r ,  ra te s  were fixed by the chemical industiy* In  1936 the 
I.G .i*  ^reem ent came in to  fo rce . The ra te s  paid to  general workers were 
higher than those paid in  the re s t  of „the chemical industiy* S h ift 
allowances were included in  the general I .G .I , agreement re la tin g  to  working 
conditions*
Many jobs a t  Ardeer carried  higher hourly ra te s  of pay than the 
minima* For many years management fixed  these ra te s  without negotiation  
w ith the union* Indeed, i t  was not u n ti l  the job evaluation scheme was 
introduced in  1948 th a t ra te s  fo r  a l l  jobs in  the facto ry  were negotiated  
by the union* N evertheless some ra te s  were adjusted from time to  time by 
represen tations of workers or the union. Adjustment o f job ra te s  took 
place ra th e r  haphazardly, and consequently the d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  
became uneven. This was i l lu s tr a te d  by the percentage growths of a sample 
u f job ra te s  between the years 1931 to  1947 es ind icated  in  Table V*
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TABLE V
Percentage Increases in  selected  rates* I93I to  1947
A ncillary workers % B lasting Department % Acids and Prop. Dept. ^
Junior Runner 58 Proo'm (paste mix) 65
Senior Banner 53 Proo-a (ep i.pdre), . 61
Proceeeaen 44 |
Wharftoan 74
Motor Driver) 72
Bigger )
Pipe coverer 58
Labourer 58
Loco d riv e r 57
Engineman 54
Hillman 42 Proc'm (H it.o f lead) $0
Proo'm (T.N.T.) 48
Procîm ( r i f l e  p ress) 48
The national minimum fo r  male workers increased hy 58^  over the period.
At the time I .G .I .  negotiated with the general worker unions, fo r 
a minimum wage agreement i t  gave consideration to  introducing a uniform 
d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  fo r i t s  factories*  There was considerable unevert- 
ess of job ra te s  not only w ithin the same facto ry , but between fa c to r ie #  
The p rin c ip a l d if f ic u lty  th a t confronted I.G .I*  o f f ic ia ls  was the creation  
o f a yardstick  fo r comparing the ra te s  of jobs in  widely d iffe r in g  circum­
stances. I t  experimented with a ra tin g  device but found i t  inq?ossible to  
co-ordinate i t s  use. I t  was forced to  abandon i t s  proposals. At Ardeer 
the method of determining the d if fe re n tia l  wage s tru c tu re  remained the 
same as i t  had over the past three decades. Job ra te s  continued to be 
adjusted haphazardly, and some o f the important jobs, p a r tic u la r ly  in  the 
main department producing b la s tin g  explosives, remained unaltered fo r many 
years* This led  to  considerable in d u s tr ia l trouble in  the post-war 
period, as the next chapter w ill  te ll*
A fter the war I .G .I .  gave fresh  consideration to  the in troduction 
of a b e t te r  method o f determining d if fe re n tia l job ra te s .  I t  drew up a 
job evaluation scheme which was worked out on a company-wide b asis  but 
which was applied to i t s  fa c to r ie s  on an individual b a s is . Ho attenipt 
was made tb  introduce a common wage s tru c tu re . When the job evaluation 
scheme was applied in  a p a r tic u la r  factory  lo ca l nego tiations determined 
#Le job ra te s  to  be paid . There were advantages in  th is  method of fix ing  
wage ra te s .  Disputes were confined to  re la tiv e ly  small numbers o f woikerà, 
compared to  the l a r ^  numbers affected  by disputes such as in  the railways 
when negotiations over the d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  broke down. Moreover,! 
i t  was questionable whether complete national uniform ity was desirab le .
I t  was appropriate th a t some m atters be reserved fo r  determ ination by local 
n q ^ tih t io n s .
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Seo. 4 . In s ta l la t io n  o f Job Evaluation. (F)
A fter the war I.O .I* fom ulated  a job evaluation scheme fo r  ùse in  
i t s  faotoi'ies* I.O .I*  claimed th a t i t s  scheme, c a lle d  'jo b  appraisement*, 
was based on the most favourable featiires o f the ranking," c la ss if ic a tio n , 
factora-cemparison and point methods* Some of the techniques of a l l  four 
methods were used* : Key jobs were chosen from à number o f I .O .I .  fa c to r ie s  
in  order to  s e t standards o f comparison. G ther jobs were then c la ss if ie d ,
: (The four; job fac to rs  fbir Whibh pbints were a l lo tte d  were mental
requirements, physical requirements, aoguired sk illS  and knowledge, 
working conditions* Under each job faOtor there  were a number o f sub- : 
fac to rs  th a t had to  be taken in to  account by the assessors*
JOB FACTORS MTED UmEE I .O .I .
MENTAL r PHYSICAL ACQUIRED SKILLS WORKING
CHAEACTBRISTÎCS CHARACTERISTICS AND KNGWLEDGB CONDITIONS
Physical
Good Memory . Muscular Strength = E duction V ibration
A bility  to  Reason Stamina Training P osition
Spèéd Of Réactbn ; ;#Agility, Experience ,. ÿ." Ebmes/Smell/
'Jtyen temperament Sensory Accuracy D ust/D irt 
A y
Bersèverance , : Wetness -
''M ech ^ icé l'Sense-: ' Clothing and
Initiative^ A ^Equipment
D isparate A ttéh- . Poor L W t
; tio n  : k- ' Exposure
A b ility  to Mental
Visudise Noise
Sense o f Height : :' ;
R esponsibility Below Groünd
Iso la tio n
;#Monotony#;v#.
Nervous 'Tension
Accident Risk
Disease Risk
The fac to rs  represented ch a ra c te ris tic s  of the job, not those o f the 
ind iv idual performing it*  Each of the ^our main fac to rs  was ra ted  by a--' 
po in t system* The poin ts re f le c te d  the overall work content o f  each factor* 
For example, po in ts  a l lo tte d  to  the th ird  main fa c to r  ra ted  thé re la tiv e  
e f fo r t  expended by the worker in  acquiring the necessary s k i l l  and knowledge 
to  do the job . One, inherent d if f ic u lty  with th is  method of ra tin g  was the , 
p o s s ib ili ty  o f taking in to  account a sub-factor which may have been im p lic itly  
a l lo t te d  po in ts under another main factor* I t  was considered, how #er, th a t  
the accuracy of the ra tin g s  was improved by keeping the number of job faqtCr# 
to  a small number. '
(F) See a summary o f th is  subject in  ' B usiness '. Nov., I956» 
'What job evaluation can mean to in d u s tr ia l  peace'*
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Fbr each of the four main job fac to rs  there was a ra tin g  scale  of 
a hundred points# Jobs with the h ighest work content under each main fac­
to r  were placed a t the top o f the scalf* The job of cleaning b o ile rs  was : 
considered to  have the worst working conditions and was therefore given the 
maximum number of po in ts  under th a t p a r tic u la r  heading# Other jobs with 
high wo]dk content under the o ther th ree main fac to rs  were also  found and 
placed a t  thé top of th e ir  respective scales# Using a combination o f the 
ranking and faetor-Oomparison methods the re s t  of the jobs were then placed 
on the scale so th a t the po in ts f in a lly  a llo tte d  to  each mainhead bore a d ire c t 
re la tio n sh ip  to  the work content o f  th a t job factor#
At the bottom o f the scale fo r  each job fa c to r  ce rta in  jobs were found# 
These werei flo o r sweeping, harrowing o f saiid, carry ing  o f messages, record^» 
ing o f f ig u res  and taking C'% simple messages# Some d e fin itio n  was also  mad.e 
o f the minimum adverse feguirements a worker was to  experience in  working 
conditions# The se lec tion  o f these jobs was im portant fo r  they ,were ho t to  
carry  any d iffe re n tia l#  They were to  represent the jobs fo r  which the 
Company and the general workers* unions fixed  the minimum ra te  o f pey#
A fter some empiidcal investigations each o f the  four main fac to rs
were given the following w ei^ ts*
mental requirements 0#4
physical requirements Q#4
s k i l l  and knowledge 1.0
working conditions 0.7
The v a lid ity  of the scheme rested  on these weights to a considerable extent# 
Otherwise a d is to r tio n  o f the d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  would have resulted# The 
weights had to  stand the te s t  o f time* They represented the re la tiv e  impor­
tance o f job fac to rs  in  making up the woifc content, on which the new d iffe re n r 
t i a l  s tru c tu re  was to  be b u ilt#  The actual d if fe re n tia ls  were c ^ c u la te d  
from a conversion scale which s e t out monetary values in  re la tio n  to  po in ts 
a llo tted *  .
A job evaluation survey was made o f general worker jobs in  Ardeer in  
194Ô* Di addition to  some o f the ^ n e r a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in  apply­
ing job evaluation, Ardeer had a specia l problem# D ue to  the ra th e r  complex 
method o f a llo ca tin g  labour by the ’tu rn  l i s t*  system i t  was in®ossible to  
se t up too many job ra te s ;  I t  was found necessary to  group various jobs 
together in  order to  give them the one job rate# In o ther words, s t r i c t  
ra tih g  was m A ified  in  favour of a c la ss if ic a tio n  system# In  th is  way the 
d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  was kept reasonably simple and provided a f le x ib le  
system fo r  prcmaoting and demoting labour#
The lo ca l branch of the T# & U.W.U# a t  f i r s t  re je c ted  the p rin c ip le  
o f  job evaluation# The workers did not understand how, the job evaluation 
scheme worked# The Company took the precaution of s e tt in g  out i t s  p rin c ip les  
in  a booklet, which was widely d is tr ib u ted  to  i t s  employees. I t  was not a 
good piece o f public re la tio n s  as i t  was w ritten  in  ra th e r  W chanical terms#
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It did not show how the worker benefited from the introduction of job evalua­
tion# The very teim was enough to cause suspicion# There was also reason 
to believe that s«ne lower management officials did not understand the scheme's 
full in^lications and meaning#
Some time after this several shop stewards attended an appreciation 
course on job evaluation# This seemed to have the desired effect for the 
local branch then approved of the principle of job evaluation# This did not 
end the difficulties of installation# Having rated and grouped the jobs 
under various wage headings it was then necessary for the management and the 
local branch to agree on every one# This was a substantial task. It was 
two years before the negotiations were completed# These negotiations were 
usually conducted at plant, rather than factory level#
Many job rates were increased as the result of installation of job 
evaluation# This softened worker resistance towards the introduction of the 
scheme, and lent evidence to the proposition that such schemes have to be 
iaqplemented in times of rising wage rates. Few job rates were decreased#
À worker holding a job whose rate was found to be too high, under job evalua­
tion procedures, received compensation in the form of a lump sum# Mo 
individual had his rate reduced by the introduction of job evaluation# Manage­
ment held an additional bait for the adoption of the scheme# The mdhsme was 
not officially declared to be in operation until all departments agreed to the 
new rates# Increased rates were paid retrospectively to the date agreed by 
the particular department#
See# 5# Procedural effects of job evaluation#
The I#C#I# scheme, like other job evaluation schemes, established a 
ranking of importance of Jobs according to a pre-determined formula# The 
point Eystem gave quantitative expression to the ranking of the jobs# The 
work content represented the 'real' worth of a job compared to all other jobs 
surveyed in the system# The quantitative measure had the advantage of allow­
ing both managemmmd^m^^nion officials to compare the range of jobs within
each mainhead# MBads CBowed the union to see the scheme as a whole* It
helped the establishment of a synmetrioal job structure#
M a n a g ^ en t s e n t  th e  I c o a l  u n io n  o f f i c i a l  o f  th e  T . & G.W.U# th e  so h ed u le i  
o f  jo b s  and p o in t s  a l l o t t e d  t o  ea ch  u nd er each  jo b  f a c t o r #  T h is  was o f  v i t a l  
im p ortan ce t o  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  scheme# Union and management o f f i c i a l s  
th e n  argu ed  ab out th e  r a t in g  o f  th e  j o b s ,  and n o t  ab out th e  m onetary d i f f e r e n ­
t i a l  each  job  was t o  carry#  T h is  m ethod c o n f in e d  union-m anagem ent d i s a g r e e  
m en ts t o  s p e c i f i c  p o i n t s ,  and l i k e  th e  n e g o t ia t in g  p r o c e d u r e , c o n d it io n e d  
ea c h  p a r ty  t o  f o l lo w  c e r t a in  s t e p s  in  r e s o lv in g  an is s u e #
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' Worker groups, who were disposed to  look e r i t ic a l ly  a t  job r e la t iv i­
t i e s ,  were able to  make th e i r  own comparisphs. A pe^tioU lar group of 
. workers, believ ing  th a t i t  had hxgher re sp o n s ib ilitie s  and du ties  than se t 
out on the sohedula, found i t  neoessaiy to  convince o ther union members th a t 
i t .  had an equitable claim# Changes in  the schedules were made a t the time 
of in s ta lla tio n *  Veiy few a l té r â t io made a f te r  the in s ta lla tio n ^  and
only when the: group and union v/ere able to; prove th a t the work content had 
changed since the time o f o rig in a l assessment# Few d isputes over assesEH 
ments went to  lo c a l oonferehoe stage*
Some w rite rs  have scorned the use of job evaluation techniques# ( l)
Yet the Ardeer case . showed th a t they were of considerable use in  s e t t l in g  
standards by which the p a r tie s  resolved th e ir  differences# Under job évalua^ 
tio n  the p a r tie s  t r ie d  to  assess a claim in  the l ig h t  of an accepted s e t  of 
job facto rs*  I f  the job fac to rs , or the ir, w eightings, d id  hot re f le c t  the 
rea l c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f the job then the scheme was bound to  lead to  d if f ic u l­
ties#  ; , S im ilar ; aijgument s could be applied to  the : m erit ra tin g  scheme Used . 
in  f a d in g  craftsmen* I f  thé personal b h afao te ris tip s: named in  the scheme 
; d id  not determine actual performance, fo r  which the worker was him self 
responsible, then the scheme was unfair* Équitable grading o f jobs aocordi 
ing to  th e i r  responsib il t t i é s  .ànd equitable grading of individuals according 
to  th e ir  personal performance, were fixed by the p a r tie s  w ithin, ce rta in  
lim its  and : subject to  ce rta in  standards contained w ithin the p a r t i c u l e  pre­
determined scheme#
: At a recent in te rn a tio n a l conference (2) a w orker's delegation
attacked the p rin c ip le  o f job evaluation on the following grounds# i t  was 
not 's c ie n t i f i c ’, i t  was based on value-judgments, i t  d id  not take in to  
account every fa c to r  o f  sign ificance in  detorm inihg 'equ itab le  rates* fo r  
d ifferen t; jobs; i t  lim ited  c o lle c tiv e  bargaining i t  froze the wage-structure, 
and i t  Was 80 incomprehensible,to  the. workers th a t i t  d isturbed union- 
management re la tions#  . - -. ' ' \
What evidence did  the Ardeer base offer, on these a llegations? Job 
evaluation was a technique ajmi i t  was certa in ly  not ' s c ie n t i f ic Î # V But i t  
allowed a  ra tio n a l comparison o f d a ta  to  be made according to  value-judgments, 
w ithin an agreed framework o f  reference# Under the I*G*I .  scheme the 
ra tin g s  Were subject to  negotiation# The: I#Q#I# scheme d id  not d ire c tly  
detbim ne the wage,, d iffe re n tia ls#  A conversion scale  se t bu t the monetary 
d if fe re n tia ls  fo r  ranges o f po in ts  a llo tte d  under the job évaluation scheme#
: (1) e .g . ,  Barbara Woottbh: TËhe : Social Foundations o f Wage P o lic y ',
; Allen & Unwin,:1955; s®® p#148 where shb questions th e ,change
in  weights# Obviously Wootton d id  not understand the':
importance o f job analysis and weighting of job fa c to rs .
(2) Resolution of the Workers' members o f the I.L.O# Metal Trades 
G c#iittee , ;8ix:th Sess^^ 195Ï#
Chapter VU*: . See. $ & Çonol.
This conversion sc a le  was su b jec t to  n a tio n a l n e g o tia tio n s . The monetary 
d i f f e r e n t ia ls  were increased  by tw enty-five percen t in  1954> to  r e s to re  the  
r e l a t i v i t i e s  deduced by in f la tio n a ry  tre n d s . Thus, the  scheme was a good deal 
: more f le x ib le  than the  system th a t  e x is te d  before i t s  in tro d u c tio n . Then 
d i f f e r e n t ia ls  were ad ju sted  haphazardly. Many, groups o f  workers became 
d is s a t i s f ie d  as they  watched o thers  succeed in  o b ta in in g  wage in c re a se s , ; 
Under th e  job ev a lu a tio n  scheme a l l  jobs had to  be considered  in  r e la t io n  
to  each o th e r . There was room f o r  ad ju s tin g  in d iv id u a l job r a te s  to  take  
account o f  sp e c ia l r e a l  fac to rs#  The general r e s u l t  o f  the  a p p lic a tio n  o f 
the  I . e . I .  job ev a lu a tio n  Scheme in  Ardeer was a more eq u itab le  wage 
s tru c tu re .  -This a s s is te d , r a th e r  tlm n hindered, th e  development o f s ta b le  
union management re la tio n s*
Conclusion
There was a constan t search to  e s ta b l is h  p r in c ip le s  which would 
reduce union-managÇment d isp u tes  over the determ ination  o f wage r a t e s .  As 
was seen in  th is  and Chapter I .  the p a r t ie s  even went to  the leng th  of e re c t­
ing  a nev/ c o lle c tiv e  bargain ing  framework, i f  they  ,thought th a t  i t  would 
reso lve  the problem*. In  the  case o f Ardeer the  wage r a te s  were linked  to  
those de tem ined  by o th e r c o lle c tiv e  bargaining, frm iewoiks* The I .G .I .  
c o lle c tiv e  frameworks made p rov ision  fo r  determ ining p a r t  o f the  vfages 
s tru c tu re  a t  n a tio n a l- le v e l  and p a r t  a t  the  fac to ry  le v e l .  At both le v e ls  
th e re  were fe a tu re s  of the wage s tru c tu re  which had much the  same o b je c tiv e s . 
The m ulti—union agreements attem pted to  m aintain a constan t r e l a t i v i t y  between 
th e  d i f f e re n t ia ls ;  pa id  .to  the  various cra ft.occupations*  Occupational r a te s  
were ad ju sted  in  r e la t io n  to  one another, and leap -frogg ing  o f wage r a te s  
was p reven ted .
The job eva lua tion  scheme a lso  attem pted to  f ix  job ra te s  f o r  . 
general workers in  accordance to  the  r e a l  value o f the  job, thus e s ta b l is h ­
ing  a constan t r e l a t i v i t y  between th e  jo b s . Once the scheme was in s ta l le d  
job r a te s  v/ere not. a l te re d , un less th e re  was a change in  the  work con ten t of 
th e  job . Under a  job eva lua tion  scheme; a l l  job ra te s .w e re  ad ju sted  by a 
percentage increase  which m aintained the r e l a t i v i t y  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t ia l  
s tru c tu re .  The aim o f job eva lua tion  and m erit r a t in g  schemes was to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  c r i t e r i a ,  accep tab le  to  both p a r t ie s ,  by which jobs and workers could 
be ranked in  ah  eq u ita b le  way fo r  the  purpose of, f ix in g  th e i r  hourly  r a te s  
o f pay.
The e ffe c tiv e n e ss  o f the job evaluation  and m erit ra t in g  scheme; . 
depended to  some ex ten t oh the  ap p lic a tio n  of tec h n ica l d e ta i l s  o f  the  schemes, 
and these  in  I . e . I .  were, not n eg o tia ted  by union and management. Thé un ioh^s: 
ro le  was la rg e ly  ope o f in te rv en o r by challenging’ m anagerial assessm ents which 
i t  thought;anomalous o r  in e q u ita b le . Thé use o f the  job eva lua tion  scheme 
d id  a g rea t deal to  make the  term s o f reference  o f the p a r t ie s  more e x p l ic i t ,
V ' /  Chapter VII,
and so-reduced the . a rea  o f  d isagreem ent.:- C erta in  re s id u a l areas o f  
disagreem ent s t i l l  had, to  he resp lyed  a t  n a tio n a l n e g o tia tio n s  — over the 
minimum company r a te s  o f  pay f o r .genera l and' c r a f t  w o rk e rs ,: th e  r a te s  pa id  
to  the  v a rio u s  grades f ix ed  f o r  craftsm en; and the in c reases  to  he g iv en , : 
to  genera l worker jobs covered hy the  job eva lua tion  scheme* :
bl-IAPTÉR VÎII. , TROUBLÉ QVBH ADJUSTIHG;: WAGES, : ' \ ,
In tro d u c tio n :. .
;■ ' The job eva lua tion  goheme d id  no t cover the e n ti r e  factory* The
main department a t  Ardeer, producing b la s tin g  exp losives, was not included 
in  th e  scheme due to  i t s  ex tensive re -o rg an isa tio n  w ith  tiré b u ild in g  o f th e  
mechanised i%iit. I t  was in  t h i s  department th a t  the  p r in c ip a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
w ith re sp e c t to  ad ju s tin g  wage d i f f e r e n t ia ls  occurred in  the post-w ar period*. 
There were sev era l reasons fo r  th is *  The wage s tru c tu re  had remained 
u n a lte re d  fo r  many years* w hile r a te s  f o r  o th e r jobs in  th e  fac to ry  were 
increased  from time to  time* The h igher-paid  jobs l o s t  r e l a t i v i t y  to  otb;er 
jobs w ith in  the  factory*  This department was th e  most dangerous in  which 
to, work. From 1940 th e re  was a d is p a r i ty  o f earn ings between th e  woikeas 
employed on. the  mechanised u n it  and o thers  : rem aining oh the  o ld  side* The 
female o p e ra tiv es  were becoming anxious about t h e i r  jobs and feared  redundancy* 
They were a lso  concerned th a t  the  management was try in g  to  cu t , back th e i r  
generoiis earnings by use of work measurement*
Several u n o f f ic ia l  stoppages ; took p lac e  in  the  post-w ar period* 
t r a d i t io n  th e  department was , in c lin e d  to  be strike-prone^; p a r t ic u la r ly  amongst 
the  female b p e ra tiy e s . The two most im portant stoppages occurred a f t e r  
acciden tal, explosions k i l l e d  a number o f  employees* The f i r s t  explosion was ; 
in  I 9 5 O) th e  second ,took p lace  in  1 9 5 4  w h ile  t h i s  resea rch  was being  conduc­
ted  in  the  factory*  The workers i n  th e  department, demahded th a t  they  be 
compensated fo r  the  hazard o f working on explosives manufacture* The manage­
ment refused  to  a d ju s t  wage r a te s  on a general basis, and argued fo r  the  use 
o f job eva lua tion  to  determine the r e l a t i v i t y  o f job ra te s*  The workers, 
re fu sed  to  agree t o  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of ; job ; évaluation* îfenagement a lso  
wished to  in trpduoe %n in cen tiv e  scheme fo r  the o ld  s id e , o f  th e  department,i 
but a f t e r  a  sh o rt t r i a l  the  in cen tiv e  scheme was thrown out by a rank and 
f i l e  decision*
Sec. 1* The h i s to r ic a l  movement in  job ra te s  %
d r ig in a lly  th re e  types o f labour were employed on the  manufacture of 
b la s t in g  exp lo siv es, , These were knomi as the h illm an, the mixing processman 
and the  runner. ; Thé. h illm an was employed on the  h ig h es t r a te d  job e x is tin g  
in  the fa c to iy . . He was responsib le  fo r  the manufacture of n itro g ly c e r in e ,
K iis was a dangerous opera tion  ; and only ezperienced workers w ith the g re a te s t  
s e n io r i ty  were promoted to  th is  job* In  I 9 1 I the  hilfcan had à d i f f e r e n t ia l  
o f six ty -one  percen t over th e  la b o u re r 's  base ra te*  In  1913 the h illm a n 's  
r a te  l o s t  r e l a t i v i t y  to  th a t  o f  the  prooessmati. The l a t t e r  was employed bn 
th e  second s t a ^  of production o f b la s t in g  explosives*
The lo ss  o f r e l a t i v i t y  by th e  h illm ah 's  r a te  came about in :a . veiy  
haphazard fash io n . In  I 9 1 3  the runners, w ith .th e  low est d i f f e r e n t i a l  obtained 
an increase  in; t h e i r  job r a te  o f a ;half-penny . They d id  t h i s  by p re sen tin g  a
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p e titio n  to the Nobel's Explosives Company. The runners were responsible 
fo r  moving the semi-processed m ateria ls about the department. Their work 
was unsk illed . The processmen a few months la te r ,  apparently annoyed th a t 
the runners obtained a concession, also p e titioned  the Company fo r  the 
increase to be extended to  them. For some reason unknown the hillmen did 
not rece ive th is  increase.
Table VIÏ
D iffe ren tia l Wage Structure of B lasting Department
showing percentage margins of job ra te s  over the 
lab o u re r 's  basic ra te  in  Ardeer fac to ry .
Hillman (N.G.) 61 28 : 45 24 25
Prooessman (Mixing) 50 28 35 20 22
Senior RunnerV 12 9 16
Junior Runner) 16 8 5 13
In  1917 and 1920 the S.U.D.L; negotiated two increases fo r the 
prooessman. The hillmen received the same increases. I t  was not u n ti l  
1927 th a t the hillmen received an increase, in  th e ir  job ra te  which went some 
way to resto re  the r e la t iv i ty  of th e ir  earning power over th a t o f the process­
men* In  1929 , the hillmen had a percentage margin o f fo r ty -f iv e  percent over 
thé labourers ' basic ra te .
In  1929 a d is tin c tio n  was made between 's e n io r ' and ' junior* runners. 
The senior runners received an increase in  th e ir  job ra te ,  while thé ju n io r 
runner stayed oh the old margin. Although the T. & G.W.U. t r ie d  to  obtain 
th is  concession down the lin e  i t s  please were re jec ted  in  1930 and again in  
1935* The only pre-war change in  d ifferen tia l©  came about in  1938 when an 
amount, paid a f te r  serving a qualify ing  period in  the. department, was merged 
with the job r a te .  Apart from th is  the jun ior runners* ra te  remained the 
same from 1913 to  1950. Job ra te s  fo r  the three o ther "categories of labour 
were unaltered from the tw enties u n ti l  the post-war period .
Sec. 2. Management r e s is ts  a sectional wage claim.
Fromotion to a higher ra ted  job was by way o f se n io rity . In  promotion 
to hillman there  was something of an anomaly. Workers were promoted from 
senior runner to  prooessman in  the mixing house. The next promotional step 
was to  çhargehànd, which carried  a d if fe re n tia l  payment of one penny over the 
prooessman. From ohargehand workers were then promoted to  hillm an. Dut th is  
la s t  step ca rried  no increase in  the hourly ra te  of pay.
In  1949 the lo ca l branch of the T. & G.W.U. lodged a claim with 
management to  provide fo r  an increase, in  the ra te  of pay of th e  hillm en.
The branch claimed th a t the hillman* s job carried  g rea te r resp onsib ility ,: 
and accordingly they should be recompensed fo r it*  Due. to the existence of
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aÿbonus: e x tra  work in  the  mixinghouse, i t  was a lso  claimed th a t
th e  ac tua l earn ings o f the  h illm en were sometimes le s s  than those o f the 
processmen,
These cond itions had long applied  to  th is  se c tio n  o f the  factory*
Why in  1 9 4 9  d id  the  workers suddenly complain about them? The r e a l  answer 
to  t h i s  question  , la y  in  the  c h ^ g e s  th a t  were then tak in g  p lace  in  the 
factory* The in tro d u c tio n  o f  job evaluation  in  the  fao to iy  led  to  some 
o th er ^ o u p s  o f workers improving th e i r  d i f f e r e n t ia l  wage r a te s .  In  e f fe c t  
th is ; led  to  reduc tion  o f the s ta tu s  p o s itio n  of the  h illm en , who were 
considered th e  ?a r is to c ra ts *  on the promotlo n a l- ra td  s tru c tu re . Even more 
im portant was the  in tro d u c tio n  of the  incen tive  scheme fo r  th e  mechanised . 
u n i t  producing b la s tin g  explosives* This was a group, scheme which included 
the h illm en, Hillmen on the  o ld  side o f  the department n a tu ra lly  resen ted  
th is  d is p a r i ty  of earn ings. In  ad d itio n , some w orkers on the  mechanised 
u n i t ,  w ith le s s  s e n io r ity , were now earning more, than the h illm en because o f 
the in cen tiv e  scheme, ■. .
The d isp u te  of the h illm en remained unresolved fo r  almost a  year*
This was due to ’ a m istake in  not follow ing the n e g o tia tin g  procedure accord­
in g  to  the  l e t t e r  o f the law. In  the meantime:the h illm en simmered, They 
passed a re so lu tio n  condemning the union.; fo r  not m eeting the Company in  
■intermediate conierence, V/hen th is  was h e ld -th e  management again re je c te d  
the b ran ch 's  claim , : The union then appealed tC 'a  h ead q u arte rs ' conference 
aga in st th is  d e c is iq n . I ,0 ,1 .  in  supporting Ardeer management's stand s ta te d  
th a t  i t  Was ag a in s t Company p o licy  fo r  i t  to  g ran t a se c tio n a l increase  in
; ,  Thé Company, a lso  re je c te d  a suggestion o f the n a tio n a l o f f i c ia l  o f 
the T. & G,W*U, to  pay a ; 1 l ie u  bonus ' ,  u n t i l  i t  was p o ss ib le  to  work out an 
ap p ro p ria te  in cen tiv e  scheme. The Company s ta te d  t h a t  i t  was not possib le  
to  in s ta l l  an incentive, scheme u n t i l  the o ld  side  wasvsurVeyiadi by the work 
s t u ^  e x p e rts . The hiliirien  repud iated  th is  suggestion by th e i r  n a tio n a l 
o ff ic e r , -  and i n  the  fo llow ing years  re je c te d  m anagerial attem pts to  place. , 
them on such a scheme -  and sought to  take th e i r  wage c l aim to  a rb i t r a t io n . 
The T, & G.W.U. d id  not wish th is  m atter to  go to  a rb i t r a t io n  fo r  th e re  was 
no c e r ta in ty  th a t  i t  would be su ccessfu l. The union (as was 1 ,0 .1 ,)  ■
opposed in  p r in c ip le  .1’ the use o f a rb i t r a t io n ,
Sec. 3 , A general wage i inoreaae sought
: ;j ■ Considerable in d igna tion  was f e l t  ; by the h illm en when th e i r  claim  
fo r  increased  job r a te s  was re je o te d . S h o rtly { a fte r  the headquarters ^
conference was held an explosion occurred in  a neighbouring s e c t io n .o f : the  
departm ent. Several fem ale o pera tives  who woiked on thé: c a r t  rid g in g  Jpperu-. 
tio n s  were k i l l e d .  They were pa id  by p iece r a te s .  . At a lo c a l conference 
c a lled  to  consider p iece ra te s  'f a i lu r e  to  ag ree ' was recorded by the branch 
on no le s s  than  twelve item s, . The workers be lieved  th a t  management was
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attempting to  reduce the favourable r a te s , by using work study. Workers 
were becoming more conscious of work .study, even th o u ^  i t  had been Used fo r 
some time in  determining piece r a te s .  Discontent grew, nerves were frayed, 
and f in a lly  a f te r  a short: stoppage in  one S0otion| a large number of workers 
in  the b la s tin g  department went on s tr ik e .  The immediate e ffec t of th is  
action was to  bring  union membership to  a hundred percent of the department ; 
fo r  the f i r s t  time in  i t s  h is to ry . The workers obviously f e l t  the need fo r 
the union to p ro tec t th e ir  in te re s ts .
At a mass meeting held in  June, 1950» a réso lu tion  was unanimously 
passed{#ich  ca lled  fo r  an increase in  job ra te s  of the jun io r ruim ers. As 
already explained, these workers ha4;no increase in  th e ir  h i f f e r e n t ia i  since 
19t3i." ; comparison w ith  other: w departments of the factory
the brshph claimed th a t the  runners were under-paid, in  other
p a rts  of the facto ry  had been increased by the in troduction  of job evaluation. 
Workers in  thé; Vdanger area*, which covered most o f ,the b la s tin g  department^ 
had as :a whole lo s t  in  r e la t iv i ty  in  earning power with o ther sections in  the 
fac to ry . They, claimed th a t they should have been compensated fo r the danger 
hdzard; The claim put forward on behalf of: the runners was designed to  bring 
up the W ole question of the d if fe re n tia l  s tru c tu re  of the b la s tin g  department.
 ^ re jec ted  the claim fo r  the increase in  the runners*
job ra te s . I t  was not prepared to grant a general wage; increase-.; Instead 
management o ffered  to  apply job evaluation to  the b la s tin g  department and to 
determine whether o r not an increase in  p a r tic u la r  job ra te s  was ju s t i f ie d .
I t  also o ffered  to  follow up th e  suggestion o f the  ,T. & G.W.U. * s national 
o ff io e r  and o ffe r  the workers an incentive scheme. A meeting o"^  th e  workers 
re jec ted  the management's proposals. At the inteim adiate conference which - 
followed several union rep resen ta tives s ta ted  th a t the workers in  the  b la s tin g  
department were very suspicious of job evaluation. They did not want to  wait: 
u n ti l  an analysis of jobs was made, and then bargain over the individual job 
ra te s  r? as had been done in  other p a rts  of the fac to ry .
Thé union f in a l ly  accepted a management proposal to send i t  a se t of 
new job ra te s  based on evaluation techhiqués, This was-done w ithin one month. 
The jobs.: analysed were, grouped and ho buy-outs; applicable under the job 
évaluation scheme, were made fo r  the jobs which showed lower ra te s  than were 
then being paid# The union o f f ic ia ls  recommended th a t the workers accept the 
inoreabed ra te s  of pay. The emotional c r is i s  was over and the workers endorsed 
th e ir  union o ff ic ia l* s  recommendation. The p rin c ip le  o f assessing wage 
d if fe re n tia ls  by the means of job evaluation was not accepted by the b la s tin g  
workers#
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A y ear o r  so l a t e r  a fu r th e r  increase  in. wage r a te s  was demanded. hut 
was re je c te d . Two years  l a t e i  the workers were persuaded to. give an i incen­
tiv e  scheme a t r i a l  fo r  fou r weeks. The men worked on in cen tiv e  fo r  a week 
longer than  the period  au th o rised . The scheme was withdrawn when the men 
stopped work fo r  a. sh o rt p e rio d . The old problem remained fo r  earnings on 
the  old side  continued to  be lower than  on the mechanised un it*  In  ad d itio n , 
the female o p era tiv es  continued to  earn high bonuses through th e i r  favourable 
p iece r a te s .
Sec. 4» A f a t a l  explosion and s tr ik e
F u rther tro u b le  broke out in  th e  b la s t in g  department towards the 
end o f 1 9 5 4 * On the I8 th  October an explosion occurred in  the  mechanised 
se c tio n . This blew to  p ieces  two workers, and in ju re d  a number o f others* 
-There was an im iêd ia te  psychological rea c tio n  on both workers and management 
o f f i c ia l s .  (? )  : A g rea t deal o f dam^e was done. Workers found th a t  i t  
was im possible to  work a t. a pace which retu rned  them th e i r  normal bonus 
earnings under t h e i r  in cen tiv e  scheme. According to  the  lo c a l  T, & G.W.U. 
o f f i c ia l  the men were to ld  by th e i r  l in e  superv iso r, w ithout apparent 
approval from h i s  su p e rio r, that, they would be compensated fo r  t h e i r  lo ss  
o f earnings* W ithin a few days th is  statem ent was countermanded and the 
workers to ld  th a t  they were to  receive  only the normal 'make-up* pay. This 
was c a lcu la ted  a t  the  hourly  r a te  of pay. The workers immediately took 
th is  as a breach o f f a i t h  and promptly went 's lo v / '.  They a lso  decided th a t  
they would, in  fu tu re  not work a t  incen tive  r a te s .  To compensate themselves 
fo r  lo s s  o f  earningS: they asked fo r  a s u b s ta n tia l increase  in  t h e i r  time 
ra te s  o f pay.
(F) The Ardeer management r e a l ly  feared  exp losions. This 
stemmed from e a rly  days. A lfred Nobel ran  in to  many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  producing explosives both  in  the. te c h ­
n ic a l  and th é  commercial f i e ld .  . I t  was not u n i l  1882 
th a t  b la s t in g -g e la tin e  was manufactured commercially in  
Ardeer. .I’wo years  l a t e r  an explosion k i l l e d  te n  female 
o p e ra tiv e s . D espite th is  se t-back , in  the  f i r s t  twenty- 
f iv e  years the  number o f f a t a l i t i e s  were kept do\vn to  
twenty-one due to  extreme sa fe ty  p recau tions; every 
death  Was bad p u b lic  and personnel re la tio n s*
The au thor was in  the  fac to ry  the day the  October explosion 
occurred. W ithin seconds the w a iling  s ire n s  o f the  fac to ry  
f i r e  brigades and ambulances were heard . The w ell 
rehearsed  emergency programme was in  op era tio n . The 
fa c to ry  manager was on h is  way w ith  h is  experts  to  in v e s ti­
ga te  the  a re a . : The doctors stood by. S t r i c t  se c u r ity  
blanlceted the f a c to ry  and communioationg were cu t w ith  the ;
, - . ou tside  w orld. W elfare o f f ic e rs  h u rrie d  to  the  sec tio n s  
where th e re  were la rg e  groups of females to  prevent out­
breaks o f  emotion. In  the  meantime the fac to ry  labour 
o f f ic e r  and h is  deputy s a t  grim -faced, w atching the  seconds 
t ic k  by, u n t i l  they knew the c a s u a l t ie s .  I t  was th e i r  duty 
to  go to  the homes o f the  worlœrs who were k i l l e d  to  break 
the  news to  t h e i r  fa m ilie s .
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The lo c a l  "branch accordingly lodged a claim  fo r  increased  jo"b ra te s  
in  the  mechanised sec tio n  o f th e  department* At the  lo c a l conference the 
se c re ta ry  a lso  expressed re g re t th a t  the  management h ad 'no t o ffe red  compensa­
t io n  fo r  the  lo s s  o f bonus. earn ings due to  the explosion* Management then  
o ffe red  to. pay a temporary amount to  th e  workers* T h is  amoiuit: was 
: qonsidered. by the workers to  be cheese-paring* Indeed, the  workers were 
; so.annoyed th a t  they even.wished to  prevent the  lo c a l  secretary ; fron  asking :
: fo r  a  review o f  th is  amount* They wanted t o  r id  them selves o f the inoen- . 
t iv e  scheme e n t i r e ly .  The lo c a l  union o f f i c i a l  knew th a t  th is , was a 
' temporary fe e lin g  and p ressed  management ib . review  th e  amount p rev iously  
offered* Subsequently, the  workers . l i f te d :  the  go-slow d ec is io n s  and 
resumed working a t  in cen tiv e  rate*  .. /
In  th e  meantime the  main argument about increased  job d i f f e r e n t ia ls  
continued. Like the older; sec tio n  the mechanised u n i t  was not covered by 
job evaluation* M aniement refused  to  concede a general wage in crease  
based on the hazard element* I t  in s is te d  on u s i t ^  3 0 b eva lua tion  to  study 
each job and determine whether i t  was worth more than i t s  cu rre n t r a te .  An 
assessment by management was'made and i t  was found th a t  no increase  in  job 
ra te s  was warranted* In  fact,.management claimed, th a t  some jobs were 
a lready  being pa id  too high a rate*. N evertheless,: management proposed 
in c reas in g  the  se n io r prooessman* s r a te  to  th a t  o f the  h illm an . In  tW-s ; 
way sen io r personnel on the mechanised se c to r  could be deployed Dn a number 
o f jobs w ithout in fr in g in g  the t u m - l i s t  ; system.
;• A fte r the  m atte r went to. in term edia te  conference a compromise was 
reached* The se n io r  processmen reoeivedy one penny th re e -fa r th in g s  p e r  hour 
ex tra  to  t h e i r  job r a te ,  w hile ju n io r  workers on the u n i t  rece ived  one 
penny-farthing* The hillm en on the ; mechanised u n i t  d id  not rece ive  any 
increase* ; The workers on the mechanised u n it  re fu se d :to  accept in  p r in c ip le  ;
the  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  based on job eva lua tion . In  the  fo llow ing  y ear management 
continued to  p re ss  the workers to  accept job ev a lu a tio n  and : a buy-out of 
r a te s  which were too high* I t  was unsuccessfu l.
Sec. ,5. Group in te rac tio n  and a 'go-slow*
T he.g ran ting  o f th is  wage increase  to  the. workers of th e  mechanised 
u n it  le d  to  immediate repfecussions from workers on the. b id  s id e  of the  
; ; departm ént. The- l a t t e r  demanded e q u a lity  o f trea tm en t, and to  enforce t h e i r  
demands"the workers went 's lo w '.  At a lo ca l conference one union o f f i c ia l  
remarked th a t  i t  was apparent t h a t  the  p a r t ie s  had made a m istake in  g ran ting .
.. .one group of workers an in crease  i n . the .ir job r a te s  w ithout considering  the 
equ ity  o f  o th e r  workers* cla im s, .This was p re c is e ly  what job eva lua tion  
aimed a t p reven ting , but job, eva lua tion  -did not apply to  th e  departm ent• To 
the  workers on the  o ld  s ide  i t  appeared', as. i f  the  mechanised , u h i t  was being 
favourably t r e a te d  by management -  and even by union officialdom * One shop 
stew ard from th e  o ld  s ide  accused th e  management o f being ' blaclcmailed* by ■ 
the, mechanised se c tio n . For t h i s  reason workers on the o ld  s ide  a lso  I decided
to  take matt$M% in to  th e ir  own hands and w o^ed- as slowly as possible*
The union lodged "a c la to  fo r  a 'down the line* increase of the workers ^  
hourly ra te s .  An increase in  wage ratés; was consideMd necessary to  oontpen- 
sa te  the men fo r the danger hazard* M^ageiaaeat was responsible fo r the safe ty  
o f the plant* I f  x t was unable to  provide fo r  the safe ty  of i t s  employees i t  
had to  pay the penalty  in  compensating workers fo r  the risk# Management ; 
rep lied  th a t i t  d id i t s  utmost to  prevent accidents* I t  claimed th a t safety  
was a shared re sp o n s ib ility  and thé necessary co-operation was h o t a lw ^ s  
forthoomihg from the workers. : I t  re jec ted  the claim fo r  a-down-the-linè 
increase* I t  offered ah indrease on job ra te s  which were assessed according 
to  the 'job evaluation scheme; each job was then properly eyaluated.^^^ %  
workers were in  no mood to  compromise and management's proposals were rejected*
The workers, on the old side cohtinued th e ir  'go-slow* o r 'working to  
ru le* , as theyj.ohose to  o a ll th e i r  behaviour* As a group they re a lly  believed 
th a t they were working according to  ru les  -  those o f the factory^ those; s e t out 
in  government re g ^ a tio h s , and thdse whi ch they conveniently madè up themselves. 
Management o f f ic ia ls  addressed one s h if t  and asked th e  workers whether they 
intended honouring a seven year old unioh-management agreement which provid,ed 
fo r  a ce rta in  ta rg e t to  be achieved* The woikers refused, and mana^ment 
then suspended the s h if t  ; As a consequence many of th e  female operatives, :. 
previously unaffected by the go-slow, were thrown Out of work* Tbe faotdajr 
management considered closing  down p a rt of the facto ry  while the suspension 
of the men was in  force* , ■
Tension; mounted in  the factory* Management o f f ic ia ls  beoan^ highly 
emotiorial and almost psychopathic in  th e ir  defence of management action . There 
was à general breakdown in  formal lined  of communioatiori between management ; 
o f f ic ia is  as they attempted to  seek Information. The jun ior labour o ffice rs  
seemed to  have l i t t l e  idea as; to  the OaUse of ' the d ispute , the mCtivation of 
the Workers' subsequent behaviour, and th e  proceedings a t the o f f ic ia l  union 
meetings, most of which were, open to  the press* They did not in te rp re t the 
events in  a ra tio n a l way, mainly because they had l i t t l e  understanding of group 
and inter^group reactions* They believed the union meetings,: to  be in  the hands 
of *a lo t  of hotheads', ; as the ra rk  and f i l e  refused to  agree to  re tu rn  to  work 
a t the hoimal speed* TUis action  was only to be ;ezpeoted ' when a; large number 
of- emotional and excited  members met * Nor was there; ahÿ évidence a t th a t 
time, or l a te r ,  that; there  was; a serious challenge to  the leadership of the 
icoal union o f f ic ia l .  In  general, thé; labour s t a f f  s p e c ia lis ts  seemed to  be 
ra th e r  in e ffe c tiv e  in  fo recasting  thé action of the workers, in  in te ip re tin g  
th e ir  ac tions, and in  m aintaining adéquate lin e s  of communioation with informal 
groups # t h i n  the union*
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; .. I t  was true: th a t the fu ll-tim e  . o f f i c i a l s l o c a l ,  reg ional and f  
national -  had d if f ic u lty  in  persuading the men to  re tu rn  to  work. For 
one; th ing  the men helieved th a t they were on s tr ik e  —-.the fa c t th a t they 
were suspended did .not concern them* They were in  a .highly nervous s ta te , 
su ffering  both from the'psychological e ffec ts  of the explosion and the . 
.inequity of treatment* The mechanised, u n it was hot ohly b e tte r  paid, but 
i t  also had good worlcjng conditions* They compared th e ir  ovm conditions 
of work, which were com paratively p rim itive . , Moreover, they did  not want ■ 
to  admit th a t they were wrong in  woiklng to: ru le . Their : s ta tu s  was a t  
stake,: not only with the officialdom  a t the facto ry  and in  the union, but 
with o ther workers in  the factory* Their position  in  the socia l s truc tu re  ; . 
of the factory  was in  jeopardy, and they were also under c ritic ism  from : 
other workers who found themselves job less. Indeed, when they f in a lly  
agreed to  wbrk according to.normal p rac tice , union and management went 
through the r i tu a l  of d iscussing:the equ ity ,o f the work load -  to  save the ; ., 
face of the men*
In the s itu a tio n  as i t  developed there was some s h if t  of power from 
the formal to  the informal group*. . Hov/ever, once the men were suspended the 
meetings of the 's t r ik e r s ' were held and. conducted by the union. Gonanunica- 
tio n  pa tte rn s  took much the same .course in  the uni oh as ' they did in  manage­
ment* ; The{rank and f i l é  wanted information, and fo r  th is  they not only 
turned out in  force to attend  the o f f ic ia l  meetings, they also gathered in  
the taverns of the neighbouring towns 'to  keep in  to u c h ', .The loca l tavern 
continued to  serve i t s  h is to r ic a l place in  in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s , th a t of 
meeting place* Despite the development of the grape-vine and the power of 
the informal, group, the leadership of the local fu ll-tim e  o f f ic ia l  was 
never re a lly  challenged; and in  many ways he b ec^ e  the Informal leader^: 
There was some f r ic t io n  between he and the regional o f f ic ia l ,  who was mainly 
concerned with seeing, th a t the ru les  of the T* & G*W*Ui{ were observed, but * ' 
th is  did not cause undue stress*  The u n io n ,o ffic ia ls  pointed out to  the 
men th a t they had broken both the union ru les  and agreements made by the 
union with the Comparer* A fter a; time the men. were persuaded to return  to  
work as .thelf New Year grew near, They felt.the lOss of earnings, the manage­
ment wanted a reco n c ilia tio n  as {soon a,s possib le , and. th e ir  a ttitu d e  became 
le ss  emotional* Thny did not immediately resume working a t th e ir  normal 
speed, but management was. to le ran t and closed i t s  eyes to  th is, fa c t .  {
Negotiations were resumed. The shop stewards s ta ted  th a t th e  - 
workers m istrusted  job evaluation* ; They did {not l ik e  the buy-out p rinc ip le  
which the company used when ra te s  were found to  be higher than they should 
have been* The buy-out p rin c ip le  gave management a permanent advantage.
The individual worker did not su ffe r but the. group workers were in  the long 
run worse off* This was a security  minded notion. The union was unable 
to ge t the workers { to accept job evaluation so the m atter went to  inteim ediate 
conference* Management made a strenuous p lea fo r  the in troduction  of job
evaluation. Job ©valuation was t h e  basis of an equitable d if f e re n tia l
{. Chapt .  V III. 8éo. 5 and Concl# ,
s tru c tu re . I t  was, system atic in  fix ing  the re la tiv e  worth of jobs. I t  , 
was b e t te r  to  pay. the job what i t  was.worth ra th e r than adjust, a l l  ra te s  
in  a section 'w ithou t taking in to  account the work content o f  each. I t s  
application  to  other departments in  Ardeer had proved sa tis fa c to ry .
The holding of an inteiinediate conference was only to  gain a breath­
ing space in  the argument. No new .sub ject was introduced. I t  d id allow 
the union o f f ic ia ls  to  wo3?k on th e ir  members to  break down th e  opposition, 
# ien the dispute was referred  back to the local p a r tie s  the old section  
agreed to  accept job evaluation as the correct techn ique 'fo r;assessing  job 
ra te s .  The ac tu a l; ra te s  assessed .were accepted witbout a murmur by the 
b la s tin g  workers,.{.The item hardly warranted discussion a t  the union meet­
ing, Ten weeks previously a mass meeting of hundreds of workers threw out ; 
th e  o ffe r . The state, o f . emotion, passed and th is  allowed the settlement#
But the Old problem nevertheless remained., The workers on the mechanised 
u n i t  resumed working oh incen tives. The old side fe je c te d  them. The 
d isp a rity  in  barningS; o f  the two, se ts  of workers was , s t i l l  oonaiderablét
Conclusion '
Events in  the b la s tin g  department in  the ea rly  f i f t i e s  emphasised th e . 
need to ad just the -hourly .wage ra te s  in  a regular and orderly  way, A 
haphazardly adjusted wage s tru c tu re , which contained in eq u ities  between the 
job ra te s  was a p o te n tia l trouble pointy i f  conditions arose to  touch o ff 
group reac tio n . In th is  case th e  in s ta l la t io n  of the mechanised,unit w ith 
its .in c e n tiv e  scheme, caused the group on the. old side to  look c r i t ic a l ly  a t 
th e ir  job ra tes '. In 1954 fa ilu re , to ad just job ra te s  throughout the en tire  
department le d  to  spontaneous action . The.groups' actions were in  défiance 
of th é ' provraiops of the negotia ting  procedure and{were taken without ; 
approval of the governing body of; th e ir  union# Their actions were primae 
fac ie  evittenoe th a t union au tho rity  over i t s  members had broken down. Union 
au thority  was repaired without too niUeh d if f ic u lty  as there was no peitianent 
sh ift; in  leadersh ip  frpm the formal to  the infoimal group in  the union*
A sponteneouB stoppage made thé task  of the negotiating  teams , 
extremely d if f ic u lt*  The circumstances aooentuated th e  d ifferences in  the ' 
terms of reference of thé two parties*  As no job evaluation scheme was in  
existence in  thé b la s tin g  department there was no objective C riterion  by 
which to  measure any,proposed w a^ increase. There tended to  be a vacuum 
in  the re la tio n s  between union .and. management* Moreover,: i t  was impossible 
to  in s ta ll  job evaluation a t  th a t time* The in s ta l la t io n  of a job evaluation; 
scheme required ra tio n a l th inking  on the p a rt o f union, management and th e ir  
members;: th is  so rt of thinking was not to be had when, passions were aroused*
Even in  .times o f peace, = i t  was d if f ic u l t  to explain to  the members of the. 
union the p rin c ip le  of job evaluation. ; The value ,o f job evaluation lay  in  
the fa c t th a t once in s ta lle d , i t  conditioned the p a r tie s  to  deal with fu tu re 
wage increases in  terms of the c r i t e r ia  la id  down in  the scheme* Thus, when 
a change se t o ff  v io len t reactions amongst the informal group, there was some
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hope.of reaching agreement about a proposed wage increase by reference 
to the p rin c ip les  of the. job evaluation scheme*. '.dp/
CHAPTER IX. HESITMGY OVER ACCEPTING INCENTIVES 
Introduotloh
Some time a f te r  the war 1 .0#I . deoided âé a general policy th a t 
i t s  managanents were to introduce incentive schemes fo r  aS maiiy workers 
as p ossib le . 4 ,1 ^  were to  become a. noimal p a r t o f the wage s tru c­
tu ré . The facto ry  management a t  Ardeer offered incentive schemes to  
p ra c tic a lly  a l l  craftsmen., w ithin i t s  employ* These schemes were based on 
time study, and provided fo r  a bonus to be paid bn the performance o f  the 
individual, o r the group according to allowed time system. Craftsmen in  
Ardeer beionged to  twelve d iffe re n t unions. : Members of s ix  unions refused 
incentives, two accepted them on t r i a l ,  two in i t i a l ly  re jected  them,: but 
subsequently reversed th e ir  decisions, and one asked th a t a Scheme béï 
extended to  them. Groups of members of the tw elfth  union, the A. E. Ü.,
M  a&  these r e a c t i o n s ^ " : ' ''' -  2 ' . / - / - I
f a r  as general workers were concerned payments by re su lts  were 
not new a t  Ardeer. ; For many years a large number of female operatives 
were paid.by piecework. Many general workers were bn incentives during 
the war, but the re a c tio n s , of groups of general workers totaffds the introduc­
t io n  of incentive schemes in  the post^war period were sim ila r to  those of. 
the craftsmen. Ohly one group scheme was imnediately accepted by the 
workers and there were special reasons fo r  th is .  The other group schemes 
were i n i t i a l ly  re jec ted ; a l l  save one ^oup  changed th e ir , minds and 
accepted incentives. Individual schemes o f which there were a considerable 
number were iim ediateiy  accepted. In  th is  there was a s ig n if ic a n t : 
d ifference i n  the general workers'  behaviour and th a t o f the craftsmen which 
was a ttr ib u ta b le  to the existence of the prbmCtional agreement. Unlike 
most of a f t  unions thé T* & G.W.U. was not opposed to  incen tives. At the 
same: time the complex rsac tion  of th e ir  numbers on the f lo o r showed th a t 
there were s im ilar motivations^, forces a t work which influenced both general 
workers and craftfflnen in  th e ir  a ttitu d e s  towards incen tives. (P)
(P) The author was indebted to  many peisons fo r  help in  
compiling thisC hapter. In  p a r tic u la r  the following 
; were p a rtic u la rly  helpful* {H.K^ General Secretary 
of the" FiT.U.j H. Gifdwood, General Secretary of the  . 
S.T.Aw} J .  Savak®, Divisional OrgaciSer, and G. D arra tt,
; National O fficer o f the A*E.U.; ; W* Hiltb^^
O fficer o f the S .P .3.J ; G .G ble, National O fficer of the 
E.T.U.; D* Gafson and E* Dale, D is tr ic t  O ffic ia ls  o f - 
the À.S.Wf; A.' Matthews o f  the Ti & G.WiU.; W. H ilton j n r . ,
Itesearoh O fficer of the A.U.B.T.W*; and H. Hoyman, Research 
O fficer of the N.P.B.T*0. {In addition , shop stewards o f 
the above unions, and the Sheet Metal Workers' Union,: the 
Boilermakers' at^  Blacksmiths! S ocie ties were also interviewed#
Qhaptér IX. Seo. 1.
: / Worker reac tion  to  the proposed incentives schemes i l lu s tra te d  the 
importance of group:behaviour on the factory  floor* Most groups o f workers 
showed considerable hesitancy about accepting incen tives schemes# These 
decisions were taken in i t i a l ly  by the workers! themselves, e i tb e r  a t  a woifc- : : 
shop meeting o r outside thé fae to iy  a t  a meeting sponsored by the o f f ic ia l  
union organisation# In  a few instances a b a llo t was held to  determine the 
wcrfcers* a ttitu d e s  to  incen tives. The groups did not make th e ir  decisions 
in  iso la tio n . They had ce rta in  s«ts. of references by which they; judged 
the issue before them. ■ The groups were influenced by th è ir  own s e lf  
in te re s t ,  e;^erienoes o f o ther workers in  the p lan t or fac to ry , the decisions 
of the branch, d i s t r i c t  and regional councils of tb e i r  union organisation, 
and by the p o lic ie s  and ru les  la id  down by national executives and 
oonferenoe*
Sec. 1. The Engineering Trades Unions
( i )  Unions whose members re jec ted  incentives
In 1950 the Ardeer management approached thé shop stewards of the 
E le c tr ic a l Trades Union, the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers and 
B raziers, and the Plumbing Trades Union to  ask them to  consider the introduc­
tio n  o f incentive echemes. A ll th ree were work measured schemes based on 
âlloéed tim es, and: provided fo r  a bonus to  be paid to  the ind iv idual on iiiS 
perfozmance. Management proposed th a t the times fo r  the jobs be se t by 
estimators* , Estim ators were already, drawn from thé ranlcs o f the craftsmen, 
a fa c t which did hot please the unions as they were not consulted over 
th e ir  appointment, A lthou^  th is  may have increased res is tan ce , the . 
reasons fo r the unions^subsequent re fu sa l to accept the schemes were muck 
more complex.
Management claimed th a t increased maintenance work in  the  fa o to iy , . . 
necessita ted  a new deployment of labour, which could only be achieved throiigh 
the in troduction  of incentive schemes^ Skilled labour was scarce*.
Management wished to  increase the work load o f  the, individual craFtsman. ■ \
I n i t ia l ly ,  management declined to give a d e fin ite  assurance th a t there would 
be no displacement of labour* Later i t  sta ted  th a t redundancy was extremely 
un like ly . The unions then ra ised  two other tra d itio n a l reasoris as to  why 
they should re je c t  the incentive schemes: the e ffe c t o f ihoentives on the
workers* health  and the d e te rio ra tio n  of the quality  of the crafts*  work*
To; meet . these arguments management s ta ted  tha t a  ce rta in  percehtage of time 
was allowed fo r  r e s t  and i t  also fixed  a possible maximum bonus of f i f t y  
percen t. These provisions, with nom al inspection; and supervision standards, 
were designed to  safeguard the quality  or the workiperfoimed* :
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The unions were also s c e p tic a l, about the schemes from another 
fundamental angle. Long experience taught them to  be beware of r a te -  
cu ttin g . Management rep lied  th a t with the new techniques developed by- 
work measurement times and woaic-unit values were now se t more accurately* 
Workers were pro tected  by the terms of th e ir  national agreement on working 
conditions. Under th is  no changes were to  be made in  ra te s , unless there 
was a lte ra tio n  in  the m ateria ls , means, method of production. Such a clause 
was designed to  safeguard the earnings of the workers. The schemes were so 
arranged as to  allow an average worker to  earn a bonus o f one th ird  over h is  
normal hourly base r a te .  Management ; also claimed th a t operatives then
working on incentive were earning from th irty -one to th ir ty - f iv e  percent 
above th e ir  basic time ra te  of pay.
The th ree c ra f t  groups then held workshop meetings and decided to  
re je c t the schemes, a l l  by large m a jo rities . These decisions were subse­
quently confirmed by th e ir  branches. There was no evidence of in terference 
by fu ll-tim e  union o f f ic ia ls  in  order to  influence the men in  th e ir  re je c tio n . 
The unions were against accepting incentive schemes, p a r tic u la r ly  thosa 
based on time and motion study. The executive council of the E.T.U., scsae 
time a f te r  i t s  Ardeer membership had re jected  the proposals fo r  a second 
time, passed a reso lu tion  which opposed the I .O .I .  incentive schemes based 
on work study. The other two unions were not happy about the use of work 
measurement in  se tt in g  bonus r a te s .  Yet a l l  th ree unions had members work­
ing under systems of payments by re su lts  in  industry  outside I .O .I .  Under 
a 1928 agreement covering the engineering industry , employers were given 
the r ig h t to  woric craftsmen on incentives.
The ru les  of the three unions also opposed incentives* The B.T.U. 
ru les  provided th a t i t s  éxecutive council was f i r s t  to  approve a system of 
payments by re s u lts  before a member was perm itted to work under the system* 
Individual bonus schemes were to ta l ly  proh ib ited . The ru les  of the Shee-fc- 
metal Workers' Union opposed use of the stop watdh on the factory  f lo o r .
The Plumbing Trades Union during World War I I  declared i t s  opposition to  
piece work because ' i t  ledm to  bad workmanship, i t  s e t up competition between 
union members, i t  impaired the unity  of the Trade Union Movement, and in  
normal conditions i t  produced unemployment'* In I95O the biennial conference 
ca lled  fo r an a l l-o u t f ig h t against premium bonus schemes. The following 
conference re-affirm ed a previous decision th a t wage increases should be 
general, and 'th a t  a l l  bonus schemes should be on a co llec tiv e  basis* . I t  
would seem from th is  l a s t  reso lu tion  th a t ceakain types of group schemes 
may not be ru led  ou t. But to  1955 I .C .I ,  had fa ile d  to s h if t  -the opposition 
of the plumbers towards i t s  incentive schemes.
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( i l )  ■ Unions whose inemhefB aooepted schemes ingnediately
Members of two engineering trades, the blacksmiths and the boileru. 
makers, behayed d iffe re n tiy  to  the craftsmen described above, although they 
a l l  worked in  the same shop. The {type of incentive schemes offered were 
b as ica lly  the same. While these unions were not en thu sias tic  about the 
use of work measurement fo r  s e tt in g  incentives th e ir  members had worked on 
piece work in  outside industry , especia lly  in  the shipbuilding yards.
This d ifference in  tra d itio n  probably explained the reason f o r 'th e i r  members 
acceptance of incentive schemes a t Ardeer* . The schemes were free  of d ispute, 
with earnings somewhere! a th ird  above the base hourly : ra te . There was no 
redundancy due to the introduction of the schemes.
. Some of the work th a t had been contracted outside was returned to
the fac to iy  trades shop on a oost-to -cost b as is . Management made th is
gemture in  re tu rn  fo r a t r i a l  run on incentives by the boilermakers. The
events leading up to  th e ir  acceptance were ra th e r unusual. A representative
of the work measurement section  o f Ardeer factory was inv ited  to attend the
meeting of the lo ca l branch of the Boilermakers' Society. He explained
various aspects of the scheme, including:
method of computing bonus and fix in g  lim its  of bonus earned bn 
jobs which were carried  over from week to  week;
payment o f bonus on jobs carried  out a t short notioe on overtime;
provision " fo r  access by workers to  records of work carried  
out under the!scheme;
procedure when i t  was im practicable to  prepare an estim ate before 
the commencement of a job;
, methods of computing appropriate compensatory re s t  fo r  tasks 
performed under varying conditions;
appointments o f estim ators to  deputise during periods o f absence 
due to  holiday8ÿ sihkness or other emergencies.
( i i i )  The indeterminate a ttitu d e  of the A#B.U.
The respective members of the five  engineering trades so fa r  
discussed a t le a s t  reacted homogeneously. = Members of the A.B.U., bn the 
o ther hand, showed no such simple reac tion , Their behaviour was complex. 
Members working in  the general trades shop of the factory  were f i r s t  offered 
a group incentive scheme, a noii-work measured type, in  1943. The men 
in i t i a l ly  re jec ted  the scheme, but la te r  reversed th e ir  decision. The bonus 
earnings turned out to  be considerable and i t  was not long before other 
A.B.U. members working in  the nearby too l room sought to  be placed on an 
incentive scheme. I t  was not u n ti l  1949 th a t management was able to  devise 
an individual incentive scheme fo r  th e ir  workers. There were no o f f ic ia l  
disputes involving these two groups.
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The g reat hulk of A.B.U. memhersy employed as maintenanoe f i t t e r s , :  
refused point. hlardE to  consider an incentive scheme offered to  them in  
1950* These f i t t e r s  frequently  worked in  close proxim ity to  general 
workers, many of whom were paid by r e s u l t .  Despite strenuous e f fo r ts  to 
persuade the f i t t e r s  to  accept the scheme they'rem ained adamant in  th e i r  ■;
re fu sa l. Their reac tions were c e rta in ly  puzaaiing to  management, and they 
were not e n tire ly  explained by the union o f f ic ia ls .  The l a t t e r  were not 
generally  opposed to the in troduction  o f incentive schemes in  the fao to iy .
At national level the A.E,U. approved of the I .G .I .  type of woik measured 
incentive achetie. This did not persuade the  men a t  the p lan t le v e l to
accept ihcen tives. The re a l  explanatioh fo r th e ir  reac tion  lay in  the
ambiguity with which the A.E.U. approached the problem of incen tives. 
T rad itionally  the union was opposed to  payments by re s u lts .  I t  had fought 
many a war with employers against the piece work system* In  1943 the! 
National Ooimittee: modified i t s  po licy  of opposition, to  incen tives. ; A.E.U. 
members were then allow ed,to accept schemes a f te r  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t  committee 
gave perm ission. There yras too much confusion am on^t the rank and f i l e  
and too l i t t l e  leadership about the question of in c e n tiv e s ,. to  permit the 
orderly  establishment of imiohrmanagement re la tio n s  on th is  s u b je c t .- { {
Sec. 2. Building Trades Unions.
The reac tions of build ing  workers were no le ss  perplexing. The 
brick layers refused to accept incentives, the p a in te rs  ; f i r s t  refused thém 
and then onahged th e ir  mind, w hilst the woodcutting m achinists Asked th a t 
they be given an incentive scheme. The jo iners twice re jec ted  them/ but 
gradually accepted them On a gang b as is . For many years th e  build ing trades 
were held together in  a f a i r ly  t ig h t naticnal bargaining u n i t /  the: National-, ; 
Federation of Building Trades Operatives, and i t  was d is tin c tly , opposed to 
the use of inoentiVea in  the build ing industry . Incentives were forbidden 
in  : 1931 nnder an agreement negotiated within th e  auspices of the S cottish  
N ational J  o in t Gouno i l  of th e  Building Industiy .  ^ The N.F.B.T.O. also 
qppoSed the; in troduction  o f incentives by the government during: the war : 
y ears . A fter = strbhg pressure by the employers the Federation agreed to  
accept incentives in  1947. This decision was subsequently confirmed in  
la te r  negotiatibhs, despite.; a • good deal of : heart-searohing by : constituen t 
/ o ^ a ^ s a t i q % :  '
(i ) See V* L. Allen "Incentives in  the Building Industjy*! 
-  Economic Journal. Vol. LXll,i 1952» Pt395*
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Bricklayers and th e ir  labourers were the f i r s t  to  be brought w ithin 
coverage o f the E ssen tial Work Order during the war. Their union, the 
Amalgamated Union of {g ild ing  Trade Workers, supported the 1947 decision of 
the N.F.B.T.O* to  accept incen tives. Subsequent conferences of the union 
called  fo r  the abo litio n  of incen tives. To the leadership  there appeared 
l i t t l e  hope of achieving th is  as many operatives accepted the schemes on the 
job. At Ardeer b rick layers s tead fa stly  refused incen tives. Their 
a ttitu d e  did  not change a f te r  the 1954 national delegate conference decided 
to  give th e ir  executive council the r ig h t to control the in troduction  of 
incen tives. Threats to  job secu rity , dangers of redundancy and de terio ra­
tio n  of the c ra f t ,  were the p rin c ip a l objections to  incen tives. The type 
o f schemes, offered were based on! an allowed time fo r a task , and paid on 
the individual worker's performance.
In  1950 members of the S cottish  Painters* Society a t Ardeer f i r s t  
re jec ted  an incentive scheme. A year la te r  the previous decision of the 
lo ca l branch was reversed by a large m ajority . The pa in te rs  took exactly 
the opposite view to  th a t of the brick layers about the dangers of redundancy. 
Management made no promise th a t labour would not be d isplaced. O rig inally  
twenty-seven p a in te rs  were placed on an incentive scheme. Three years 
la te r  th is  figu re  increased to  fo r ty -s ix . The painters* optimism was borne 
out by ©venté.
One explanation of the change o f a ttitu d e  by the p a in te rs  was 
supposed to  l i e  in  the i n i t i a l  approach by management, th is  approach did 
not immediately bring  the local union o f f ic ia l  in to  the negotiations. The 
Sco ttish  Painters* Society was the only union, apart from the T. & G.W.U., 
th a t maintained a lo ca l o ffice  in  the nearby town of S a ltco a ts . The members 
in  Ardeer apparently re lie d  more on th is  fu ll- tim e  o f f ic ia l  than on th e ir  
shop stewards fo r  guidance and leadersh ip , and consequently f e l t  th a t he had 
been d e lib e ra te ly  l e f t  out of i n i t i a l  d iscussions. C ertain ly , there was 
l i t t l e ,  i f  no difference in  the d e ta ils  of the two schemes o ffered . When 
the  local secre tary  entered the discussions opposition to incentives by h is  
members, faded. The type o f .scheme offered was based on allowed times, but 
was paid on a group b as is , and not on the performance of the ind iv idual. The 
decision of the branch followed, the precedent se t by the 1947 decision o f the 
N.F.B.T.O. to  agree to  the in troduction of incentives in to  the building 
industry .
Shortly a f te r  the p a in te rs  agreed to  accept an incentive scheme the 
woodcutting m achinists, o f whom there were only seven in  the facto ry , 
requested management#© introduce a scheme fo r them. Management, wary o f 
the dangers of dealing d ire c tly  with the rank and f i l e ,  including th e ir  shop 
steward, f i r s t  s o u ^ t  approval of th e ir  union, the Amalgamated Society of 
Woodcutting Machinists* The scheme adopted was one based on allowed times 
and paid on an indiv idual b a s is . During the period vhich th is  research 
covered there was no formal disagreement about the operation of the scheme.
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. ' The re a l ly  in te re s tin g  s itu a tio n  developed amongst the jo iners  in
the factory* Along with most other craftsmen jo iners  re jec ted  incentives 
in  1950* . ■ Before the war the Amaîgâmated Society of ; Woodworkers had very . ; 
s t r i c t  ru les  in  re la tio n  to  payments by resu lts#  Members caught working 
fo r  incentives were lia b le  to  be expelled* Incentives were f i r s t  introduced 
during the war in  Admiralty dockyards, shipbuilding and a i rc ra f t  es tab lish ­
ments. In 1947 the : Society faced another c r is is  when the m ajority of unions 
a f f i l ia te d , to  the N.F.B.T.O. accepted incen tives. The A.S.W. la te r  
authorised i t s  members to accept incentives on a gang b a s is . This gave 
Ardeer management the opportunity to  once again attem pt;the in troduction of 
incen tives, %  scheme was s im ilar to those already offered  to  other 
craftsmen and was considered favourably by the d i s t r i c t  o f f ic ia l .  Despite 
h is  support the rank and f i l e  refused to  change th e i r  decision . At a meet­
ing of eighty jo in ers  only seven s ta ted  that. j;hey were, prepared to  accept 
incen tives/
. : Then occurred a-most s ta r t l in g  event. . When the shop steward commenced 
to  co llec t the names of those w illing  to  . accept the scheme he received not 
seven, but so many, th a t he to re  the l i s t  up in  d isg u s t, r I t  was in  the 
in d iv id u a l's  in te re s t to  work on incentive, but i t  was not in  the group's 
in te re s t .  A fu rth e r  meeting of. the jo iners  re jec ted  incen tives. At la s t ,  
in  1952, the main joiners* shop was persuaded to  agree to a t r i a l  of an 
incentive, scheme., Breaking th is  i n i t i a l  resistance, le d  to  a general gang 
by gang approach/ only one gang refused to  accept a scheme. This la s t  . 
gang worked in  proximity to  a large group of general workers who consisten tly  
refused to  accept an, incentive scheme. Perhaps th is  had something to  do 
with th e ir  obstinanoy. With th is  exception, the jo in e rs  worked under 
incentives although they never co llec tiv e ly  assented to  the in troduction  of 
incentives*
Sec. 3* The P rin tin g  Trades Unions .
Like the o ther c ra f ts  the printers-w ere tr a d itio n a lly  opposed to  
incentive schemes. In 1949 the p rin tin g  unions entered in to  an agreement 
with the Sco ttish  A lliahce of Iknployers in  the P rin tin g  and Kindred Trades 
th a t th e ir  members would co-operate ' i n  experiments designed to e s ta b lish  . 
the s u ita b il i ty  of individual and group bonus schemes in  industry** The 
Ardeer management was not a party  to  th is  agreement, but by convention, 
conditions of thé outside p rin tin g  industry applied to: a ooABiderable extent 
in  the factory* Management sought to bring the p r in tin g  trades on to  an 
incen tiv e■scheme in  the following year. The lo ca l chapels of the S cottish  
Üÿpographloal Society and the National Union of Bookbinders Paper Workers both 
refused to  en te rta in  the idea of an incentive scheme*
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The type of scheme proposed to  the p r in te rs  was d iffe re n t to those 
offered to  o ther craftsmen. In  the f i r s t  place management proposed a l t e r ­
ing work p rac tice  by reducing the number of a s s is ta n ts  th a t tended the 
machines* The 8.T.A* represen tatives refused to  agree to  th is  proposal# 
Secondly, management proposed a scheme involving displacement of labour.
The General Secretary o f the S.T.A. said th a t i t  was contemptible fo r any­
one to  increase h is  pay while another man was displaced from a job. The 
lo ca l chapel was empowered to  accept incentive schemes, but not one involv­
ing redundancy. I t  was pointed out to  the union th a t p roductiv ity  came about 
in  two ways: by the ex is tin g  number of workers producing more a r t ic le s ,  or
by reducing the number o f workers and producing the same number Of a rtic le s*  
The schemes offered  to  the re s t  o f the craftsmen were prim arily  of the 
f i r s t  type, whereas those o ffered  to  the p rin tin g  trades were prim arily  of 
the second. The l a t t e r  type was very much le ss  a t tra o tic e  to  the operatives 
than the former.
Sec. 4* General workers' complex reac tions.
Payment by re su lts  fo r general workers in  Ardeer was not uncommon.
The female operatives employed on production o f explosives had been paid by 
piecework from the inception of the fac to ry . Ifany other workers were on 
some form of piecework during the h isto ry  of the fac to ry . The Bedeaux 
engineers v is i te d  Ardeer before the Great Depression to  introduce time and 
motion study to  f ix  incentives* Very few operations were a t th is  stage 
placed on incen tive . A fter the depression time and motion study was used 
to  f ix  the b as is  o f piece work ra te s  to  pay the female operatives. During 
the second world war several thousand general workers were placed on incen­
tiv e s . Some of these schemes survived u n ti l  the post-war period* I t  
was in  th is  l a s t  period th a t management attempted to  place as many general 
workers as possib le on incentive schemes.
( i )  Acceptance of a group bonus scheme.
Perhaps the most s ig n ifican t event which occurred in  the post-war 
period a t the facto ry  was the build ing  of a mechanised p lan t to  produce 
b la s tin g  explosives. I t  brought many in d u s tr ia l problems. On a sectional 
basis i t  was responsible fo r  a la rge share of the post-w ar union-management 
d ispu tes. No res istance  was offered to  the in troduction  o f incentives by 
the men manning th is  p a r tic u la r  p la n t. The scheme applied was a group one, 
based on tonnage output, and to  some extent calcu la ted  by work measurement.
I t  was the only group scheme, covering a large number o f personnel, which 
was not i n i t i a l ly  re jec ted  by the workers in  the post-war period. On close 
examination there were found specia l reasons fo r  th is  behaviour*
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The personnel fo r  manning th is  p lan t was based ; to  a la rge degree on 
sen io rity ; the men were selected  frcan those who worked on the old section  
of the department. This section /p roducing  explosives by tra d itio n a l 
methods, was not covered by an incentive scheme. Management made i t  c lear 
to  the men tran sfe rred  to  the new mechanised p lan t th a t i t  required them 
to  woik on an incentive ^ s te m . This proposal was never questioned by 
the workers o r th e ir  union. The team which f in a lly  came in to  existence 
was a new socia l grouping* In  p a r tic u la r  the norm of production was 
g rea tly  changed, and the new team showed a w illingness to se t th e i r  pace 
in  order to  benefit from the bonus scheme* The section  gradually b u il t  
up i t s  own e n tity , i t s  own leadership and s triv e d  to  improve the d e ta ils  
of the incentive scheme by fu rth e r negotiations.
Another reason which explained why th is  p a r tic u la r  group scheme was 
accepted, was the absence of a redundancy problem. As the team was new, 
no one was faced by redundancy. The number o f workers fo r  the new team 
was se t in  re la tio n  to an tic ipa ted  output. I f  output was reduced fo r  any 
period of time then the normal sen io rity  clauses governed the tra n s fe r  of 
excess personnel. Workers were temporarily tran sfe rred  to the older section , 
where with th e ir  long serv ice , they promptly 'bumped* someone with le ss  
sen io rity . To the woikers there appeared to  be none of the usual uncertain ty  
th a t shrouded the in troduction  of an incentive scheme in to  a well estab lished  
section . The techn ical d e ta ils  of the scheme were worked out in  advance/ 
sent on paper to  the lo c a l union o f f ic ia l ,  and explained to  them by management 
o f f ic ia ls /  including no le ss  a person than the Chairman of D irectors o f the 
Nobel D ivision. In  subsequent years there followed a g reat deal of negotia­
tio n s  over the operation of the scheme, which due to ce rta in  technical reasons 
was amended from time to  time* Only once in  s ix  years a f te r  i t s  commence­
ment, did the workers seek to  re tu rn  to  a system o f payment, and th a t action 
was taken only a f te r  a nerve-shattering  explosion, followed by a s tr ik e .
( i i )  I n i t i a l  re je c tio n  of group schemes.
The more o r le ss  p e rfec t conditions, which prevailed  when the group 
incen tive , scheme de ta iled  above was introduced, d id ;not ex is t in  other 
departments in  the fac to ry . Opposition to the in troduction  of group schemes 
was the ru le , not the exception. The following three examples took place in  
chronological order, and subsequent to  the events desoiibed in  the preceding 
sub-section. Three departments in  which management s o u ^ t  to  introduce 
incentives had somewhat d iffe re n t pa tte rn s  of so c ia l re la tio n s , (Eie f i r s t  
department was mainly s ta ffed  ly  women and g i r l s ,  the o ther two by men.
The f i r s t  and the th ird  were re la tiv e ly  new departments, having been trans­
fe rred  to Ardeer from other p a r ts  of the country shortly  a f te r  the depression. 
The second was an o r ig n a l  p a r t o f the fac to ry . From the viewpoint of union 
membership the f i r s t  was weak, while the other two were strong, p a rtic u la rly
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the ; th ird , which gave the T. & G.W.U, i t s  present "branch secretary* The 
processes in  the f i r s t  and the th ird  were moderately dangerous, "but working 
conditions were generally  more odorous in  the second. The reason fo r  the 
i n i t i a l  re je c tio n , and subsequent reversal o f th e  workers* decisions, did not 
l i e  in  the departm ent's soc ia l or physical environment.
The groups of general workers, with .the important exception o f the 
tra d itio n a l b la s tin g  woikers, changed th e ir  minds to  accept incen tives.
The lo ca l o f f ic ia l  of the T. & G.W.U. went through the motions of nego tiating  
over the teims o f the scheme. Usually the branch succeeded in  reducing the 
numbers of workers to  bé d isplaced. Sometimes i t  obtained improvements in  
the incentive r a te s .  Probably the most important featu re  about th is  s itu a ­
tio n  was the existence of genuine negotiations, to convince rank and f i l e r s  
th a t,  under the schem e/they secured benefic ia l r ig h ts , as well as the 
obligation  to  work harder. Workers saw th a t they were given 'sa fe g u a rd s '/ 
and so they accepted the scheme/ The piece workers and those on, the':"#{A'-'. 
mechanised u n it made considerable bonus earnings. The T. & G.W.U. was not 
opposed in  p rin c ip le  to  incentives, and the lo ca l branch was able to negotiate 
a good agreement^
There was one common ch a ra c te ris tic  of the schemes offered to  the 
workers. A ll schemes were based bn  the p rincip le  of reducing the number o f  
ex is tin g  number of personnel i  Fear of displacemeht was c lea rly  the reason 
fo r  i n i t i a l  resis tance  by workers. Other reasons were secondary in  imports 
ance^ For example, the f i r s t  department was offered i t s  incentive scheme 
when the union sought an increase in  tline ra te s . This was not a p a r tic u la r ly  
favourable atmosphere fo r gaining acceptance fo r  an incentive scheme. The 
workers apparently had second thoughts, ànd.tn the following year reversed 
th e ir  decision -  much to the astonishment of the lo ca l union o f f ic ia l .  
S im ilarly , a f te r  a time, lag  .the o ther two departments reversed th e ir s .  There 
appeared to  be comparatively l i t t l e  change in  the d e ta i ls  of the schemes 
offered to  the f i r s t  and th e  second departments. In  the case of the th ird  
department there was some uniorwnanagement bargaining about the ntmbers to be 
displaced, and the scheme was made more a t tra c t iv e . Despite these minor 
fac to rs  the workers' decisions to  accept the schemes were re la ted  to  th e ir  
new assessment of the displacement of labour.
( i i i )  Refusal- to  aooept incen tives.
One important group of geneid workers s tead fa stly  refused to  accept 
an incentive scheme. This group worked in  the o ldest section  of the faotoiy  
producing explosives. Their reac tion  was one of the most puzzling featu res 
of the whole study a t  the fac to ry . Management was unable to  fathom why the 
workers continued to  refuse incen tives. The scheme was based on a large Cut 
in  personnel. This explained a good deal of the opposition. The bonus 
earnings possible under the scheme were not la rg e , A maximum bonus of le ss
than one-th ird  o f hourly ra te s  was proposed due to  the technical nature of the
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plant* A fter negotiations i t  appeared as if - th e  workers would follow the 
course o f reac tion  of other departments. The workers had second thoughts 
and agreed to  a t r i a l  of four w e e k s T h e  men tem porarily displaced were 
deployed from the department ;acoordi.ng to th e ir  seniority* The men woiked 
on incentive fb r  a week longer than  the t r i a l  was .authorised, when i t  came 
to  a grinding h a lt d.ue to  one of the s h if ts  refusing  to  work a t a l l  -  u n t i l  
the incentive scheme was withdrawn* The v io len t end was eas ily  explained* 
; The wçirkerà thought there  was a breach of fa ith  in  allowing the scheme to 
continue fo r the ex tra  week* Union and management had agreed tha t in  the 
event of the men re je c tin g  th e  scheme thé method o f production would revert 
to  th a t ex istin g  p r io r  to the in troduction of the scheme*
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Table of Bonus. Bamings under Proposed Incentive Scheme 
 ^ = Ardeer. Gelatine: Section ' :
B lasting Department 
Weighted Average Job Basic Rate 3/2&d per Hour* .
Man Hours .per . 
Short Ton of . 
Packed Ebn^losive
. : - \ i6 * 8
17.Q
i 7,*â .
17*4 
■ 1 7 . 7  
1 7 . 9  
18*1
18.3 
18*5 
18*7
1.8*9: -
19.1
19. 3:. ' .
19*5
1 9 . 8
20.0
20.2
' '20*4\\:.;^
20.8 
21*0 
21*2
21.4
Bonus/operator/shift
6/tOd
5/7d
5/3d
.4/114
4/74
3/114
ft.
2/114
2/74
2/34
1/114
,1/44
Nil'
Bonus as ^  of 
Average Job 
Basic Rate*
' - . ' 27V8 .- 
26,0  ■ 
24.8 
23*3 
21*5 
20,3
19.0
17.5 
1$*0 
14. 8 . 
13*3,
12*5 
.1 1 .0  
10*0 
8*5 . : ; :  
: 7*5
6*3 
/  5*3 
. ; 4 .2
3*2
2 .0  
1*0 
Nil
Source* Division Work Measurement Section, Ardeer, March 1952*
Th^ e workers then voted to re tu fn  to the d id  method o f working and be 
paid by time. When the old complement came to  be resto red  i t  was found 
impossible to  rea llo ca te  the  actual individuals who were o rig in a lly  displaced. 
During th e  course of the t r i a l  these had taken jobs in  o ther departments 
according to : the H um  . l i s t * .  The apparent in te re s t in  keeping one*s 
personal job was not therefore o f ,any g reat influence in  the workers* decision. 
At the same time th is  group of workers .wac la rge , and i t  probably took a 
longer-run view of the s itu a tio n  than a sm aller group. Where would displace­
ment lead  in  th e  fu ture? Where would they, th e ir  sons and friends secure 
jobs i f  the facto ry  did  not increase i t s  intake of labour? In  short, there
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was an objection to  the in trodnotion  of incentives on p rin c ip le , as there 
had been fo r many years by the whole of the trade union movement.
There were perhaps contributory reasons. Earnings under the scheme 
were not p a r tic u la r ly  a t tra c tiv e  compared to  the bonus earned on the mechan­
ised  section  of the same departm ent,■ The men also complained th a t they were 
forced to  work too hard, under the new scheme, , Work in  th is ; section  Was 
never a t  a p a r tic u la r ly  fa s t r a te .  The o rig inal manufacture o f  explosives 
did not lend i t s e l f  to speed, A hon-monetaiy incentive scheme existed  in  
the; section, before the la s t  war* Workers were allowed to leave the factory  
when they, fin ished  th e ir  task  fo r  the day. This p riv ileg e  was withdrawn 
by management when the department went on s h if t  work to,meet increased 
production requirem ents. Workers did not a ltogether applaud thisohange 
in  worlcing conditions -  and i t  did not increase the ra te  of work. A small 
bonus: was paid fo r  producing an ex tra  batch of production,
. The/original idea fo r  a monetary incentive scheme came from the 
national o f f ic ia l  of the T, &; Gr*W.U, in  1950 when manageiment refused to  con* 
cede an increase in  the time wage* The men turned down the idea. The 
lo c a l uhion o f f ic ia l ,  d id not; bring the t r i a l  period in  1952 to  an end, fo r  
he believed; h is  members would gain l)y working incen tives. The informal 
group, although t # ; '  never challenged the o f f ic ia l  leadership^ had th e ir  
way* . Prom time to:,tiiHe management attempted to  introduce the scheme again. 
The /loca l union o f f ic ia l  was in  favour o f dropping the idea fo r  fe a r  of 
accentuâting the members i  d ifference of opinions. A b a llo t was held; 
amongst the: membership but the m ajority, ,154 to  37* were c lea rly  against 
incen tives. In  1954 when the question Was discussed again, ah explosion 
ocourred in  the mechanis®d section* :The l a t t e r  decided to  forego working 
on bonus, so the older section promptly re jec ted  any in troduction o f an • 
incentive scheme. The men on the mechanised section  - back to  wqrk
on bonus, but the others did' not reconsider th e ir  decision* ; So the; d isp a rity  
of earnings remained between the two sections*
(iv): Acceptance of. individual schemes*
There was no resistance to the in troduction  of individual or small 
group schemes. Between 1.948 and 1954 no le ss  than tw enty-five schemes were 
introduced to  cover groups of workers of le ss  than te n , A fu rth er ten  
schemes were introduced to  cover ^ o iip s  of; workers of between eleven and 
th irty *  ; These schemes tended to  f i l l  in  the. gaps l e f t  by the app lication  of 
the la rg e r group schemes. The number of workers covered in  a p a r tic u la r  
group.scheme .was to a large extent d ic ta ted  by the techn ical fac ts  of 
production. Not one o f the group schemes covered the to ta l  personnel in  a 
departm ent,. Although the Central Work Study Department of 1*0.1.
! (P) See B.I.M* * Conference on Work Study ' , p* 36*
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favoured the in troduction  of the individual scheme i t  was found impossible 
to  apply th is  p rin c ip le  in  Ardeer, simply because of the d if f ic u l ty  of 
separating and measuring the content of each job in  a production line*
Of the ind ividual and small group schemes introduced, twenty out of 
th ir ty - f iv e  involved some displacement of labour* The. prospect o f increased 
earnings overrode the f e ^ s  o f redundancy* In  any case, general workers,? 
unlike the draftsmen, had a w ell estab lished  system o f sen io rity  to  deal 
with problems of displacement and demotion* General workers were w ell- 
conditioned to  accepting dcgi^ea of redundancy, fo r  i t  was taken care of 
in  an equitable fashion* To them, removal o f personnel dne t o  the introduc­
tio n  o f an incentive scheme was no d iffe re n t to any other ohan^ in  the 
production schedule* The craftsmen had no such protection* They did not 
know who would be displaced o r where they would fin d  a job* The general 
worker simply went back to  the labour pool and was re-allO oated to  another 
tu m - l i s t  when the opportunity presented i ts e lf*  This job security  agree­
ment was s u ff ic ie n t to  d ispel the fea rs  of general workers*
Conclusion
What motivated the reac tions o f the groups towards the in troduction 
of incentives? Given th e ir  respective terms of reference, p a rtic u la rly  the 
mores, tra d itio n s , ru les  and po licy  pronouncements of th e ir  unions, only 
two assertions were possib le . Those Who accepted incentive schemes saw in  
them a way to  increase th e ir  pay packets* For th is  reason individuals o r , 
small iso la ted  groups usually  accepted incentive schemes* Those who re jec ted  
incentives d id  so, not because they did  not want an increase in  th e ir  pay 
packets, but on the conditions proposed by management* Pears about job 
secu rity  dominated th e ir  behaviour* Group schemes o r individual schemes 
offered to  a medium or large group, were usually  rejected^
There was some difference in  the  behaviour of oreifts and general 
worker groups who generally  changed th e ir  a ttitu d e  and l a te r  accepted the 
schemes* This was due to two factors* The general workers were w ell- 
conditioned to accepting displacement of labour; i t  was handled by the 
demotional m les* The c ra f t groups were not covered by those ru les , con­
sequently they did not have job security  and fea rs  about redundancy remained 
dominant in  th e ir  minds* The T* & G.W*UW applied i t s  experience gained from 
negotiating  over piece ra te s  to  the new incentive schemes; in  p a r tic u la r  
nego tiating  over the ta rg e t a t which bonus was to  commence, and over the 
number of personnel to  be displaced* The c ra f t  unions, with one exception, 
did not attempt to  negotiate improved conditions o f the incentive scheme 
offered; consequently the c ra f t  groups did not change th e i r  behaviour*
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The reaotion  of some of the woifc groups to  management's proposals 
to in s ta l  incen tives schemes ind icated  another form of breakdovm in  union 
control over i t s  members, more subtle than an unauthorised stoppage, but 
every b i t  as ominous fo r the fu tu re of union-management re la tio n s . When 
anagfeement allowed management to  introduce an incentive scheme, the particu ­
la r  d e ta ils  o f which were negotiated by the o f f ic ia ls  of the union, and a 
group of employees refused to  accept the scheme, there was a primae fac ie  
case th a t union au thority  had broken down; the power of deoisioiwnaking 
had moved from the o f f ic ia l  governing body to  the leadership o f the informal 
groups. The behaviour of the men On the old side o f the b la s tin g  depart­
ment and the maintenance f i t t e r s  appeared to f a l l  in to  th is  c a te ^ ry .
Another primae fa c ie  case of breakdown occurred when a group accepted an 
incentive scheme without approval of th e ir  governing body, which opposed 
incentives on p rin c ip le  and refused to  negotiate the d e ta i ls  o f a  schema.
In  th is  s itu a tio n  the informal group defied the au thority  o f th e ir  govern­
ing body.
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Introduction
/Dhe la s t  chapter, attempted to  explain the.behaviour o f the.various 
worker groups. towards incentive, schéraes. The reactions of each gioup were 
considered against thebaokground of the .rules and policy  on inoehtives of 
th e ir  ,respective unions* ; The unions did not go; out of th e ir  way to 
persuade; th e ir  members 'to  accept the schemes* Unions were generally opposed 
to  incentives# They believed th a t incentives caused redundancy, and th is  
impaired the strength  of th e ir  organisations# They were suspicious of 
incentives because they f e l t  the employer obtained an undue proportion o f  
sayings resu lting , from the application  o f  ; incentives* Irioehtive schemes •
;weTO a major; source of trouble to  the union o ff ic ia is#  , They, had to  watch 
against so -called  'r a te  * Gutting. : They were p a r tic u la r ly  opposed tb
incentive schemes based on time etudy because it ,ad v e rse ly  affected  the 
bargaining function of the .unions, , ;
/, I# G* I ,  attempted to  obtain the hat ional unions * support fo r  work 
measured; incentive schemes i t  was attempting to  introduce in  i t s  f a c to r ie s . : 
I t  inv ited  various union o f f ic ia ls  to attend an appreciation,course on 
♦V/ork. btudy *. Then followed a se rie s  of Conferepoes in  19.5*^51 between the 
Signâtoiy Unions and I . e . I ,  t 6 consider the im plications of work stuSy# 
These.'conferences were a; lamentable fa ilu re  f o r  they did  not help the 
acceptance of incentives on the work shop floor#  The in tru sio n  o f  the tehn ; 
'work study' was a mistake, and the unions were bewildered by i t .  They did 
hot seem to  knov; how to  bargain with the " Company over i t s  in troduction . The 
la t te r ,  was .also a t fa u lt as i t  did not really : seem tb  want ;.an;# agreement on / 
work study. The conférences were in e ffec tua l as armeans of communication* 
From an an a ly tica l po in t of view the'conferences provided im portant d a ta  fo r  
deducing p rin c ip les  about fundamental union-mahagement rela tions*  (F)
Sec". t« National conferences on work study f
; Work study was a term coined by l .C .I ,  to describe techniques of 
management used to  improve the overall effic iency  of production. According 
to one expert it.w as 'th e  system atic and objective examination and improve-, 
ment o f the fac to rs  w ^ch d ire c tly  governed the productive or operational
(F) The author was indebted to  Mr, E* Higgins, . Secretary 
of the Signatory Unions fo r supplying him with records 
.of the nego tia tions on Work Stud.y; to  iîr. L; Gale, 
formerly Personnel D irec tb r/c f ,Nobel Division; fo r , 
arranging fo r  him to attend the I . G.Ti. Work Study 
Conference oalled  .by the. B.I.M;, in  1954» ahd t o  Mr.; E. 
;Fletcher of the T.tJ.O, fo r a,liowing him to  attend an: 
.'appreciation course ion/Work Study for. trad e  union ;
. ■ o f f ic ia ls  in  th e  same yeah. ■  ^ •
efficiency, of any specifled. a c t iv i ty ' .  ■ ih  had two main aspects* . The ^
f i r s t  was 'Method Study* which aimed a t imprbving the e ffec tiv e  use of •
m a te r ia ls , 'p la n t j equipnent ^nd manpower*:. ; This was to  he , achieved hy b e tte r  
'layout of p la n t, by se lec ting  the most ebbhcmical working procedures and by 
making more e f f ic ié n t use of human and m ateria l iesourceS*: ' The second 
aspect was ,'Wbrk Measurement', which was designed to  e s tab lish  an allowed 
time to  perform a ta sk  in  p id e r  to  improve manning, planning and oontroi#
I t  was also to  be used as a basis  fo r  sound incentive schemes* ( 2) The 
: techniques : used , in  bbth msthod study and work measurement were e ssen tia lly  . 
the same as those idibwh as 'motion* and 'tim e'- s tu i^ i (3)
 ^ There was a good d ea l of iconfusion oh the ; p a rt ; of th e  Unions as to
whether work study was : somethihg hew. \0r nq.t. According to  one au thority
the: origin! of 1 .0*1 ,'s.-own work Study programme dated from the post-war , 
period. The Oompany in i t ia te d  a de 1 ibera te  long term policy  of educating 
management in  th e  techniques, o f work study* 1 . 0*1.  adopted the : term ' work 
study' to cover in te r re la te d  techniques and gradually b u i l t  : up.a functional 
headquarter's department ..to Co-ordinate i t s  applicdtibnv ! (4) Although work 
study, iU: so f a r  as i t  w asthe  in te n s if ica tip n  of .good works management,. 
was not techn ica lly  .hew, in  i t s  public re ia tio h s  aspects i t  ce rta ih ly  v/as.
I t  might have ass is ted  the Company, in  winning over scep tica l managerial 
o f f ic ia ls ,  bu t the ,use of new terms did not iielp'unioti-raanagemeht : re la tio n s , • 
One. prominent union o f f ic ia l  c l aimed th a t work study looked more lik e  a % 
slogan (5) than a s c ie n t if ic  approach to  management, : The 1*0.1. Ghief 
Labour : O fficer admitted th a t the, new terarinblogy was .not eas ily  .understood; 
by the u n in itia te d . (6}  . , ' t  .." i'.t: '. ''
i 1*0,1, in  i t s  conferences with the Signatoiy Unions made the po in t
th a t work study was usefu l in  ra is in g  productiv ity  eveh when .incentives 
were not included, in: any specif ip. programme. But, contended the Company^
the g rea tes t advahtage followed from, the app lication  of method study, works,
: méasurèmeht : and ihcbntives.:. 'While 1 .0 ,1, s ta ted  th a t incentives were not 
new to  the organisation, many Union o f f ic ia is  suspected :that incentives were 
bbihg sold under a d iffe re n t name work study. Indeed, I .G ,I .  to ld  the . , 
S i^ a tb iy  Unions, th a t i t  was i t s  policy  to  o ffer-incen tive  schemes to  as many 
o f ' i t s  employees as possib le . : These conferences discussed incentives, not
work study. The unions ra ised  only one po in t/regard ing  method studyf That 
concerned the, use of slow motion film s. I t  was only a minor point*
:( 1 ) 1  Conference on Work Study', B*I,M ,, . Harrogate, 1954»
Intfoduotory ta lk  by S ir % a rt Smith; " ; f  ‘ -
( 2) J .  Grange Moore -  'The f ie ld  of work study'  ^ ib id , • , ; \
( 3) P. J.: Tpfrie -  'Method study techniques'.^ :ibid* .
S.L.G.Hurable -  ^Work measured teolmiqUes ' ,  ib id .
(4) S ir  Ewart Smith -  'Introdubtory Talk' * 'ib id ,  : ; ,
’ (5 ) E, : F letcher -  'Work Study and the Trade \ Unions ibid* ;•
/ (6) E* Té Grint -  dV/ork Study and Labour ;kelations*> ib id .
Apart fran  the confusion which ^rose pye r  the use o f tertninology. 
there were o ther reasons why the conférences on work study were ineffective* 
The timing o f the conferences was important in  so f a r  as the case study o f 
Ardeer was ooncerned* . Ifost of the craftsmen had made up th e ir  minds i ^ t  
th e ir  a t titu d e s  were to incentives* By the time the la s t  conference was 
held in  September 195Tj the craftsmen had a l l  held second meetings and 
decided e ith e r  to  reverse o r endorse th e ir  o rig in a l decisions* There was 
not one shred o f .evidence which showed th a t  th e  conferences held nationally  
on work study had any e f fe c t on the behaviour o f the workers on the p lan t 
a t  Ardeer* The conferences were n e ith er usefu l as negotiations nor as 
consultations in  removing workers* objections to  incentives* Although the 
Coarpany s ta te d  th a t  i t  was prepared to  consult with the unions over tbS 
app lication  o f work study* as one union o f f ic ia l  ppihted out, th is  was a 
l i t t l e  la te  as incentives had already been offered a t fac to ry  lev e l i One 
union o f f ic ia l  even expressed su rp rise  th a t h is  members were Working on 
incentives, although he had no complaints about, them*
The f in a l  reso lu tion  adopted by the Signatory Unions on Woik Study 
was f u l l  of loopholes and did not even re fe r  to  incen tives:
*The Signatory Unions note thé safeguards contained in  the 
agreed document (which summarised the conclusions reached 
in  the discussions) which have met some of the objections 
ra ised  by thé Signatory Unions* I t  i s  noted th a t the  ! 
extension o f Work Study i s  a m atter fo r lo c a l agreemehi|“ 
and i s  subject to  the r ig h ts  of constituen t unions to  
negotiate  on m atters which contravene th e ir  separate oorfe 
s titU tio n s  o r national po licies*  /Subject to  these reset»- 
vàtions th is  meeting o f TOparesentatives accepts the general 
p rin c ip les  o f Woak Study*%
I t  was obvious from th is  reso lu tion  th a t the Signatory Unions did 
not wish to  fo rce th e i r  constituen t unions to  accept incentives* Indeed 
provision Was made in  the reso ïu tion  to  recognise the r ig h t o f the loca l 
negotiation  machinery to  deal with problems associate^  with work studj^*
In  e ffe c t th is  recognised the r ig h t o f groups o f workers to  decide whether 
or not they would accept incentives* The reso lu tion  did not change the 
s ta tu s  quo* Only some of the objections of the unions were met by the 
Company* Broadly speaking, the acceptance of the general p rin c ip les  of 
woifc study was meaningless*
VHhen the unions f i r s t  met 1*0*1* to  discuss work study they mentioned 
. the p o s s ib ili ty  o f having a national agreement on the subject* They did  not 
qu ite  see how i t  was to  be accomplished* 1*0*1* then pointed out th a t 
ex istin g  agreements already covered the position : ( l )  under the agreement
re la tiv e  to  working conditions provision was made fo r  subm itting incentive 
ra te s  to workersj (2) under the 1947 nego tiation  procedure workers were 
enqpowered to  r e je c t  the ra te s  offered and bring th e ir  union o f f ic ia ls  in to  
the discussion; (3) schemes a ffec tin g  large numbers o f  workers were usually  
Sttlanitted to  the lo ca l union o f f ic ia ls  aocoiding to  the n e ^ t ia t in g  procedure;
(4) bonus payments were made in  accordance with the agreement on working 
conditions; (5 ) the l a t t e r  also  defined the ciroumstj^ceB by ïràiich i t  was 
peimissable to  a l te r  fates*
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A few minor po in ts  were agreed to  during the conferences on work 
study* On the whole there was no positive  bargaining and so no positive  
resolution* The CoiBpany attempted to  explain techn ical po in ts which i t  
hoped the unions would use to  persuade the members to  accept inoentiveSi 
The tmionsÿ who were divided amongst themselves in  these conferences more 
than usual, d id  not seem to  know how to  bargain over work study*
Sec* 2* Disnlaoeraent o f personnel*
1*0*1* took the view th a t there would be some i n i t i a l  displacement 
o f labour due to work study* According to  a Company spokesman histozy 
showed th a t such displacement was temporary, and in  the long run benefited  
the eoioaùnitÿ's standard o f liv in g . I t  drew on a T*U*C. rep o rt by a team 
of B ritish  taràdo un ion ists  who investigated  the ro le  of unions in  increasing 
p roductiv ity  in  the U*S* This report s ta te d  th a t a r is in g  standard of 
liv in g  was obtained from labour-saving machinery, té^hnioal progress and 
sk ill*  Bedundahby of workers was an inev itab le  consequenoe unless increased 
production enabled the immediate re-absorption o f displaced workers* !Qie 
report contended th a t redundancy was not unemployment where f u l l  employment 
ex isted  in  the economy* Unions were ca lled  to  reoogrdse the need fo r  
taking a f le x ib le  a ttitu d e  towards the m obility Of labour* 1*0*1* hoped 
th a t these b ^ a d  arguments might have won the unions* support fo r  work study 
in  i t s  factorleb#
The arguments were not oidy profound, they were also  irrelevan t*
So fa r  as Ardeer was concerned there was no evidence, as seen in  Chapters V 
and Vi th a t unions opposed the in troduction o f new machines o r technical 
improvements* They sometimes opposed changes in  work p rac tices  and woxk 
loadal From management's viewpoint a saving in  labour cost due to  the 
in troduction of a  new machine was much the same as a saving on the wages 
b i l l  due to  the in troduction of an incentive scheme* For the workers there 
was a vast d ifference to  being paid  by time ra te s  as ocsnpared to  incentives* 
For the h ea lth  of the B ritish  economy any improvement in  p roductiv ity  was 
d es irab le . As the la s t  Chapter showed, many workers accepted displacement 
o f labour in  th e ir  sections, but on certa in  conditions* Those who re jec ted  
incentives did os, not to  hu rt national production, but because they were 
d is s a tis f ie d  w ith the p a r tic u la r  working conditions the management proposed 
introducing*
I t  was the fe a r  of being declared redundant th a t motivated the 
employees on the workshop f lo o r to  refuse to  accept incentives* Opinions 
expressed by the various union o f f ic ia ls  a t  the national lev e l substan tiated  
th is  conclusion* The A.B*U* representative f e l t  th a t while workers took 
in to  account the p ro b ab ility  of higher earnings, against th is  had to  be s e t  
the p o s s ib il i ty  o f ce rta in  numbers o f  them losing  th e i r  jobs* The represen­
ta tiv e  of the T* & G.W*U* believed th a t the woifcshops re jec ted  the incentive
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schemes because there was no national agreement governing the displacement 
of labour* The Signatory Unions wished to  know whether I*C*I* proposed 
finding su itab le  a lte rn a tiv e  employment fo r those d isplaced, and irtiether 
th is  would be accomplished without lo ss  Of earhings* This l a t t e r  question 
was not pursued by the unions during ih e se  conferences*
In  i t s  reply  1*0,1# s ta ted  th a t i t  was tak ing  a l l  reasonable steps 
to  avoid discharging workers due to the in troduction Of work study*
Because o f  the normal ra te  of turnover 1*0*1* believed  a t was generally  
possib le  to  re-absorb any displaced labour, although in  some circumstances 
a ce rta in  amount of redundancy was possible* I t  proposed th a t azy 
displaced workers be found a lte rn a tiv e  work in  o th e r departments o f the 
same works o r in  otiier 1*0*1* establishments* I t  a lso  s ta ted  i t  would not 
replace personnel on a  p a r tic u la r  operation immediately preceding the 
application  o f  work study* But no agreement was concluded on these items* 
So f a r  as Ardeer was concerned general workers had some bontrol over the 
deployment of labour, so these ♦ undertakings 1 -  as they were ca lled  -  had 
l i t t l e  o r no e ffe c t on the workshop behaviour* The undertakings ce rta in ly  
d id  not have the same e ffe c t as a union-manag^ent agreement* The Ardeer 
workers in  the b iasing  department obtained the lo ca l management!s assurance 
th a t i t  would not remove any of the personnel before the department went 
on to  incentives*
The Company also proposed th a t where an individual worker lo s t  h is  
job through the d ire  c t re s u lt  o f the in troduction o f work study 'he o r she 
would be e lig ib le  fo r consideration fo r  the p a r e n t  of a g ratu ity^  * For 
many years 1*0*1* s ta ted  th a t i t  gave sympathetio consideration to the 
payment o f g ra t i^ t ie s  to  indiv iduals who lo s t  th e ir- jo b s  on account o f the 
pezmanent c losing  of p la n ts , or the in troduction  o f new methods in  the 
in te re s ts  o f efficiency* Such payments were designed to  reduce hardship* 
No payment was made to  workers due to  a recession in  trade o r fo r  o ther 
reasons outside the Coapany's control* The rep resen ta tives of the unions 
a t  the time of the discussions about work study wanted to  know whether 
there was a d e f in ite  scheme* This could have been a negotiable issue*
The Company was opposed to  w riting  th is  m atter in to  an agreeiDsnt* < 
Payments were to  be made on the m erits o f each case, and were to  be re la ted  
in  p a r ti  oui a r  to  the p o s s ib il i ty  o f finding su it able e#ioym eht in  the 
loca lity *  In  th is  way the payment was to  be a w indfall a t  a time o f need* 
This proposition  had some a t tra c tio n  fo r  the individual from a taxation
viewpoint* d^e Chief Labour Officer o f I*0*I* stated in  195  ^ (?) that i t  
had not been hecessary to make one payment* Whether he was en titled  to
(7) E* T* Glint* B*I*M. Work Study Conference,- 
Harrogate, 1954»
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conclude th a t  widespread p u b lic ity  of th is  promise fostered  a favourable 
atmosphere fo r  the woifcshop to  accept incentive ech o es  was seriously  open 
to  doubt* When a payiwnt o f th is  type was l e f t  so le ly  w ithin manage­
m ent's d isc re tio n  the more cynical un ion ists  were inc lined  to  doubt the 
whole idea* I t  smacked too much of paternalism*
Sec* 3* D istribu tion  of savings*
I t  was apparent to the workers th a t when they accepted incentives 
the Oonipary saved the wages of those removed, saved a considerable amount 
of overheads, and a t  the same time had the b en efit o f increased production. 
According to  the represen ta tive  o f the T* & G*W*U* ^certain  inconsiderable f 
increases in  e a rn in g  then followed whidh gave l i t t l e  s a tis fa c tio n  to  the " 
workers* The r e s t  of the workers then quipped! 'W ell, i f  th a t was what 
work study meant -  you've had i t '*  The workers also  wanted to  know what 
happened to  the saving in  costs* The unions were not able to  t e l l  them*
On receiving a copy of the Ocmipany balance sheet they showed i t  to  the 
union o f f ic ia ls  and commented! 'W ell, th a t was where i t  went'* %e 
workers'were p rim arily  concerned with th e ir  pay packets and pressed th e ir  
unions to  obta in  higher wages fo r  them* While union offic ia lssaw  i t  was 
th e ir  ro le  to  improve wages, they were bewildered as to  how work study 
f i t t e d  in to  the bargaining relationship*
The company labour o f f ic ia ls  were very surprised  th a t these 
questions were being asked* They acknowledged th a t scanetiines groups of 
workers d id  see savings effected  by a p a r tic u la r  scheme, which were con­
siderably  in  excess of the bonus eàm ings paid to  the workers* But the 
Oompany rep resen ta tives contended th a t  no Improvement in  effic iency  was 
possible i f  u n it  co sts  were increased a l l  the time* One union o f f ic ia l  
had a hedonistic  rep ly  to  ih is i  '% e  individual t r ie d  to  take advantage 
o f the p o sition  to  g e t more'* The Chief Labour O fficer o f 1*0*1* asked: 
♦Was th is  purely  a s e lf ish  approach on the paa?t of the individual?*
Another represen ta tive  o f the Compary was astonished th a t these questions 
were asked by workers in  the year I95O* 'Had nob the unions the lead o f 
the T*U*0* who were fu lly  aware of the s ta te  o f the economy? Was i t  not 
possib le to  educate union o f f ic ia ls  who would inform the workers o f the 
answers to  these questions? ' But th e  age old argument over the d is tr ib u ­
tio n  o f in d u s try 's  rece ip ts  was not solved by an appeal to  national economio 
patriotism * The spokesman fo r  thé Signatory Unions rep lied  th a t the 
questions about the d is tr ib u tio n  of savings had been ra ised  ever since he 
worked, and obviously the answers given by employers were u nsa tisfac to ry , 
o r  otherwise they would not be s t i l l  questioned*
Because the union o f f ic ia ls  did not understand thé impact of work 
study on unionHnanagement re la tio n s  they did  nothing to  bring  r e a l i ty  to 
the situation*  The discussion o f these conferences d ea lt a g rea t deal 
w ith academic Arguments in  the sphere o f labour economics* These d id  not 
doive the problems which confronted unions* The Conpany should have given
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attentioD  to  form ulating add itional terms fo r working conditions created  
o r a lte red  by thé in troduction of work study* The unions thought the 
answer lay  in  persuading the Q<w^any to  adopt a formula which would have 
apportioned the savings to  a general improvement of wages^ additional 
cap ita l expenditure fo r  mechanisation and reduction of consumer prices* v
To he f a i r  to  the Ccppany rep résen ta tives, they to ld  the Unions 
th a t the problem was being looked a t the wrong way* Various agreements 
already goveined thé  payment of wages# Under the 1938 agreement re la tiv e  
to  w oj^ng  conditions, the method adopted provided th a t incentive ra te s  / 
were to  be so fikéd  as to  give workers o f average a b i l i ty  a th ird  bonus of 
th e ir  hourly rates* The hourly ra te s  were subject to  national bargaining* 
In  determining hourly ra te s , such th ings as s k i l l  required to  perfoim the 
job, wozking conditions, c o s t.o f  liv ing; and the overall p roéperity  of the 
Gompany were Considered; Incentives wei-s intended to  recompense the ; 
individual worker fo r  additional e f fo r t which resu lted  in  increased output* 
According to  the type of scheme; d ire c t labour savings were shared equally 
between the employees aM management, as in  the standard hour plan and : 
piecework* In  other schemes, workea^ shared a t  a lé sa  than proportionate 
increase with management in  the increase in  production* Savings in  
in d ire c t co s ts , which ware considerable when many wozkérs were placed on 
incentives, accrued to the Company*
i f  the unions thought th a t the above conditions were unsatisfac to ry  
then they should have bargained fo r  an improvement in  these national agree­
ments, o r in s is te d  on a . h igher ra te  of sharing in  d ire c t labour savings o r 
even in  in d ireo t savings* But they did  not do th i s ;  .... They did  not try  
to  improve the bargain, so the conferences lo s t  direction* The union 
o f f ic ia ls  s ta te d  th a t i t  was a l i t t l e  d i f f ic u l t  to  convince workers th a t 
the p o sitio n , as outlined by the Company, was already covered by ex istin g  
agreements* The rea l trouble was one of terminology. Workers were asked 
to  accept incentives* When Work study Whs also mentioned they became 
confused* The workers were quite ju s t i f ie d  to  demand the establishm ent 
of some p rin c ip les  to  cover the use of Work study, fo r  example, by asking 
what happened to  the savings* I t  was the union o f f ic ia ls  who were a t  
f a u lt  fo r not perceiving thé true  nature of the problem; and the Oompany 
confused m atters by introducing the term *woi|: study**
This l a s t  mistake could have been r e c t if ie d  a t  the facto ry  f lo o r  
had the union o f f ic ia ls  simply reported back th a t the po sitio n  was s a t i s ­
f a c to r ily  covered by ex istin g  agreements* Workers would 1hen have known 
where they stood in  regard to  ex istin g  r ig b ts  and obligations la id  down by 
these agreements* ; The s itu a tio n  was made s t i l l  more confusing by the 
d is tr ib u tio n  of a pamphlet which s e t  out a ra th e r  elaborate account of the 
♦cap ita list*  method o f production* This pamphlet was e n t i t le d  'The 
Implicétioné o f Work Study** A lthou# i t  cpntained some in te re s tin g  
information on some aspects o f work study, as a means o f communication on 
the d is tr ib u tio n  o f savings, i t  was m isdirected and was probably 
incompréhensible to  thé average wôadcer*
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See* 4* Safeguarding, bonus earnings*
In  the 1*0*1* agreement management was forbidden to  a l te r  incentive 
o r piece ra te s  except under three weili-defined Conditions* an e rro r  in  
ca lcu la ting  the ra te , a change in  Wages ^ d  working conditions declared 
to  a f fe c t piece ra te s , and a change in  m ateria l, means o r method of 
production o r otherwise in  the sp ec ifica tio n  of the job* I t  was only in  
the case o f the th ird  obnditiohs th a t d iscussion arose over the  applica­
tio n  of work study*
The Gcaapany defined the ways in  which changes in  jobs arose*
These were c h a n ts  in te d u c e d  by management, changes improvised by workers, 
and an accumulation o f minor changes due to  management and workers* The 
unions agreed to  the id i^ t  o f management to  re -assess the ra te s  fo r  a job 
when i t  was changed* , The national agreement provided th a t  ra te s  were 
not to  be a lte red  so fas to; reduce the bonus earnxngs of the workers 
employed on the same jobs* Yet i t  was these changes, introduced by 
management, which caused the g rea tes t number o f d isputes a t  Acdeer* I t  
Was impossible fo r  the p a r tie s  to  resolve these issues a t  the national 
le v e l, fo r  éÿery. dispute involved fac to rs  which were closely  re la ted  to  the 
p a r tic u la r  workshop* ' ' 'f::-'-:''"'
The im provisations introduced by workers gave l i t t l e  p ra c tic a l 
d if f ic u lty  a t  the facto ry  le v e l, but caused considerable controversy in  
the national d iscussions on work study* The p rin c ip a l union objection to  
the a lte ra t io n  of ra te s  following an improvisation by the worker was th a t 
i t  robbed him o f the f r u i t  of h is  ingenuity* The work study engineer 
d id  not always perfec t a method; the worker sometimes found a more 
e f f ic ie n t way of doing a job* As the incentive ra te  was fixed  on the 
basis o f  rewarding the worker fo r  additional e f fo r t ,  i t  was e a s ie r  fo r him 
to  earn a given bonus a f te r  im provisation than before* This meant : th a t 
he was able to  earn more than h is  fellow wCrkersT; The Company considered 
th is  inequ itab le , and thought th a t th is  was one o f the reasons why incen­
t iv e  schemes became unpopular* ; 1*0*1* *s scheme aimed a t a f a i r  day 's pay
; ;; ;
The Company proposed rewarding the operative who made the 
im provisation a lump sum under i t s  Awards Scheme, which was not subject ; 
to  negotiation* The unions generally  opposed th is  as the worker got a 
short terra b en efit while the Company received the b en efit fo r  a l l  time*
The unions claimed th a t under these proposals the in te ll ig e n t worker was
penalised while à worker with brute strength  was able to  earn as much as 
he wanted* This was one o f  the fundamental problems o f paying incentives 
on e f fo r t  exerted , ra th e r  than on value produced. There were, no schemes
in  Ardeer based on th is  l a t t e r  principle*
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I^C.I*»a proposal to  a l te r  incentive ra te s  as a re s u lt  o f 
accumulated minop changes introduced, by management and worîœrs, was also 
challenged* The B#T.U* represen ta tive  complained th a t the Con^any 
intended to keep a close watch oh the workers in  order to  exp lo it th e ir  
in i t ia t iv e .  The Company denied th a t i t  wished to  re -assess  ra te s  
immediately there  was some increase in  operator e ffic ien cy . I t  merely 
wanted to  secure th e  r ig h t to  a l te r  ra te s  when they ■ .were. . m ahifestly 
out o f l in e  fo r  some tim e. I .G .I .  pointed out th a t i t  was not always 
possib le to  study the e ffe c t o f  every small job changé^ order to  
a rriv e  a t a new rate* I t  d id  not wish to  add to  the burden o f  union» 
management negotiations by arguing over inconsequential changes in  
incentive r a t e #
The Oompany then offezod to  ^ lo w  a l l  incentive ra te s  to  remain 
unaitered fo r two years from th e  time o f  th e ir  assessment* The unions 
did  no t seem to  thiidc th a t t h i s  o ffe r  was qu ite  good enough. The 
Company then o ffered  to  compensate workers by paying them a lung» sum 
equivalent to the d ifference, of earnings under the old and new ra te s  
m ultip lied  by s ix  months. K iis was accepted by the  unions and was one 
o f the few -  i f  not the only negotiated poin t in  the whole o f the 
national conferences on work study* Only once d id  a lo ca l dispute a t  
Ardeer make reference to  th i s  p rin c ip le  -  so the fe a ts  of the unions were 
not substan tia ted  in  fact*
Sec* 5; The technique o f  rating*
1*0*1* used work measurement in  the determ ination o f  allowed times 
fo r  the workers to  complete th e i r  tasks or targets*  In  order to  d e te r­
mine a time schedule fo r  paying bonus i t  was neoSssary to determine a 
'normal* time fo r  doing a  p a r tic u la r  job* The most d ire c t  way o f doing 
th is  was to  stop watch an operative in  the performance of h is  ts^k* Such 
a metiiod was: sub ject to  two types o f  errors* F ir s t ly ,  the ntraber o f  
timings were no t always su ff ic ie n t to  elim inate e rro rs  made during the study* 
Secondly, : the sample o f  times taken were not necessarily  represen tative 
of the overa ll work performance of the operative* Given su ff ic ie n t 
readings i t  was s t a t i s t i c a l ly  possible to  cor root the f i r s t  error* I t  was 
OHdy possib le to  tack le  the second e rro r  th ro u ^  a  technique known as 
'ra ting*  * A subjective assessment was made of the speed w ith which the 
operative, performed h is  ta sk  so th a t account was tafcOh o f slow, average 
and quick workers* I# iV id u a l judgment frequently  d iffe re d  Qover the 
speed of mi o p e ra tiv e 's  woik* There^ no s c ie n t if ic  way o f avoiding 
the problem of rating* In  addition to these two problems, allowance fo r  
comper^atoïy r e s t  and personal needs had to  be made in  the allowed times*
I t  was hot possib le  to  come to  m  exact method of determining these 
h llo w a h c e s * - : ''I
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Any mistake made in  the reading of the tim es, the ra tin g  of the 
speed of work, and the allowance made fo r  compensatory r e s t  had a d ire c t 
hearing on the a h i l i ty  o f the worker to earn su ff ic ie n t honus* A time 
a l lo ^ d  which was too 'tig h t*  made operatives woik too hard, or they did 
no t earn th e i r  customaiy bonds* A time se t too 'lo o se ' had the reverse 
effect*  In the conferences dealing with work study the unions were o f 
course in te re s ted  in  preventing the se ttin g  o f t ig h t  times* In  th is  they 
concentrated th e i r  a tten tio n  to  one aspect of time study -  the ; technique 
of r a t i ^ *  They did  not attempt to argue about the number o f readings 
th a t were to  be taken, nor d id  they attempt to  s e t  some, formula fo r  
determining allowahces fo r compensatory rest*  13ie argument which developed 
over ra tin g  arose la te  in  the course o f the conferences* I t  was obvious 
from discussions th a t  some union o f f ic ia ls  did no t understand the nature 
and defects o f time study*
Most, i f  not a l l  union o f f ic ia ls  understood th a t th e re  was some 
subjective element involved in  the technique o f rating* For th is  reason 
they s ta ted  qu ite  ca tego fica lly  th a t they regarded the times s e t by the 
time study engineers Subject to  negotiation* (@ ) The unions elaborated 
th e ir  objections to  time s t u ^  by concentrating th e i r  a ttack  on r a t i n #
Some f e l t  th a t  in  a cost squeeze the  time study engineer might be tempted 
to  miake tim es t i t t e r  by ra tin g  the operatives a t  a lowe|è performance lev el 
than wasp ab tually  the case $ Using a ohan^ in  the job as an excuse 
the times could then be a lte red  and the bonus o f the workers out* For 
these reasons the E*T*U* in  p a r tic u la r  urged th a t the old-fashioned method 
of tim ing the average worker to  do the job, was a more s a tis fa c to ry  way 
o f tack ling  the problem*
1*0.1* in  i t s  rep ly  admitted th a t an element o f judgment was 
involved in  assessing the speed of an o p era tiv e 's  performance* I t  was 
therefore prepared to  negotiate over the times assessed by i t s  work measure­
ment sections* Timing an average man was not a so lu tion  to  the problem* 
Picking an 'average* man was p ra c tic a lly  impossible* 1*0*1, claimed th a t 
the tecM iques i t  used were superior to  the old ones* A g reat deal of data 
Was being co llec ted  and analysed, and th ro u ^  th is  approach the margins of 
e rro r  of time study were considerably reduced* Work study was an improv®- 
ment on previous p rac tice s , and was more lik e ly  to  re s u lt  in  fix in g  equitable 
incentive rates*  I *0.1* c e rta in ly  did not attempt to  ci%cumvent the 
problem of bargaining*
The most thorough analysis yet made o f time study 
concluded th a t modem in d u s tr ia l time study had no 
claims to  s c ie n t if ic  aocuraoy* At best time study 
was an em pirical guide to  s e t Up a range of values 
Trithiii which co llec tiv e  bargaining could take place* 
See William Gomberg* *A trade union analysis o f time 
Study*9 (Science Eesoarch Associates, Chicago, 1948)•
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Sèc» 6« PlecB woric -v -  Incantlvea»
Groups o f workers wore h ss ita n t about accepting ihoentive schm es 
because they feared fo r  tkè  secu rity  of th e i r  jobs* Incentives were sJ.so 
unpopular because workers Claimed th a t they did not receive a sa tis fac to ry  
share of the increased production o r savings in  c o s ts , This l a t t e r  reason 
was secondary* I t  was possible fo r  the unions to  improve the bargain and 
obtain â la rg e r  bonus fo r  th e i r  members, ; and also safeguard th is  bonus 
against flu c tu a tio n s  by improving woiking conditions* Although the 
Signatory Unions d id  not succeed (they re a lly  d id  not even try )  in  obtain­
ing  any worthwhile improvements in  the conditions applying to  incen tives, 
a t the loca l lev e l the T* & G*W*U* a t  Ardeer did obtain  su b stan tia l improve­
ments in  ind iv idual incentive schemes. Local T, & G,W*U* o f f ic ia ls  had 
experience in  dealing with p iece wO;k, They applied tb is  kno#edge to  
bargaining over incentivce, and so a l o t  o f h o s t i l i ty  by general workers 
to  incentives was reduced* Most Craftsmen were not won in  th is  way, fo r  
they saw no improvements being bargained by th e ir  unions — so th e ir  fe a r  
of redundancy remained dominant*
The craftsmen were not encouraged by th e ir  unions to  drop th e ir  
opposition to  incentives* The c ra f t unions, as in s t i tu t io n s ,  and d is t in c t  
fron th e ir  member gfCtips on,the factory  flo o r; were generally  opposed to  
payment by r e s u l t s .  Paying by re su lts  ^ave the unions more bargaining 
troubles than did  time ra te s  o f pay. I t  was re la tiv e ly  easy to s e t t le  on 
a figure by vÉioh the hourly ra te  fo r  a given category o f workers was to  
be changed; Once th is  amendment to  ^  hourly ra te  was agreed a l l  workers 
understood exabtlyj w ith in  the lim its  of in te rp re ta tio n , the wage fa te  th a t 
they were to  be paid. While i t  was possible to  la y  down general conditions 
surrounding incen tives , each scheme heeded p a r tic u la f is a tio n  because o f the 
d ifference in  the physical methods of production* This meant le s s  control 
by union O ffic ia is  over the working conditions Of th e ir  members, which in  
tu rn  implied le ss  control over thé bargaining s itu a tio n ; Incentive schemes 
based on woïk measiirement were considered by many unions to  be a th re a t to  
th e ir  cen tral function of nego tia ting . Piece work, although not as 
desirab le  as time ra te s  o f pay, was not cpi^idered by the unions to  be quite 
so dOTgerous to  th e ir  functions as were incentives*
, The h o s t i l i ty  to  incentives per se became very evident in  the 
se rie s  of conferenoes on work study. The E.T.U* in  p a r tic u la r  a f^ e d  ,th a t 
the system of p iece work was a b e t te f  method of payment than a work 
measured incentive scheme; I t  was fo r  th is  reason th a t i t  prbposed timing 
an average man to  do the  job. This argument was m isin terpreted  by the V 
Company rep resen ta tiv es. The union was re fe rr in g  to  a system o f union- 
management re la tions*  In  contending th a t work measured schemes were b e t te r  
than piece work, 1 ,0 ,1 , was re fe rr in g  to  the accuracy of the  techniques used 
in  assessing the work content o f a job* This was a q u a lita tiv e ly  d iffe re n t 
argument* As n e ith e r side seemed to  re a lis e  th is  d is tin c tio n , feelings 
became heated* 1*0*1* accused the B.T.U* o f suspecting i t s  whole scheme of
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worfc study* The union cried  th a t the Company was try in g  to  tUxn itte 
workers in to  robots* These emotional overtones, coupled with a le i^  , j  
o f direO tion o f the conferences, did not a s s is t  the Company i n  breaking 
down imion res is tan ce  to  i t s  incentive schemes*
= Piece woik was generally  more a t tra c t ic e  to unions than were 
incentive schemes based on work measurement. The unions were fam ilia r  ; 
w ith bafgaihihg over piece rates*  Bargaining over the so-called  
's c ie n t i f i c ' schemes was UK^cwn to  maOy of the o f f ic ia ls ;  The s c ie n t i f ic  : 
schemes were inheren tly  more d i f f i c u l t  to  understand*/ The unions f e l t  
th a t  the Oompa^ h #  a d e f in ite  advantage in  using time and motion study*
The unions d id  not have the s ta f f  resources to  make th e i r  own s tu d ie #  
Accordingly they did not khbw a l l  the fa c ts  in  the situa tion*  I t  wds; 
possib le  fo r  them to be dazzled by science* Under the piece wook system 
the Workers-merely complained th a t they did not earn su ff ic ie n t bonus and 
; they demanded a re^assessment o f the piece rates* They were not concerned 
with arguing about th e  work content of the job; the v a lid ity  of the tin #  
study or th e  amount allowed fo r  compensatory rest*  The piece ra te  
s tru c tu re  was p rim arily  b u i l t  from negotiations* The incentive sohemes 
based on work measurement appeared to  the unions to  be; determined by 
mwagemenli alone.
To sane ex ten t the unions W re porrect in  th e i r  a ttitude*  . The , 
development o f the piece ra te  s tru c tu re  a t Ardeer was more favourable to  f 
the operatives than were the work measured incentive schemes* The Company , 
argued th a t work measuraaent allowed workers to  be paid according to the 
e f fo r t  they put in to  the job* I t  contended th a t  even with i t s  technical 
defic ienc ies work measurement produced more equitable re su lts  in  wage 
payments than did tra d itio n a l piece woik* To the  utiions the use of work 
measurement t ie d  the negotiations down to  narrow lim its*  This whs not 
necessarily  an impairment to  the unions' cen tra l function of bargaining*
In the f in a l analysis a l l  disagreementsj whether over incentives or any 
o ther question, had to  be u ltim ate ly  resolved in  narrow lim its*  Given 
reasonable m ilitancy on the p a r t of th e ir  members in  the Workshop, and a 
igéner;# Gompetehcy : of th e ir  local, o f f ic ia is ,  there  was, no reason why th# 
tenus o f work measured schemes could not be made jù s t as favourable as the 
piece ra te  structure*  The basic Consequences o f e i th e r  method o f paying 
by V ^sh lt wGrs su b stan tia lly  the s^^ /. 'X . X '
Conclusion
The conferences on work study were la rge ly  in e ffec tiv e  fo r  they 
reached no p o sitiv e  agreement about the way incentives were to  be in s ta lle d  
and maintained*} Only one or two minor po in ts were negotiated; and even 
here there seemed to  be doubt in  the union o f f ic ia ls ' minds as to  whether 
they had re a lly  negotiated some new conditions* The trouble lay in  the / 
behaviour of the rep resen ta tives o f unions and I*C*I* The uni o f f ic ia ls  
d id  not presen t any claims to  the Company, p a rtly  through ignorance, and
Ohapt» X» Concl;
p a r tly  th ro u ^  confusion due to  the ta c tic s  of the Company* Work study
was a confusing term, and by nature d i f f ic u l t  to  understand* The Company 
attempted to get the best possib le tenns, and gavé v ir tu a lly  nothing awey; 
the unions gave in  re tu rn  a hazily  worded reso lu tion  which did  not bind the 
Signatory Unions nor th e ir  lo ca l organisations*
%te Gcmpany o f f ic ia ls  : believed th a t the ex istin g  agreements already 
covered the position ; in  actual fa c t the agreements appeared inadequate 
to the groups on the facto ry  floor* As no new agreement came in to  e ffec t 
the governing bodies of the Signatory Unions th e ir  branches o r members were 
not bound to  change th e ir  a ttitu d e  to  incentives* An agreement se ttin g  
out r i j ^ t s  fo r  ecployees would have helped to  change the a ttitu d e  of the 
c ra f t groups bn  the facto ry  f lo o r  towards incentives* I f  behaviour was 
to be changed, then the governing bodies had to  do th is  by formal means 
not by mere consultations w ith th e ir  rank and f i le *  .
The conferences on work study were consultations ra th e r  than 
negotiations* The Company o f f ic ia ls  hoped th a t the union o f f ic ia ls  would 
persuade th e ir  rank and f i l e  to  accept incentives by using the arguments 
th a t were advanced by the Company and ultim ately  p rin ted  in  pamphlet form 
fo r  d is tr ib u tio n  to  union members* Their hope was incapable of achievement 
fo r  two reasons* F ir s tly ,  because they made no decisions consultations 
were inherently  ine ffec tiv e  by comparison with negotiations which.came to  
decisions about r ig h ts  and obligations of the p a r t ie s .  Secondly, informal 
means of ccacmunication in  the union organisation were le ss  e ffec tiv e  in  
changing member behaviour than the formal lin e s  of au thority  th a t 
la id  from the governing body to  the union members* The terms of a new 
agreement were transm itted along the formal lin e s  of communication* News 
about the conferences on woifc study only f i l te r e d  th ro u ^  to  the rank and 
f i l e  and made no d e f in ite  impression on th e ir  conduct.
: ^  BY IŒ8UÏT8
V'.: /  : , /
: In  1948 17 P®3^ P®nt of male and 68, percent o f female workers a t Ardeer
were paid by re s u lt ,  most of th é  females being paid by tra d itio n a l piece work.
By 1955 the respeptive percentages: had r isen  to  35 and 8 0 ,, Most o f the 
operatives paid by re su lt were générai workers, although there were some ;
: p ra f t  grpiips on inoentives. Ttiese included the p a in te rs , jo in e rs , b o ile r -
i makers, blacksm iths, and f i t t e r s  in  the engineering toolroom and.general
" ;
: The two groups of workers responsible fo r  mo re than h a lf  the disputes
about payments by lë s u l ts were the female rpiecewpi&er^^^  ^ men on thé
mechanised unit# The piece ra te  s truc tu re  reached a : complex and sophisticated  
; stage of development in the poet-war peidpd# The incentive scheme which 
covered the! mechanised im it required a considerable amount o f  adjustment 
a f t e r , i t  was introduced in  1948» The group sohemes which were introduced 
in to  lothèr departments did not cause a great deal of trouble* The sohemes 
which covered craftsmen were re la tiv e ly  trouble free*
T^ clauses which were included in  the; I*C .I. agreement re la tiv e  to  
working : conditions were comparatively simple; They la id  down ru les  which 
governed the ra t io  of the bonus earnings to. the hourly ra te  of the job, and 
the procedure to  be followed when ra te s  were; re-assessed  due to  change in  
job méthods# These provisions were l e f t  in ta c t by the conferences bn  work 
study, although there were one o r  two m odifications of provisions in  the 
e a r l ie r  agreement# The in s ta lla tio n  and maintenance o f incentivo arid piece 
ra te s  were b as ica lly  problems fo r  thé factory  management arid fo r  negotiations 
a t  lo ca l le v e i; Bach scheme bad to  be b u ilt;  up separately , and fo r  th is  
reason m a^ conferences were ca lled  to  discuss piece work, and incentives a t  
Ardeer in  the post-war^ period#
Sec; t ;  The spread of payments by re su lts  in  Ardeer;
: The In s ta l la tio n  and maintenance of incentive and piecework schemes
transferred  much: of the power of s e t t l in g  union-management le la tio n s  from 
national to  fac to ry  le v e l; / Incentives and piece ra te s  a t  ATdeer were la rge ly  ; 
fixed; through th e  use of time study# Both incentive and piece ra te s , of 
which there were oVér two hundred in  the facto ry , were b u il t  up from an analysis 
o f the jobs# This, was acne by the special work measurement section . The 
formal negotiatiohs with the Union were conducted by the facto ry  management 
on advice from the labour o ffice  and the; work measurement section* Negotia­
tio n s  on piece work w©re over monetary ra te s , while those on incentives were 
supposedly over the allowed times to  perform given tasks, but there was l i t t l e  
d ifference in  the process of the negotiations#
Xy.;,
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Under the 1,0*1» sohemes the operations of jobs had to  be analysed; 
on some occasions extensive m odifications were made to  p lan t and equipment, 
Group schemes in  p a r tic u la r  required a considerable amount of study, even 
individual operations needed some study in  order to  determine the time to  
do a spScified  ta sk . I t  was im practicable to  apply th# same scheme to  jobs 
which were s l ig h t ly  d if fe re n t in  méthode, o r produced somewhat d iffe re n t 
products. The techn ica l fa c ts  o f production detennined the nature o f the 
scheme. Group schemes were used to  cover la rge numbers of workers where 
the operations were in ter-looked . Even piecework was performed bn a 
small group b as is  because of cS rtaln  oharao teris tio s  of the lay -ou t o f the X  ^
operations. The extension o f incentives schemes proceeded somewhat spas­
modically, depending on the/ a b i l i ty  of the work measuranent ssCtion to 
study thé job^ the nature o f thé job and the reac tion  of the operatives, to  
the d e ta ils  o f th e  incentive schemes proposed. Even when the operatives 
agreed to  the p rih c ip ie  o f Study, i t  was s t i l l  necessary fo r  the d e t # l s  
to  be negotiated with the  union.
The most inportan t incentive/scheme introduced in  the postr/war 
period was th a t ooVering the mechanised u n it in  the department producing - 
b la s tin g  e ip lo siv es . The u n it commenced operations in  1948# The u n it 
was s ta ffe d  by male, workers se lec ted  from the old g e la tin es  section  o f the 
department. U ntil the incentive scheme was prepared the men were/paid an 
in terim  bonus. Such a payment was not a normal featu re  o f  Ardeer incen­
tiv e  schemes, but in  the mechanised u n it some re la tiv e ly  senior operatives 
had t# e n  lower paid; gobs in  order to  p a rtic ip a te  in  the bonus earnings 
l a t e r  to  be won. The scheme provided fo r  a/bonus of forty-two percent of 
job ra te s .  Thé uhion Succeeded in  securing a reduction o f tlis ta rg e t S t / 
which the Operatives commenced to  earn {bonus* Work m easur#ent Was hot 
used to  determine th ese . ta rg e ts  as in fo ^ a tio n  concerning output leve ls  
/was availab le  from other countries whefe s im ila r p la n t was in  use* There 
were subsequent negotiations oonceibing the ta rg e ts  o f the scheme to allow 
la rg e r earnings, = // ■ X-X/;/./////;:{////'/,// ..; -r-;/X/{' /-//.'//.:/./
A separate scheme was formulated fo r the packing operations in  the 
mechanised u n it however as the re s u lt  o f  p% duction there was considerable 
m odification o f ; thé numbôr o f personnel b r i g i n a l l y ^  to  mann these
operations. Disagreement arose, and thé operatives agreed to  the use o f  
woik measurement to  study the r a t io  of personnel to  output*. {D ifficu lties 
arose with packing operations, and bonus earnings were notX h i^ $  A 
considerable time was spent studying the opérations. In  1949 management 
offered a scheme which perm itted the packers to earn bonus a t a slower pace 
o f working^ Although the bonus fo r  packing operations was o rig in a lly  kept 
separate from the bonus earned on other operations, the two were u ltim ately  
pooled* In  1953 the pooled bonus was approximately forty-tw o percent o f  
average jobs rates*
C hapt* X I .  S é o ,  1*
Most o f the female operatives employed in  the department producing 
b la s tin g  explosives were paid hy pieoework. Thèse operatives were 
employed on o a# rid g in g  and paoking o f explosives. G artridging was the 
operation by which the mass o f explosives m aterial was out in to  s tic k s  o f 
g e lig n ite  and dynamite* : Various methods were used; some machines were 
worked by hand, o thers driven by power. Packing operations were also  
performed by female operatives on the old side of the department. On the 
mechanised u n it both the cartrid g in g  and packing operations were performed 
by men. I t  was the th re a t o f lo ss  of employment through thé use of 
mechanisation and the replacement of females by males th a t led  to  d if f ic u lty  
in  ad justing  piece ra te s  in  the post-War period*
The p iece workers a t  Ardeer had a d is t in c t  so c ia l h is to ry . The 
female operatives were paid by piece from the tim e. the facto ry  ooraraenced 
o p e ra tio n #  The men who worked on the old side of the department were 
paid by time ra te s .  The female operatives developed th e ir  own s e t  o f 
a ttitu d e s  and so c ia l leadersh ip . For many years they conducted negotiations 
through an oligarchy which was composed; of the most, sen ior workers. The 
o lig arch y 's  hold was broken by the récognition of the shop stewards. Pew 
piece workers were members of the general worker, union # i t i l  the days of 
the second world War, and they d id  hot become completely organised u n ti l  
the explosion o f 1950.
Strong informal group behaviour p e rs is ted  desp ite  union organisation. 
Groups o f pieceworkers were extremely earn ing*  conscious and any fa c to r  
which in te rfe red  w ith th e ir  capacity to  earn bonus was strongly  resented. 
When there was a production hold-up or a breakdown in  machines they demanded 
specia l compensation. When they were paid a composite ra te  fo r  products 
o f various s iz e s , which required d iffe re n t e f fo r ts  to  produce the same 
amount of bonus, they urged a re-assessment o f the r a te .  When the ta rg e ts  
were reduced they demanded the removal o f excessive personnel. When th® 
pieceworkers f e l t  th a t the ta sk  was too hard they demanded add itional help, 
a t  the same tin ^  depanding aüti upward re-assessment of ra te s  to  permit them 
to  earn as much bonus as befo re . When the work team included learn ers ,' 
in s tru c tre sse s  and inspectors they secured specia l ru le s  to  govern th e ir  
payment. When the d if fe re n tia l  job ra te s  were a lte re d  they demanded a 
re-assessment of r a te s .  The piece workers At Ardeer succeeded in  obtainii%  
veiy favourable conditions which allowed them to  earn high average bonsues, 
higher in  the main than those eained under the newer incentive schemes.
Ohapt* XI. geo. 2. .
Seo. 2. Factors determining the s ize  of the bonus
The p rin c ip a l provision^ which governed the determ ination of piece 
ra te s  and allowed times to  do a t a s #  was contained in  the 1938 agreement 
re la tiv e  to  working conditions; these were to  be so fixed  th a t workers of 
average a b i l i ty  were to  earn a bonus of not le ss  than one th ird  of th e ir  
hourly job r a te s .  Qhis clause was a very general one and had to  be given 
in te rp re ta tio n  a t  fac to ry  le v e l. I t  was à  /permissive clause in  the sense 
th a t  i t  d id  not preclude operatives earning more than one th i id .  The 
e ffec tiv e  l im its  o f the earning power o f the operatives were se t by the 
d e ta ils  o f the ya#ous schemes In s ta lle d . OroUp schoaes which se t ta rg e ts  
fo r  saotions o r departments were la rge ly  d ic ta ted  by the techn ical d e ta ils  of 
the production line* operatives were f re e r  to  vary th e i r  e f fo r t  when 
placed on individual inoentives or piecework when the pace o f th e ir  work 
was not d ic ta ted  by a machine or process. There were natu ra l human limitam 
tio n s  on the earning capacity o f, operatives.
At the conferences on work study there was considerable d iscussion 
about the sharing o f the savings or additional output due to  incentive 
effo rt*  No national decision was reached on th is  question* The a llo c a ­
tio n  o f f r u i t s  of increased output varied  according to  the nature o f the 
sohemes. For exaiiple, thé s tra ig h t proportional scheme, e i th e r  standard 
hour plan o r piece work, provided th a t the operative be paid in  proportion 
to  the increase in  additional output. Other schemes, such as the geared 
o r the variably-geared, shared the f i u i t s  of operative performance in= 
d iffe re n t proportions according to  the level of ou tput. The s tra ig h t 
proportional schemes were used on d ire c t production, the geared schemes were 
much more applicable to  non-repetitive  jobs such as maintenance work, o r 
a c t iv i t ie s  a n c illa iy  to  production^ or fo r  le a rn e rs . Usually, these 
schemes favoured the in te re s ts  o f operatives a t the lower le v e ls  of output, 
and favoured those o f mahaganent a t  higher le v e ls . These schemes allowed 
workers to  earn bonus with le s s  e f fo r t  a t  th e  lower le v e ls  o f  production 
than d id  the s t r a i ^ t  proportional sohemes. Bonus was earned a t  fo rty  or 
fo rty -f iv e  u n it hour instead  of a t the customaiy s i i i y  ■unit hour fo r the 
s t r a i ^ t  proportional schemes* The s t r a i ^ t  p roportional schemes placed
no lim it on the amount th a t could be earned, while a lim it was placed on
the variab ly  geared schemes when applied to  maintenance work. Both the 
s tra ig h t proportional and geared schemes were based on the theory th a t a
bonus of one th ird  of the hourly job ra te s  was earned when the operatives*
e ffo r t  reached an e i ^ t y  u n it hour, one th ird  over the  normal pace of 
wohking. ( l )
( l )  B.I.M. * 'Conference on Work Study* (Harrogate, 1954)»
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D ifferent so rts  of incentive schemes assiuned ce rta in  fa c ts  of 
human hehaviour* For example, i t  was presumed th a t the s tra ig h t propoav 
tio n a l system was superior to  o ther types of incentive "because the 
d is tr ib u tio n  of the f r u i t s  o f incentive labour was fa ire r*  In  l ig h t o f 
the findings a t  ArdeSr there  was l i t t l e  evidence to  su bstan tia te  th is  
assumption. At the time the schemes were in s ta lle d  a t Ardeer there was 
no discussion about the method of sharing the f r u i t s  o f incentive labour#
The operatives were in te re s ted  in  the amount o f th e ir  bonus earnings, and 
i f  th i s  Was unsa tisfac to ry  they complained, There were more complaints 
over the s t r a i i ^ t  proportional piece work schemes than there  were over the 
geared schemes applied to  maintenance or non-repetitive  work, There was 
no formal dispute over the geared schemes with a maximum bonus o f one h a lf  
of the hourly job ra te s  in  the engineering toolroom, boilerm akers, black­
smiths, woodcutting machinists# and joiners? shops# The operatives were 
obviously in te re s ted  in  actual e a rn in g , not th e ir  th e o re tic a l lim it#
A good deal more in te re s t was displayed in  the lower lim its  fo r  
earning bonus# I f  operatives fa ile d  to  reach the lower lim it proposed 
by the  p a r tic u la r  scheme they were paid by time ra te s  of pay, according to 
the job ra te  th a t applied* The lower lim it usually  became one of the 
bargainable issues a t  the time a  scheme was in sta lled #  For example, the 
lev e l o f output a t which operatives on the mechanised u n it commenced earn­
ing bonus was dropped below the  standard (s ix ty  u n it how ) normally se t by _ 
work study# Although the work study sp e c ia lis ts ,  seemed to  resen t th is  
concession made by the f a c to ^  management, i t ,  re a lly  d id  not m atter once 
the operatives were able to  increase th e ir  production and eawi good bonus 
of over one th ird  the average hourly ra te .  I t  was the lev e l o f bonus 
earnings on a week to  week basis  th a t conceasied the operatives* Because 
they had family çpmràitanents, which were c lea rly  influenced by the lev e l o f 
th e ir  earnings, they waited a reasonably s tab le  bonus#
A ll conditions which affected  the capacity of operatives to  earn 
bonus had to  be la id  down a t the time of the in s ta l la t io n  o f the incentive 
o r piece work scheme# Although some of these conditions could be 
th e o re tic a lly  defined, each incentive or piece ra te  had to  be b u il t  up 
separately  so th a t there was an appropriate r a t io  between e f fo r t of opera­
tiv e s  and th e ir  reward# I f  machines, methods of m ateria ls  d iffe re d  between 
jobs, then account had to  be taken of these d ifferences in  fix in g  the piece 
ra te s  or the times allowed to  do a ta sk . Even though the r a t io  o f e f fo r t 
to  output was determined by work measurement the times to  do a ta sk  were 
frequently  questioned by the operatives# They complained th a t the times 
were se t too 'tig h t*  and consequently they could not earn th e i r  expected 
bonus# Mana^ment" claimed th a t  the times were se t f a i r ly ,  and th a t the 
operatives were not exerting  themselves su ff ic ie n tly  to  reach the necessary 
outputs to  earn sa tis fa c to ry  bonus* I t  was the aim o f work measurement to  
solve the re la tio n sh ip  of e f fo r t  to  output, but due to  the lim ita tio n s  of
f ig u re  i l
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the teolmigue the times established, to cLo a job were subject to  n e ^ t i a -  
tion# (P) As there were over two hundred piece and incentive ra te s  in  
j ^ e e r  i t  was only natu ra l th a t the number of conferences ca lled  to  d iscuss 
the. consequences of payments,by re s u lts  was correspondingly large*
Although negotiations took place over monetary ra te s  work measure­
ment, was used fo r  deteimining times fo r  the payment of piecework* A 
standard was adopted which equated a given number of work u n its  to  an 
a y e ra ^  e a s in g  per sh ift*  This standard was designed to  i^ im burse  
operatives fo r  the  same physical effort*  The earnings were based purely 
bn p h y s ic a l 'e f fo r t and did not take in to  account value produced by the 
operations* The a v e ra ^  bonus earnings ; of piece workers were usually  
g rea te r than a th ird  o f the hourly rates*  ; On several occasions when the 
union requested some adjustment o f piece ra te s  manag^ent found th a t there 
were. no jobs where eamxngs were le s s  than one th ird* '
A good deal o f trouble occurred over the build-up o f congosite 
piece, rates* Bveiy operation did  not have a separate piece rate* Jobs 
which were s im ila r in  method and produced sim ilar items were o ften  grouped*
A composite ra te  cut down c le r ic a l  problems and sim plified  the p iece ra te  
structure* Usually explosives of sm aller size required  g rea te r  e f fo r t  to 
produce than did  explosives o f la rg e r size* When the sm aller sizes,grew  
in  proportion to to ta l  output fo r  the period, the operatives complained - 
th a t th e ir  earnings were reduced* When the proportion o f la rg e r  s izes  to  
to ta l  output increased, bonus earnings were in f la te d  without e f fo r t on the 
p a rt o f the operatives* There was no easy way out of th is  problem while 
there We® & ooiyposite rate* Sometimes the, union argued fo r  the separation 
o f fa te s , a t other times fo r  the consolidation of rates*  Management, too, 
found i t s e l f  in  th is  dilemma* Towards the end o f 1954 management attempted 
to  separate th ree main categories of jobs in  one o f the most important 
sections of the department in  order to  elim inate minor adjustment problems 
which inev itab ly  occurred due to  a lte ra tio n s  in  production schedules. 
Subsequent negotiations s e t  up a comprehensive ra te  to  cover a large range 
of jobs, but the problems" o f composite ra te s  remained*
Another technical d if f ic u lty  th a t confronted payments by re su lts  
was, th e  ;dogçee to  which operatives were free  to  exert themselves in  attemp'fc- 
ing to earn adequate bonus. I f  the pace of a machine s e t  the ra te  of work>- 
ing fo r  a considerable period of time there was i i t t l ê  th a t the operative 
could do to  increase h is  bonus* Sim ilar problems arose where the techn ical 
nature o f thé p lan t forced the operatives to  remain id le  fo r  a period of time*
(?) In  passing i t  was in te re s tin g  to note th a t the
craftsmen did not object to  the usé of an a ly tica l 
estim ating and syn thetic  time studyj ^ though  
unions a t  national leve ls  frequently  c r i t ic is e d  
these techniques*
Figure 6*
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Obviously, i t  was in  the in te re s ts  of the operatives fo r the to ta l  woite- 
ing time to  be taken in to  aoooimt when building up incentive ra te s  in  such a way 
as to  allow them to  earn one th ird  o f th e ir  hourly ra te .  I t  was not in  
management * B  in te re s t  to  recognise th a t the operatives were free  to  earn 
bonus over the e n tire  working day, when in  fa c t they were prevented from 
doing soy by techn ica l fa c ts  o f the job. This issue soon found i t s  way 
to  interm ediate conference,
Fegotiaticns took account of the conferences on work study which 
apparently stipu la ted (by  v ir tu e  of the memoranda submitted by I .O .I ,  to  the 
Signatory. Unions) th a t incentive ra te s  were to  be s e t so that, operatives 
could earn one th ird  bonus of th e ir  hourly jobiVatea *while on measured 
work*. This l a s t  phrase was a modification o f the o lder provision in  the 
I* C ,I, agreement re la tiv e  to  woaking conditions which re la ted  the fix a tio n  
o f piece ra te s  to the hourly job ra te .  The ru lin g  was given a t in te iv  
mediate conference th a t incentive schemes were to  be based on the time 
operatives could work a t incentive e f fo r t ,  A scheme in s ta lle d  on, these 
conditions did not re tu rn  operatives one th ird  bonus o f th e ir  time ra te s .
This décision did  hot increase the .popu larity  of incen tives in  the fac to ry ,
For example, the scheme on. the old side of the b iasing  department, re jec ted  
in  1 §52, offered a maximum bonus of only 2%,8 percent o f the average job r a te ,
A d is tin c tio n  was made between ^unproductive? and ‘waiting*; tim e. 
Unproductive time covered periods spent w aiting durihg normal batch produc­
tio n  or fo r  machines to  complete a process, ‘Waiting* t ^ e  occurred when 
operatives were prevented by exceptional fac to rs , such"as the breakdown of 
machines o r the non-arrival o f m ateria ls , from wOiking a t  bonus speed. The 
recognition of w aiting time, usually  fo r  periods^ over f if te e n  minutes, 
encouraged operatives to  work a t bonus speed fo r the r e s t  o f the woifc-dayi 
I f  w aiting time was not recognised, and operatives were prevented from 
earning bonus fo r a period, there was l i t t l e  po in t i n  th e ir  try in g  to  reach 
th e ir  ta rg e ts , fo r  no m atter how hard they worked, they would be unable to 
make up fo r  the time lo s t .  Waiting time was paid a t  the hourly  ra te  fo r  
the job of the operative. Operatives had an in te re s t  in  obtaining the 
sh o rtes t period possib le fo r calcu la tion  da ily  as opposed to  weekly, in  
order to  prevent subsid isa tion  of e f fo r t .
Once an incentive scheme was in s ta lle d  any conditions -  human, 
m ateria l, con tractual, organisational — which affected  the  earning capacity 
of the operatives became a leg itim ate  Bubjeot of d iscussion between the 
management and the union. On the mechanised m iit some very d e ta iled  
questions were ra is e d , For example, i t  was claimed th a t m ateria ls  re-worked 
were re jec ted  by the machines5 th is  prevented operatives from earning 
th e ir  customary bonus* The union wanted ce rta in  adjustments to machines 
and operations done outside the normal work period to  allow the operatives 
more time to  earn bonus. The meal.time was discussed, 80 were the du ties 
and job ra te s  of a n c illa ry  wookers* A formula was also la id  down fo r 
remunerating operatives when they went on vacation. Operatives were paid
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more than th e ir  hourly ra te s ; they had th e ir  vacation on incentive earnings. 
Usually group schemes led  to  more discussion than ind ividual schemes hecause 
there were more technical fac to rs  to  discuss.
Special conditions covered lea rn ers . These could he paid e i th e r  
by time ra te s  fo r  the learn ing  period, o r p a r t thereof, o r by the use of a 
variably  geared scheme. When learners  had to  be in s tru c ted  by qualified  
persons, as they were on many of the piecework operations, specia l 
conditions governed the remuneration of the in s tru c to r . On the oartridg ing  
operations the in s tru c to r  was paid the same bonus as the h ighest average 
earnings o f  any group o f workers in  the same section  on the same sh ift#
The same method of payment was used fo r. inspectors on these operations'#
This method of payment was introduced so as not to  penalise  these opera# 
tiv e s  who were required to inspect o r in s tru c t .  In l a te r  years management 
was hot so happy about th is  method of p%ment, but to  oh^ge to  an hourly 
ra te  w ith a fixed  percentage o f bonus would have reduced the earnings of 
inspectors and in struc to rs*  Consequently the union opposed the change.
These problems arose where in s tru c to rs  and inspectors worked alongside 
operatives earning large bonuh#
Sec, 3# Reasons fo r  alterin jg-the incentive r a te .
The I#C,I# agreement re la tiv e  to working conditions attempted to 
safeguard piece and incentive schemes from ' ra te -cu ttin g * , Piece ra te s
and allowed times to  do a task  were perm itted to  be a lte re d  in  three 
oiroumstancesi, f i r s t l y ,  when an e rro r  was discovered in  the o r ig in ^  
schemej secondly, #hen national negptiations sp e c if ic a lly  declared them to  
be altered} th ird ly , when there were changes in  the methods, m ateria ls , 
means or sp ec ifica tio n  of a job . As a source of d ispute a t  Ardeer the 
f i r s t  was unimportant, and few adjustment d i f f ic u l t ie s  arose# The second 
led  to  d isputes a t facto ry  lev e l and involved in te rp re ta tio n s  of the 
national agreement. I t  was about the th ird  condition th a t the g rea t bulk 
of disputes occurred a t Ardeer and caused the g rea tes t trouble in  negotia tions.
I t  was usualÿ: fo r  national negotiations to specify the percentage 
by which piece ra te s  were to  be adjusted# This pronouncement was made 
a t the same time a s  a new agreement came in to  force with respect to  hourly 
ra te s  of pay. On two occasions the method of ad justing  piece ra te s  w ^  
l e f t  to  loCal nego tiations; once in  1947 when the standard working week 
was reduced to  fo rty -fo u r houjs, and the o ther in  1950 when the war supiement 
was merged w ith the minimum hourly rate*  The war supplement paid from 
1942 u n t i l  1950 and had not been taken in to  account when calcu la ting  piece 
r a te s .  In  I 95O a local conference was called  to  determine the method o f 
adjustment. The union wanted to  increase piece ra te s  by the same percentage 
as the war supplement bore to  the hourly ra te .  Management refused to  agree 
to  th is  formula, as i t  would have increased piece earnings well over the 
one-th ird  standard. The piece ra te s  were f in a lly  adjusted by a formula 
which took account o f average eaa^n g s.
C h a p in  X î .  . S e c ,  3 .
in  1953 job d if fe re n tia ls  covefed by the I ,C ,Ï ,  job evaluation 
scheme, were increased by national negotiations by tw enty-five percent.
This was the f i r s t  time wage ra te s  were adjusted by th is  method in  Ardeer* 
hfo declara tion  was made by the national negotiations th a t piece ra te s  were 
to  be ad justed . The lo c a l branch immediately f i le d  a claim fo r  an 
increase in  piece ra te s  based on the increase in  the d if fe re n tia ls .
Management declared th a t i t  had no power to  a l te r  piece ra te s  as the 
national negotiations had not declared them to  be affected  by the a l t e r s  
tio n  in  d if fé re h tia lS ’t The female, operatives threatened d ire c t action and 
the dispute went to  interm ediate conference. Management stuck by i t s  
previous in te rp re ta tio n  of the national agreements and no a lte ra tio n  in  
job ra te s  was made. I t  offered to  consider ad justing  any piece ra te  which 
was not re tu rn ing  operatives an average o f one th ird  bonus over time ra te s ,
Uo such ra te s  were found in  the faotory^ÿ
Hourly ra te s  o f pay were not o f great inportanoe to  piece workers 
as they did not have a g rea t deal of influence on to ta l  earnings. When 
production was in terrup ted  time ra te s  were used to  ca lcu la te  w aiting time, 
and they were used fo r  paying the meal brWak on s h if t  work. U ntil I953 
the piece workers had never been p a rtic u la rly  in te re s ted  in  th e ir  d if fe re n tia l  
payment# A very small d if fe re n tia l  of one penny had been paid fo r  many 
years; subsequently increased in  1938 by n ine-six teen ths of a penny per 
hour when the qualify ing  fa te  was merged wi.ith the d if fe re n tia l  paid to  the 
lowest job in  th e  department. The d if fe re n tia l  Was increased by lo ca l 
negotiation  in  1949 following the in s ta lla tio n  of job evaluation, and in  
1953 when the W enty-five percent increase was announced. The ra te  was 
fu rth e r increased by lo ca l negotiation  in  1955 when male: workers in  the 
b la s tin g  department received add itional ra te s  fo r  danger hazard. No 
increase was made to  the p iece ra te s ; average earnings above base ra te s  
were somewhat reduced, although they were s t i l l  more than a th ird*
An inherent advantage of a work measured incen tive , scheme based on 
allowed times to do a task , was i t s  capacity to  take account of changes in  
hourly ra te s  without a l te r in g  the scheme. I t  was not necessary to  re^ 
negotiate these types of incentive schemes as the workers received the 
b en efits  o f a l l  increases in  hourly ra te s  of pay. There was some disputa­
tio n  about the c la ss if ic a tio n  o f some group tonnage schemes. The branch 
, succeeded in  c la ss ify in g  a l l  but one scheme as a work measured type, and 
accordingly incentive earnings were in d irec tly  increased by an a lte ra tio n  
o f hourly ra te s .  The scheme covering the mechanised u n it was not 
considered to  be based oh work study, although i t  was used in  f ix in g  the 
targets^  and consequently incentive ra te s  had to  be re-negotia ted  ad hoc, 
ffiiis led  to some uncertain ty  and possibly to  d iscontent fo r the loss in  
r e la t iv i ty ,  a lth o u #  the men s t i l l  earned high bonus.
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' The 1 ,0 ,1 , national agreement re la tiv e  to  working conditions 
precluded the a lte ra t io n  of allowed times to  do a ta sk  o r piece ra te s  
unless the job was a lte re d , A lth o t^  th is  provision was designed to 
give some secu rity  to  employees in  maintaining the permanence of ra te s  
i t  Was an il lu s o ry  clause. A ltera tions in  jobs and methods were bound 
to  occur which necessita ted  the re-assessment of allowed times and piece 
r a te s .  In  p a r tic u la r  the mechanised u n it a t Ardeer was new, and mafQT 
a lte ra tio n s  were made on the job and hence in  the incentive scheme.
Some of the o ther group schemes did not cause a g reat deal of trouble as 
they were in s ta lle d  in  departments which did not change th e ir  methods a 
g rea t dealî Consequently,' these schemes did not lead to  d ispu ta tion  in  
union-management re la tio n s . But change was bound to  come, and once i t  
d id  there was the problem of re-assessing  r a te s ,  Even where piece work 
operations were b as ica lly  the same fo r  many years a lte ra tio n s  in  jobs 
were in e v itab le .
When jobs were a lte red  management assessed new tim es, ta rg e ts  or 
ra te s  depending on the type of scheme and submitted them to  the operatives 
or the union, Qtaite frequently  the operatives claimed th a t the new ra te s  
d id  not allow them to  earn th e i r  customary bonus. Such a claim invariab ly  
led  to  a d ispu te , Did the operatives give the a lte re d  ra te s  o r times a 
fh ir  t r i a l?  Did they put forward th e ir  customary e f fo r t ,  o r did they hold 
back fo r  some psychological reason? The operatives claimed the ra te s  
were too H igh t* , while management claimed th a t they were * f a ir* .  This 
was the problem which work measurement, by re la tin g  e f fo r t  to  time, tr ie d  
to  so lve. As i t  was not ind isputable , the times were not an objective 
measure which could s a t is fa c to r i ly  resolve union-managanent d ispu tes. 
Arguments over the re-assessment of ra te s  were one of the reasons yûxy 
incentives and piece woik were a frequent source o f trouble in  Ardee#-
There Was another clause in  the 1 ,0 ,1 , agreement re la tiv e  to  working 
conditions which was m aterial to the reso lu tion  o f  disputes oyer charges in  
allowed times or piece ra te s .  When a new rat% or allowed time was offered 
i t  had to  be such th a t i t  would not reduce the earnings: of the operatives^
In  the case o f jobs fo r  which piece ra te s  or incentives were being offered 
fo r  the f i r s t  time, the sole provision governing th e i r  f ix a tio n  was the 
necessity  th a t a worker of average a b i l i ty  could earn a t le a s t  one-th ird  
bonus of the hourly r a te .  As many piece workers earned a g rea t deal more 
than one th ird  bonus, i t  : was m aterial fo r the operatives to  question whether 
or not the job was in  fac t a new one, or merely a lte re d . While there 
appeared to  be general agreement th a t bonus earnings were not to  be reduced 
when piece ra te s  were a lte red , there seemed to  be le ss  c e rta in ty  about the 
r ig h t of management to  a l t e r  allowed times to  reduce earnings of operatives 
on incentive schemes. For example, there was d is sa tis fa c tio n  when manage­
ment made a s l ig h t  a lte ra t io n  in  method so th a t a very *loose* ra te  could 
be adjusted to reduce considerably the percentage earnings o f the operatives.
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This uncerta in ty  arose fTom the confusion th a t took place a t  the conferences 
of work study, and to  the general lack  of agreement on the  sub ject. For 
ra te s  to  remain equitable * loose* ra te s  had to  be elim inated, but as the 
l iO .I ,  agreement re la tiv e  to working conditions stood, the r ig h t of manage­
ment to  a l te r  the ra te  fo r  th is  reason was in  doubt,
Besidéô the changes made to  jobs by management there were other 
reasons why jobs were a lte re d . Inadvertent dhanges were introduced by bad 
maintenance of machines or fau lty  m a teria ls . Both these held up Operatives 
o r made i t  impossible fo r  them to  reach th e ir  bonus. Even i f  w ^ing  time 
was allowed, th is  reduced the s ize  of the bonus# In  some oases the 
machines broke down fo r  short in te rv a ls  which were not recognised fo r  
paying w^aiting-time, and these reduced the bonus earned. I f  management 
was s a t is f ie d  th a t conditions were beyond the contro l o f the operatives, i t  
Offered specia l ra te s  or allowances to  give the operative some incentive 
to  t ry  for, a reasonable output.
The most d isas tro u s  changes were those which occurred accidentally  
through explosions whioh destroyed equipment and adversely affected  the 
morale of the operatives. The operatives were unable to  earn th e ir  
customaiy bonus through no f a u l t  o f  th e ir  own, as management was responsible 
fo r  the safe working of the p la n t. Oh two occasions specia l *make-up* 
payments were made, one to  pieceworkers and the o ther to  the men on the 
méohaihlsed tm it. Both groups o f workers had low morale as several of 
th e ir  compahiohs were k il le d  in  the ^ p lo s io n s . The ’make-up* pay ; 
re lieved  soi# o f the p riv a te  fin an c ia l worries o f the operatives when 
th e ir  earnings f e l l  to  th e  standard hourly rate>
, Changes were also introduced by operatives. Sometimes operatives 
found a quicker way to  do the job. This allowed them to  earn higher bonus 
than predioted by the vYork measurement section . This problem caused 
considerable discussion a t the conferences on woik study, a l th o u ^  in  the 
lig^ht of the Ardeer experiohce the agreement was a l i t t l e  academicr. The 
ntmber of a lte ra tio n s  made by operatives were few. During the conferences 
on work study I ,C ,I ,  s ta ted  th a t operatives wodld be oonpensated fo r  th e ir  
ingenuity by an award under the 1 ,0 ,1 , Suggestion Schemei" No conference 
was held a t Ardeer to  consider th i s  problem, ( f )  The conferences on work 
study also offered  to  ’buy-out* a loose ra te  due to  a  number o f minor 
changes of unknown oidgin. Only one Conference conside#d th is  problem 
a t Acdeer^ .
(f ) Perhaps the ^ g g e s tio n  Scheme would have ; then become 
subject to  unionHnanagement nego tia tions.
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8eo, 4# D iff io u ltie s  in  a l te r in g  ra te s  or ta rg e ts
A ltered piece ra te s , allowed times or ta rg e ts  were u sually  suTmitted 
to  the operatives. This procedure was la id  down in  the 1,0*1, agreement 
re la tiv e  to  working conditions. Under the 1947 negotiating  procedure 
the shop steward was responsible fo r  representing  the operatives, and i f  
the issue remained unresolved then thé dispute went to  lo ca l conference 
between facto ry  management and the union branch# Many a lte ra tio n s  to 
times and ra te s  were accepted by the operatives, but in  the case o f piece­
workers, the problem of gaining th e ir  acceptance o f a lte red  ra te s  became 
increasingly  d i f f i c u l t  in  1949 and 1950, The female operatives were 
anxious about th e i r  job secu rity , and consequently claimed th a t most ra te s  
offered to  them were * tig^t* . In  some instances, they refused to  give 
the a lte re d  ra te s  a t r i a l .  Maniement, and even the union, ware unable 
to  persuade the pieceworkers to  give the a lte red  ra te s  a t r i a l .  The 
operatives simply s ta ted  th a t they could or would hot be able to  earn 
th e ir  customary bonus and refused to  accept the ra te s .
The re a l trouble was not the formal method of nego tiating  a lte red  
ra te s  follow ing job changes, but the to ta l  human re la tio n s  s itu a tio n  
perta in ing  to  the sections employing female piece workers. Nevertheless, 
the problem had to  be solved by some formal means, and in  1950 managmient 
proposed to  the union a new procedure fo r  ad justing  piece ra te s .  Manage­
ment undertook to  n o tify  the lo c a l union o f f ic ia l  and shop stewards of 
d e ta ils  of the proposed ra te s , the suggested t r i a l  period of the ra te s ,’ 
and a s lid in g  scale  to  cover the tra in in g  period when the ra te s  were to  be 
reduced. I f  the shop stewazd objected to the equity o f the ra te s  thé 
m atter was to  be discussed a t lo c a l conference. Readjustment of ra te s  
would be re tro ac tiv e  to  the date o f t r i a l ,  a condition which had the 
e ffec t :of lengthening the t r i a l  period as the operatives had l i t t l e  to  lose 
by holding back agreement. This new procedure was accepted in  p rin c ip le , 
a l th o u ^  the branch maintained the r ig h t to  ohallenge any ra te  which i t  
considered in eq u itab le . In troduction of thé procedure followed the relaxa­
tio n  o f tension  amongst pieceworkers, so i t s  importance fo r s e t t l in g  
co n flic t was not e n tire ly  estimable*;
When management proposed to a l te r  the scheme covering the mechan­
ised  u n it the suggested changes were submitted to  the union fo r  discussion 
a t  lo ca l conference, A t r i a l  period was arranged, but sometimes not 
before some items were negotiated, fo r  example, the maintenance of earnings 
of operatives and the reduction ta rg e ts  to  earn bonus during the t r i a l  
period . At another conference the number of personnel was fixed  fo r  the 
t r i a l  period, and the union agreed to  consider the reduction o f personnel 
a t  the end of the t r i a l  period . Sometimes there was argument over the 
ra te s  to  be re -stud ied ; the union proposed th a t * t i ^ t*  ra te s  be re ­
assessed, while management countered with the proposal to re-study  a l l  
jobs including those th a t were * loose*'.
The purpose o f the t r i a i  period  was to  keep n eg o tia tio n s  open 
while the  o p era tiv es  worked under the new r a t e s .  No o b lig a tio n  was 
inourred  by working under the  r a te s .  During the  t r i a l  the  op era tiv es  
watched t h e i r  e a rn in g  c lo se ly , and frequen tly  oo i^ la ined  th a t  the  new 
ra te s  were f ix e d  too * tig h t*  and they  were not ab le  to  earn  t h e i r  customary 
bonus. The t r i a l  p e riod  was u su a lly  continued to  determ ine whether the  
op era tiv es  could  earn  a h i ^ e r  bonus. I f  the issu e  remained unresolved 
a p roduction  Study was made by management* This study aimed a t  f in d in g  
reasons fo r  th e  o p era tiv es  n o t earn ing  s u f f ic ie n t  bonus. Such a study 
Was more system atic  than  the normal time s tu d ie s . I t  was oustom#Rr a t  
Ardeer to  perm it the  lo c a l  union o f f i c i a l ,  the p re s id e n t o f the  branch 
o r  a shop stew ard to  be p rese n t while the  study was in  p ro g ress . This 
d id  not mean th a t  th e  branch Was committed to  accep ting  the  l i t e i a l  findr- 
i n #  o f  the  study f o r  th e  e r ro r s  o f time study p e rs is te d  re g a id le ss  as to  
how thorough the  study might be . On occasions the  union Claimed th a t  a  
Study Was too sh o r t, o r th a t  i t  Was male in  id e a l circum stances which d id  
not correspond to  p r a c t ic a l  working oonditionsi
Tie fin d in g s Of th e  study  were considered a t  lo c a l  conference.
Sometimes management found th a t  r a te s  were s e t  too h igh , in  Which case 
the re so lu tio n  o f  th e  d isp u te  Was made more d i f f i c u l t .  Sometimes the  
s tu d ie s  revealed  why the  o p era tiv es  d id  no t earn  s a tis fa c to ry  bonuhi 
For example, i t  was; found a f t e r  one study th a t  men on the  mechanised u n it;  , 
d id  no t earn  s a t is fa c to ry  bonus because o f bad tim e-keeping, non-uniform 
types o f  packing» lo s t  time due to  mechanical f a i lu r e  and. i l l -b a la n o e  in  
the  packing team s. When management was s a t i s f i e d  th a t  the opera tives  
had p u t fo r th  an in te l l ig e n t  and genuine e f f o r t  i t  a ^ e e d  to  some *make-up* 
being pa id  to  the  o p era tiv es  during  the t r i a l  p e rio d  when a  s a t is fa c to ry  
bonus was not eam edï Management opposed such an allowance to  cover the  
t r i a l  p e rio d  when i t  f e l t  th a t  the opera tives  had not r e a l ly  t r i e d .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in  a d ju s tin g  p iece  r a te s  on a lte re d  
jobs were no t met to  the same e x te n t on some o f  the  newer in cen tiv e  sc h « # S ,
On one o r two occasions th e  o p era tiv es  refused  to  allow  the  work measurement 
se c tio n  to  re -s tu d y  a jo b . Thé im ion o f f i c ia l s  soon overru led  th i s ,  and
the  s tu d ie s  ware subm itted . The r e a l  problem was to  secure opera tive  r
approval fo r  new tim es o r  t a r # t s *  Although: production  s tu d ie s  were used 
on in ce n tiv e  as w ell as p iece  work u ltim a te ly  the issu e  had to  be reso lved  
a t  lo c a l  conference, and th e  reo<mmiehdations o f  the  conference endorsed by 
the  o p e ra tiv e s . Sometimes the  d ispu te  remained unresolved f o r  one, two 
o r  even th re e  conferences, JWhere thO te c h n ic a l i t ie s  o f  the  job were in  
d isp u te , and th e  argument was over whether o r  no t th e  tim es o r ta rg e ts  were 
* f a i r * , the re so lu tio n  had to  come from lo c a l n e g o tia tio n s . R eferring  the  
d ispu te  to  in te im ed ia te  conference was only p o ss ib le  when some in te ip re ta t iv e  
issue: was a t  s t ^ e :  th is  s i tu a t io n  d id  not: u su a lly  a r is e  in  cases o f arguments
oyer changes in  allowed tim es. The abso lu tion  o f d iffe re n c es  o f opiniop
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over the  f a irn e s s  o f the  r a t io  of e ffo r t;  to  time were e a s ie r  to  reso lve  
when the  t o ta l  hiuaan r e la t io n s  s ta te  in  the, ‘department o r  seotioh. was : 
favonrah le . I f  morale was low the  ré so lu tio n s  o f  d if fe re n c e s  d id  h o t
■ ' ■ . ' ' . ,  ■ -, - . . - - . ' ' ■■ .
The o p era tiv es  fre q u e n tly  conplained th a t  they could not earn  
th e i r  customary bonus when mothods were a l te re d . This Complaint was 
u su a lly  a  ju s t i f i c a t io h  f o r  t h e i r  low earn ings. O peratives then  demanded 
h igher r a te s  to  b r in g  th e i r  bonus up to  t h e i r  expectations* À chsuige was 
bound ; to  upset : th e  opérai iv es  and they  seemed n a tu ra lly  susp ic ious o f  the  : 
new ra te s  o r tim es o ffe red  by management. The o p e ra tiv es  were not 
cohDérned whether motion study  was used in  determ ining the ;meth6d; t h e i r  
so le  in te re s v  was to  m ain tain  th e i r  ea rn ings. They were cond itioned  to  
rec e iv in g  a c e r ta in  weekly pay-^paoket and th e y  had a d ju s ted  t h e i r  l iv e s  
to  th a t  pay-packet. The p ressu res  generated by th e i r  f a i lu r e  to  o b ta in  
th a t  customary bonus were s u f f ic ie n t  to  eause them anx ie ty  when methods 
were changed; On only one occasion d id  the o p e ra tiv es  demand to  re tu rn  
to  the  o ld  method ra th e r  than be compensated by h i # e r  in cen tiv e  r a te s .
; The o p era tiv es  dem onstrated to  th e  s a t is fa c t io n  Of management th a t  t h i s  
new method Was p h y s ic a lly  im possible o f accomplishment;
The a l te r a t io n  o f p iece  r a te s ,  allowed tim es o r ta rg e ts  was always 
su b jec t to  approval by the  union, which g en era lly  backed thO demands o f  
the  group o f workers who were a ffe c te d  by the change, A r e a l  th r e a t  
arose to  union-management r e la t io n s  when o pera tives  refu sed  to  .accept the  r 
a l te re d  r a te s  o r  t i ^ ^ s .  Only once a t  Ardeer d id  management reduce ra te s  
a f t e r  the  pieceworkers, refu sed  to  agree t o  t h e i r  m od ifica tio n . This 
d r a s t ic  a c tio n  was taken a f t e r  a s e r ie s  o f ab o rtiv e  conferences had f a i le d  
to  reso lv e  th e  is s u e . The union s tro n g ly  p ro te s te d  a g a in s t the  breach 
o f the  s ta tu s  quo, bu t as th e  job was sh o rtly  going out o f  ex is tence  the 
m atte r was dropped. i t  was c le a r  th a t  once an in cen tiv e  o r  p iece  work 
system was in troduced  management ’s  p j^ ro g a tiv es  were l im ite d .  For example, 
the  men on the  mechanised u n i t  were o ffe red  a l te r a t io n s  and refused  to  
accept them f o r  a  tim e. Management made, no attem pt to  in troduce  the  
changes u n t i l  i t  secured the  approval o f the  men* In  th e  f in a l  a n a ly s is  
b o t i  s id e s  had one im portant sanGtion* they could r e s o r t  to  working under 
time r a te s  in s te a d  o f  under in cen tiv es  o r  pieoewOr]^
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, i'. f a r  the most im portant ; e ffeb  t  o f  the  in tro d u c tio n .o f  a group 
in cen tiv e  scheme was the  ex tension  o f union co n tro l over the  deployment o f  
lab o u r . Before in o e n t iv #  were in troduced  th é  union had v i r tu a l ly  no 
co n tro l over the deployment o f personnel,  The de té im ihatiôn  o f  the number 
o f personnel to  be empioyod on a ta sk  was w ith in  manag^nent ’s  p r e : ^ a t i v e s .  
Once an in ce n tiv e  scheme was in troduced  a  o o n tra c tu ra l r e la tio n s h ip  was 
e s ta b lish e d  between output and the operatives* e f f o r t .  F o r d i f f e re n t  out­
p u ts  th e re  was a d e f in i te  schedule which la id  down the number o f workers to
be employed  ^ Ahy change in  methpds. or materials in  the way a job was 
pèrfbimed, involved an alteration  o f effort in  rela tion  to output»! which 
frequently necessitated a rè-déployment of labour. Fixing the number 
of personnel to work on a giyen operation or within a section or depart#* 
ment, was one o f  the mcœt contentious issues in  union-managemeht, relations. : 
There was no sc ie n t if ic  method o f assessing whether or hot the operatives 
Were working at the required pace to reach the group target or earn the : 
customary bonus. Negotiations were the means, by which uiiioh-managemeht ‘ 
arguments were resolved* ' .
One o f the reasons wiy bonus earnings were re la tive ly  low on some 
of the newer group schemes, introduced in the post-war period, was due to 
the retention of more personnel on the operation than was fixed by the ; 
work measuremeht section . The group frequently refused to permit the 
removal of excessive personnel due to the desire to protect the jobs o f  
i t s  members; The workers were given the choice, through negotiation, of 
accepting: a lower bonus or maintaining their work force intabt. Usually* 
workers on the newer: schemes decided to keep the numbers; then ,they 
attempted to force management to re-assess the targets so: that bonus earrw 
ings would be increased. This was a d iffiou lt: problem to resolve, as earn­
ings on some schemes were so low that the bonus was hardly an incentive 
to stimulate greater work e ffo r t . Other groups aoquited reasonably favour­
able rates nAlch permitted the workers to earn bonus* On à number o f  
occasions a production study showed that additional personnel were needed 
for an operatioh.:
Piece work at Ardeer was frequently performed by small groupé. As: 
with the tonnage output schemes i t  was necessary to f ix  the ratio of 
personnel in relation  to the task performed. Problems arose over the 
calculation of th is  ratio as they did over incentive schemes. There was 
one icportant behavioural difference between the pieceworkers and the 
workers on the newer incentive schemes* The pieceworkers wanted to get 
rid of excess: personnel. In th is  way they protected the dandlings of the 
more experienced and faster groups by avoiding rationing o f material. They 
were particularly opposed to the dumping o f personnel temporarily short of 
a job. They favoured use o f the demotiorial rules to reduoe the number of 
personnel in  their sections, even to the .extent o f management dismissing 
the most junior workers. They wanted to exclude from sharing in  the to ta l 
bonus earnings any workers who contributed ihdio^ctly to th eir  e ffo r t. 
Sometimes th is  had. unfortunate repercussions} on one occasion a group of 
female operatives b itter ly  complained about a male worker, paid by an 
hourly rate, who did not work hard enough to penult the female operatives 
to earn larger bonusi Sometimes the groups demanded that th eir  team be 
increased in  s iz e ÿ but they also wanted maha#ment to pay higher piece 
rates to compensate them for sharing their bonus with another person.
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p ie re  were cohsiderah le  d i f f ic u l t i e s  in  f ix in g  the r a t io  o f 
personnel to /o u tp u t fo r  thé piecework schem es.' Each opera tion  had to  
he in d iv id u a lly  assessed} fo r  example, a team packing: explosives in to  
Cartons and wooden hoxes was la rg e r  than  one hu lk  packing fih reh o ard  
oases. This was due to  d iffe re n c es  in  s iz e s  o f the  packages and to  the 
way the  jobs were perform ed. The aim o f  work study was to  f ix  a  schedule 
which s e t  out the  r a t io  o f personnel to  ou tpu t. Suoh:.a sohedule was 
p o ss ib le  where th e re  were d e f in i te  production t a r g e ts .  Where th é re  was 
no fix e d  p roduction  ta r g e t  thé  op era tiv es  watched th e i r  bonus eaamings 
w ith some u n c e rta in ty  and an x ie ty . The method evolved to  meet th is  
problem was to  c a lc u la te  a  ’normal* days’ earn ing  based on e x is t in g  p iece 
r a te s ,  and then  a llo c a te  personnel to  the  opera tions performed so th a t  
reasonable bonus could be earned. In  theory , t h i s  was fix ed  so th a t  the  
average opera tive  would earn  a bonus o f  one th i r d  above the  hourly  r a t e } 
bu t in  p ra c tic e  earn ings o f  piecew orkers was freq u en tly  h igher than  t h i s .  
There was constan t p ressu re  by the  opera tives working in  those se c tio n s  
w ith  no fix e d  p roduction  schedules, to  take s te p s  to  push th e i r  e a rn in g  
h ig h er than  those proposed by management;
The problem o f  su b s id isa tio n  Was accentuated  by a group scheme.
As i t  was a lread y  noted su b s id isa tio n  occurred when bonus earned on one 
opera tion  was o f f s e t  by lo s s  on another. In  o rder to  safeguard  th e i r  . 
in cen tiv e  e f f o r t  o p era tiv es  demanded th a t  the  time, f o r  c a lc u la tio n  o f bonus 
be kept as sh o rt as p o ss ib le , f o r  example on a d a ily  as opposed to  weekly 
b a s is ;  They wanted management to  r e c o ^ is e  th e  s h o r te s t  p o ss ib le  p é rio d s , 
f o r  c a lc u la tin g  w aiting  time in  th e  event o f b re^dpw ns. M ateria ls  
d i f f i c u l t  to  p rocess d id  not. have to  be shared amongst th e  o p era tiv es  when 
a  group scheme was in  e x is te n ce . But i f  A âd iff iC d lt  p rocess was no t 
included in  a composite r a te ,  the  group was quick to  re a c t  once t h e i r  
bonus earn ings f e l l .  On the  mechanised u n i t  i t  was ho t unknown fo r  the  
men on one machine t o  woik a t  le s s  than  in cen tive  r a te  in  case they  
subsid ised  the work o f those on another which was e i th e r  fa u l ty  o r d i f f i ­
c u lt  to  woik* I f  management s e t  tim es too ’ t ig h t*  on one machine then 
th i s  discouraged men on ahOther machine from "incen tive  e f f o r t .
The problem o f  su b s id isa tio n  was l ik e ly  to  a r is e  when a group 
scheme covered a  sec tio n  o r d.epartment which d id  not have f ix e d  technology 
and schedules o f o u tp u t. This was one o f the  main reasons why some 
departments gave alm ost no tro u b le , w hile the scheme covering th e  mechan­
ise d  u n it  needed considerab le  adjustm ent. I f  the  department worked on 
s h i f t  then  the o p era tiv es  on one s h i f t  demanded th a t  t h e i r  earn ings be 
separa ted  from those o f ano ther s h if t*  S u b sid isa tio n  a lso  took p lace 
when s<ffiie men worked a t  a  slow er pace than  e th e rs , due to  the  natu re  o f  the 
work o r th e  human f a c t d r .  Somewhat d i f f e re n t  behavioural p a tte rn s  were 
seen in  re sp e c t to  these  c a ses . I f  the  cause lay  in  management’s  in flu en ce , 
includ ing  the  technology o f  th e  p la n t, the  men on the group scheme attem pted 
to  be recompensed fo r  fa c to rs  which lim ite d  t h e i r  bonus. On the o th e r  hand
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the #pup on the mechanised unit and in the non-piecework seotiohe seemed 
to protect those woikers who did not wozk as fa s t as many o f the other 
operatives. PregUéhtly, the woik study speoia iiet wanted these workers 
excluded as additichal personnel reduced the average bonus earned hy those 
settin g  the pace. (Bière was a lim it to th is  process of exclusion, and 
anyone f i t t in g  lo g ica lly  within the work group was protected by h is  
fellow woikers.
In group schemes the bonus was divided equally. This principle was 
applied to both incentive and pieceworkers. A number o f schemes, when 
first-proposed, included a prevision which would have distributed the bonus 
earned in proportion to job rates. This provision was dropped, partly . 
because i t  was opposed by the Union, and partly because o f the complex 
cler ica l calculations ihvolved. The effect o f equal d istribution was to 
reduce the status of the higher rated jobs and to anphasise the importance 
of the group incentive scheme. There was scrnie ju stifica tion , for th is  
system as group, and not individual effort produced the additional output. 
Group schemes were clearly more sà tisfacto iy  where co-operation was the 
keynote o f  the production lin e . One had only to  see the men at work on 
the mechanised unit to rea lise  the importance o f  co-operation amongst the 
group. These men worked hard, helping each other out i f  production 
d iff ic u lt ie s  arose in  Order to keep the bonus high. dheir average earnings 
were amongs the highest for operatives in Scotland*
Groups paid by piece also shared equally in  the total,bonus earned. 
Group piecework tended to reduce the discriminatory nature o f  incentives 
as variation o f individual output tended to be ironed out. The piecework 
groups urged th eir  members to work fa ster  a® there appeared to be some 
competition amongst the groups to be the highest earners. At the same 
time the groups were very careful to see that they had equal opportiuiity 
to earn bonus. For example, some materials were harder to produce than 
others, and the groups sought a fa ir  distribution of these materials so that 
some groups would not be penalised. A constant watch was kept on the 
earnings of groups, sections and sh ifts  to detect discrimination.
Another problem of group schemes was the inclusion of special 
categories o f personnel who were unable to work at fu ll  incentive e ffo r t . 
Such personnel were learners and instructors. Special provisions to cover 
the training period were included in  the scheme covering the mechanised, im it. 
During, the training period the trainee was not paid by resu lt but was reinw 
bursed by hourly rates, plus a fixed  bonus. As the inclusion of a learner 
obviouely affected the a b ility  of the group to earn bonus, some adjustment 
in target rates was also allowed. Special provisions related to the train­
ing o f a new sh if#
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The determ ination of the tra in in g  p e r io d ,th e  method of remuneration, 
and the adjustment of ta rg e ts  fo r  the trained, operatives had to  he assessed 
fo r  eaoh operation, % e ru les  varf,ed from section  to  sec tion . For 
example, b n  the oartridg ing  operations female learners  were segregated 
from experienced piece workers. They were taught hy an in s tru c to r  who 
was paid hy reference to  th e  earnings of the group w ith the highest output 
in  the sec tio n . I f  i t  was necessaiy fo r a lea rn er to  he included in  a 
group, the le a rn e r’s work was cred ited  t o  the group’s output. The learner 
was paid hy time ra te s .  A fter a learn ing  period the tra in e e  was re -  
o ia ss if ie d  b e  an improver and allocated  amongst eiperienced operatives in  
accordance w ith a s t r i c t  r a t io .  hnprovers shared in  the group’s "bonus 
earnings. These ru le s  pro tected  th e  earning capacity of the more 
experienced woi^kers.
Sec. 6. Comparison with the 1 .1 .0 . statement hy experts
The siibject of payment by re su lts  was one of the most controversial 
in  in d u s tr ia l re la tio n s , both a t  the p ra c tic a l and th e o re tic a l le v e ls . A 
large amount o f l i te r a tu re  was published on the sub jec t in  the te n  year 
period a f te r  the war; much of i t  was co n flic tin g  and confusing* With i t s  
extensive use and experience of incentives Ardeer was a g ian t laboratory in  
which to  check the v a lid ity  o f  many of the  assertio n s  made about payments 
by re s u lts .  For th i s  purpose the I.L .O . statement by experts ( 2) W one 
of the most au th o rita tiv e  ever made -  was compared w ith the findings a t 
Ardeer. The Ardeer study confirmed the general p rin c ip les , la id  down by 
the liL .O ., but i t  went a long way fu rth e r  to  explain many o f the problems 
th a t  arose in  unioiwmanagement nego tia tions,
A good deal o f the I.L .O . statement was devoted to  the e ffe c ts  of 
payments "by re s u lts  on the q u a lity  of production and the health  and safe ty  
of workers. These problems were not sp ec if ica lly  examined a t Ardeer fo r  
they did  not become formal items o f dispute between union and manag%nent. 
While i t  was probable th a t some f a l l - o f f  ih  quality  was to  be expected with 
extensive payments by re s u lts ,  the problem was met a t  Ardeer by more 
e ffec tiv e  inspection and supervision. Although the p iece work was 
probably introduced a t  Ardeer because i t  was. d if f io u l t  to  supervise the 
operatives in  th e ir  huts s c a tte re d  over the facto ry  area, supervision and 
inspection were s t i l l  necessary. In  th e ir  e f fo r ts  to  secure higher earn­
ings there  was a temptation On the p a rt of operatives to  produce in fe r io r  
a r t ic le s ,  to  take r isk s , and to  work harder than they should. The two 
explosions which led  to  much in d u s tr ia l trouble in  I95O and IO54 occured 
in  sections working on piece work and incen tives. At the same time poor 
qualiiy  co n tro l; in e ffec tiv e  supervisionj accidents, and poor morale were
(it) i.L .O . ’Payment by R esults’ , 1951, espeo ia ily  Ghapt. V IÏI.
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riot necessarily  connected w ith incentives and piecework; they were ju s t 
as l ik e ly  to  occur in  sections paid hy hourly, r a te s .  However, lik e  a l l  
prohlems associated  with incentives and piece work they tended to  he 
magnified and to  he made more a r tic u la te .  The fac to ry  management was con- 
s ta a tly  on the watch to  fo ?# 8 ta ll techn ical and human prbhlems.
ihe I.L .O . statement made i t  c le a r  th a t the app lica tion  o f incen­
tiv e s  was to he only one step  ih  a programme designed to  ra ise  p roductiv ity . 
A system of payments %  re s u lts  yielded f u l l  b en efits  only i f  human steps 
WQVS taken to  improve the production prooess, lay-ou t of equipment and 
the u t i l i s a t io n  of human and m aterial resources p r io r  to  and during the 
app lication  Of incentive and piece woik schemes. The work study section  
a t  Ardeer attempted to do th is*  The a b i l i ty  to  secure adequate response 
on the p a rt of the operatives was to a large extent influenced by the 
technical fa c ts  o f production and whether or not the machines o r p la n t  
affected  the pace o f working. Tbis was seen very c le a rly  a t Ardeer in  the 
conferences dealing  with thé period during which: operatives oduld work a t 
incentive r a té .
Although the I.L .O . repo rt described the c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f a 
number o f incentive schemes -  piecework, standard hour plan» the Halsey, 
Bowan, Taylor and Beduax schemes -  i t  came to the conclusion: th a t there 
was ho marked advantage of one over the o ther. Thé chbioe of a p a r tic u la r  
type o f scheme depended oh the technical and human fa c ts  of production.
The piece wo4t and the standard hour plan: had bertsdn  advantages in  th a t 
the Çperativés were paid in  proportion to  th e ir  increased output and th is  
appeared f a i r e r  tO“ them ., I t  warned th a t the successful app lication  of 
pieoe-woik and standard hotir. p lans had to  be based on stud ies of the job 
and accurate ra te  fix ing , otherwise d isp a rity  of earnings resu lted  from : 
d isproportionate applications o f energy and s k i l l  on the job due to 
d ifferences in  machines and methods.
/ At Ardeer a l l  operations were studied whether they were covered 
by piece work, standard hour p lans, # a re d  schemes, o r group bonus schemes. 
Woik measurement was used in  fix in g  ra te s  or the number. of personnel on 
operations. , The most d if f io u l t  ra te s  or ta rg e ts  to  f ix  were fo r  those 
operations which were subject to a lte ra tio n  o r produced d iffe re n t products 
by d iffe re n t mejuis. V The group bonus scheme covering the mechaniéed u n it 
caused as much trouble as the piecework operations. The operatives a t  
Ardeer did not seem to  be. g rea tly  oohoerned w ith the type of scheme offered 
them; i f  they d id  not earn su ff ic ie n t bonus they protested# They were 
in te re s ted  in  the lower l in d ts  a t  v ^ c h  they could earn bonus; they were 
d ls ih te re s ted  in  the ce ilin g , but they were.most concerned about average 
earnings -  i t  was to  the lev e l o f earningg th a t they adjusted th e i r  l iv e s .
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The ch ief defioienoy o f the I.L.O, statemëht la y  in  the fact that 
i t  did not outline/the extensive conditibns that had to he defined hy 
uiiion-jaahagement negotiatiohs* I t  mentioned the heed for #aranteeihg  
workers th e ir  hourly rate : of pay . = At Ardeer operatives demanded more 
than th is; they wanted a special: rate when circumstances prevented them : 
from earning th eir  customary bonus. Their recognition of waiting time 
did something to prevent the subsidisation of effort but the operatives 
s t i l l  received le s s  bonus than they would normally have received; The 
I.L.O* report stated i t  was desirabie to measure incentive effort over 
as short periods as possible to avoid subsidisation of effort* The 
problems of subsidation went further than th is . Subsidisation occurred in  
a niuûber of forms; when there was à composite rate, when different machinés 
or materials were used* or where learners or ancillary workers # r e  
included in  the scheme. Subsidisation was a b i^ e r  problem for group 
schemes than i t  was for individual SPhémes# Any factor that affected the 
a b ility  of operatives to earn bonus was l ik e ly  to lead to disputes.
The I.L.O. report referred to the need for safeguarding against 
raté^cutting and to peiniit the v^dssessmont of rates in  certain ciroum- . 
stances. At Ardeer the a lteration  o f jobs rates due to c ler ica l errors 
and to worker improvisations was Unimportant. Alterations in  hourly rates 
and. the standard hour week sometimes led to some adjustments at the local 
le v e l;  The real trouble lay in re-#*aêssing rates after there was a 
changé in  the job content. Déspite the use of time study, production 
studies, tr ia l  periods, provisions to prevent a re-assesaaent of rates 
which led  to a reduction of earnings of the operatives, arid the o g lin g  
of local and intermediate conférences, one ultimate d iff ic u lty  r^ainedi 
the operatives Conplained that the rates set were too ’tight*, while 
management claimed that the rates were equitably s e t . ./ Management was not 
permitted to instsd the new rates; without the union’s approval, and that 
tràs bbund to; be withheld i f  the Operatives were convinced that the rates 
were too ’t ig h t ’if I t  was the task of union and management to résolve the 
dispute by formal means and th is  was no easy task* The I.L.O, statement, 
lik e  many other publications, understated the problem with respect toV 
si#ri%.rateé;\/;'r 7':.';-
The Ï.L.O.. report stressed the heed for the development of good 
industrial relations before introducing incentive schemes. Introduced 
into an atmosphere o f h o s t i l ity  incentives and piece work iniposad an 
intolerable strain  on union-management relations. The v a lid ity  of th is  
principle was w ell demonstrated at Ardeer; incentives and piecework 
required so many negotiations that ahÿ background of general frictiott  
between union and management led to immediate d if f ic u lt ie s  in  resolving  
disputes over incentives and piece work, : A shaip drop in morale amongst 
the operatives due to .some factor, not necessarily associated with# the 
incentive or piece, work,schemes, was usually followed by some formal 
dispute about thé bonus earnings* This was seen in  two c la ssica l incidents
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following the esploeioiis in  î^gO and/1954* Formai negotiations were 
made OKtreraely d if f io u l t  because o f s tieng  informal behaviour. : As 
incentives and piecework encouraged Informal group formation and gave many 
opportunities fo r the groups to  express th e ir  d is sa tis fa c tio n  about th e ir  
earnings the formal lin e s  of au thority , both in  management and the union, 
had to be kept working with utmost effectiveness#
Ardeer also offered some in te re s tin g  data  on the behaviour o f 
groups when not unionised,: and where the piece ra te  s tru c tu re  was not 
subject to  co llec tiv e  bargaining.  ^ As i t  was seen the female piece 
workers were capable of s tr ik in g  even though they did  not belong to  a 
union. Because no formal organisation regulated th e i r  conduct they 
b u il t  th e ir  own socia l system to  cope with # ievanoes and complaints about 
th e ir  piece ra te  s tru c tu ré . The leaders of the oligarchy were not as 
e ffec tiv e  as the formal union organisation when nego tia ting  with management 
over piece ra te s .  Before 1947 Yhen ^ o p  stewards were unrecognised, the 
procedure fo r  a i  ju s tin g  workers* grievances about piece and incentive ra te s  
was inadequate. There was no ind ication  th a t operatives were h o s tile  to  
working on piece work, as the I.L .O . report suggested, because o f the 
absence of co llec tiv e  bargaining. Unions, however^ as in s ti tu tio n s  were 
opposed to  payments by re s u lts  because they were freq u en tly  excluded from 
bargaining over incentives and piece work. They believed th a t the unity  
of th e ir  organisation Was. destroyed by payments by r e s u l ts .  In  th is  
contention, they were p a r tly  co rrect because of the strong informal reac­
tio n s; but management, too, was lik e ly  to  be caught up in  in d u s tr ia l 
anarchy i f  operative grievances about payments by re s u lts  grew to  serious 
proportion^;
A lthou#  the piece workers a t Ardeer never wanted to  change th e ir , 
method o f payment to  hourly ra te s  with le ss  earnings, the absence o f adequate 
’safeguards' -  as the I.L .O . report chose to c a ll  them -  le d  many other 
workers a t  Ardeer to  re je c t management’s o ffe r  to  put them on incen tives. 
These workers were conscious o f  the many abuses th a t were associated  w ith 
incentives in  industry  generally ; they wanted e x p lic it r ig h ts  with a s p e c t  
to earning capacity;' the f ix a tio n  of ra te s , times and ta rg e ts , the deploy­
ment o f personnel, changes in  work p rac tice  and jobs and the re-assesm ient 
of ra te s . The operatives d id  not t ru s t  management to  u n ila te ra lly  d e te r­
mine these r ig h ts ; th is  was a  function of c o lle c tiv e  b a r# in in g , and i f  
t l#  formal union organisation chose not to  exercise i t s  r ig h ts  of negotiej*- 
tio n  i t s  members usually  re jec ted  management’s o ffe r  to  put thé# on incen­
tiv e s  as d id  many o f  the c ra f t  groups. Operative’s suspicion of incentives 
diminished when th e ir  unions intervened to  negotiate d e ta i ls  o f the scheme 
offered . When management went in to  a conference determined to  s tic k  to  
the exact figu res  compiled by the work measurement section , i t  overlooked 
an ingportant in d u s tr ia l  re la tio n s  mores, th a t i t  had to  negotiate with the 
union, not d ic ta te  to  it*
■Cli&piî* XX* Conol*
Once incentives were accepted by the operatives, thé role of the 
union was to control the system of payments by resu lts by negotiating any 
Change in  d eta ils  with the management* At Ardeer, the union did not 
participate in  the timing of jobs, in fir in g  production standards, or 
settin g  rates, save through negotiations* The loca l T* & G*W,U* o f f ic ia l  
Was not trained in  time study, nor had he attended any course on woik 
study. : He deliberately refrained from interfering in  management’s 
prerogatives* Consequently, he did not confuse h is  ro le , and for th is  
reason was responsible for negotiating one o f the most sophisticated piece 
and incentive rate structures in  the United Kingdom as th is  chapter amply 
demonstrated.
Conclusion
The parties found i t  d if f ic u lt  to establish  suitable sets  of 
reference to guide their negotiations about incentives and piece work.
By comparison to the provisions which set out the hourly wages structure 
in  a ll  i t s  facets there were few 1 statutory’ conditions; th is  meant that 
the piece aM. incentive rate structure had to be determined by a case to 
case approach. A rather vague clause existed in  the national agreement 
relative to working conditions which ostensibly fixed  the relationship  
between bonusearnings and effort; in actual fact there were considerable 
disparities between earnings under the various ech oes due to a variely  
of conditions. Unfortunately, the conferences on. work study did not 
c lar ify  maxiy o f  these problems, and local negotiations were le f t  to work 
out the d eta il as best as they could. Sometimes i t  was possible to . 
resolve an interpretation dispute by referring i t  to an intermediate 
conference, but in  the main, disputes.about incentives were not resolved 
by reference to an overall statutoiy condition. Precedents were reached 
for establishing conditions relating  to the .measurement of bonus earning 
time, waiting time, and thé alteration of incentive and piece rates when 
there were changes innihimum or job evaluated hourly rates.
Many issues associated with piecework and incentives were not 
easily  resolved by reference to a principle in the same way as were disputes 
over promotion, demarcation, and job ratés* This was due to th e . technical 
nature o f the production lin e  which necessitated the building o f  incen­
tive  and piece rates on an Individual b asis. The operatives frequently 
complained that they were unable to  earn su ffic ien t bonus and that the 
rates were too ’t ig h t’.  As time study was not a completely acceptable 
measure to resolve the disagreements, reference had to be made to the 
fairness of the rates. Union and mana^ment frequently had d ivèr#nt  
ideas as to the equity of rates and times, thus disputes w re  d if f ic u lt  to 
settle*  Where the ratio o f personnel to task had to be fixed , when a 
composite rate was paid for several s ize s , when there was some form of 
subsidisation o f  e ffo rt, then the determination of equitable incentive or 
piece rates was complex*
Chapt* XI. Concl.
The problem of in sta llin g  and maintaining incentive and piece 
rates was affected by the strong disposition for informal group behaviour. 
Althou# the groups did not necessarily have their entire origins in  the 
incentive or piecework schemes they had ai obvious in terest in them, and a 
natural inclination  to protect their job security and raise their earning. 
The disposition for informal group behaviour was to some extent encouraged 
by management by dealing d irectly  with the employees rather than with the
union. This position  continued under the agreement relative to working
conditions which permitted management to offer new or altered rates to 
the employees concerned, who then had the right to take the matter to  
the shop steward under the negotiating procedure. When conditions 
changed, such as when a job was altered, the union sometimes found i t  
extremely d iff ic u lt , to persuade the; operatives to accept the new ra tes.’
The task o f negotiations was made extremely d if f ic u lt .  I t  was found 
necessary to introduce additional terms of reference to govern a tid a l 
period as the negotiating procedure did not appear to be adequate as a 
se t of references. There appeared to be a primae facie case o f breakdown 
in  union authority when the operatives refused to give altered rates a
tr ia l or resorted to direct action.
PART i l l  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER X II
THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Introduction
What conclusions can be drawn about the general 
relationship of union and management from the Ardeer 
case? There Is considerable evidence for postulating 
principles concerning the nature of collective 
bargaining. Negotiations were a law-making process.
The parties legislated rules to cover certain matters 
such as the negotiating procedure and the national 
wages structure, they Interpreted those laws when 
determining specific cases, they created, Interpreted 
and observed precedent, and they Invoked the standards 
of equity when the case did not fall within mutually 
accepted rules. The end result of negotiations was an 
agreement set out in rights and obligations to be 
observed by union and management and their members.
The parties used the same method of negotiations 
to resolve disputes both over wages as well as non-wage 
matters. One of the important conclusions of the Ardeer 
ease is that the system of industrial jurisprudence, said 
to cover only non-wage matters,governs the relations 
of the parties with respect to wages and payments of 
results. This principle appears to be true of union- 
management relations both In Britain and in the United 
States. Having clearly established this principle It 
is then possible to define collective bargaining 
accurately In terms of purpose, function and process.
This definition Is the central proposition from which 
other principles are deduced to present a theory of 
collective bargaining.
Ill cf.’ Sllchter: ’Union Policies and Industrial
Management’, (Brookings) 19^1.
Dunlop & Healy: ’Collective Bargaining;
Principles and Cases’, (Irwin) 1953.
Fl&nders and Clegg: ’The System of Industrial
Relations in Great Britain’ , (Blackv/ell)
195^ .
Chamberlain; ’Collective Bargaining’, (McGraw-
Hill) 1951.
Once the essential nature of collective bargaining 
is established other questions, such as peace and 
conflict in industry, can be properly defined and 
classified. When negotiations are effective, peace 
reigns in the workplace. When negotiations fail 
conflict between the parties persists. Evidence of the 
Ardeer ease suggests that negotiations fall because of 
a number of factors, the most important of which are 
the separate interests of the parties. Negotiations are 
only effective if the parties behave judicially. In the 
sense that they try to find a solution to the dispute 
In terms of rules, precedents and equity. This view 
does not overlook the importance of the social and 
economic enfironment, which is of particular significance 
to the adaptive behaviour of management. The final 
section of this chapter brings out the difference between 
the nature of collective bargaining and that of joint 
consultation.
Chap,XII Sec.l 
Section 1. Elements of Effective Negotiations
Disputes between union and management occurred over 
three types of subject matter. Firstly, disputes 
involved the general inter-instltutional relationship 
such as negotiation rights and the policy of management 
towards union membership of its employees. Secondly, 
there were disputes over the security of employment of 
union members; these Included disputes relating to 
demarcation, dilution, manning, work practices, demotion, 
promotion and transfers* Thirdly, there were disputes 
relating to the fixation of wages, hours and similar 
working conditions. The disputes relating to piecework 
and incentive payments fell into both the second and 
third categories.
The common method by which disputes were resolved 
was through negotiation. Negotiation ended with an 
agreement set out in terms of rights and obligations for 
each party to observe. The discharge of these rights 
and obligations was the responsibility of union and 
management. It is the task of this section to examine 
the characteristics of the method of reaching agreement 
in negotiations. In this connection the following 
hypothesis is advanced: that negotiation resulting in
agreement is a similar process to that of law-making as 
this is commonly understood in society at large. This 
hypothesis may need some refinement at a later stage of 
the analysis.
Negotiations at Ardeer were conducted within certain 
terms of reference set out in the national agreements 
relating to the negotiating procedure, minimum wage rates 
and working conditions. These agreements set out the 
.jurisdiction of ’local’ negotiations, which involved 
factory management and the local union branch, and ’national* 
negotiations, which involved I.C.I. and the various head­
quarters of the unions. The national level had the right to 
reserve certain matters for its exclusive consideration, to
withdraw matters previously reserved for negotiation at 
the factory level, Or to establish a new set of references 
in which local negotiations were to take place. Within 
their competent jurisdiction at each level of the framework 
of collective bargaining the parties were free to resolve 
disputes and lay down rules to regulate their conduct with 
the respect to certain matters.
It was usual for agreements reached at national level 
to be printed and distributed on a wide scale. This was so 
of the agreement relative to the negotiating procedure, 
the agreement setting out working conditions, and the 
agreement relating to the minimum wage rates. The 
reason for setting out these agreements in explicit terms 
was obvious. The employees needed to know their rights - 
that they were entitled to so much and no more - while 
management and union officials in widely scattered 
geographical areas had to know what responsibilities they 
were obligated to discharge. It was not usual for local 
agreements to be set out in writing in quite the same way; 
the conference proceedings were recorded in a minute 
agreed between the parties. While this minute recorded 
the decision of the negotiations, the same format was not 
used in setting out the rights and obligations. These 
were implicitly laid down, but the parties recognised them 
in the same way as they did the explicit rights and 
obligations contained in the national agreements.
The traditional role of a union was to challenge 
management’s prerogatives, and to intervene in order to see 
tha.t its members were treated fairly by management. No 
better illustration of this role was to be seen than in the 
T. & G.W.tr.’s relations with Ardeer management over the 
promotional and demo tional system. Management used the 
criterion of seniority in making its promotions and 
demotions, a system which was extremely fair to its 
employees. At first the union was content to see that
this policy of promotion and demotion was administered 
in an equitable way by management officials in the sense 
that there was regard for the rights of individual 
employees. Anomalies were challenged as these appeared 
to the union to be departures from general rules, and were 
expressions of either favouritism or victimisation by 
management. The standardization of conditions, with 
departures for specific cases which deserved special 
treatment in order to be fair, was an important basis for 
common rules to be applied in the workplace.
The union also sought the extension of the promotional 
system to departments which were not originally included. 
This piece-meal approach laid down certain precedents which 
had the effect of modifying the rules relating to the 
system. Finally, in the post-war period the parties 
negotiated a complete agreement on promotion and demotion. 
This agreement took into account thé various precedents 
that were previously agreed, so in a sense there was a 
codification of the previous decisions. Codification was
nothing less than a legislative act.
The demarcation and manning practices were established 
by a ’case by case’ approach. Precedent was the basis of 
demarcating the work prerogatives of the various crafts. 
Difficulties arose over the interpretation of precedents 
due to the overlap of criteria in fixing the demarcation 
lines. The protesting union argued that management had 
broken practice, while management argued that it had not. 
Several unions drew up demarcation agreements and this 
codification of rules prevented disputes arising. Dilution 
disputes were virtually eliminated by ’statutes’ - 
agreements negotiated at a national level. Other work 
practices were settled by a case by case approach and by 
reference to standards of equity. When an incentive scheme 
came into being manning ratios were established by agreement,
Negotiations about incentives and piecework were 
conducted within a rather vague framework of a national 
agreement. For this reason there was a case by case in 
the Introduction of incentive schemes, the details iof- 
which had to be negotiated with respect to every scheme.
The agreement relative to working conditions set out the 
theoretical relationship between effort and the size of 
the bonus. This clause was subject to considerable 
interpretation, particularly in relation to the time on 
which operatives could earn bonus. A precedent was 
established in this regard, as others were in relation 
to alteration of incentive rates after there was a change 
in hourly rates, including both minimum and differential 
rates. Indeed, the whole of the piece rate structure 
was said to be preferable to incentive schemes because 
it was built up through the use of precedent. However, 
the distinction was slight for some ’statutory' conditions 
existed for both piecework and incentive schemes, and 
precedent Was just as important to the maintenance of 
incentive schemes as it was for piecework. The final 
resolution of any differences lay in involving standards 
of equity. Such disputes occurred over the claim by 
operatives that they were unable to earn sufficient bonus, 
while management claimed that the rates, targets and work 
teams were fixed fairly*
At Ardeer there was no general agreement which covered 
the determination of job rates or wage differentials for 
non-skilled jobs. Job rates were laid down in a case by 
case approach; the parties proceeded to adjust job rates 
when a claim for an increase was submitted by the union.
There was no accepted standard to resolve the differences 
in the sets of references of the parties with respect to 
the fixation of wage differentials. Job evaluation was 
introduced to try to resolve this problem of deciding 
standards by which wage differentials could be set equitably.
Due to the fact that the parties at national level did 
not ’legislate* for a general agreement, its installation 
and maintenance was achieved by a case by ease approach, 
using interpretation and precedent. Each job was 
analysed, and using the objective criteria laid down in 
the scheme, and an interpretation was made to classify 
the job under certain headings* Certain key jobs were 
used as precedents in the way they were analysed and 
interpreted. From this data it was then possible to 
determine hourly rate of pay.
The case by case approach which was used to determine 
rates of general worker jobs was in sharp contrast with 
the rules contained in the national agreements which set 
out the rates for all skilled and semi-skilled jobs covered 
by the various craft unions. The national agreements 
also made provision for the payment of an additional 
hourly rate in accordance with a grading scheme. The 
unions did not participate in the installation or the 
maintenance of the grading scheme which was based on a 
merit rating principle. In 195^ the grading of craftsmen 
became subject to appeal by the union, in accordance with 
the negotiating procedure, but the details of the merit 
rating scheme were not subject to general 'legislation* 
of the two parties.
The use of job evaluation, merit rating and work 
measurement schemes, although relatively new in union- 
management relations, was designed to solve an old age 
problem, namely, the establishment of standards to resolve 
differences over wage fixation. Although criticised by 
both unions and some theoreticiansthe use of these 
personnel techniques, as they were known, offered an 
objective measure towards settling the vexed problem of wage
(2) See Wootton: 'The Social Foundations of Wage
Policy*, (Allen and Unwin). 1955, 
particularly pp.6 8, l6l, 163,
o n a p , A J » J .  i > e c , i
differentials. Under a job evaluation scheme the 
parties tried to assess a claim in the light of accepted 
job factors. If the job factors, or their weightings did 
not reflect the actual characteristics of the jobs surveyed, 
then the scheme was bound to lead to difficulties. Similar 
arguments applied to merit rating schemes. If the personal 
characteristics named in the scheme did not correspond to 
those actually determining personal performance the scheme 
was unfair. These criteria, objective in the sense that 
they were accepted by the parties prior to their use in 
resolving a dispute, were in the final analysis based not 
on industrial engineering, but on equity. Under the merit 
rating scheme individuals were graded in accordance to 
their 'worth* on the job, while under the job evaluation 
scheme jobs were ranked in accordance with their 'worth* 
to the organisation. Provided the individuals and the 
jobs were graded properly and fairly the grading conformed 
to the ideas of equity held by management, union and 
their members.
Incentive and piecework schemes based on work 
measurement were designed to reimburse operatives with 
the same amoimt of bonus for the same amount of effort 
exerted. Used in this way work measurement was an 
attempt to reduce differences of opinion about the amount 
of work that had to be produced to return the operatives 
an equitable bonus. In short, the use of work measurement 
tied negotiations to very narrow limits. In the final 
analysis, negotiations over any issue whether incentives 
or not, had to be resolved within narrow limits or other­
wise there was no meeting of minds of the parties. The 
difficulties of incentive and piecework lie not in the 
use of work measurement, but in defining the circumstances 
in which the effort is to be exerted and the bonus is to 
be paid. Frequently the decisions reached by the parties 
were based on the general notion of equity, rather than on 
simple interpretation of existing rules and principles.
The standards of equity did not always remain the 
same for either party or both parties when resolving disputes 
related to the fixation of wage rates. For example, at 
one time the general worker unions appeared anxious to 
introduce a general levelling up of wage rates; by the 
post-war period adjustments to job rates included in the 
job evaluation scheme were amended by a percentage increase 
which had the effect of increasing the differentials 
between the job rates. In the same way the local union 
organisation sometimes argued for the improvement of rates 
for special categories of jobs; at other times it wanted 
'down-the-line' or 'across-the-board* increases in all job 
rates. These ideas about the equity of a particular method 
of adjusting wage rates arose from different circumstances 
and they tended to upset the terms of reference which the 
parties had for resolving disputes about wage fixation.
The determination of alterations in the national agreements 
covering minimum wages for general workers and the wage 
rates of the craftsmen were sometimes difficult, for 
accepted standards of reference were absent. Nevertheless, 
wage rates were not fixed in an ethical vacuum; the parties 
had their standards to judge good and bad wage c l a i m s , (3)
Over time the parties were seen to be making tremendous 
efforts to find suitable terms of reference for resolving 
disputes over wage rates. In the early period of the 
factory the parties tried to dodge the issue by tying 
Ardeer wages to those found in other collective bargaining 
frameworks. This was not always successful. New 
collective bargaining frameworks were erected to solve the 
problem of wage fixation by introducing uniformity both on 
a regional and occupational basis* The erection of the
(3) See generally Wootton: h o c *cit. and the review of
her book in Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review. April, 1956, p.^87.
I.e.I. frameworks were designed to insulate the Company 
managements from conflict which flowed from disagreement 
over the national fixation of wage rates. Since 1936 
wage rates were settled through multi-union negotiations, 
and without one stoppage. Obviously so-called 'bargaining 
power* was not used in these negotiations for neither party 
knew how 'strong* each other was. Wage rates were not 
settled by some form of power conflict but bv reference to 
equitable standards, and this was a very different process 
of fixation of wages by the *laws * of supply and demand.
The union-management relations at Ardeer were 
characterised by a dispute which was then resolved by 
negotiation. The process of negotiation included the 
settling of general rules, the interpi^tion of these rules, 
and the establishment and the interpretation of precedent. 
When the parties legislated they set out ih idetail the 
rules in an agreement. When they did this they took 
account of past precedent; • in the case of the promotional 
and demotional system the rules were codified from existing 
precedents. For their agreement to be effective the rules 
had to be such as to cover future contingencies. Where 
the clauses were vague, or were designed to cover only the 
most general of rules, it was necessary for the parties at 
the local level to interprète. These interpretations 
sometimes laid doim, precedents; at other times precedents 
were established by a case by case approach. In turn, these 
precedents were subject to interpretation. When the 
parties had no recourse to statute or precedent the 
parties resolved their differences in accordance with the 
notion of equity. The case by case approach was by far the 
most important at Ardeer, and this processor negotiation 
was similar to the method used by the common law courts.
The process of negotiation was the same regardless whether 
they dealt with the general inter-institution relationship, 
job security or wages and working conditions.
Section 2. Definition of Collective Bargaining
Originally conceived as a method by which individuals
joined together in a trade union, and hence 'bargained
collectively* with their employer,collective bargaining
is now a very ambiguous term. In his essay "collective
bargaining" Flanders concludes that it means 'different
( 5)things to different people',  ^ For example, 'many look 
on it as the best way of keeping peace in industry. More 
than a few take the opposite view; for them it is the 
expression of a class struggle with the overthmw of 
capitalism as its ultimate goal'. In his own essay it is 
not clear whether Flanders thinks of collective bargaining 
as the general union-management relationship (the framework 
of collective bargaining), the negotiating procedure(rules 
relating to the conduct of the parties engaged in 
collective bargaining) or the wages and condition structure 
(which comes into existence as the result of collective 
bargaining).
Flanders then quotes the American authority,
John I. Dunlop^^) who states that collective bargaining 
fulfils three purposes; firstly, it establishes the price 
of labour services; secondly, it provides a system of 
industrial jurisprudence by establishing and administering 
conditions, other than wages (my italics), under which wage
(h) See Flanders: 'British Trade Unionism* (19^8), where
he defines collective bargaining as the process 
whereby workpeople, instead of settling individually 
with their employers the conditions of their 
employment, do so jointly through the agency of 
their trade union.
(5) Flanders and Clegg; 'The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain', p.316,
(6) See Routh; 'The Structure of Collective Bargaining* 
Political Quarterly. Jan. 1956, which deals with 
aspects of wage fixation,
(7) Dunlop and Healy; loc.cit., pp.27-28, (Actually 
Dunlop's ideas are very similar to Slichter - see 
later in this section).
earners render their services; and thirdly, it provides 
a mechanism by which employees may be represented in 
decisions that affect their individual and group interests. 
The last statement is not an accurate description of the 
process as the individual and group do not directly 
participate in collective bargaining; only the trade union 
is engaged in collective bargaining, and this state of 
inter-institutional relations is different to one involving 
the relations of a group with its employer. Nor is 
Dunlop's distinction between first and second situations 
correct. As the Ardeer case study shows, no distinction 
in principle can be drawn between the fixation of wages and 
other working conditions ; both are consequences of 
collective bargaining and both are determined by the same 
process. Management has no more prerogative to 
set wages than it has working conditions; the hile of law* 
applies equally to all aspects of union-management 
relations.
Probably the most exhaustive analysis and complete 
synthesis of collective bargaining is made by Chamberlain. 
Chamberlain is concerned with the definition of collective 
bargaining as it is presently found in the United States.
As there is a certain amount of state interference in that 
country, which is absent in the United Kingdom, it is 
material to test whether the theories of collective 
bargaining hold true on both sides of the Atlantic, or 
whether the social mores are such in each country that 
there is a distinctive set of characteristics of collective 
bargaining. For example, in America most collective 
agreements are in written form, they are 'contracts* 
between the parties for a specified duration, and they 
establisheih detai 1 the rules which govern the specific 
working conditions and wages. While written agreements
(8) Chamberlain: loc.cit*
are known in Britain (for instance, the I.C.I. negotiatings 
procedure, the agreement relative to working conditions, 
and the minimum wages agreements covering craftsmen and 
general workers,) it is not usual for all union-management 
rules to be spelt out in a written document. It is 
unuiUal for a written agreement to have a specified life, 
and most agreements are altered at conferences called for 
that specific purpose, and are not subject to full-scale 
bargaining conferences as are known in the U.S.
Chamberlain deals with three theories of collective 
bargaining, which he believes are not mutually exclusive, 
but are inter-related because they all describe some 
aspect of the bargaining process as it developed or 
exists at the moment. 'The marketing theory looks upon 
collective bargaining as a means of contracting for the 
sale of labour, Its justification is its assurance of 
some voice on the part of organised workers in the terms of 
sale. The governmental theory views collective bargaining 
as a constitutional system in industry. It is a political 
relationship. The union shares the sovereignty with 
management over the workers, and as their representative 
uses that power in their interests. The management theory 
regards collective bargaining as a method of business 
management. It is a functional relationship. The union 
joins with the company officials in reaching decisions on 
matters in which both have vital interests'.
Chamberlain then considers the nature of the collective 
agreement. When the collective agreement is viewed as a 
contract. the same objective rules which apply to the 
construction of all commercial contracts are invoked, since 
the union-management relationship is conceived as a 
commercial relationship. If a situation is covered by the
(9) Chamberlain; loc.cit., Chap.6 , especially pp.136-137»
(exact quotes).
terms of agreement, the answer to the specific problem 
is logically dervivative from the agreement. When the 
agreement is regarded as a matter of industrial jurisprud­
ence, its application is governed by a weighing.of the 
relation of the provisions of the agreement to the needs 
and ethics of the particular case. Interpretation of the 
terms follows from the logic of experience and morality, 
so that the agreement becomes in fact moulded to the 
dominant operational needs of both parties and their social 
setting, rather than the reverse. When the agreement 
is looked upon as a set of administrative standards 
providing guidance in areas of managerial discretion, its 
application proceeds from the intent to accomplish certain 
jointly conceived objectives. This is a functional 
conception, and when the terms of the agreement fail to 
achieve that function in a particular case, it is the joint 
objective and not the terms which must c o n t r o l . I n  
describing differences between these descriptions 
Chamberlain appears content to treat them as distinctions 
of emphasis, rather than of kind. This view is open to
question, as one, theory should explain the entire
uhenonema of collective bargaining.
Chamberlain points out that those who follow the 
contractural Interpretation of an agreement are generally 
reluctant to process grievances which fall outside the 
scope of its terms; for the contract represents the whole 
of the bargain struck, and theemployer retains the undiluted 
discretion in, and control over, other matters. To 
submit under union pressure to negotiation or arbitration 
on other issues than cthose embraced in an agreement would 
be to surrender more than the bargain calls for.^H^ At
(10) ibid; pp.156-7 (exact quotes)
(11) This is of more than academic interest; in Canada
the law draws a clear distinction between the 
bargaining of a new contract, and the interpretation 
of -berms in an existing contract; it allows strikes 
under certain conditions in relation to the former, 
but prohibits strikes while an agreement is in its 
currency; see Logan: 'State Intervention and
Assistance in Collective Bargaining' , (Canadian 
Studies in Economics, Wo.6) 1956, and Woods:
once it becomes apparent that the marketing theory and its 
corallory of the agreement as a commercial contract does 
not explain the process of collective bargaining in the 
United Kingdom, iy- for there is no comprehensive
written agreement. Nor are the many agreements reached in 
operation for a specified period of time.
It is open to question whether or not there is such a 
thing as 'bargain' as it is used in the economic or legal 
sense. Do union and management bargain, as do parties in 
arriving at a commercial contract? In every commercial 
contract one party agrees to do something or desists from 
doing something in return for consideration. Consider 
the case of a trade union, when it negotiates an alteration 
of wage rates in a national agreement (such as occurred in 
I.e.I. agreements), what does a union give management in 
return for a increased scale of wages rates? It does not 
offer labour, only its members do this, in any case all 
existing employees are already under individual contract 
with their employer when an agreement comes into effect.
Does consideration refer to the undertaking by a union 
that in future it will process further amendments in 
accordance with a prescribed agreement? If so, this is 
past consideration^^^) for the union is already bound to 
observe the prescribed agreement. Even in the case of 
agreements which call for adaptive behaviour on the part 
of employees, such as when an agreement allows the 
introduction of incentives, there is at best only an implied
undertaking that a union will try to persuade its members
to accept the scheme. If a group of employees refuse to 
accept a scheme they are simply paid less than the maximum 
specified in the agreement. It appears that the commercial
contract and the collective agreement are not the same type
of thing.
(12) See Anson's Law of Contract. (Oxford) 21st Edition.
Although the collective agreement may not he 
similar in nature to a commercial contract, does the 
marketing theory of collective bargaining describe the 
process of collective bargaining? Do the parties haggle 
in the market place? To the extent that they argue over 
standards for determining wages and working conditions, 
there is some similarity between the processes. But if 
collective bargaining is to realise its purpose of 
resolving the differences of the parties, and at the same 
time control the behaviour of the groups of employees, 
standards of equity have to be introduced. In the case 
of bargaining over the terms of a negotiating procedure, 
where there is some element of 'give-and-take', the 
process is not similar to that which precedes the 
commercial contract. The process is not 'so much for 
so much' but which is better or worse in establishing 
orderly relations between the two parties.
In short, a party is not acting in its own interest 
if it refuses to concede a point which would improve 
the operations of the procedure. The idea of 'horse- 
trading' is quite foreign to the idea of effective 
negotiations. To achieve their aims the parties must 
devise a method which is 'right* in the moral sense.
There is a process of compromise in negotiations when 
the parties cannot agree on the standard of equity and 
they 'split their differences' to reach an agreement.
For this to be effective, in the sense that it controls 
behaviour on the workplace floor, the standard of equity 
must be acceptable to all concerned.
The development of a theory of collective bargaining 
as a system of industrial jurisprudence is associated with 
the name of Slichter. Collective bargaining is a method 
of building up a system of 'industrial jurisprudence'. 
'Through the institution of the state, men devise schemes 
of positive law, construct administrative procedures for 
carrying them out, and complement both statute law and
administrative rule with a system of judicial review.
Similarly, laboring men, through unions, formulate policies 
to which they give expression in the form of shop rules 
and practices which are embodied in agreements with 
employers or are accorded less formal recognition and assent 
by management; shop committees, grievance and other means 
are evolved for applying these rules and policies ; rights 
and duties are claimed and recognised. When labor and 
management deal with labor relations analytically and 
systematically after a fashion, it is proper to refer to 
the system as "industrial jurisprudence";' - Slichter 
arrives at this conclusion from a study of job security 
issues including some aspects of incentives and piecework.
He specifically excludes consideration of the price or 
wage-making aspect of collective bargaining as an 
essentially separate s u b j e c t . In the light of the 
analysis of the negotiatings at Ardeer this exclusion is 
incorrect.
Chamberlain develops the ideas of Slichter along the 
following lines, although he does not seem to hold this 
theory to the exclusion of the others. 'The law of this 
system has its several components - constitutional, 
statutory and common law. Its constitutional law is to 
be found in the collective agreement and application, its 
statutory law is in the form of subsidiary or supplementary 
agreements and their application; and its common law 
derives in great measure from the decisions of thearbitrators, 
impartial chairmen and umpires on specific issues not 
provided for in any written rule, though the parties them 
selves assist in its f o r m u l a t i o n ' . (15) 'In the constitutional 
T13) Slichter; Loc.cit., p.l, (exact quotes).
( l b )  I b i d .
(15) Chamberlain; Loc.cit., p.l48.
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or the statutory law of industry the agreement 
establishes the terms of the employee-management 
relationship, and individual cases are governed by those 
terms. In the area of common law, where no written 
standards control, it is the mutual recognition of the 
requirements of morality(1 )^ and the needs of operation 
which provide the basis of decision and ultimately the 
norms of action*.
Chamberlain observes that the distinction between 
the statutory and the common law systems in industry is 
very fine. 'For the interpretation and application of 
the statute must proceed from the same individuals who 
look to the institutional setting for their cue construing 
what actions may reasonably be required of people in their 
relations with each other. The same ethical forces which 
help to determine the common law continue to operate even 
when standards of behaviour are reduced to writing, and 
these serve to hold the law in operation.* ' There 
are two influences at work, seemingly contradictory in 
nature; one, the effort to establish the common rule, 
standards which establish the same liability for reasonable 
behaviour on the part of all within the social unit; the 
other, the reliance upon the logic of the situation rather 
than the logic of the rule to determine cases which seem 
to warrant special treatment even though falling within 
the rule. It is the universalizing as opposed to the 
individualizing principle.’, with sufficient of the latter - 
the extraordinary justice which was the basis for the 
early system of equity - as to make the former more 
acceptable'. (^ 9)
'(Ï6) See also Goodhart; 'The English Common Law and
Moral Law*, (Stevens), 1956.
(17) Chamberlain; Loc.cit., p.l5l.
(18) Chamberlain; Ibid, p.152.
(19) Ibid.
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This account of Chamberlain is particularly good 
of the general nature of collective bargaining. Perhaps 
a more accurate description can be made along the following 
lines. Given the fact that there is no statute law in the 
U.K., and that there is voluntary collective bargaining 
in the liassez-faire sense, collective bargaining can be 
viewed as part of the same social development that gave 
rise to the English common lawi in other words industrial 
society is characterised bv the same social mores as was 
in evidence in British society mam centuries ago. Thus, 
'collective* is only another word for 'common*, in the 
sense that it applies to all, within a group, while 
'bargain* is an 'agreement*, by which all agree to abide 
by an accepted standard. This is simply 'law'. That is 
to say collective bargaining is common law.- The bargain 
establishes on moral grounds certain obligations which 
each party is required to observe. The adherence to this 
law relies not the use of power, which is so much be­
laboured in Industrial relations literature, but on the 
sense of obligation. There can be no doubt that 
collective bargaining is a system of industrial 
jurisprudence, that this is so in, the United Kingdom or 
in other parts of the world where it exists.
It is now possible to define precisely the exact
( 21)
nature of collective bargaining. In terms of social theory.
(3) Collective bargaining is not the only system of 
Union-management relations. In Canada the law 
greatly modifies the institution of collective 
bargaining, through compulsory conciliation, 
and in Australia there is state regulation of 
industrial relations based largely on compulsory 
arbitration. See the Author's treatise: 
'Canadian and Australian Industrial Relations;
A Comparative Study of Half a Century of 
Legislative and Regulative Interference in Union- 
Management Relations in Two countries*.
(21) See T.T. Paterson's 'A Methetic Theory of Social 
Organisation', (University of Glasgow), 1957*
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collective bargaining is an institution, which has as its 
purpose the government of relations between union and 
management. Its function, through which its purpose 
is achieved, is to establish rights and obligations for 
union and management and their respective members. These 
rights and obligations are set out in explicit and 
recognisable forms, that is, they are structured in a 
formal way. The rights and obligations relate to general 
rules governing the method by which union and management 
are to lay down future rights and obligations, and to 
specific rules which cover special subjects such as wages, 
hours of work, incentives, and other working conditions.
The method by which the function of collective bargaining 
is achieved is known as negotiation. The 'process* of 
collective bargaining is therefore synominous with 
negotiation.
Collective bargaining realises its purpose of 
resolving the conflict of union and management when 
negotiation is effective. Collective bargaining fails 
when it does not achieve its purpose of governing the 
relations of union and management in an orderly way.
Such a breakdown in the institution of collective bargaining 
is due to ineffective negotiations. Unions and managements 
then resort to more primitive relations, in the sense that 
these are disruptive to orderly behaviour. Thus, industrial 
anarchy is a consequence of a failure of collective 
bargaining, industrial anarchy takes two main forms, a 
strike or arbitary behaviour by management. Arbitary
action by management is in direct conflict with the 
purpose of collective bargaining, for the latter is largely 
directed to control the arbitary actions of management.
A strike,on the other hand, can have goal similar to that 
of collective bargaining, that is, it may aim at establishing 
a right at the expense of curtailing managerial prerogatives. 
Indeed, * the right to strike' is really a corruption of the 
original cry 'strike for the right* - a right to an
equitable share in society's production, a right to be 
rewarded for skill, the right to be treated with human 
dignity and with justice* Although a strike may have a 
similar purpose to collective bargaining, so far as a 
union is concerned, it is fundamentally a different state 
in union-management relations. Although the threat of 
strike or arbitary action on the part of management may 
spur union and management to reach agreement in 
negotiations, neither can be regarded as part of the 
institution of collective b a r g a i n i n g , (22)
(22) In their attempt to show that an indeterminate state 
of industrial relations results from the suspension 
of the right to strike, some Canadian writers 
dangerously assert that the strike is inherently 
part of collective bargaining; this is not so.
See Phillips 'Government Conciliation in Labour 
Disputes', Canadian Journal of Economic and 
Political Science. 1956. and Woods; Loc.cit.
Section 3 Factors leading to Peace and Conflict
Collective bargaining realizes its purpose when it
provides for the establishment of orderly relations
between union and management. This eliminates conflict
in industry. The question arises; are there any
conditions which determine whether or not collective
bargaining is a success or failure? This question may
be answered from general knowledge of the behaviour of
( 21)social institutions. A social institution to function
effectively depends on the existence of a number of 
prerequisite conditions: the acceptance of common
beliefs, values and definitions amongst the members of 
the institution, the maintenance of order, the motivation 
of those who have roles to play in the maintenance of 
the institution, an adequate communication system, and 
the protection of the institution against the encroachment 
of other institutions and forces that may disrupt its 
work. It is the task of this section to examine all but 
the last of these pieiequisitet conditions in relation to 
the institution of collective bargaining.
The two members of the institution of collective 
bargaining are union and management, • Unfortunately, the 
history of union-management relations is such that there 
is a wide gulf between the beliefs of union and management. 
Many managements regard unions with suspicion, believing 
that unions are seeking to limit managerial prerogatives, 
and even to eliminate management itself. Unions tend to 
regard managements with distrust due to past events which 
were characterised by injustice and arbitrariness. 
Managements tend to favour the liberalism of laissez-faire, 
while unions tend to support collectivism. Managements 
are production-centred and unions are orientated to 
social relations.
(23) Schnieder; 'Industrial Sociology* (McGraw-Hill)
1957.
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Some of the beliefs held by union and management are 
due to the inability of each to perceive their's and each 
other's roles in the industrial system. This is a 
consequence of the failure of those who determine policies 
in union and management to see the true purpose and 
function of collective bargaining as an Institution, Some 
of the beliefs are the reflection of a real difference in 
the interests of union and management. For example, a 
union is necessarily interested in Increasing wages and 
improving working conditions, both of which are bound to 
lead to some increase in labour cost - a situation which 
does not usually meet with management's approval. This 
does not mean that management is bound to oppose every 
demand for increased wages or improved working conditions.
But there is a propensity for the interests of the parties 
to conflict.
It is worth noting, however, that there is a natural 
limitation to the demands that a union can make on a 
management. If its wage demand is too high then the 
security of the jobs of its members is endangered, and 
this is detrimental to one of its main goals . A union
may not see the consequences of its own actions; this is 
likely to happen when there are wide, rather than narrow 
collective bargaining frameworks.  ^ Where a single
management and a single union make up the collective 
bargaining framework, there is much greater likelihood 
that the parties see that their interests are mutual.
For example, the collective frameworks established by 
I.e.I. did a great deal to reduce the conflict of interests 
of the parties engaged in negotiations. The wider frame­
works, particularly those established in the period after 
the first world war, led to greater uniformity in wage 
- m i  TbT.
For some problems of the width of bargaining frameworks, 
see Roberts : 'National Wages Policy, in War and
Peace' (Allen & Unwin) 195o«
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rates and working conditions. To this extent, the
reduction of inter-regional and intra-occupational wage
differentials provided for greater wage justice on a
national plane. At the same time the wider frameworks
intensified the conflict of interests of the parties, and
destroyed the mutual interests that could exist between
managements and their employees.
In the final analysis the point of union-management
conflict and mutual interest lies in the employment of
union members by management. Indeed, the only common
interest that binds union and management in the institution
of collective bargaining is the need to establish a social
order which allows production and employment to take place.
Conflicts of interest arise over the details of the social
order, that is over the terms of employment. ' The
question immediately arises : is it possible for two
institutions, union and management with substantial
conflict in interests, and with concern for the material
outcome of the negotiations, to sit down and behave
judicially as is required if negotiations are to be
effective? In many union-management relations collective
bargaining fails because the parties allow their conduct
to be influenced by their separate, rather than their
mutual interests. However, the Ardeer case proves -
after examining over two hundred disputes - that the
parties can behave judicially. In other words, it is
possible for the parties to overlook what appears to be
their short-term interests in favour of long-term interests
of building a stable social order in the workplace.
T2F) There is no rule as to the width of the collective 
bargaining framework should be. Relations between 
union and management are sometimes peaceful when the 
framework is industry-wide, for example, the clothing 
industry in Quebec, Canada. The failure to create 
a reasonably wide collective bargaining framework in 
the construction industry in British Columbia led to 
industrial discontent. See Woods: 'Patterns of
Industrial Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian 
Industries’, (McGill University) 1958,
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An institution to function effectively depends on 
the. maintenance of order; this is dependant on an 
appropriate authoritarian structure, a system of division 
of labour,definition of differentiated roles, and a status 
system for the positions of authority in the institution.
The pecularities of collective bargaining becomes apparent 
when it is realised tha.t the elements of this formal 
structure appear to be absent. In the main collective 
bargaining relies on the formal structures of two other 
institutions for maintaining order, particularly in regard 
to the discharge of the obligations laid down in the 
agreements.
The agreements reached by negotiations which set 
out the rights and obligations of the parties, are the 
formal arrangements which contain the instrument of 
authority of collective bargaining. The importance of the 
negotiating procedure to the process of collective 
bargaining immediately becomes apparent. The negotiating 
procedure lays do\m rules as to how the two parties are to 
behave in the event of conflict arising between them. The
existence of a well-structured negotiating procedure is 
of vital importance to the maintenance of order in the 
relations of the parties. It is essential that the parties 
allow their conduct to be regulated by law. The 
negotiating procedure for this reason has to be detailed. 
There is no reason to suppose that the legalistic nature 
of the negotiating procedure tends to confuse the parties 
in solving the problems that are found in the workplace.
The existence of a negotiating procedure is nrimae facie 
evidence that the parties intend to act according to rules.
The negotiating procedure does not, of course,set out
all the rules relating to the conduct of negotiations, many 
other rules are laid down in the agreements on specific 
subjects such as incentives, piece work, promotion and 
demotion.
(26) cf. Sharp: 'Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration'
(Allen and Unwin), 1950, p.b^5? and,
Golden and Parker: 'Causes of Industrial Peace*
(Harper) ,1955» p.W#
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The institution of collective bargaining has little 
or no control over the human officials responsible for 
carrying on the work of collective bargaining* Agreements 
reached by collective bargaining usually lay dovm rights 
and obligations with respect to union and management, and 
not in relation to their officials. There is an exception 
to this in the negotiating procedure which specifies 
differentiated roles for certain officials, such as the 
labour officer and the local union official, but if the 
particular personalities fail to cope with their taskq they 
are punished hot by collective bargaining but by their 
respective organisation. However, other officials in 
union and management, not mentioned in the negotiating 
procedure, have roles to play in the maintenance of the 
work of collective bargaining. Thus, the full structure 
of division of labour is not to be found in any of the 
formal arrangements of the collective bargaining institution 
itself. The division of labour and the role structure 
are to be found in union and management. In a not 
dissimilar manner, the status of officials engaged in 
collective bargaining derive their formal status principally 
from their own organisation. Sometimes, the status of a 
particular group of officials, may originally come from 
collective bargaining, for example, the recognition of shop 
stewards in the I.G.I. agreement. The general improvement 
of status of the personnel officer in management is largely 
attributable to the development of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining does exert some direct control 
over the behaviour of the officials who take part in the 
actual negotiations. Apart from the specific provisions 
laid down in the agreement the officials observe certain 
conventions. These conventions may be such that they are 
almost part of the formal arrangements of collective 
bargaining. For example, the way the parties sit in 
conference and argue may be sufficiently standardised as 
to be almost rules to regulate their conduct. There are
many informal relations between the officials, for 
example, the personal relations between the parties, 
whether or not they engage in off-the-record discussions, 
and whether they know that they can rely on each other's 
word. Collective bargaining may even become an informal 
method for removing officials either in management or 
union by the inter-play of politics. Informal arrangements 
may in some cases disrupt the work of collective bargaining, 
at other times the informal arrangements may help collective 
bargaining.
For collective bargaining to function effectively in 
laying doim rights and obligations for union and management, 
the latter institutions must perceive their own roles and 
those of each other in such a way that the roles are 
effectively discharged. Thus, a management which 
perceives a union's role as an intervenor, and not as a 
participant in formulating rules relating to working 
conditions, may frustrate the union in its pprpose, and 
may cause it to be aggressive in its behaviour towards 
management. In some situations, however, it is often 
desirable for a union to remain an intervenor, rather than 
a participant; for example, when a job is evaluated or 
timed for work measurement p u r p o s e s , union's 
legitimate role may change from situation to situation; 
for example, it may challenge work assignments and loads 
when time rates of pay are in force, but as soon as incent­
ives are introduced it has to participate in the fixation 
of those assignments and loads. However, a union, by its 
very nature, cannot take over the task of supervising,#;his 
is clearly a function of management. In other words there 
are limitations to which roles each institution may play, 
and these limitations must be recognised by both, if 
collective bargaining is to succeed.
(27) cf. Harle: 'The Role of Trade Unions in
increasing Productivity', Political- Quarterly. 
January, 1956.
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An adequate communication system is needed to allow 
collective bargaining to function effectively. The 
negotiating procedure is not only an orderly way of 
conducting the process of collective bargaining, it is 
also a communication system. If the rules are carefully 
laid down there is less liklihood of the parties falling 
into communication pitfalls. For this reason the I.C.I. 
agreement set the steps of the procedure out clearly and 
in detail. Emphasis was placed in resolving the disputes 
as near to the workplace as possibles and for stating 
the problem clearly, and for transmitting the resulting 
agreement to the attention of the work force. The most 
effective messages were conveyed when these were in terms 
of rights and obligations. Messages were much less 
effective when they were in general terms of information, 
such as the brochures on job evaluation and work study, 
because they were less meaningful to union members.
In order for communication to be adequate, for 
institutional roles to be properly perceived, and for 
effective means to be determined for reaching the objectives 
of particular negotiations, the personalities involved in 
the bargaining process have to be competent to cope with 
their roles. The Importance of personalities in the union 
is mentioned in the concluding chapter, particularly in 
relation to the law-enforcement function of a union. The 
Ardeer case study suggests that management officials determine 
to a considerable extent the success or failure of the 
particular series of negotiations. A management negotiator 
to adequately discharge his role needs to have considerable 
knowledge of union-management relations in general, a 
specific knowledge of the history of relations on all 
subjects likely to come into dispute, a general knowledge 
of trade union behaviour and of informal group behaviour 
of employees, and an ability to foresee the repercussions 
of his arguments and joint decisions on the behaviour 
of work groups, union and management officials. Although
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no doubt there are many successful negotiators with 
varying personalities, certain qualities such as basic 
honesty to inspire confidence are essential for the 
management official to perform adequately in his 
difficult task of persuading his counterparts in the 
union to come to agreement. In the final analysis the 
principal management official must personify and uphold 
the principle of rule of law in industry.
Summing up, it appears that collective bargaining 
lacks certain well defined prerequisite conditions which 
permit a social institution to reach its goals without 
disruption and instability. In the first place, far from 
having common beliefs, values and definitions its two 
members, union and management, have separate interests, 
different norms of behaviour and suspicions of each other's 
intentions. In the second place, while there is an 
authoritarian structure in the form of agreements reached 
in negotiations, the institution of collective bargaining 
has no officials to enforce its orders. It has no way 
of punishing those humans responsible for not maintaining 
it. The division of labour, differentiated role and 
status structure are generally absent from the formal 
structure of collective bargaining; instead collective 
bargaining relies on the formal structures of union and 
management to maintain it. The communication system is 
likely to be fouled because of the failure of the parties 
to perceive their roles in collective bargaining. It 
follows that collective bargaining is difficult to maintain. 
and, functions effectively only in special conditions. 
which are defined at the end of the next section,
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Section h Difficulties in the Negotiating Process
The Ardeer case showed that many difficulties beset 
the negotiating process. Some negotiations were 
characterised by strain which hindered the objective of 
negotiations being reached. Some negotiations were 
disrupted, in the smise that the negotiations collapsed 
or were unable to make progress for an interval of time. 
Finally, some negotiations broke down, in the sense that 
they did not reach agreement, or reached an agreement 
which was unacceptable to the groups in the factory. As 
these negotiations were ineffective it followed that 
collective bargaining failed to achieve its purpose.
Was there one dominant reason for the ineffectiveness of the 
negotiations? It is the task of this section to explore 
this question.
Negotiations became strained and disrupted when the 
parties failed to communicate. For example, in 1951 the 
parties discussed certain amendments to the negotiating 
procedure, and the Company agreed to certain proposals of 
the Signatory Unions , only to find tiiat a mistake had 
been made in the original claim. Negotiations were 
disrupted, and the parties were forced to retrace their 
steps when they learnt of the error. Again, in the 
negotiations with the A.E.U. in 1935 the Company mistook 
the proposal of the union; the A.E.U, wanted a negotiating 
procedure to process disagreements about wages claims, and 
was offered instead a national wages agreement. The 
negotiations would have broken down entirely had the 
delegates of the A.E.U. refused the Company's offer - its 
proposal was accepted by a majority of one vote. The 
minority of delegates saw the Company's proposal as not 
being in their interest.
Negotiations became subject to strain when one of the 
parties failed to realise the consequences of its or the 
other’s parties proposals. In the case cited above, the 
A.E.U. signed its wages agreement in company with other 
engineering unions. But it did not discover the 
consequences of this until the following year when it 
sought an alteration in the rates. It found that it did 
not have an exclusive agreement with I.C.I, At the time 
of the signing of the agreement the union officials had 
told their delegates from I.C.I* factories thâ their wages 
were not tied to any other craft, when in actual fact they 
were. No disruption occurred over this mistake for the 
A.E.U. agreed, after one Gilbertian act, to join other 
unions in negotiations with the Company, Had the A.E.U. 
decided that it was not morally bound to accept the 
agreement, because it did not understand its full implicat­
ions, negotiations would have been abortive. This example 
was more than the result of faulty communication; it 
clearly involved conflicting interests of the parties.
Negotiations about the negotiating procedure were 
also subject to strain and disruption because of the 
refusal of the unions to recognise the Company's works 
council scheme. This strain and disruption was a direct 
result of the development of a status situation. In 1938 
the Signatory unions had rejected a negotiating procedure 
proposed by the Company because it included works 
councillors andworks councils and did not recognise shop 
stewards. In 19^7 the Company demanded the acceptance of 
the works council scheme, not because it added anything 
to the proposed negotiating procedure, but simply as a 
'price' for recognising shop stewards. This was 
negotiating for the sake of status, rather than for 
establishing the best possible negotiating procedure. 
Consequently, the signing of the negotiating procedure 
was held up for another six months - after six years of 
frustration by the Company. The issue was unresolved in
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1938 because the Company officials did not make a clear 
distinction between joint consultation and the negotiating 
procedure, so their methods of reaching objectives were 
astray.
The most fruitless series of conferences were those 
relating to work study. Part of the trquble lay in faulty 
communication; the union officials did not really 
understand how work study fitted into the union-management 
pattern, while management talked of work study instead of 
incentives. Part of the trouble lay in the negotiators 
failing to decide a means to reach an end; the unions did 
not make any specific claims, and the company did not 
assist them in realising their aims. Most of the trouble 
lay in the conflict of interests; some of the unions did 
not want their rank and file to accept incentives, and the 
Company did not want to concede any fresh terms for workers 
accepting incentives. As a consequence the parties did 
not really negotiate, they did not try to lay down rights 
and obligations for introducing and maintaining Incentives. 
In a sense they did not genuinely negotiate, they did not 
reach their real points of disagreement, and hence they 
did not reach agreement. As a result the Company conceded 
practically no real conditions, and the unions in turn 
gave a hazily worded resolution which did not obligate 
members of unions to accept incentives based on work study. 
In short, these conferences were not negotiations, but 
consultations. Consultations did not involve decision­
making on the part of union and management and for this 
reason were completely ineffective for they did not change 
the refusal of workers to accept incentives.
Negotiations, when they resulted in effective 
agreement authorised those in formal positions of authority 
in both union and management to do certain acts. This 
authorisation not only gave certain officials the right 
to act, it also obligated them to act in a certain way. 
Thus, the terms of the decision reached at negotiations
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were transmitted by the formal organisations of management 
and union to their members at the workplace and it was this 
transmission of authority that controlled the behaviour of 
the union members, who were also the employees of management, 
In the case of consultations, such as occurred over work 
study, these were not transmitted by way of the formal 
lines of authority of union and management. The Company 
produced a brochure, which was distributed to its 
employees, but this did not have the same effect on their 
behaviour as when union officials reported on the terms 
an agreement* The union officials did not report their 
consultations to their members in order to persuade them 
to accept incentive schemes.
Evidence at Ardeer suggested that negotiations were 
subject to disruption and breakdown due to the fact that 
there had been no previous negotiations on a subject.
For example, the absence of rules to cover possible 
displacement led the craft groups to refuse incentive 
schemes. The failure of unions and Company to arrive at 
a national agreement which installed job evaluation as a 
method for determining job rates led to the rejection of 
this method at Ardeer. The fact that job rates had 
remained unaltered in the blasting department for many 
years led to discontent amongst the men on the old side, 
which was one of the underlying reasons for the 195^ 0 strike. 
The absence of job evaluation as an accepted method of 
settling wage differentials was a prime reason why 
negotiations were strained and disrupted after the 1950 
strike and the 1954 'go-slow*. In short, the failure 
of the parties to set up adequate terms of reference led 
to strain, disruption and breakdown in negotiations at a 
later stage*
.The triggering of the actual stoppages on the old 
side in 1950 and on the mechanised in 1954 were not 
directly the result of underlying dissatisfactions. The
triggering took place because of emotional tension generated
by accidents and breaches of faith by management, as the
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employees saw them. The actions of the men were in 
defiance of theprovisions of the negotiating procedure.
While the negotiating procedure was of the utmost importance 
for establishing orderly conduct between the parties, it 
was by no means the total set of references for the parties. 
If there were no sets of reference for specific subjects, 
such as on job evaluation or for regulating changes in 
work load, the rules were insufficient for regulating 
employee conduct. When employees were required to make 
considerable adjustment in their behaviour the provisions 
of the negotiating procedure were insufficient to control 
behaviour. Observance of provisions of the negotiating 
procedure in the minds of the employee groups were too 
distant as a means of settling their grievance. Thus, it 
was possible for short term conduct to be disorderly, while 
in the long term behaviour was conditioned to observance 
of the negotiating procedure.
The 'go-slow' on the mechanised unit in 1954 was the 
result of disorganisation in management; line management 
promised something to its employees when it had no authority 
to do so. The maintenance of collective bargaining as an 
institution lay in the hands of those not directly involved 
in the negotiating procedure. Those directly responsible 
for negotiations were then required to restore the authority 
of collective bargaining; this they found was extremely 
difficult to do, partly due to conflicting methods of 
achieving ends, and to a clash of interests between the 
parties as management did not wish to concede a wage 
increase which paid jobs more than rates assessed by 
job evaluation.
The subsequent 'go-slow' on the old side occurred 
under different conditions; it was direcly attributable to 
the decision of those directly involved in the negotiating 
process. The negotiators did not see the consequences of 
their own actions; the conflict of interests, particularly 
the desire of management to restrict the wage increase, had
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a great deal to do with the behaviour of the negotiators. 
Changing the status of the work groups in the management 
organisation was the trigger for setting off the 'go-slow*; 
the position was repaired when increased rates were given 
to improve the status of the men on the old side. Thus 
the status of the parties, the negotiators and officials 
of union and management, and the work groups were 
significant to collective bargaining, even though 
collective bargaining had no status structure. For this 
reason the ritual of discussing a seemingly irrelevant 
matter of work loads to save the face of the men was of 
considerable importance in restoring the prestige of 
officials and groups in union and management. For 
similar reasons it was highly commendable that negotiations 
were reopened even though the men had not resumed work at 
the proper pace.
Some of the greatest difficulties that confronted 
negotiators were over piecework and Incentive schemes.
The failure of the work study conferences to elucidate the 
very vague clause in the agreement on working conditions 
placed considerable strain on local negotiations. This clause 
ostensibly set out the relationship between earnings and 
effort, but in actual fact it did little to solve problems 
both at the time of installation of the schemes and when 
conditions c,hanged. Time study was designed to solve 
this problem, but sometimes the studies were not accepted 
by the operatives who insisted that they were working at 
a suitable pace. In such a situation there was a clash 
of interests between the parties, which was only resolvable 
if the parties made scrupulous efforts to be equitable in 
their consideration of the dispute.
($) None of these negotiators were punished by
collective bargaining, but some officials may 
have lost status in their respective institutions 
Fear of possible loss of status was no doubt the 
reason for the emotional behaviour of officials 
at the time of the stoppage.
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The Ardeer case also showed that collective bargaining 
was disrupted by external factors such as technological 
change. This was evident after the installation of the 
mechanised unit which touched off patterns of insecurity 
particularly amongst the female piece-workers. The piece 
rates offered were frequently rejected by the operatives, and 
in the case of one rate management installed it without 
approval of the union or operatives. This was a breach of 
the rules of collective bargaining, and as a result, a new 
set of references supplementary to the negotiating 
procedure were introduced. This procedure was not adopted 
in the case of disputes affecting the mechanised unit; the 
practice was to refer a dispute to another local conference. 
These procedures did not eliminate a clash of interests 
between the parties, but mitigated the conflict in so far 
as both parties strived vainly to find a standard which the 
other party would find acceptable.
The empirical evidence showed that communication 
difficulties and failure of the parties to work out an 
appropriate method to reach their objectives were reasons 
why negotiatbns were sometimes rendered ineffective.
However, the most important reason was the clash of 
interests between the parties, and this clash was of such 
importance that even communication difficulties were 
sometimes the result of a clash of interests. In other 
words, the parties saw a clash of interests in situations 
of bad communication, where in actual fact there was no 
need to do so. Where a party failed to work out a method 
appropriate for reaching an objective in negotiations, the 
resulting confusion was interpreted as a clash of interests 
of the parties.
How then were the parties to avoid such difficulties?
The only method was for the parties to behave judicially, 
in the sense that they came to an impartial decision, within
proper terms of reference previously laid dom. which
established equitable rights and obligations. This was
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attempted at Ardeer, with the result that confidence 
existed between the parties; as a consequence real and 
Illusory clashes of interests were reduced to a minimum. 
It made communication easier and the determination of 
methods of reaching objectives in negotiations more 
straight forward. If one or both parties allowed their 
conduct to be governed by their immediate self interests 
a situation of strain, disruption and breakdom in 
negotiations became a strong possibility.
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Section 5 External Forces and Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is an institution which governs 
the relations of two other institutions, union and management; 
thus, three institutions are involved. Due to the type 
of inter-institutional relationship which exists between 
union and management, collective bargaining is extremely 
vulnerable to disruption from external factors. At this 
stage of the analysis, it is reasonable to assume that 
either union or management, or both, can upset the 
institution of collective bargaining. This assumption 
turns out to be false,; it is management's behaviour which 
determines whether or not the institution of collective 
bargaining: is to function effectively, in the sense that 
collective bargaining realises its purpose of governing 
the relations between union and management. It is the 
1ask of this section to deal with this very contentious 
conclusion.
Before proceeding with the analysis it is desirable to 
define a factor which is endogenous to collective bargaining 
and one which is exogenous. The formal arrangements of 
collective bargaining including negotiating procedure and 
the agreements relating to wages and working conditions are 
endogeneous factors. If a change is made in the set of 
references by which the parties conduct their negotiations, 
for example by altering the method of payment from hourly 
rates to incentive or piece rates, this is clearly a 
factor endogenous to collective bargaining. A dispute 
arises when one or both parties desire to change these 
formal arrangements. The more stable the formal 
arrangements the less disputes, and hence the less strain 
is likely to take place in collective bargaining. At 
Ardeer, the post-war period was one of considerable change 
in the formal arrangements and for this reason alone many 
disputes arose.
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The desire of one of the parties to alter the formal 
arrangements is due to the pressure of some change taking 
place in its social structure. On the management side 
one of the most important of these pressures is change 
due to technological progress. A rapid change in 
technological progress is bound to be followed by serious 
adjustment patterns when the security of the jobs or 
earnings of the employees is threatened. For this 
reason the most important single event that occurred in 
the post-war peüod at Ardeer was the establishment of the 
mechanised unit in the largest department of the factory. 
Other departments, which were not drastically re-organised 
in the post-war period, did not experience the same 
stress and strain; consequently the work of collective 
bargaining was not disrupted in these departments.
Both management and the union are forced to adjust 
to changes taking place in the general economic and social 
enfironment. Rising costs of living and rising prices of 
raw materials are respective stimuli on the social structure 
of union and management; both are external to union and 
management, and to the institution of collective bargaining. 
Their impact is only felt in collective bargaining when 
a formal dispute arises between union and management and 
requires negotiation to resolve it. The respective
interests of the parties are really external to the 
institution of collective bargaining, but their method 
of resolving conflicts of interests by acting judicially 
through the process of negotiation is endogeneous to the 
institution of collective bargaining.
It is obvious that many disputes arise because 
of response in the social structures of one or both 
parties due to the stimuli of social and economic factors. 
For this reason narrow, rather than wide collective 
bargaining frameworks may (but not always) eliminate some 
of the need for the social structures of the parties to 
react to external factors. It also follows that when
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collective bargaining frameworks are stable for many 
years the 'social structures of the two parties supporting 
the framework of collective bargaining become adjusted to 
each other, thus giving rise to definite formal and 
informal arrangements in collective bargaining. The 
more the frameworks alter the more adjustment is needed 
in the formal arrangements in collective bargaining, and in 
the social structures of the parties.
Failure to distinguish between endogenous and
exogenous forces tends to cloud some of the controversial
issues arising in the studies of collective bargaining*
On reflection it soon becomes apparent that the so-called
•socio-economic’ environment is of more relevance to
management behaviour rather than that of the union.
For example, the size of the workplace, the production
pattern, the degree of technological change, the state of
demand, cost factors, location, and the type of labour
used, are all directly related to the social structure
of management or to its environment. Indirectly, some
of these factors may affect the social structure of a
union or its behaviour, but the reaction is by way of
the behaviour of management. Even the basis of the craft
union evolves from the occupational structure found in the
organisation of work by management. There are some
social and economic forces which call for adjustment of
union behaviour, but generally these are fewer and more
diffused than those that bear on the social structure of
management. For this reason management behaviour is
much moreresponsive and articulate to the external 
and
environment/is critical in the relation to the source of
dispute. This is borne out by experience at Ardeer,
where by far the largest number of disputes emanated from
pressures on management and the need for it to adjust.
(20) cf. Clark Kerr: 'The Collective Bargaining
Environment' in Golden and Parker: loc.cit. See
also Dubin: The World of Work* (Prentice-Hill) 1958*
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It is reasonable to suppose that certain economic 
environments favour the adjustment af management and hence 
assist collective bargaining to realise its purpose, while 
other environments are unfavourable to management's 
adjustment and hence prejudice the chances of collective 
bargaining realising its purpose. Empirical evidence 
does not seem to support these a priori assumptions.
For example, different states of union-management relatons 
are to be found in industries charactelsed respectively 
by small, medium or large-scale units of enterprise. 
Different firms in the same industry, or the same industry 
in different countries enjoy different states of union- 
management r e l a t i o n s . ^ E v e n  the employment of casual 
labour is not always associated with conflict in union- 
management relations, The N.PA survey covering a number 
of companies in the United States concludes that 'external 
factors do not necessarily predetermine the nature of a 
collective bargaining relationship; environmental factors 
set limits, but within these limits the parties are free 
to create a bad relationship or a good one'.^^O)
It is sometimes asserted that industrial giants, when 
they set patterns of wages and working conditions, are 
particularly vulnerable to the clash of conflicting 
interests. On the other hand it is stated that moderately 
sized plants and pattern-following tends to dampen the 
conflict of interests of the parties. ^ 1^) Ardeer was a 
large factory, for all intents and purposes was located 
in a one-industry town. It was a pattern-follower of key
(29) See Woods : 'Patterns of Industrial Dispute
Settlement in Five Canadian Industries', and 
compare Walker: 'Industrial Relations in
Australia', (Harvard) 1956,
(30>) Clark Kerr: Loc.cit.
(31) Golden and Parker: Loc.cit.
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wages and working conditions laid down in national
agreements; nevertheless it had considerable autonomy
to resolve disputes at the factory level. Ardeer was
part of a much larger industrial society, I.C.I. This
company was a 'pattern-setter', and part of the success
of collective bargaining at Ardeer must be attributed
to the fact that I.C.I.*s personnel and labour policy was
an innovating one. To the date of this research, no
national industrial dispute had shaken the Company.
Nor did I.C.I. as a monopolist in many parts of the
chemical industry 'buy* industrial peace; this was
achieved ohly through collective bargaining. There is
therefore no indication that large companies are prone
to unsuccessful collective bargaining.
Nor is there any apparent relationship between the
state of union-management relations and ownership of the
enterprise. The Manchester Ship Canal Company, a public
body, did not enjoy peaceful industrial relations,
although much of the trouble in the Manchester Docks
apparently lay in the dock labour system. London
Transport, a public board, did not have markedly different
(33)relations to those existing in private industry. In
the post-war period, the nationalised railway and mining 
industries had considerable conflict in union-management 
relations. The assumption once held by many unions, that 
the difficulties in union-management relations were to be 
found in the private ownership of enterprise, was not 
sustained by the post-war experience in the U.K.
Indeed, far from solving union-management conflict the 
nationalisation of industries became dominated by labour 
t r o u b l e s .(35) By contrast union-management relations in 
I.C.I. in general, and Ardeer in particular, were good due 
to the success of collective bargaining.
(32) 'The Dock Worker' (The University of Liverpool Press) 
(1954).
(33) Clegg: (Labour Relations in London Transport*, 
(Blackwell), 1950.
(34) Speroi 'Labour Relations in British Nationalised 
Industry', (M.Y.Uni.Press) 1955.
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If the socio-economic factors are not the determinant 
cause of successful collective bargaining, and hence peace 
in industry, what is? By far the most important factor 
is the behaviour of management in respect to the union 
and collective bargaining, and in respect to its employees. 
The N.P.A, survey lists the first and most important 
factor: full acceptance by management of the collective
bargaining process and of unionism as an institution.
When management refuses to recognise the role of the 
trade union in collective bargaining conflict in union- 
management relations is Inevitable. In such a
situation it may be a misnomer to call the relations of 
union and management as collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining only exists where the union-management 
relationship is characterised by the judicial behaviour 
of management and union in resolving their differences.
This system of union-management relations is dependent 
on management accepting the obligations laid down bv 
agreement: in short, collective bargaining to work
effectively is mainly dependent on mapaabrialJbebaviour.
At Ardeer the unions were accepted by management, thus 
paving the way for the establishment of industrial peace.
A management does not discharge its entire 
responsibilities in the field of personnel by recognising 
a trade union as a participant. It has other respons­
ibilities in the way that it carries out its day to day 
task. Line management is largely responsible for good 
leadership of the work groups, and for their high morale. 
For this reason good 'human relations *(37) is an 
important ingredient for the social structure of management 
to work in the interests of the enterprise. A personnel 
programme
(36) See Golden and Parker; Loc.cit. (However, the 
N.P.A. theory includes other factors which are not 
crucial in determining the state of union 
management relations).
(37) See McGregor: 'The Influence of Attitudes and
Policies’ in Golden and Parker: Loc.cit.
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devised and implemented by a special staff department 
is only a framework within which the work of the human
( 3 8 )
beings in the organisation can be directed and co-ordinated. 
If by chance supervisors are ill-trained and poor leaders, 
informal groups may express discontent about their 
treatment, even to the point of a spontaneous stoppage. In 
such a situation the union has the task of repairing the 
damage, and seeing that the obligations of the employees 
are discharged. Ultimately, management is responsible 
for seeing that law and order are maintained in its 
workplaces. This was done at Ardeer.
(38) Rigors and Myers: 'Personnel Administration*,
(McGraw-Hill).
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Section 6 Comparison with Joint Consultation
It is the task of this section to examine briefly 
the relationship of joint consultation with collective 
bargaining, in particular to test the contention that 
joint consultation is complementary to collective 
bargaining in the maintenance of peace in union-management 
relations. For this purpose it is necessary to look at 
the functions of joint consultation and compare them to 
those of collective bargaining. From this comparative 
analysis it is possible to assess their relative 
effectivenesses in maintaining peace in industry! As 
I.C.I. and Ardeer have experience in joint consultation 
reference is made to the empirical data drawn from those 
sources.
The I.C.I. Works Council Scheme was established 
shortly after the Company came into being. This works 
council scheme provided for joint consultation machinery 
between various levels’of the management hierarchy and 
representatives elected from amongst the operatives.
Works councils were organised in the various factories and 
workplaces under I.C.I. ownership. The joint consultation 
machinery also covered the divisions of I.C.I. These 
divisional works councils were composed of representatives 
drawn from the works councils under the control of a 
particular division. In addition, there was a Company- 
wide works council which was composed of representatives 
of the divisional councils. Each level of the works 
council scheme had certain prerogatives and defined 
jurisdictions. A formal constitution set out the powers, 
duties and functions of each council.
The objectives of the I.C.I. works council scheme were 
threefold: firstly, to give employees a wider interest
in, and a greater responsibility, for the conditôns under 
which their work was performed; secondly, to provide a 
recognised and direct channel of communication between the 
employees and the management on matters directly affecting
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their joint or several interests; and thirdly, to promote 
throughout every works a spirit of co-operation in serving 
the efficiency of that works and the contentment of the 
employees engaged therein.
A works council was established in Ardeer a few years 
after it was taken over by I.C.I. Research at Ardeer 
showed tht the first objective of the works council was 
not realised; the works councils did not deal with many 
matters which were employment conditions , The works
council dealt with relatively minor matters - 'cantèens and
latrines*, as many employees expressed it. The ordinal
scope of the works councils was limited by collective
bargaining which was responsible for determining most of the 
important working conditions . Indeed, this limitation 
was explicitly recognised by the agreement relative to the 
negotiating procedure. However, collective bargaining 
could handle only those working conditions which could be 
expressed in 'legal* terms, and about which explicit rules 
could be drawn. Where some aspect of a working condition, 
such as the placement of a drinking tap, was incapable 
of expression in legal terms - it was left to the deter­
mination by management. In this latter situation it was 
possible and correct for the works council to make its 
representations on the prerogatives of management.
In other words, under the social system as it 
prevailed in I.C.I., discussions about employment 
conditions in I.C.I. factories were limited to those aspects 
which could not be defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. These matters were 'welfare* items, as 
distinct from 'negotiable' items in union-management 
relations. Most of these 'welfare* items were related to 
the physical environment of the workplace or to the 
protective clothing of the employees. When management
(39) This research was done by Mr. Henry McKinlay, the 
other I.C.I. Research Fellow in Industrial 
Relations at the University of Glasgow.
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* conceded* to some of the 'representations* of the works 
council real improvements were made to the working 
conditions of the employees.
While the works council scheme probably stimulated 
the interest of employee representatives in 'welfare* 
matters, it was open to doubt whether it gave them 
greater responsibility. Exacting responsibility was 
not possible without delegating authority,(^0) and this 
was not possible under the works council scheme, or any 
other joint consultation machinery for that matter. A 
works council had no power to make decisions; it only 
advised the factory management which was free to reject the 
advice tendered. Under the work council scheme 
representations were frequently 'irresponsible', as the 
representatives had no authority to decide what 
'concessions* were to be made. On one occassion in 
response to pressure for greater clothing allowances the 
works manager was forced to remark that the Company did 
not see that it had to provide 'every stitch of clothing 
for all its employees'•
The situation was very different under collective 
bargaining. Under collective bargaining there was joint 
decision-making between representatives of union and 
management. Although union representatives sometimes 
made ridiculous demands, a situation of irresponsibility 
did not develop for both parties had to agree to the
final concession made by management. These representatives
of union and management, within terms of authority granted 
to them by their respective organisations, had pèwer to 
bind their organisations in the agreement reached. 
Management believed that it was bound by the decisions 
reached by negotiations. The parties held their 
respective members responsible for discharging the 
obligations incurred by previous negotiations.
(40) See Urwidk: 'The Elements of Administration’,
(Harper), 1943.
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The third objective of the I.C.I. works council 
scheme in so far as it referred to the promotion of 
efficiency, was not realised at Ardeer. Few matters 
were discussed which improved the efficiency of the 
works. One reason for this was the existence of a 
suggestion scheme which tended to channel creative 
suggestions into another direction. As individuals 
were rewarded for their suggestions, they were not 
disposed to give creative ideas to their representative 
on the work council for him to get the cudos, and for 
them to remain unrewarded. Another reason for not 
disnussing matters relating to the efficiency of the 
works was the widespread nature of incentives and 
piecework. The organisation of wark was frequently 
mentioned at the meetings of union and management when 
arguing about the fairness of the details of times, tasks 
and teams. In addition, a system of production sub­
committees, established by collective bargaining but 
ostensibly part of the works council, also discussed 
various matters that had some bearing on the efficiency of 
the works.
The third objective also referred to promoting a 
spirit of co-operation and contentment ^ of employees, but 
this was so vague, and related to many other factors than 
to the existence of formal joint consultation, that the 
contribution of the works council was probably negligible.
It was impossible to collect empirical evidence which 
proved whether or not this purpose of the works council 
was achieved. Quite clearly the contribution of line 
management, through good leadership at the supervisory and 
managerial levels, was the determining factor in securing 
employee c o - o p e r a t i o n , G e n e r a l  contentment of the 
workforce was the result of good management generally, 
including 'good* agreements respecting employment rights, 
and appropriate welfare items. If the works council gave 
the employees some feeling that they belonged to the
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organisation then it assisted the contentment of the work 
force. On the whole it was unlikely that the works 
council through its monthly meetings contributed a 
great deal to this feeling of belonging in a works 
employing nearly seven thousand.
The realisation of the second objective was incapable 
of empirical proof; it was not by nature a purpose of the 
works council, but the method by which it operated,
Primae facie there were reasons for supposing that the 
method was inherently ineffective in what it explicity or 
implicitly set out to do. In the first place as a means 
of upward communication it was limited and inefficient.
It did not provide management with a means of knowing 
that there was growing Industrial discontent in its 
plant; it was not able to raise the matters which were 
likely to fall into dispute. Even as a morale indicator 
it worked less effectively than say the suggestion scheme 
which could assess a very definite ratio of constructive 
suggestions to destructive c o m p l a i n t s . A s  a means of 
downward communication the works council did not take the 
place of the normal chain of authority; and even as a 
means of communicating information from top .to bottom it 
was inefficient for the works councillors had no formal 
method of reporting back to their constituency. By 
contrast the reporting back of shop stewards was much more 
formal and efficient. If the works councillor failed to 
report back, he could be removed in the next elections.
If the shop steward failed to report back he could be 
removed immediately by his union. The shop stewardls 
authority and responsibility to his electorate were much 
more formally defined than were those of the works councillor.
(42) See Davis: Human Relations in Industry (McGraw-Hill)
1956.
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Despite the general awareness at Ardeer amongst
employees, works councillors and management officials
of the shortcomings, if not the general failure of the
works council, most opposed its abolition. Why did
this seemingly irrational attitude prevail? McKinlay
advanced an interesting and unique explanation. Looking
at the key role of the factory manager, who presided at
the meetings of the works council at Ardeer, McKinlay
believed that the works councillors’ interest was
focussed in him. The factory manager was the supreme
authority in that particular industrial society. Under
the works council the councillor was able to invoke his
authority and appeal directly to it. In short, the
works council provided a mechanism by which the operatives
at the end of the scalar chain had the right to appeal
directly to the fountain of justice without the
intervention of intermediatory officials. In this way
there was a check on the a r b i l r a r y  authority of other
management officials.
This theory of joint consultation also explained why
the unions disliked the I.C.I. works council scheme. The
unions saw in the scheme one mfethod of protesting the
arbitrary use of management’s authority. This method
was akin to the type used by the serfs, in approaching
the feudal lord for justice. If the feudal lord was just
then the serfs' position was successful; if he was unjust
then the serfs' rights and privileges suffered. The
unions saw no reason why the establishment of justice in
the industrial society of I.C.I. should be based on the
personal worth of its factory managements. HaHeT they
(*) is far as the downward communication was concerned 
the works council scheme provided a framework for 
the use of charismatic authority, an appeal from 
the supreme leader direct to his followers , and 
without recouMB to intermediatory officials.
This also was one of the reasons why management 
did not want the abolitions of the works council.
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wanted employees to have common law rights so that 
justice was dependent on the negotiating process.
Moreover, they did not want management to establish an 
internal system of processing grievances which took ' 
away one of their important functions.' The works 
council scheme belonged to the 'paternalistic* idea, 
while trade uniomrepresented the 'democratic* ideal.
The employees accepted both the works council and also 
used the negotiating process because they belonged to two 
societies - the paternalistic factory and the maternalistic 
trade union.
From this analysis it is clear that joint consultâtion 
is neither supplementary nor complementary to collective 
bargaining. Collective bargaining is an institution 
which governs the relations of union and management.
Joint consultation.the I.C.I. way, is not an Institution: 
it i s  merely one method by which the Company conducts its 
business. It is a special communication and participation 
technique which departs from the normal management 
bureaucracy found in most industrial societies. The 
formal authoritarian structure has superimposed upon it 
an extraordinary set of formal relations, which does not 
recognise the intermediatory levels of aurhority in the 
bureaucracy.
This situation does not apply to those joint 
consultation machineries which are composed of union and 
management officials; here joint consultation takes the 
outward form of collective bargaining. Because there is 
no law-making the union officials frequently confuse 
their roles; they are never sure whether they are 
'negotiating' or 'consulting'. One process ends in 
effective agreement, the other does not govern any one's 
actions. Consultations are ineffective for they do not 
change behaviour. Just what these forms of joint 
consultation are meant to achieve is in the realm of 
conjecture.
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Underlying joint consultation and similar types of 
machinery is a false assumption that there are common 
and mutual problems that fall outside the realm of 
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is founded 
on the assumption that disputes arise between union and 
management, and by negotiating these disputes are 
resolved. The mutual problems appear to cover matters 
such as safety, apprenticeship, training, general health 
of the industry and operational efficiency. While some 
'co-operation' , meaning consultation between union and 
management representatives, is possible joint decision 
making on these subjects is unlikely. A management cannot 
dispose of its responsibility for the safe working of its 
plant, the training of its personnel or the operational 
efficiency. A union cannot enter into some form of 
p a r t n e r s h i p (^ 3) with management as the functions of 
management and union would be impaired. Although the 
Scanlon plan is evidence of some contribution of a union 
to operational efficlency^^^^ this is one of the key 
functions of management. Operational efficiency is to 
be obtained by dynamic management, such as runs I.C.I., and 
is to be obtained by research, development, planning and 
modern technical e q u i p m e n t . A  union is simply not 
competent to enter this field, if it does then its true 
purpose is likely to suffer. There is of course no 
reason why a union cannot criticise a management in the way 
that it runs its enterprise, and suggest changes in order 
to secure better wages and working conditions.
(43) cf, Roberts; 'Wages and the Railways', Political 
Quarterly, April, 1955; and Harbison and Coleman: 
'Goals and Strategy in Collective Bargaining' 
(Harper) 1951.
(44) Lesieur: 'The Scanlon Plan: A Frontier in Labor-
Management Co-operation', (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology) 1958.
(45) See Drucker: 'The Practice of Management'(Heineman) 
1955, Davis: 'Industrial Organisation and
Management' (Harper) 1956.
(46) The general failure of joint union-management 
committees in the U.S.A. and in Australia indicates 
the instable nature of joint committees. See also 
J.Mack! 'The Glacier Metal Experiments', Political 
Quarterly July, 1956, p,3l8.
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Conclusion
Collective bargaining is an institution which has 
as its purpose the government of relations between union 
and management. Its function, through which its 
purpose is achieved, is to establish rights and obligations 
for union and management and their members. These 
rights and obligations are set out in explicit and 
recognisable forms. The method by which the function of 
collective bargaining is achieved is known as negotiation.
The process of collective bargaining is therefore 
synonymous with negotiation. Thus collective bargaining 
realises its purpose when negotiation is effective, in 
the sense that it resolves union-management disputes, and 
collective bargaining fails to reach its purpose when 
negotiation is ineffective. In this latter situation 
there is industrial anarchy, that is,there is the 
absence of law. Thus a strike is evidence of anarfihy, 
as is arbitrary behaviour by management in the way it 
treats its employees*
In order to achieve its purpose, collective bargaining 
as an institution is dependent on its two members, union 
and management, having a common interest. The only 
common interest that binds union and management in the 
institution of collective bargaining is the need to 
establish a social order which allows production, and hence 
employment, to take place. Conflicts arise over the details 
of the social order to be established, and if negotiations 
are ineffective these conflicts remain unresolved.
Empirical evidence suggests that the separate interests 
of union and management are likely to cause strain, 
disruption and breakdown of negotiations, and this is so 
even when there is only faulty communication between the 
parties. Conflicts of interests are to be resolved by 
the parties behaving judicially, in the sense that they 
take account of existing rules and precedents, and by
resolving any residual difference by invoking the standard 
of equity.
Collective bargaining is a somewhat peculiar 
institution in that it does not directly exert authority 
over those who are ultimately included within its ambit.
It exercises authority over two other institutions, union 
and management. It is dependent on these two institutions 
for its maintenance and for enforcing its laws. It is 
only natural that collective bargaining should be 
vulnerable to disruption if either party fails to play 
its proper role. Pressures generated by factors from 
the environment or within the social structure of 
management tend to force changes in the terms of reference 
by which the parties regulate their conduct. The more 
stimuli there are, the more necessary are changes in the 
social fabric of the management institution, the larger 
the number of disputes arise, and the greater the 
possibility there is of union-management conflict. It is 
this adaptation of management to external stimuli, and 
its consequent behaviour in negotiations that determines 
whether or not collective bargaining succeeds in 
establishing law and order in industry. It is management 
behaviour which is the principal determinant of peace in 
industry. As it is seen in the next chapter, even a 
union’s function to enforce the law of collective 
bargaining is mainly dependent on how management behaves 
in respect to its own. employees.
Collective bargaining assumes that the union-management 
relationship commences with a dispute. There is only a 
limited range of subject matter over which dispute can 
arise. These are job security matters, wages, hours and 
similar working donditions and the details of the 
general relationship of union and management itself• 
Precisely the same method, that of negotiation, is used 
to resolve all these type of disputes. Negotiations 
can only take place over items which can be expressed 
in legalistic terms, that is rights and obligations.
Concl.
Union and management can have no explicit authoritarian 
relations over other subjects. Where consultations take 
place between union and management there can be no stable 
relationship as there is no joint decision-making process. 
Joint consultation is neither supplementary nor complementary 
to collective bargaining. Joint consultation is not an 
institution, it is simply one way of carrying on managerial 
activities, and a union has no basic role to perform these. 
Thus, union-raanagement co-operation outside the maintenance 
of collective bargaining is impossible.
CHAPTER XIII 
BREAKDOWN IN UNION AUTHORITY
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to answer the last 
question posed by the Ardeer study: why do union members
refuse to abide by the terms of agreement laid down by 
union-management negotiations? In order to satisfactorily 
answer this question it is first necessary to consider 
some general aspects of trade union behaviour. Rather 
than proceed empirically, it is desirable to consider 
some consequences of sociological theory for explaining 
trade union behaviour. The purpose, functions and structure 
both formal and informal, of a trade union are examined 
in terms of industrial sociology. From this analysis 
certain weaknesses are found to exist in the prerequisites 
considered necessary for a social sy s t e m , o f  which a 
union is a type, to function effectively. These 
weaknesses lead to strain, social disorganisation, break­
down or even disintegration when conditions are 
unfavourable.
A union has many weaknesses in its formal structure: 
an indefinite status system, inadequate rewards and 
punishments, a weak authoritarian structure and an ill-defined 
system of division of labour. Some of the weaknesses 
can be attributable to the nature of union membership.
Union members are also members of another institution,^^) 
management, and this gives rise to weakness. The most 
important informal groups, which place so much strain on 
the union structure and are responsible for breaking d o m  
the authority of their union, originate in the organisation 
of work by management. Other weaknesses arise because 
of the interdependent functions of union and management, 
and if the latter chooses to frustrate the purpose of the 
union then immediate social disorganisation follows, with 
possible breakdown and disintegration. Social
(3) Moore: Industrial Relations and the Social Order’,
jMacmillan) .19Hi - -
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disorganisation may also occur when functions are 
inappropriate for the purpose of a union, when they 
conflict, or when personalities fail to cope with their 
roles,
The mere existence of weaknesses in the formal union 
structure does not necessarily imply that a breakdown 
in union authority must take place. For example, the 
failure of a union official to cope with his role may set 
in train certain consequences which are evidence of social 
disorganisation. Similarly, social disorganisation takes 
place when, a union fails to discharge its bargaining 
function, A breakdown in union authority only occurs 
when an informal group of union members takes overt action 
to defy the authority of their governing body. There are 
degrees in the breakdown of union authority, and it is 
only when there is a drastic shift of power (in the sense 
of control of member behaviour) to the informal leadership, 
that there is a serious breakdoi^m. Disintegration may 
take place when groups of members secede from a union.
It becomes obvious from applying these sociological 
concepts to the empirical data collected at Ardeer and 
elsewhere, that a union functions effectively (in the sense 
that it achieves its purpose) when collective bargaining is 
successful, that is when a union establishes rights and 
obligations with respect to its meibers’ employment by 
management. While other environmental factors may 
frustrate a union, in the conditions which at present 
e±ist in the United Kingdom, it is management which 
determines whether or not a union is to function effectively. 
If it co-operates with a union to establish laws of 
employment to govern the social relations at the workplace 
there is little likelihood of a breakdown in union authority, 
(h) Schneider: Loc,cit, pp,26-28,
If it decides on a policy of attacking a union, the 
letter’s purpose is frustrated, collective bargaining 
fails 5 and informal groups of employees are left to fend 
for themselves against the inequitable practices of 
management. In the case of Ardeer, the local branch of 
the T.& G.W.Ü, functioned effectively in",the post-war 
period because of the constructive policies of I.C.I. 
which assisted the union in reaching its objectives of 
establishing law and order in the factory.
oaap.AjLiJ. D ec*±
Section 1 The Purpose and Functions of Unions
Every social system has a purpose in the sense that 
it attempts to achieve certain goals, and it also has 
functions which are the means of achieving the purpose. 
Social disorganisation can take place when goals, other 
than the fundamental goals are superimposed on the primary 
purpose of the social system. Moreover, some functions 
exercised by a union, as a particular form of a social 
system, may be inappropriate for achieving the goals of 
the organisation* The aim of this section is to 
determine the true purpose of unionism, and to see whether 
or not strains leading to social disorganisation take 
place because of the imposition of other goals on primary 
goals, or whether some functions are not achieving their 
goals.
According to the Webbs’, a trade union is a continuous 
association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining 
or improving the condition of their working l i v e s T h i s  
definition has been criticised for being too narrow by 
Milne-Bailey, who described a trade union as a ’body- 
having as its purpose the advancement of the vocational 
interests of its members’. S u c h  a definition contains 
ambiguities, for professional bodies which are distinguish­
able from trade unions would be i n c l u d e d . T h e  
improvement of working conditions and remuneration of their 
members are not the primary purpose of professional bodies.
(5) ’The History of Trade Unionism’, Longmans, 1920.
(6) ’Trade Unions and the State’ , 193^ H.
(7) J.D.M.Bell ’Trade Unions’, Chapter III in Flanders
and Clegg: Loc.cit.
(
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In a somewhat clumsy manner Cole described a trade 
union as a *bo#y of workers designed to do for its 
members by combination which these persons, acting in 
isolation, could not do for themselves*. In present day 
conditions ’a trade union is a body which bargains 
collectively on behalf of its members either with single 
employers of business firms or with an association or 
federation of employers, or with "opposite numbers"
Trade unions also carry on other activities such as 
education, political action and act as friendly societies, 
but their main activity is collective bargaining. In his 
search for an adequate definition Cole mixes purpose with 
the functions of unions.
These definitions do not contain two important points. 
The first of these relates to the interdependence of 
functions of union and management, even though union and 
management are separate institutions with separate functions. 
The union’s purpose is concerned with its relationship to 
management. The union is not interested in all management 
functions5 it is only concerned with management’s employment 
f u n c t i o n . T h e  union aims at establishing rights for 
its members with respect to their employment by management. 
Without management’s employees the union has neither purpose 
nor life. The union's whole existence relies on the fact 
that all its members are members of another institution, 
known as management. The second point is that these union
(8) 'An Introduction to Trade Unionism*, Allen and Unwih,
1953.
(9) For this reason the frontier of collective bargaining 
is unlikely to grow into the field of industrial 
management; this conflicts with views held by Laski and 
Cole, and most Fabian socialists; see Laski, ’Trade 
Unions in the New Society’, p.171, and Cole, ’An 
Introduction to Trade Unionism’, p.292.
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members belong to management in a*very special way, they 
occupy positions of inferior status to those who direct 
and control them. It is this particular form of over­
lapping of union and management membership, plus their 
separate, but Interdependent functions which makes the 
union-management relationship unique amongst inter- 
institutional relationships,
A new definition of a trade union is now attempted: 
a .trade union may be described as an institution which has 
as its purpose the participation with another institution, 
management, in formulating laws to govern the rights and 
obligations of its members with respect to their employment 
by the second Institution. Or more generally, a trade 
union is an institution which has as its purpose the 
participation in formulating law to govern the rights and 
obligations of its members with respect to a second 
institution to which they all belong as subservient 
members,
A trade union's purpose may not be realised when 
management does not allow it to participate in formulating 
law, in which circumstances the union may call a strike 
of its members with the objective of disrupting the 
activities of management. Management may then be forced 
to allow the union to bargain with it. A union's 
purpose may also be frustrated by sections of the state 
by preventing collective bargaining taking place, or by
(10) See Dubin in his 'Discussion' with Moore, 'Industrial 
Sociology: Status and Prospects', American Sociological 
Review. August, 19^8, in which he argued that union- 
management relationship is unique because union and 
management are caught in an involuntary relationship 
involving overlapping membership and jurisdiction, and 
separate but interdependent functions, Moore argues 
that this is true of all collective relations - for 
example, Church and State, family and school, etc, - 
where there are separate but interdependent functions: 
see Moore: 'Industrial Relations and the Social Order* 
(Macmillan) 1951, P*339* If the peculiar nature of 
union membership is taken into account then the present 
Author's views correspond more closely to Dubin's.
Dubin does not seem to pepeat this interesting 
contention in his 'Working Union-Management Relations^, 
(Prentice-Hall), 1958,
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placing limitations on the existence of the union itself.
State intervention may also regulate the terms of wages
and working conditions, in wh ich situation a union may
function more as protest g r o u p , r a t h e r  than as an
institution involved in a law-making process. On the
other hand, state intervention may possibly assist a union
to realise its purpose, when for example' it provides legal
(12)recognition and makes collective bargaining compulsory.
State intervention may also indirectly assist a union 
to achieve its purpose when it nationalises a management 
which has previously denied a union the right to negotiate. 
In fact, at the present time this is probably the only 
legitimate argument for the trade union movement to support 
the policy of nationalisation of the British Labour Party - 
an argument which does not apply to I.C.I, as this 
Company permits unions to bargain with it. Environmental 
factors determine whether or not a union achieves its 
purpose.
A union carries on a number of activities which are by 
nature functions to achieve its purpose. The principal 
function is that of negotiating or bargaining with 
management. The formal structure of a trade union is 
constructed to carry out its primary function. Apart 
from its primary function of bargaining a union also 
has a function of striking when collective bargaining fails.
(11) See the present Author's treatise: 'Canadian and
Australian Industrial Relations: A half century
evaluation of state intervention into union-raanagement 
relations in two countries' (to be published), where 
the author argues that Australian unions function as 
protest groups because they have little or no 
authority to participate in the law-making process due 
to the. way the Australian arbitration system operates.
(12) For example, Canada or in the U.S., see
Logan: 'State Intervention and Assistance in Collective 
Bargaining', (Canddian Studies in Economics, No,6)1956* 
Jamieson: 'Industrial Relations in Canada', (Corn#$I 
University Press), 1957*
Reynolds: 'Labor Economics and Labor Relations' 
(Prentice-Hall),
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The strike function is generally used sparingly, for it 
has many limitations to its effectiveness. Apart from 
the drain on the financial resources of a union the 
certainty of winning a strike is oftan open to doubt. 
Moreover, it is not possible for a union to continually 
disrupt the activities of management, otherwise it destroys 
the job security of its members. If a governing body of 
a union or a majority of its members come to believe 
that striking is the man function, the union is bound to 
disintegrate^^^Âe bargaining function cannot be displaced 
by the strike function.
A union also performs other functions which tend to 
support the bargaining function of management. It carries 
on welfare and friendly society (benefits not gotb j by 
collective bargaining) activités which tend to give 
members a personal stake in the union. These functions 
do not come into conflict with the primary function of 
bargaining. The education activities are also designed 
to assist union officials and members to understand their 
environment so that they may become more effective in
(Ih )
their roles of bargaining. Some socialist minded persons 
urge unions to educate their members so that they may 
lead the unions in their march towards socialism and 
worker control of industry - a goal which is not necessarily 
in keeping with the union's purpose. In the main, unions 
keep their education function to a realistic plane.
Through its political function a union seeks to alter 
some aspects of the invlronmat in which it operates. It 
may believe in nationalisation if under state ownership the 
management allows the union to discharge its bargaining 
function more effectively. At the same time there are
(13) For example, the Knights of Labour and the I.W.W., 
see Logan: 'Trade Unions in Canada' (Macmillan)19^8, 
Dulles: 'Labor in America', (Crowell) 19^9*
(14) See Laski, Loc.cit., p.l6l.
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natural limitations in the effective dlscharg.e : by a union 
of its political functionj^^^ It may be successful in 
making representations to some external body about relative 
minor matters, but in genenl it discharges its political 
function by affiliation to other bodies more suitable for 
the purpose, in particular, the T.Ü.C. and the British 
Labour Party, Social disorganisation or breakdown in 
uhion authority rarely occurs with respect to these 
affiliations, A delegate may fail to vote in accordance 
with the instructions laid down by his governing body, in 
which case he can be removed from his office without a 
great deal of difficulty, A member or group of members 
may refuse to pay a political levy, which is evidence 
of some sort of frustration to the union's function.
Members may disregard their governing body to vote in a 
certain way at the time of an election, but in this 
situation no breakdown in union authority is overtly 
recorded.
However, in certain situations the political function 
of a union may conflict with x.-' the function of bargaining. 
This may occur when a political group is in control of the 
governing body of a union, and where their political 
intentions override the effective discharge of the bargaining 
function. A strike aimed at disrupting the community 
without the purpose of establishing rights for union 
members could lead to dissession within a union and 
possible disorganisation. Communists are not the only 
political group who upset the stability of the union 
organisation.. A conservative governing body anxious to 
support the Labour Party, could also cause disruption in a 
union by failing to discharge its collective bargaining 
function. Such a situation exists when a governing body
refuses to press new claims for its members, when these
(l5) The™account of the power of the T. & G.W.U. given 
by Goldstein is extremely misleading and based on 
false notions of union purpose, functions and 
structure of a union; see his 'The Government of 
British Trade Unions: a study in apathy and the
democratic process in the T. & G.W.U.' (Allen and 
Unwin) 1952#
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refuses to press new claims for its members, when these 
earnestly desire the rectification of an injustice or 
some improvement in their standard of living.
Unions favour the maintenance of full employment 
because it is a favourable environment in which to 
operate. It is logical and within the aim of the union 
for it to consider the consequences of a particular wage 
demand on employment, but it is unlikely to agree to a 
voluntary wage restraint which adversely affects its 
m e m b e r s . A l t h o u g h  it may affiliate to an inter-union 
body, such as the T.U.C. and agrees to abide by that 
body's rules, a governing body cannot suspend the bargaining 
function of the union. A governing body has the 
responsibility of respecting the constitution of the union, 
and the rights of the members laid down in the constitution, 
of honouring agreements it has with management, and 
observing the rules of the bodies with which it is affiliated, 
and the laws of the State. A breakdown in union authority 
is possible if a union fails to discharge its bargaining 
function for that is essential for its purpose.
Apart from its law-making function through bargaining, 
a union also exercises a function of law-enforcement; it 
has to see that its members honour the agreements which it 
negotiates with management. While some breakdown in union 
authority can occur with respect to its strike function 
(when members refuse to respond to the call to strike) most 
instances in breakdown in union authority take place when 
a group of members go on strike without the approval of 
their governing body. In such a case there is frustration 
of a union's law-enforcement function. Frustration of 
this function also occurs when a union fails to recruit 
management's employees as members, for until it does ' 
it can exercise no authority over them. A union needs 
to recruit à sizeable proportion of management's 
employees not ohly to exercise its strike function but its 
law-enf or cement one as well.
Jan.1956.
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Section 2 The Formal Union Structure
A union has a formal structure^^^). This 
strucutre differs in detail from that of management and 
it appears more vulnerable to instability than that of 
a political and elective group of bodies for the purpose 
of determining policy, while its administrative machinery 
is more like the conventional form of bureaucracy which 
is characteristic of an industrial enterprise. In the 
latter, at the end of the scalar chain of authority there 
are well defined t^is which gives each a sharply defined 
role. In a union there is a mass of laity who have no 
defined tasks or differentiated rules in the formal union 
organisation. Again the authoritarian structure in a 
union is less effective than the one that exists in 
management, as there is no clear chain of command as it is 
known in a management organisation. The status system 
does little to reinforce the authoritarian structure in 
a union, and the rewards and punishments are inadequate 
to motivate the great mass of union members so as to allow 
a union to perform in the most effective possible manner. 
Because of its interdependent functions with management 
and overlapping union membership, and often a hostile 
environment, weakness strain, social disorganisatim and 
breakdown occur in the union structure. The hypothesis 
advanced here is that the union has a very delicate 
structure which stands up to strain only in special 
circumstances,^
(17) See Schneider: Loc.cit,, Part Two and Part Three, 
his excellent empirical analysis of American unionism 
is followed by a rather trite treatment of the union 
structure at the theoretical level.
(18) cf. Allen 'Power in the Trade Unions' (Longmans) 
Chapter V.
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The formal organisation, that part of the structure 
which sets down the functional positions in the union, 
consists of a series of governing bodies, ranging from 
the local committee and branch to the national executive 
and convention. The union constitution defines how these 
bodies are to function. In most unions there are 
democratic elections of delegates and representatives 
to superior bodies. The union constitution sets out 
the powers, functions, and authority of each body, 
reserving to the supreme governing body the right to 
alter the relationship of their inferior governing and 
policy making bodies. In effect, there is a'democratic' 
hierachy, but its nature is different to that of 
management. The division of labour of these governing 
bodies tend to be less sharply defined than they are in an 
industrial organisation, such as I.C.I. (which through 
its divisional structure has a hierachy of governing bodies), 
Sometimes the inferior bodies usurp powers which are 
reserved for superior bodies and this causes confusiont 
and disorganisation.
There is another side of the union organisation 
which consists of union officials responsible for 
implementing the decisions of the governing bodies. In 
theory, this hierachy, from the general secretary to the 
shop steward, has similar characteristics to that of the 
management hierachy. There is some evidence of a 
definition of tasks and duties, the delegation of 
authority, the maintenance of responsibility, the existence 
of a chain of command and communication system - all 
requisites for successful functioning of a management.
In practice, this likeness between union and management 
soon disappears. Especially if union officials are 
elected, instead of appointed, personal prestige is such 
that it allows officials to exceed their authority and to 
step out of their defined roles. They may not confine
(19) For example see Jeffreys® 'The Story of the E n g i n e e r s ' ,
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themselves to the role of implementing policy, they may 
actually formulate it. This is also true of the general 
secretary when his personality is such that he dominates 
the governing body.^^^^
Unlike management where there is a fine division of 
labour and sharply differentiated roles of managers, the 
roles of the union officials frequently conflict. No 
where is this confusion more pronounced than it is in the 
local organisation. For example, at Ardeer a member of 
the T. & G.W.U. can play three distinctive administrative 
roles, viz., a shop steward, a committee member and a 
member of a delegation bargaining with management. At 
the same time he has the right to vote and participate 
at departmental and branch meetings, and to be a delegate 
to regional or national policy-making bodies. Such an 
active official combines the role of seeing that policy 
is satisfactorily administered, while at the same time 
carrying out a role of administrator. In such situations 
clashes of conflicting of roles and clashes of personalities 
are inevitable; for these reasons, disorganisation is a 
likely consequence.
Compared to management a union's authoritarian 
structure is weak. It has recourse to four types of 
authority - structural, specialist, moral and charismatic. 
Structural authority is the entitlement, stemming from 
legal or other contract (the union constitution), vested 
in a position of an organisation to order and co-ordinate
functions pertaining to other positions, and to expect
( 21 )obedience in the ordering. Structural authority is
( 22)
something equivalent to legal authority,
(20) See"Allen: 'Trade Union Leadership: based on a 
study of Alfred Deakin’, (Longmans), 1957? especially 
Chaps. XT and XTI.
(21) T.T.Paterson: 'A Methectic Theory of Social 
Organisation', University of Glasgow, 1957? (mim).
(22) Newman: 'Administrative Action' (Prentice-Hall) 
see also Koontz and O'Donnell: 'Principles of
Management’ (McGraw-Hill), 1955? Chap.h.
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A management assumes that it has the power to 
command because of the legal powers delegated to it by 
the owners of the business. In the same way a union 
has structural authority over its officials, there is an 
implied threat that if an official fails to carry out his 
role satisfactorily he can be removed from office.
However, due to the nature of union membership, which is 
considered in the next section, it may be sometimes 
impossible for those who have structural authority to 
secure obedience to their commands.
Specialist authority is the entitlement to be heard 
by reason of knowledge or e x p e r t n e s s . M a n a g e m e n t  
relies on this type of authority to carry out its many and 
varied technical tasks. Due to the absence of a fine 
division of labour and the existence of a passive mass 
of laity, specialist authority is not as important to a 
union as it is to management. When a union provides 
a number of staff functions, such as education and 
research, to assist those on 'the line' to carry out 
their tasks, specialist authority is used. At Ardeer, 
the regional and national offices of the T. & G.W.U. 
although in a line relationship, seemed to use specialist 
authority when they assisted the local official in negotiat­
ions with management. In the case of headquarters' 
conferences the national officer was vested with structural 
authority as he was the official responsible for the 
negotiations, regardless of his authority as laid down 
by the union constitution. The type of authority exercised 
by an official of a union can be influenced by a union- 
management agreement which gives certain authority to that 
official - and it is possible that this might conflict
with the terms of the constitution.
(23T  Pa^rson, loc.cit., uses the term 'sapiental'.
(2h) Similarly, the duties and responsibilities of shop 
stewards defined by the I.C.I, Agreement relative to 
the Negotiating Procedure, even though the various 
union constitutions laid down other duties and 
responsibilities.
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By far the most important authority to a union is 
the use of moral authority. Moral authority is the 
entitlement to control and direct by reason by 'rightness' 
and 'goodness' in action in accordance with the contractual
( pq)
system of the institution. As moral authority is the
entitlement to act, it follows that it may be exercised 
bnly by those vested with structural or specialist 
authority. The exercise of moral authority by a union 
over its rank and file is extremely important, much more so 
than the use of structural authority. Normally, the ranlc 
and file look to their official leaders for 'orders', 
However, if the rank and file feel that their leaders 
are neither 'good' nor 'right' then disorganisation is 
likely to take place, and the leaders of the informal 
group exercise moral authority to dissuade the members 
from following the orders of the official leadership say 
to desist from striking. For the exercise of moral 
authority it is important that the officials of a union 
be free of tarnish of bribery and corruption, 
extremist political and religious views (except where 
such views correspond to an extremist situation). They 
need to be responsive to the wishes of their members, 
whether these wishes to be interpreted by a popular vote, 
of by empathetic qualities of the leader.
(25) Paterson, ibid, uses the term 'enterprise* which 
appears to be equivalent to 'institution* -
see Miller and Form, loc.cit, p.229. 'Organisation', 
as mentioned in the above context rêfers to the 
ordering of positions in the formal union or 
management structure, these positions being defined 
in terms of tasks, authority and responsibility - 
see Koontz and O'Donnell: loc.cit. Chapter 9*
(26) Ballot-rigging and high-handed actions of full-time 
officials described by Goldstein has relevance to 
this problem of moral authority. See §oldstein: 
loc.cit.
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In exercising one type of authority a union appears
to have an important advantage over management. As a
union is an institution which is concerned with ultimate
and non-material things - equity, justice and the
equality of employees - it may fall under the influence
of a leader who has charismatic authority. Charismatic
authority is the entitlement to control and direct by
reason of God-given grace. In the minds of the rank and
file a particular general secretary or president may
appear to be all-powerful, all-wise, and the ultimate
source of authority in the union for 'rightness' and
( 27)'goodness'. According to Paterson  ^ there is no 
special system of charismatic authority, but one essential 
condition appears to be the ability of the leader to 
appeal directly to the rank and file and to ignore the 
chain of authority and presence of the intermediate 
leaders. Such appeals may relate to strike action or to 
desist from striking; in either situation the stability 
of the union is assisted by a leader with charismatic 
authority. So far as the T. & G.W.U. was concerned, 
Ernest Bevin had some of these qualities which greatly 
assisted the union but Alfred Deakin was bereft of them, 
setting clique against clique and faction against faction. 
His blunt criticisms, especially those openly given to 
the press, of unofficial strike actions detracted from 
his role of supreme protector of the entire union.
Happily, he rarely interfered in Ardeer affairs.
As in other social systems, management relies on a 
formal status system to reinforce its authoritarian and 
role structure. A union is less happily placed; the 
elective nature of the governing bodies and the democratic 
ideals conflict with a status system. A national 
convention is an extremely important body, but union 
sentiment holds that it is simply 'representative* of the
(27) T.T.Paterson: ibid.
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rank and file. A general secretary is usually held in 
high regard, but he is the 'servant* of the union, not 
its 'master*. A status system relates to the positions 
held by the officials of the union, but personal prestige 
is frequently so important that the status system breaks 
down. In other words, a relatively minor official 
may wield considerable moral authority in a particular 
situation. Superior relationships are indefinitely 
defined, and this contributes to a blurring of the 
chain of command.
In management there is an appropriate system of 
rewards and punishments which motivate its managers to 
carry out their duties efficiently. A union does not 
have quite as an effective system of rewards and 
punishments, particularly when considering the motivation 
of the part-time officials. The full-time officials 
are not highly paid, promotional opportunities are 
limited, but they usually have considerable job satisfaction. 
Power and ideological interests are important motives to 
union officials* These motivations may be ineffective for 
the large number of part-time officials including the 
shop stewards and the local committeemen, who take on 
thankless and selfless tasks, like many other voluntary 
workers they are frequently inefficient. No matter how 
inefficient a union can rarely afford to replace part- 
time officials. It is here that apathy strikes a serious 
blow at the effectiveness of a union. Usually a part- 
time official is removed only when he deliberately and 
consistently flouts the official policy of the union.
It is also rare for a union to remove a full-time 
official, when that official is appointed and not elected, 
although as the Ardeer case showed it is not an 
impossibility. Even elections do not seem to remove 
ineffective officials, although there is theoretically 
more chance of changing officials than when they are 
appointed.
(28) cf. Allen: * Power in the Trade Unions* (Longmans),195^#
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Management has Its problems with communication.
So far as downward communication is concerned the 
authoritarian structure is used to pass orders down 
the line. Communication downwards in a union depends on 
the willingness of the officials to report back; due to 
indefiniteness of the message, such as reports of the 
progress of negotiations, there is a natural limitation 
to the effectiveness of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e  union's 
upward communication line may be more effective than 
management's, as usually upward communication consists 
of grievances, claims or resolutions sent to superior 
bodies for consideration. However, as the Ardeer case 
showed the rank and file may not understand that no 
effect can be immediately given to their wishes. If 
the rank and file are not instructed in the limitations 
of the union’s ability to deal with a claim it is 
possible that strain and disorganisation may emerge.
(29) See The Dock Worker (University of Liverpool Press)
for examples of ineffective communication, pp.210-210,
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Section 3 The Nature of Union Membership
Special problems arise due to the nature of union 
membership. The aim of this section is to examine the 
nature of union membership to determine whether 
disorganisation takes place because of torn loyalties',, 
apathy, compulsory unionism, because the type of authority 
wielded by unions over their members is ineffective or 
because there is an inadequate system of rewards and 
punishments.
All members of a union, with the-exception of a
few full-time officials,are members of another
institution Imown as management. Why. do' employees of
management join unions? Basically, employees join '
unions because they desire protection from the arbitrary
actions of m a n a g e m e n t . ^^0) These security goals are
realised when a union obtains rights for employees under
a collective agreement. , Except for the active members
few individuals realise recognition goals through joining
unions, in fact in factories dominated by an anti-union
tradition personal prestige may even decline as the
result of joining a union. Indirectly, a union may
raise the personal prestige of its individual members by
collectively improving the status of the occupations
it covers. Thus, employees join unions to achieve
instrumental g o a l s , goals which are achieved
indirectly. For example,.there is a bague hope that
their standard of living may be improved by the efforts
of the union. If the union performs its bargaining
function successfully, membership is meaningful to the
employees it seeks to cover. In passing it may be noted
that few employees join unions for purely social purposes,
(32)
or for making up deficiencies of social relations at work.
T30) The present Author does not accept the thesis of job 
scarcity as the basis of unionism; see Perlman; *A 
Theory of the Labor Movement’, (Kelly), 19^9
(31) See Schneider, loc.cit. p.17? and p,3^ t2.
(32) The union is not an organisation which gives satis­
faction to its members because they fail to obtain 
satisfaction at work; cf. Tannenbaum:'Philosophy of 
Labor*, Knopf, 1951*
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Does the union member suffer from torn loyalties 
between management and his union? This depends a great 
deal on the effectiveness of collective bargaining. If 
bargaining breaks down and a strike is called then there 
is a conflict of loyalties. When union members fail to 
respond to their governing bodies to strike then a 
breakdown in union authority occurs. If the union is 
successful in calling out its members then management’s 
authority breaks down.
Generally, there is no clash of loyalties between
the membership of the union and that of management* The
reason for this lies in the distinction of employee’s role
in management and his role as union member. The role of
the employee of management actively contributes towards
the attainment of that institution’s goals. Although
satisfaction with his work may be destroyed by arbitrary
management, his role as a worker is an extremely satisfying
activity. Normally this role does not conflict with the
role as union member; he pays his fees, he may vote in
elections, he may attend union meetings, and only when he is
called upon to strike does conflict in roles take place.
For the great bulk of members activity in union affairs
is spasmodic and discontinuous. For this reason apathy
is a direct consequence of a passive role, both in theory
and practice, of union membership. Apathy is not an
indication that the social organisation of a union has
broken down; usually it is a symptom that it has not.
There is considerable membership participation when a union
(33)organisation breaks dom, during an unofficial strike.
(33) cf. Goldstein: loc.cit. In some situations, when
for example there is an unofficial strike apathy of 
members to official activities of union is an 
indication of serious disorganisation; see The Dock 
Worker for an example of this.
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Why do employees refuse to join unions? Fundamentally, 
the Individual who refuses to join a union does so because 
of a divergency of personal interests from those of the 
union, as he sees them. This may be due to purely 
selfish interests, to perverse isolate behaviour, to 
competing moral forces such as religion, to the actions 
of management to counter the union, and to general 
community values which disapprove of union membership. 
Management may effectively limit union membership by the 
discouragement of union membership, through paternalistic 
personnel policies or by genuine leadership which makes 
union membership superfluous (as the individual employee 
sees it). In some situations employees leave a particular 
union because they feel that it does not adequately serve 
the interests of their particular occupational group.
A union with a high turnover in membership of employees, 
remaining within Industries, covered by the union, indicates 
a general failure of the individual to identify himself 
with that u n i o n . (3^) The secession of groups of members 
is indicative of the failure of a union to satisfy group 
goals and is a form of social disintegration.
One of a union's fundamental functions is to extend its 
membership amongst employees. This is not done simply 
for 'empire-building'. Membership is a prerequisite before 
a union can wield authority. This is most important for 
the effective functioning of collective bargaining. As 
the union is responsible for seeing that agreements are 
observed by employees, they must first be members of the 
union. As it was seen in the Ardeer case study considerable 
anarchy resulted from the direct action taken by employees 
who were not union members. Indeed, it was one of the 
essential tasks of the T. & G.W.U. to bring the behaviour 
of the informal groups of employees under control; it 
could do so only by recruiting them as union members.
(3^ -) See Goldstein: loc.cit.
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In line with the reasoning adopted in the previous 
chapter on the nature of collective hagaining the issue 
of the 'union* and the ‘closed’ shop may foe disposed on 
a uriorie principles. For collective bargaining to be truly 
effective as a law-making institution, it is a necessary 
condition that must be Included in an appropriate union.
For a union to exercise its authority over employees to 
respect agreements reached by union-management negotiations 
they must first be members of the of the union. One of 
the notable features of employee behaviour at Ardeer 
was the fact that groups took direct action even though 
they did not belong to the T. & G.W.U. In fact, it was 
one of the essential tasks of the T. & G.W.U. to bring 
the behaviour of these work groups under control. It 
follows that a management which prevents its employees 
joining a union is ieso facto discouraging the spread of 
law and order in industry, as the union is not only a 
participant in the law-making process, it is also the law- 
enforcement institution as well.
This does not mean that a management is encouraging 
law and order when it rejects particular demands of a 
union involving some feature of union security. For 
example, there could be legitimate disagreement between 
the parties as to how law and order is to be established 
for example, by rules governing the behaviour of shop 
stewards. But a management which supports an employee 
who defies a union with respect to his membersiiip fees, or 
when he refuses to abide by union rules , or does not 
accept normal group conduct on the workshop floor, is 
encouraging disorder. By taking a completely neutralist 
attitude to a union* s attempt to recruit employees in its 
factory, especially when a group displays a tendency for 
spontaneous action, management is not assisting the 
elimination of anarchy, A management which watches a 
union flounder in membership drives, is by its own default 
permitting conditions of anarchy to exist in its workplace.
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Far from being a primae facie case against the union or 
closed shop, there is primae facie case for it, for all 
employees are brought within the ambit of the law-making 
process of collective bargaining.
There is a mistaken impression that once a union or 
closed shop is introduced, the nature of union authority 
exercised over its members is altered. Instead of a 
union remaining a voluntary society it becomes instead 
a compulsory one with certain disadvantages for its 
m e m b e r s . ^85) A union exercises structural, specialist or 
moral authority over its members, regardless of the 
proportion of employees recruited in a single workplace.
The real problem of union stability is not the use of 
structural authority, but its relative ineffectiveness. 
Although union members agree to contracturally pay their 
dues and abide by the constitution, few believe that 
their union has the legal right to order them to do or 
desist from doing something. A few unions try to impose 
their structural authority on members, by fining them for 
failing to vote in an election, or not attending a special 
meeting or for taking part in unofficial activities. But 
most unions rely not on their right to command, but on 
their ability to persuade members to conform to rules 
of the institution.
The rank and file of a union obey their governing 
body to strike when they believe it to be right and just. 
Union members disregard a call for strike when they feel 
that their governing body is wrong. Similarly, a group 
of union members may refuse to desist from striking if they 
believe that they are right in their unofficial strike, 
and they believe their governing body wrong in its order 
to return to work. Apart from the interests of the 
group and their sense of injustice, tradition, too, plays 
a part in their behaviour. Although the legal right
(35) See Allen: 'Power in Trade Unions', pp.56-59*
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(structural authority) to call a strike is vested with 
the governing body most of the ranlt and file believe that 
they have the moral right to strike - a sentiment which 
is a hangover of an earlier period of union development.
Every social system must have as one of its pre­
requisites incentives, rewards and punishments which
adequately motivate the members of the social system to
( 37)perform adequately. So far as the great bulk of
union members, who are not aspiring to be part of the 
governing hierachy, the rewards (compared to those gained 
as employees of management) are frequently vague and in­
definite. From time to time union members may expect 
to see some improvement in their wages and working 
conditions : - sometimes, however, only after they have 
foregone some material gain to strike against management.
For this reason striking is hot looked with any great 
eagerness by union members. Yet they respond to the call 
by their governing body to strike because it is a means 
to an end - to rectify an injustice. The members would 
much rather secure a wage increase, a reduction in hours 
or.an improvement in working conditions through effective 
collective bargaining. A union which is able to achieve 
these results through collective bargaining satisfies its 
members' goals much more directly than one that strikes.
The provision of an adequate grievance procedure to handle 
individual members' complaints is also one of the rewards 
which a union offers employees who conform to the rules 
and agreements laid down.
Through punishment a social system prevents its 
members from disrupting its work. Unlike management a 
union has few penalties which it can impose on its members. 
It can impose fines on its members, and even expel a members 
but if management does not then dismiss the person from 
the workplace, the expulsion is unlikely to be successful.
(37) Talcott Parsons, 'The Social System', Tavistock 
Publications, 1952.
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Union members may refuse to work with the expellee, a 
course of action which leads to conflict with management 
The expellee or a member can be sent to Coventry until 
he mends his ways and conforms to the forms of behaviour 
of the workplace. , To achieve this form of punishment 
a union must rely on the behaviour of the informal work 
groups at the workplace as this punishment cannot be 
directly imposed by a union. A union is sometimes,but 
not always, successful in imposing penalties on activists 
in the organisation, for example, by imposing a ban on 
Communist Party members holding effice. Such action is 
only effective if thos penalised are unable to secure 
the leadership of the informal groups in the union. It 
may be concluded that the system, of rewards and punishments 
available to a union are rather weak and Inadequate for 
the purpose of maintaining discipline in the organisation.
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Section h- Informal Groups and Behaviour
A union has an informal as well as a formal structure;
such an informal structure consists of those relationships
which are not explicitly recognised by the formal structure
for advancing the predominant purpose of the u n i o n , (38)
One of the main features of the infoimnL structure is the
informal group of union members. An informal group is
a section of membership not specifically recognised by
the formal union structure, consisting of a number of
persons between whom there is a high degree of interaction,
and whose interests and sentiments are distinguishable
from those of other groups in the u n i o n . ^^ 9) An informal
group persists for a time, it has a structure which
allocates roles to its members including that of leadership,
it prescribes a code of conduct relating to the group's
behaviour, both internally and in relation to other groups,
including that of management and union. Informal
groups' behaviour is highly significant to a union in
times of stress, social disorganisation and disintegration,
as power tends to be transferred from the formal to the
informal leadership. It is the aim of this section to
outline the formation and behaviour of informal groups
within a union.
Informal groups tend to behave divergently from
the aims of the unions to which they belong when their
interests conflict with those of the unions. This takes
place when a union membership lacks common beliefs,
definitions and v a l u e s . I n  such a situation the
cf. 8co11 and others: 'Technical Change and
Industrial Relations', (University of Liverpool),
1956, p.269.
(39) of. Schnieder: loc.cit, p.20,
(ho) Miller and Form, loc, cit. p.27h.
(hi) Schnieder:' loc.cit, p.22.
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stability of the formal structure of a union is seriously
threatened, because informal group goals take precedence
over formal union goals. A union with few common
occupational bonds, such as the general worker unions,
is more likely to be subject to this disruption than a
closely-knit craft union organising a single, well-defined
occupation. Similarly, widely dispersed sections of a
union, with divergent social characteristics, are likely
to give rise to informal groups because of the divergence
of values. On the other hand, sections of union members
may develop common beliefs, definitions and values, as the
result of their employment by a large company such as I.C.I.,
or because their terms of working conditions are fixed by
the same collective bargaining framework.
Informal groups which arise in a union may be of several 
types, namely, friendship cliques, interest or political 
g r o u p s . (^ 3) Communist groups are frequently mentioned 
as being important within the union but this aspect of 
union life is overstressed. At Ardeer by far the most 
important were informal groups who originated from some 
common bond attributable to a feature of the formal 
organisation of work in the management institution. For 
example, informal groups grew about differentiated jobs, 
job rates, seniority, piecework and incentive schemes.
The hillmen distinguished themselves from processmen, the 
processmen were distinct from the runners, and the female 
pieceworkers had their o\m group. These groups werenot 
primary groups, as were described in the Hawthorne 
experiments, but were secondary groups. The men on the 
mechanised unit were a separate entity even though they 
■ had sharply differentiated tasks in the formal structure 
of management, but the group incentive schemes gave them 
a common bond. Even the blasting department as a whole 
was set aside from the rest of the factory because of the
way the informal system operated,
T p 2 T cf. Clegg: 'General Union', Part V.
(m-3) See Sayles:'Behaviour of Industrial Work Groups,
Prediction and Control (Wiley) 1958.
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The purpose of informal groups which arose from work 
was to protect their particular job interests. These 
job interests took two main forms. Firstly, they 
attempted to safeguard their job security by marking out 
demarcation lines, resisting dilution of jobs, challenging 
manning ratios and work loads, and demanding conditions 
to protect themselves against the movements in the demand 
for labour. Secondly, they attempted to maintain or 
improve their status in the workplace, by trying to 
increase their hourly wage rate and improving the conditions 
bf their incentive scheme. Sometimes their behaviour 
was negative in the sense that they protested the actions 
of management, when for example, it proposed to introduce 
a job evaluation scheme to determine job rates or when 
new incentive rates were introduced for altered jobs.
Their behaviour was controlled by the formal organisation, 
when they demanded increased job rates through the 
lodging of a claim in accordance to the negotiating procedure, 
or when the went to a union meeting and tried to improve 
their position vis-a-vis to other groups by constitutional 
means.
The informal groups at Ardeer tended to confine 
their activities to the workplace. Only in special 
circumstances did an informal group apply pressure in the 
T . & G,¥,U. branch, and this was usually due to action 
taken by union officials. For example, when a spontaneous 
stoppage occurred at the workplace the local official 
(in the post-war period) called a special meeting of that 
section of members to which the Informal group belonged.
Thus, he brought the informal group behaviour within the 
framework of the formal union structure. Those groups 
which did not honour the obligations laid do-vm in the 
union-management agreements then became subject to formal 
union pressure, and they in turn exercised a function of 
pressing their claims within the formal union structure.
It was through this mechanism that the authority of the 
T. & G.W.Ü. was re-imposed.
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This was seen very clearly in the case of the 
second ’go-slow’ towards the end of 1954 amongst the 
men on the old side of the blasting department. The 
’go-slow’ was designed to bring pressure both on union 
and management to repair the deterioration of their 
status due to increased job rates conceded to the group 
on the mechanised unit. Subsequently, a strong majority 
of workers at the meeting called by the union refused to 
return to work at normal pace. Later, the men at another 
meeting called by the union were persuaded to return to 
work. Still later, the final proposals for the settlement 
of the dispute about job rates, including the acceptance 
of the principle of job evaluation, were submitted to a 
formal meeting of the branch and accepted without a murmur 
of discontent by the informal group. The authority of 
the branch was completely re-imposed.
The Importance of the negotiating procedure was to be 
seen in relation to the conduct of the informal groups. 
Before 1947 an informal group had to express itself as in 
an overt act to secure recognition of their complaint or 
claim; or they were forced to attend the branch meetings 
to act as a pressure group to push few of their demands 
in a constitutional manner. This latter course of action 
was used to some extent, but not by all informal groups - 
particularly those in the blasting department. These 
groups overtly expressed their dissatisfaction with their 
treatment. Moreover, such actions by-passed the local 
officialCwho did not adequately discharge the bargaining 
function) and allowed the Communist chairman of the branch 
to step outside his formal role into one which supported 
informal group activity (for which breach of union 
discipline he was subsequently removed from his position). 
After 1947 the negotiating procedure provided a constitution­
al means for handling more readily informal group demands 
within the formal system of authority jointly laid down by
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union and management, and at the same time avoided taking 
overt action to do so. The negotiating procedure had a 
beneficial effect on the behaviour of the Informal groups.
The recognition of shop stewards and their role in 
processing employee grievances was also very important.
The shop stewards became the formal leaders of the union 
in the workplace, and as they had the exclusive right to 
approach management on behalf of their groups, they were in 
an advantageous position to take over the leadership of 
the informal group as well. In the case of the piece­
workers, the shop stewards broke the hold of the oligarchy 
which had developed as the leadership of the ’girls'. This 
informal leadership had been selected on the basis of 
seniority and ability to work quickly. Management had 
frequently met the leaders of the oligarchy in 'negotiations’ 
and this had stabilised their position of power* Once 
the negotiating procedure came into effect the pieceworkers 
became subject to the authority of the shop stewards as 
representatives of union authority. Although one 
important stoppage took place in 1950 after a sharp drop 
in morale due to an explosion, disorder, which had 
characterised the section in the periods before the war, 
was generally absent in the post-war period. It was quite 
possible that persons other than the shop stewards were 
the real informal leaders, but from the course of events 
it was reasonable to conclude that the shop stewards were 
never very far away from the locus of power of the 
informal group.(
Another important example of informal group behaviour
which occurred at Ardeer in the post-war period was the
reaction of the groups towards the proposal to introduce
incentive schemes. These schemes were usually proposed
T44) "Por an interesting method of indentifying the informal 
leader, see Paterson: ’Morale in War and Work’
(Parrish), p.131.
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to the shop stewards, and although management was well 
within its rights in terms of the negotiating procedure 
to act that way, it stimulated informal group activity.
Most of the decisions which rejected incentive schemes 
were reached at meetings held within the workplace where 
the informal groups maintained the greatest power. The 
groups were anxious to protect the security of their 
jobs and fears of redundancy clearly dominated their 
behaviour. These groups only changed their minds on the 
intervention of their formal leaders, and when these 
leaders went through the motions of bargaining to make 
the schemes more acceptable to the informal groups. The 
behaviour of the informal groups became subject to control 
by the formal union leadership, and this was accomplished 
by the process of collective bargaining.
Unfortunately, the events described in the previous 
paragraph did not take place with every informal group. 
Several groups refused to accept incentives despite the 
general approval of their union officials, and the right 
of management to install incentive schemes in the workplace. 
In this situation there appeared to be a primae facie 
case of breakdovm. in union authority. In many ways this 
behaviour was similar to that of an unofficial strike for 
a group refused to honour the terms of an agreement. The 
similarity was real when a union exercised its bargaining 
function, and there was a genuine improvement in the 
incentive rates and reduction of the number of personnel 
to be displaced. Another case was also to be distinguished. 
When a governing body of a union failed to discharge its 
bargaining function, with the result that the informal 
group had to look after their own interests, there was 
social disorganisation through the frustration of the 
bargaining function. The disorderly conduct of the 
pieceworkers, prior to the post-war period, was an 
illustration of the dangers of not subjecting payments 
by results to the strict control of collective bargaining..
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In the main the T. & G.W.U. discharged its 
"bargaining function effectively at Ardeer. All but one 
group, those working on the old side of the blasting 
department, ultimately accepted incentive schemes. The 
reason for this change in behaviour was due in part to 
the existence of rules , themselves subject to collective 
bargaining, which protected the security of the groups* 
jobs. The failure of the formal leadership to persuade 
the men on the old section the blasting department to 
accept an incentive scheme had disastrous consequences for 
the union and management. Social disorganisation and 
breakdown in union authority occurred because two sections 
of the T. & G.W.U. membership were working under different 
working conditions and this led to inter-group rivalry and 
argument over status. Collective bargaining failed to 
solve both the short and the long term problems caused 
by this situation, and as a consequence the predominance 
of informal grouu pressure remained.
A situation described above differed a good deal from 
the state of social relations existing in a number of 
craft unions. These union^, which had strongly opposed 
incentives for many years, had been forced to change their 
policy because informal groups had accepted Incentives 
without permission of their governing bodies. Union 
authority had broken down, and to repair it the governing 
bodies delegated authority to their district or local 
committees (or gangs in the case of the joiners) to decide 
whether incentives were to be accepted or rejected. In 
this way they avoided the problem of expelling those 
informal groups who had defied union authority when they 
accepted incentives. While this seemed to be a sensible 
solution two problems immediately arose. Firstly, informal 
groups acquired a great deal of power from such devolution 
of authority, which detracted from the authority of the 
governing body. Secondly, informal group behaviour became 
exaggerated when various sections of union membership worked
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under fundamental different conditions, thus destroying 
common ideals and making the task of future collective 
bargaining extremely difficult. Indeed, this was one 
of the reasons for the ppposition of some unions 
incentives.
A number of important points in regard to informal 
group behaviour should be noted. Firstly, the stimulus 
for group behaviour usually came from a desire of 
management to change the terms of reference by introducing 
:an incentive scheme, by trying to change the incentive 
rate, by using job evaluation to determine job rates, and 
by changing work practices and loads. Secondly, group 
reaction was possible because the new conditions of work 
required adaptive behaviour on the part of the work group, 
for example, to work harder due to the introduction of 
an incentive scheme. When an agreement was discharged 
by management alone no adaptive behaviour was required.
For this reason time rates of pay were usually accepted 
without p r o t e s t , s o  long as employees offered 
themselves for work they received their rights under 
the agreement. Thirdly, when an informal group 
protested about some change by taking overt action, it was 
not usually associated with a union-management agreement, 
for example, there was no immediate connection in the 
minds of the men on the mechanised unit between the 
events following the explosion and the clauses set out 
in the negotiating procedure. Thus, a union had little 
to do with the usual circumstances which led to strong 
informal group reaction, vet it had the responsibility 
to bring the informal group behaviour under control.
(45) cf. The Dock Worker. see next section.
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Section 5 Examples of Unofficial stoppages
The mere existence of Informal groups and competing 
personalities does not necessarily imply that social 
disorganisation is bound to occur, nor is this necessarily 
followed by a breakdown in union authority, whereby 
members refuse to obey the commands of governing bodies.
The aim of this section is to examine the circumstances 
of the breakdown in union authority, with reference to 
Ardeer and to comparative research, particularly The Dock 
Worker.
The most spectacular breakdown of union authority 
occurs when members strike without proper authorisation
(46)
of thir governing body. Usually, an ’unofficial* strike 
involves the dishonouring of an agreement reached by 
union-management negotiations. In most situations it is 
the agreement relative to the negotiating procedure which 
is dishonoured; members do not follow the prescribed 
procedure for filing and discussing their grievance. Some 
unofficial strikes do not ’get on* to the procedure, some 
'fall off* while the negotiating procedure is being used-, 
and some occur after the steps of the procedure have been 
complied with. In this last situation the governing body 
of a union may withhold official sanction fcr its membets 
to strike, even though no dishonouring of a union-management 
agreement need take place.
Some strikes occur spontaneously, in that they take 
place so quickly that there is no time for the local 
union official to intervene. Such stoppages are the 
result of a sharp fall in morale of the employees; 
triggering of the strike is usually due to outbursts of 
fear or anger - such as occurred on the mechanised unit 
in 1954, It is almost an invariable rule that a ’go-slow* 
or strike is set off by some managerial act which the
employees strongly resent. No formal decision is
(46) See Knowles: 'Strikes: a Study in Industrial 
Conflict* (Oxford), 1952, for the various types of 
overt conflict*
(47) Sometimes these stoppages were later made official by
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usually taken to stop work, the groups just walk off the 
jobs.
Frequently, it is impossible for a union official
to preduct when a spontaneous stoppage will take place.
However, any sensitive union official Imows when there
is discontent in the plant. What role does a union
official play with respect to action or contemplated
action on the part of the informal group? In the first
place he cannot openly support an attempt by the informal
group to dishonour a union-management agreement, otherwise
he may be disciplined by his superiors He is obliged
to support the honouring of.agreements. Yet he may
privately agree with the grievance of his members* His
subsequent actions depend on his assessment of management's
behaviour. Does management know that there is discontent
amongst its employees? If a union official believes it
does not, can he successfully convey this information to
management? Even if management knows that there is
discontent in the plant, will it do anything tangible to
remove it? If a union official believes that he can
communicate the fact that there is discontent in the plant,
and he believes that management will concecb something to
rectify the grievance, he will counsel the Informal group
against taking overt action. If he believes that
management will not listen to him, he may allow the informal
groups to take action which will bring pressure on the 
(49)management. In such a situation the breakdown in
union authority is mild, because there is no real shift in 
power from the formal to the informal leadership. Even so 
collective bargaining is ineffective, until negotiation 
leads to some rectification of the grievance.
(48) See Allen: 'Trade Union Leadership', p.l69 for 
actions of his superiors.
(49) See Clegg; 'Labor Relations in London Transport*,
p . m .
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Unfortunately, for a union official he never really 
knows the answers to these questions. The power, in the 
sense that he can secureobedience from his workers, that 
the union official exercises oirer the informal group 
depends a great deal on the actions of management. If 
management provokes the situation in any way the power 
may shift drastically to the leadership of the informal 
group, who may then challenge the formal leadership,^
Although a management may honestly believe that a strike 
may clear the air, and have a therapeutic effect on the 
social relations in the factory, in the final analysis 
management is encouraging industrial anarchy if it does 
not take positive steps to remove discontent amongst its 
employees. Moreover, a management can hide with propriety 
behind the provisions of the negotiating procedure, and 
parade as a paragon of virtue within its rights as laid 
dovm by the procedure. It can apply pressure to a local 
official's superiors who will usually not endorse the actions 
of the informal group. The governing body may even take
(51)action against a local union official and discipline him.
To a local union official an unofficial strike may be a 
hazardous business, which may lead to loss of prestige 
and position.
Sometimes a group of employees stops work when it feels 
that the negotiating procedure has already been used* For 
instance, the men on the old side of the blasting department 
at Ardeer refused to work until the trial Incentive scheme 
was withdrawn; the men felt that there was a breach of 
faith on the part of management (connived to some extent 
by the local official who wanted to see the scheme adopted) 
as the scheme was not withdrawn on the date previously 
agreed by negotiation. Again, there was no drastic shift 
in power from the official to the unofficial leadership.
(50) See Gouldner: 'The Wild Cat Strike*, Routledge, Kegan
Paul, 1955.
(5D See Clegg: 'General Union', p.124.
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R worse example occurred in 1950 when the hillmen's claim 
for Increased differentials was refused after all steps 
in the negotiating procedure were exhausted. (The 
governing body of the T. & G.W.U, refused to sanction 
an appeal to arbitration). There was no doubt that the 
hillmen*s discontent was an important element in the strike 
of the department which took place at about the same time.
In this case collective bargaining was ineffective for it 
failed to take a realistic view of the hillmen*s claim.
The strike in 1950 was triggered by a rapid change in 
working conditions which led to a sharp drop in morale*
The most serious breakdown in union authority which 
occurred at Ardeer, was the ’go-slow* and subsequent sus­
pension of the men on the old side because they were not 
given equal treatment by unionèmanagement negotiations. 
Underlying this breakdown in union authority was a long 
term discontent over the disparity of earnings between the 
two sides of the department, a problem which collective 
bargaining had failed to solve. For some time power 
shifted to the informal group, but no real political 
challenge was made to the leadership of the local union 
official. Pressure was put on this official by his 
superiors to resolve the issue, but for a time the union 
was unable to persuade the men to return to work at the 
normal pace. Management assisted the process of readjust­
ment by resuming negotiations even though the men were 
still technically dishonouring a union-management agreement* 
To save ’the face* of the men, who had thrown idle a large 
number of employees just before Christmas and New Year, 
management and union went through the motions of negotiating 
over the work load, which had not been met because of the 
’go-slow*. Management did everything to start negotiations 
so that an ultimate solution to the dispute could be ■ 
found.
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The unofficial stoppages amongst members of the 
T. &, G.W.U. at Ardeer contrasted remarkably with those 
amongst members of the same union at the Manchester 
Docks.(5^) In 1951 a. short unofficial stoppage was 
followed by a much more devasting strike, lasting sixe 
weeks. The first strike was the result of disappointment 
over a new agreement which fell short of the expectations 
of the dockers - expectations which were borne too high 
by both the formal and the informal group. The second 
strike was triggered by management’s enforcement of a 
new provision in an agreement to work compulsory overtime, 
without adequate coramunication by management, followed 
by an inequitable (as the men said it) suspension by the 
local manager of the Dock Labour Board of two dockers for 
refusing duty. The dockers elected an unofficial committee 
to represent them 'in their fight against shipowners, the 
Ship Ganal Company, the Dock Labour Board which was 
supporting the shipowners, and the trade union (T. & G.W.U.) 
which was agraid of them all.(^3)
Once the strikes were triggered power shifted rapidly 
and drastically from the formal to the informal groups.
This was partly due to the seeming incompetence of the 
formal leaders. For example, they lost control of the 
communication system by cancelling the officml meeting of 
the union because the members were engaged in an unofficial 
strike. (By contrast at Ardeer, the local official called 
meetings of those engaged in unofficial activities)• The 
control of the communication network, so important during 
a strike, passed to the informal group. One key union 
official had conflicting roles, as he was also intimately 
associated as chairman of the local Dock Labour Board with 
the disciplinary body of the Port of Manchester. His 
TFz) The Dock Worker. Appendix I.
(53) Ibid: p.242.
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moral authority was thus reduced. As his prestige 
was reduce the informal leaders' prestige was greatly 
enhanced. Arrest of dockers (not in Manchester) in the 
first strike consolidated rank and rile opinion behind 
the informal group, while attacks on their behaviour 
by press, government, management and their oim union, 
greatly strengthened the informal group. The second 
strike dragged on because neither union, management nor 
the dock authority did anything to settle the dispute.
They had no definable aims, except to discredit and 
eliminate themWzmal leadership. (At Ardeer collective 
bargaining was used to bring the informal group under 
control). The dual system of management of the docks, 
with the Manchester Ship Ganal Company and the local dock 
labour board led to a tripartite- system which was an 
unsuitable framework for collective bargaining.
Social disorganisation, followed by a breakdown in
union authority, gave way in some instances to social
disintegration, when several informal groups left the
union to form breakway unions or join other unions. The
most famous of these was the defection of some London
(54)
busmen and the Glasgow dockers in the period before the 
war, and various groups of dockers to the National Amal­
gamated Stevedores and Dockers towards the end of the
( 55)period covered by the Ardeer study (195^0- Clearly,
some groups within the T &, G.W.U. did not feel that the 
union was serving their interests.
(54) See Glegg: ’Labor Relations in London Transport’, 
loc.cit., p.128,
(55) See Allen: ’Trade Union Leadership’ pp.59, 72, 206.
(56) See also Clegg: loc.cit, pp.103-112, cf. the 
conelusions, pp.136-138.
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Section 6 Interpretation of the Empirical data
Why did power shift rapdly and drastically from the
formal to the Informal leadership in the case of the
Manchester Docks, while at Ardeer it remained close to the
formal leadership at times of unofficial strike? According
to the account given by The Dock Worker the breakdown in
u^ion authority was the result of incompetent leadership
(both in the failure of personalities to cope with their
roles and to conflicting roles in the case of one key
official), ineffective communication (especially in
reporting back), and to an apathetic, if not distrustful
membership (due apparently to a failure of the union to
fulfil their groups’ goals). In the most general terms
The Dock Worker asserted that the real trouble lay with
( 57)the rapid growth and sheer bulk of the union. If this
conclusion was correct then other sections, including 
that of Ardeer and elsewhere, would have been subject to 
severe disorganisation and breakdown in union authority.
The facts did not support such a contention.
Did the answer lie in the difference in structure of 
the two local organisations? In the post-war period 
the Ardèer local organisation had mahy features which 
favoured its effective p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e s e  included 
extension of union organisation into the work place, 
grievance handling by shop stewards, integration of shop 
stewards into the branch committee (special officers 
handled the dockers’ grievances), rank and file represent­
ation at union-management conferences (the dockers had a 
permanent negotiating committee), a full time official to
(57) See pp.218 and 221.
(58) Cf. some of these with Roberts: ’Trade Union
Government and Admlnis 
(Bell). 1956, Chap.XXI.
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handle affairs at Ardeer and an industrial type of branch 
which only included members employed at Ardeer (these last
I
two features were also present at Manchester). In 
addition, the branch had direct representation on the 
T. & G.W.U.'s regional and national chemical committees, 
when these were established. Due to the fact that the 
branch dealt with only one employer the goals of the local 
organisation were easily determinable (this was also the 
case at Manchester) and there was sufficient autonomy 
within I.e.I. collective bargaining frameworks to give the 
local union an active role in collective bargaining (the 
Manchester dockers probably had less control over their 
affairs). Whether these differences in T. & G.W.U. 
organisation between Ardeer and the Manchester Docks were 
sufficient to explain their respective functioning was open 
to doubt.
Nevertheless at Ardeer there were few organisational 
weaknesses,and the strains in the way the local organisation 
operated were correspondingly less. Grievances were 
initially handled by the shop stewards. If necessary, 
meetings of the groups were held at departmental level, 
particularly when a contentious issue was at stake. The 
departmental groups were responsible for electing their 
representatives to the negotiating team when disputes 
were referred to local conference. These representatives 
reported back to the departmental groups who then voted 
to reject or accept the recommendations of the local 
conference. The planning antivity of the local organis­
ation was performed by the branch committee. The plenary 
branch meeting was poorly attended (indeed, less than one 
percent of members usually attended the monthly branch 
meeting), despite the efforts of full and part-time 
officials to persuade them to come. The plenary branch 
meeting functioned as * a court of appeal’ where a member, 
dissatisfied with his treatment by shop steward, committee 
or full-time official, brought his grievance to the
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governing authority under the union constitution for 
local union affairs. The branch reserved certain 
rights for its determination, such as members who wished 
to refuse promotion under the turn-list system. In most 
matters, however, the plenary meeting was little more 
than a rubber stamp for the work of its committee and union 
official. The full-time official was in the post-war 
period a personality who coped adequately with his role 
of co-ordinator of the local organisation. He was held in 
high regard by both his members and the management of the 
factory. All told the local union organisation operated 
in such a way that it functioned effectively by achieving 
its purpose*
The way the local T. & G.W.U. organisation functioned 
in the post-war period contrasted sharply with its 
performance in the period before 1948* Before and during 
the war the local union organisation was subjectcio strong 
informal group pressure especially amongst the pieceworkers, 
but also amongst other sections. The T. <&, G.W.U.*s 
authority amop^t Ardeer employees was weak, very much 
weaker than it was amongst the Manchester dockers who were 
strongly organised. The Ardeer branch had no workshop 
organisation as shop stewards were not recognised. Its 
officials were ill-disciplined; a left clique, including 
at least one Communist, disrupted the work of the branch, 
the full-time official at the time was incompetent and did 
not respond to the wishes of his members, and even its 
delegates to other bodies did not always vote in accordance 
with the instructions issued by the branch or union. Its 
function of bargaining with the Ardeer management appeared 
limited both in terras of subject matter discussed and in 
the number of conferences held. In short, the local 
union organisation was not achieving its purpose of 
participating with management in formulating laws to 
govern its members’ employment at Ardeer.
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This picture added up to social disorganisation, 
which was due to strains appearing in the formal structure 
of the union. As it was seen in a section of this 
chapter these strains came about through fundamental 
weaknesses in the formal union structure - a weak and 
diffused authoritarian structure, a blurred chain of 
command, an indefinite status system, inadequate rewards 
and punishments, little division of labour leading to 
conflicting roles amongst union officials, a non-active, 
apathetic membership, and a conglomeration of different 
occupational interests which assisted the formation of 
informal groups. In short, the prerequisites for the 
orderly functioning of a social system tended to be weak 
leading to vulnerability in the functioning of the union 
structure. There was some tendency by the left to 
glorify the positical and possibly'the strike functions, 
and the bargaining function sometimes remained undischarged 
by the conservative, incompetent official.
Why then did the local T. & G.W.U. organisation at 
Ardeer change from being ineffective to being effective?
Was it due to spontaneous factors arising within the union, 
or was it due to some external force? From the evidence 
assembled by the case study, 194? stood out as the year 
that earmarked the changed. In that year the I.C.I. 
negotiating procedure came into existence. That 
procedure greatly strengthened the authority of the union 
with respect to handling grievances, by extending the union 
organisation into the workshop, and by establishing a 
machinery for holding union-management conferences. A
( 59)
formal re-organisation of the local T. & G.W.U. followed;
f59) Note also the adjustment to Union structure following 
the signing of the I.C.I. agreements in 1936-1938 and 
the emergence of the Signatory Unions as a new 
confederation as a direct result of I.C.I.*s 
Innovating policy.
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shop stewards were appointed, the branch committee was 
re-constituted to include shop stewards, and negotiating 
teams were appointed from amongst the branch officials, 
shop stewards and representatives from thé rank and file. 
The removal of the incompetent and conservative official 
followed in 1948. Though the left-wing (Communist) 
part-time official was removed in 1947, the effectiveness 
of this action was conditional on the elimination of other 
anarchical elements in the workplace, in particular on 
the settlement of employee grievances in an orderly 
fashion. Union membership was extended in the turbulent 
blasting department, and the oligarchy's hold over the 
female pieceworkers was broken. Many of the shop stewards 
became both the formal(and ’democratic’) and the informal 
leaders of the various work and union groups within the 
factory. At the same time the rights and obligations of 
the shop stewards were clearly set out, and their conduct 
was controlled by agreement. Thus the formal union 
structure was strengthened by the advent of the I.C.I. 
negotiating procedure.
By far the most important consequence :'of the I.C.I. 
negotiating procedure was the explicit recognition of the 
local branch’s function to negotiate with the factory 
management. The number of union-management conferences 
rose, for the first time all job rates in the factory were 
subject to negotiation by the union when the job evaluation 
scheme was introduced in 1948-1950, Prior to this, job 
rates were adjusted on an ad hoc basis. New Incentive 
schemes were subject to negotiation, and union-management 
conferences dealt with many piecework problems. The 
rules covering promotion and demotion were codified for. 
the first time by union-management negotiations. No 
limitations were placed on the right of employees and union
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to raise any matter over which they disagreed with 
management, and this permitted the union to negotiate 
over many of the technical aspects of incentive schemes 
and work loads. Thus, the local union fulfilled its 
fundamental purpose of participating in the formulation 
of rights and obligations to govern its members* employment 
at Ardeer factory.
Moreover, these negotiations had a direct affect on 
the behaviour of the informal groups. For example, the 
job evaluation scheme prevented anomalies and inequities 
growing around job rates. Informal groups had less 
chance of exerting pressure on management and union than 
they had when job rates were adjusted haphazardly. The 
estàblishnmtof rules to govern the behaviour of shop 
stewards and the method of processing grievances led 
directly, to the dampening of informal group behaviour.
The codification of rules to cover job security satisfied 
one of the most important goals of the infonmL groups.
When negotiations were successful in resolving the many 
problems that arose over the introduction and the maintenance 
of incentive and piecework schemes the area for informal 
group behaviour was drastically reduced. Only when 
negotiations failed, and there was a situation that 
required considerable adaptive behaviour on the part of 
the informal groups, did it succeed in breaking down union 
authority. The presence of rules mutually agreed to cover 
the employment Conditions of employees at Ardeer protected 
the T, & G.W.U. from drastic shifts of power from the 
formal to the informal leadership.
At the Manchester docks the authority of the T. & G.W.U. 
broke down because of ineffective collective bargaining.
A lot of the trouble seemed to lie in the framework for 
collective bargaining; the management’s functions conflicted 
with aid were confused by those of the dock labour board, that 
management did not have full control over its personnel 
function. This contrasted with Ardeer where the collective
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bargaining framework was simple, and relied to a great 
extent on local negotiations in a single workplace. This 
identified the interests of union members more closely with 
those, of management.. Much more important was the general 
attitude of I.G.I. management, that it was responsible for 
formulating and administering personnel practices along 
sound rational lines with regard for the morality of 
purpose of human conduct. In the final analysis, it was 
this sound management, which also typified I.C.I.‘s progress 
in commercial and te clinical fields, that was ultimately 
responsible for allowing collective bargaining, and hence 
the union, to function effectively. For the union relied 
upon I.C.I. management to allow it to bargain, thus 
permitting it to participate in the establishment of law 
and order in industry.
Putting t|ie contentions more positively, the real 
determining factor which allowed the Ardeer branch to 
function effectively and achieve its purpose was the 
general union-management relationship. Ardeer management 
’co-operated' with the T. & G.W.U. to establish an approp­
riate system of ’factory law’ for governing the employment 
of general workers. Before the post-war period the union 
tended to function as a protest group, which sought to 
modify the arbitrary actions of managerial officials. In 
the post-war, period, due to the development of I.C.I. 
personnel policies to a sophisticated stage, the union 
functioned as a ’law-making* and ’law-enforcing’ institution* 
The loop-holes to industrial anarchy were gradually closed 
by effective collective bargaining. The breakdowns in 
union authority were not accompanied by sharp shifts of 
power from the formal to the informa^ group, as the Ardeer 
management helped the restoration of law and order in the 
factory by setting in motion the process of collective 
bargaining. In other parts of British industry managements 
refused to eliminate anarchy by bargaining with the trade 
unions, hence frustrated their purpose, leaving the way open
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Conclusion
A trade union may be described as an institution 
which has as its purpose the participation with another 
Institution, management, in formulating laws to govern 
the rights and obligations of its members in relation 
to their employment by the second institution. Its 
primary function to achieve its purpose is that of 
bargaining, that is negotiating and reaching agreement 
with management over the rights and obligations of the 
letter’s employees. A union’s function, and hence its 
purpose, is frustrated when a management refuses to 
allow it to participate in the formulation of laws 
governing the employment of its members. The informal 
groups which arise from the organisation of work are 
then left to fend for themselves and spontaneous stoppages 
are possible. Workplaces characterised by anarchy and 
disorderly conduct for many years continue to give union 
and management trouble through informal group activity, 
even though management allows the union to participate 
in the formulation of employment laws, Informal group 
behaviour is gradually brought under control by the 
establishment of appropriate laws; it soon becomes 
disorderly when collective bargaining fails.
In addition to its function of formulating laws to 
govern employees' behaviour, it has a law-enforcement 
function as well; that function consists of seeing that 
the terms of agreement are discharged. It once becomes 
apparent that a union is far less competent to carry out 
the latter function than the former. Firstly, often it 
is unable to recruit all employees as its members; 
consequently, it is unable to exercise discipline over 
some employees. Secondly, the formal structure of the 
union is such that is weak in its authoritarian, status and 
motivational systems which prevent it exercising strong 
disciplinary controls over its members. Thirdly, the
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groups of members who disobey the orders of their 
governing body have their common bond at the workplace, 
and a union may not be able to bring their behaviour 
under control. Fourthly, the triggering of a spontaneous 
stoppage is usually the fault of management, and not that 
of a union; the long term disaffection may be due to the 
general ineffectiveness of collective bargaining, and for 
this management must also accept its share of the blame.
Thus, a union which faces ill-discipline amongst its 
members is the victim of bad management.
This does not rule out the possibility of internal 
factors arising in a union which leads to disorganisation. 
The failure of union officials to cope with their roles, 
(particularly the one relating to bargaining) the conflict 
of roles for union officials, the clash of functions, the 
imposition of less important functions on the primary 
function of the union, are all responsible for disorganis­
ation and breakdown in union authority. The evidence of 
the Ardeer case strongly suggests, however, that trade union 
behaviour in the ultimate is determined by management 
behaviour, and the very maladjustments and weaknesses, 
just mentioned, are to be corrected by positive management 
behaviour through collective bargaining. Thus, where 
a management co-operates with a union in establishing law 
and order in the workplace there is little likelihood of 
union authority breaking down. In short, a union realises 
its purpose when its bargaining function establishes 
equitable rights and obligations for its members, this 
is achieved through effective collective bargaining, and 
the latter is possible only with the consent of management 
and its desire to regulate its conduct by respecting the 
moral law - the law of obligation.
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